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Abstract 
This dissertation provides an in-depth research about the intragroup corporate governance manage-
ment of automotive financial services subsidiaries. In the following, I will identify the relevant influenc-
ing determinates in automotive multinational groups and investigate the relevant corporate govern-
ance mechanisms, key topics and appropriate intragroup management instruments to increase trans-
parency, intra-organizational alignment and governance conformity. This dissertation applies the Del-
phi method, which so far received only little attention within this field of research, to develop a com-
prehensive intragroup corporate governance management model that considers both the theoretical 
and practical experiences to overcome the current research deficits. I will call for a much needed, but 
so far solely limitedly applied, broad understanding of corporate governance that needs to be supple-
mented with a situational perspective to be effective. This dissertation provides insights about the in-
tragroup corporate governance management in regard to growing legal and regulatory pressures and 
greater public awareness for subsidiary governance around the globe. I will demonstrate that a mixed 
‘glocal’ management approach with a combination of centrally and decentrally managed components 
as well as cultural, administrative, outsourcing, planning and cybernetic management instruments, fits 
best to handle the heterogeneous, multifaceted subsidiary landscape in an ever-changing and increas-
ingly competitive business environment with varying legal and regulatory frameworks in the respective 
host countries. This dissertation clarifies the roles and responsibilities of the parent, the subsidiaries, 
their involved top and middle managers as well as other involved stakeholders. Furthermore, it identi-
fies relevant criteria for the selection of appropriate instruments to secure an effective and efficient 
intragroup corporate governance management and demonstrates in which way it creates value for the 
multinational group as a whole. The introduced intragroup governance management model integrates 
for the first time a comprehensive overview of all relevant intragroup corporate governance topics from 
a risk based approach in one holistic model and consists out of three parts: (1) management instru-
ments, (2) focus topics and (3) the measurement of their governance maturity to identify governance 
deficits and variances to prioritize and define appropriate management measures. In addition, the 
qualitative nature of this research project helps to identify progressive success factors and challenges 
of the intragroup corporate governance. This dissertation provides a crucial contribution for the better 
understanding of the intragroup governance phenomenon within this comparatively new subfield of 
cross-functional corporate governance research. The matter of financial services subsidiary govern-
ance is a global topic with profound implications in many directions. This dissertation helps to shape 
the dialogue among scholars of different disciplines and provides new ideas on how multinational 
groups can better serve the needs of their societies. The gained results not only contribute to the dis-
cussion of what constitutes good subsidiary governance but also provides a foundation for upcoming 
discussions among academics, practitioners, regulators and supervisors. 
Key words: Corporate governance management, general management, supervision, corporate gov-
ernance instruments, intragroup governance implementation, group governance, corporate govern-
ance evaluation, OEM, financial services subsidiaries, legal and regulatory requirements, banking 
regulation, multinational companies, automotive industry.  
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reputation. It is the personal life insurance of each top  
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Research gap and research question 
Since the financial crisis, prominent company scandals on board level and conflicts of interests in 
many ways resulted in an identity crisis of corporate governance.1 What formerly was a topic of inter-
est for selected corporate governance academics now has resulted in an ongoing, much discussed 
issue with great interest among the public, scholars and management practitioners alike.  
Retrospectively, four causes are responsible for the loss of the public confidence in the economy in 
general and in the top managers on management and supervisory board level in particular.2 The re-
cent corporate governance crisis started with the Dot.com bubble, which was a result of irrational exu-
berance in excessive stock market speculations. Even if there is no doubt today, that the World Wide 
Web is a crucial tool for companies to build their businesses and match products and services, in its 
beginnings 15 years ago, it was not the revolutionary new business model that many had expected. At 
the same time, there had been numerous popular examples for bad corporate governance practices in 
Europe as well as in the USA, which made a significant contribution towards the financial crisis and 
the rapid loss of the population´s confidence in their business leaders and the economic system in 
general. In addition, this time was shaped by prominent examples of company failures because of 
strategic misjudgments (e.g. Swissair, Nokia, AOL). Institutional supervisory bodies (e.g. supervisory 
board / board of directors) had taken too risky strategic decisions placed by the top management as a 
consequence of e.g. missing management audits and the lack of professional risk management re-
views on board level. Furthermore, driven by the analysis of miss-management studies, Hilb (2016, p. 
4) highlights that there had often been a missing integrity of top managers and auditors, whose partic-
ipation in overly risky decisions was additionally encouraged from misguiding incentive schemes (e.g. 
stock option programs). 
 
Even if most of the recent corporate governance research refers to a specific theory, the mentioned 
incidents and company failures indicate that their argumentations fall short and have only limited value 
to explain the undesirable developments within the imperfect world due to their often one-dimensional 
view (cf. Hilb, 2016). For example, the often-cited Agency Theory is insufficient, because it assumes 
that earnings and share prices cannot be manipulated (Brecht et al., 2002, p. 47) and builds primarily 
on extrinsic motivational factors (Frey, 2011, p. 4) and ignores other possible influencing variables, 
such as e.g. intrinsic motivational factors. Furthermore, it concentrates solely on the top management 
and the shareholders while ignoring the vested interests of employees, customers or other relevant 
stakeholder groups (e.g. public, environment) and in addition cannot explain any country variances (cf. 
 
1 According to Hilb (2016, p. 3 f.) stated David Tweedie, Chairman of the International Accounting Standards 
Board in 2013: “Executive boards failed, non-executives were kept in the dark, audit committees failed, auditors 
fell asleep at the wheel, or let problems go, credit rating agents did none too well, analysts missed it, the SEC 
failed to regulate, and the investment banks and lawyers (and consultants) were part of the problem, helping 
companies with their questionable deals . . . It wasn’t just one little piece gone wrong. The whole system was 
collapsing.”  
2 Cf. Taylor (2003); Hilb (2016, p. 3): The four main reasons for the corporate governance crisis are: (1) on a 
technological level: Dot.com bubble; (2) on an economic level: the financial crisis and “bad governance” scandals 
(3) on a risk awareness level: high-risk corporate strategies; (4) on a social level: Missing integrity of many top 
executives. 
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Aguilera & Jackson, 2003). Thus, the monitoring role of the supervisory body has to be modified and 
the need of a rather comprehensive approach fulfilled, while corporate governance research has to 
take into account further supplementing and crucial roles of the institutional supervisory bodies. The 
Resource Dependency Theory is another example of an insufficient explanation by arguing that 
board members have a crucial coaching and advisory function for the CEO. I argue that under some 
circumstances board members and the CEO may need to maintain a clear distance from each other to 
secure an effective and independent supervision with a clear separation of tasks, roles and responsi-
bilities (Daily et al., 2003, p. 376). Further, while the Stewardship Theory argues, that the strategic 
decision making of the top management can be improved if the supervisory body supports the holistic 
and comprehensive view on the company, the Institutional Theory explains corporate governance to 
a large extent in the context of multiple social and cultural institutional factors alone and ignores other 
influencing determinates. In sum, all the above mentioned existing theories explain corporate govern-
ance solely from a single perspective. To overcome the recent corporate governance crisis however, it 
is of utmost importance to no longer apply this narrow understanding in future research and connect 
the multiple perspectives in an integrated, universal corporate governance approach as Hung (1998), 
Htay et al. (2013) or Hilb (2016) suggested to take into account the various direct and indirect interde-
pendencies. Nevertheless, such a comprehensive and integrated perspective, that takes into account 
relevant internal and external determinates (e.g. legal, regulatory, cultural, leadership or organizational 
issues) by applying multi criteria approaches and greater stakeholder consideration, is still missing 
among most management scholars and will be a matter of debate in this dissertation (cf. Haller, 2017, 
p. 37; Melé, 2012, p. 50). 
 
Much of the already existing corporate governance research focuses on the decision-making by 
institutional management bodies, chief executives or other senior staff, while the most recent discus-
sion provides substantial results regarding the incentive alignments, corporate culture, risk taking and 
coordination challenges within firms (cf. Tihanyi et al., 2014; Goergen & Tonks, 2019).3 Considering 
that, there is an emerging interest regarding the managerial roles, organizational contexts, and internal 
and external social processes companies need to manage. Particularly Tihanyi et al. (2014) outline the 
necessity for management scholars to rethink their approach for governance research and put a 
greater emphasis on stakeholder engagement, implications of new technologies, social processes, 
global dimensions, and comparative studies for a better understanding of governance mechanisms 
and their multiple effects. At the same time, Aguilera et al. (2015) and Madhani (2015a; 2015b) argue 
that there is still research necessary, which follows a comprehensive, company-wide approach that 
integrates both, internal and external governance mechanisms to a greater extent and embeds them 
into a country’s institutional, legal and regulatory environment. This confirms the intention of Tihanyi et 
al. (2014), who encourage aiming on a more inclusive interpretation of governance, which also take 
leadership systems, managerial control and decision-making procedures into account as enablers for 
organizations to execute their mandate. Such a comprehensive view is currently missing in the ongo-
ing debate and will be addressed in this dissertation. 
 
3 Cf. Tihanyi et al. (2014) and Eulerich et al. (2014) for an overview about the latest trends governance research. 
Filatotchev et al. (2018) and Aguilera et al. (2019) provide a comprehensive literature review about corporate 
governance practice of multinational corporations. 
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I outline the necessity to explore new corporate governance approaches and to shift the attention 
away from the solely legal driven view and incentive alignment between managers and owners and 
towards the importance of (internal) organizational architecture, coordination, collaboration and (exter-
nal) social mechanisms. This research project will contribute to overcome the above-mentioned defi-
cits of the recent corporate governance research and broaden the debate of a better understanding by 
analyzing the relevant governance mechanisms and their effects on the need to rethink the term cor-
porate governance. 
 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, regulators around the globe introduced new regulation initia-
tives to improve the effectiveness of corporate governance in banks and since then, it has been sub-
ject of many in-depth discussions among scholars. In banks, the effectiveness of governance mecha-
nisms is different compared to firms with other business models, because of their unique characteris-
tics of strong regulation, their capital structure, the complexity and opacity of their business and their 
structure (cf. Haan & Vlahu, 2016). There have been numerous initiatives to strengthen, overwork and 
implement new banking regulations (cf. e.g., BCBS, CRD IV, MiFiD, EBA stress testing, EBA guide-
lines) and their supervision within the last years, to overcome the recognized weaknesses of the re-
spective corporate failures. Even so, there is still an ongoing debate about the quality and effective-
ness of the existing corporate governance standards (cf. Welge & Eulerich, 2014). The serious bank-
ruptcies and state intervention further caused a new debate about the effectiveness of the governance 
mechanisms and robustness of the legal and regulatory governance frameworks, which already lead 
to significant changes that required organizations to improve their internal governance arrangements, 
decision-making mechanisms or even restructure their operations. In many cases, corporate govern-
ance is no longer handled as soft law with codes and principles, but it is rather based on legal and 
regulatory frameworks (cf. Chaaya & Anderson, 2017).4 Aguilera et al. (2019) outline the necessity for 
future research on whether and how such new corporate governance initiatives might affect multina-
tional groups. 
 
Nevertheless, prior literature concentrates mainly on recommendations and adjustments concerning 
listed companies or standalone bank entities but ignores the specifics of subsidiaries in intragroup 
structures (e.g. in terms of strategy development, company supervision, decision making scope, nom-
ination procedures of key function holders etc.) (cf. Frederick, 2014). The current recommendations for 
group governance are fragmented and superficial (e.g. in terms of independent directors, intragroup 
decision making, committee structures) (cf. Szabó & Sørensen, 2018). Especially within the last dec-
ade multinational groups in different industries set up own (bank) subsidiaries with similar business 
models in varying contexts. Particularly in the automotive industry those financial services subsidiaries 
play an increasingly important role to support car sales (cf. Söhnholz, 2013). Even if it is clear that 
holding a full bank license has several advantages (e.g. direct access to central bank funding), it also 
contains additional risks for the car manufacturers, because e.g. a potential high revenue loss or data 
 
4 Soft laws are declaration of intents with no legal binding character and are usually applied on international level 
as memorandum of understanding. Hard laws have a clear legal obligation for the affected parties and compli-
ance can be judicially demanded (cf. Brummer, 2017; Strauß, 2016, p. 21 ff.). For advantages and disadvantages 
of hard and soft law approaches, cf. Shaffer & Pollack, 2009. 
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breach in a bank subsidiary could negatively affect the whole automotive brand’s reputation or may 
cause financial penalties (cf. Bauer, 2015). Despite the fact that there is a growing interest for the in-
tragroup corporate governance management of such financial subsidiary networks, there is currently 
no literature available, which concentrates on this particular topic. 
This is a significant research gap, as the parent companies are faced with several structural specifics, 
which go beyond the pure management of financial institutes. On the one hand, such comparatively 
high regulated subsidiaries operate in other business areas outside the traditional core competences 
of the car manufacturers and have to be embedded in their traditionally grown group structures (cf. 
Stenner, 2015, p. 6 f.). At the same time however, such financial services subsidiaries are usually not 
located in one location and rather have global networks to support their local sales activities within the 
host countries, which make direct control and monitoring from the overseas headquarters even more 
complex (cf. Hoenen & Kostova, 2015). Consequently, car manufacturers have to manage ‘multiple 
embeddedness’ across heterogeneous contexts at the parent and subsidiary levels. On the one hand, 
on headquarters level they must organize their networks to effectively exploit both the differences and 
similarities of their multiple host locations. On the other hand, at subsidiary level, they have to balance 
‘internal’ embeddedness within the company-wide internal network, with their ‘external’ embed-
dedness in the host country, which implies both the necessity for a group-wide governance approach 
of their financial services subsidiaries, but also the complexity to meet local demands in a volatile 
business environment (cf. Oehmichen & Puck, 2016; Meyer et al., 2012). Nevertheless, it also means 
that they have to cope with multiple regulations and bank supervisory authorities in both the home 
country of the parent and the host country of the subsidiaries, sometimes even with contradictory re-
quirements. In addition, they also have to deal with different cultural contexts, which impacts the 
awareness on the one hand, but also the interpretation of the term corporate governance, as the way 
in which it is handled varies around the globe.5 
 
The rising regulatory pressure combined with the different natures, sizes and large number of financial 
services subsidiaries significantly increases the complexities of managing global subsidiary net-
works across different jurisdictions and illustrates the necessity to gain a much better understanding 
of intragroup governance mechanisms among member firms and their professional management as 
well as their involved corporate actors (cf. Frederick, 2014; Tihanyi et al., 2014; Colli & Colpan, 2016; 
Aguilera et al., 2019). Whereas until now, mainly the agency relationship between the parent’s man-
agement board and the investors has been intensely examined, future research will have the need to 
go beyond that and focus on the management and intragroup governance structures, processes and 
other governance mechanisms of such multinational groups to better understand their dependencies 
(cf. Tihanyi et al., 2014; Filatotchev & Wright, 2011; 2017). This dissertation aims to close the existing 
research gap and to provide valuable insights for the further development of the global governance 
research. 
 
 
5 There is still no generally accepted, common definition for corporate governance available among regulators, 
scholars and companies (cf. Tricker, 2015; Witt, 2013; Feddersen et al., 1996; Conyon & Schwalbach, 2000). 
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Altogether, this leads to an increased management liability of the executives and a greater public 
perception on governance and compliance topics and requires a greater consideration of stakeholder 
interests than in the past.6 Thus, many management boards increased their efforts to professionalize 
their corporate governance management within their corporate groups. Due to external stakeholder 
groups’ increased scrutiny of executives in multinational groups to give account how they man-
age and oversee their intragroup governance framework among their subsidiaries, companies have to 
implement monitoring systems to detect deficits in their internal organizational structures and process-
es in consideration of their unique characteristics (cf. Paetzmann & Schöning, 2014; Frederick, 2014; 
Werder, 2015, p. 3 ff.; Martínez-Ferrero & García-Sánchez, 2017; Tihanyi et al., 2014). Customer 
groups, investors, regulators and other stakeholder groups expect the consolidating parent companies 
to demonstrate how they manage and control their subsidiary governance and fulfill their duty of care 
obligations. Therefore, it is of great importance to achieve such a target oriented and proactive 
management of the group-wide corporate governance, a so-called multi-dimensional approach, as 
Malmi & Brown (2005) firstly introduced in the context of management control systems as a package.  
 
In the research field of business administration is corporate governance still perceived as unsystemat-
ic and fragmented (cf. Eulerich et al., 2014). At the moment is no comprehensive overview available 
about the critical corporate governance topics that have to be addressed in financial services subsidi-
aries from a risk-based perspective of the corporate parent. Thus, this dissertation concentrates on the 
following research questions: 
 
What are the relevant determinates for the corporate governance management of the mentioned busi-
ness units? In particular, I concentrate on the question, which dimensions have to be considered, 
which instruments are available and how they can be integrated into a coherent management model. 
 
What are major challenges and success factors for the intragroup management of corporate govern-
ance that multinational automotive groups have to take into account? 
 
This dissertation aims to provide a scientific contribution in this persistent discussion and aims to con-
tribute to governance scholars’ ability to gain a better understanding of the intragroup governance 
management. The overall objective of the dissertation project is to develop a management model for 
the intragroup corporate governance of automotive multinationals with financial services subsidiaries 
in different jurisdictions to reduce complexity and increase transparency across the global subsidiary 
network. 
 
I will hereby follow a much needed, but currently rarely applied, more advanced, holistic and situation-
al corporate governance understanding than utilized in the past, to contribute to the latest corporate 
governance discussion among scholars and corporate leaders alike. 
 
 
6 In particular the unique combination of stronger corporate governance regulation, state supervision and the 
rising numbers of subsidiaries in most multinational groups significantly increases the intragroup management 
complexities, favors opacity and increases management liability.  
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Based on a comprehensive literature review and open guided expert interviews I will subsequently 
develop a suitable management model that considers legal, regulatory social and organizational 
mechanisms as well as characteristics of wholly owned financial services subsidiaries. The developed 
management model will enable subsidiary boards to execute their governance duties, clarify the ex-
pectations of the parent and improve intra-organizational lucency among the entire group. Additionally, 
it will provide a valuable management instrument for the parent and will assist to oversee and to steer 
the different maturity levels of the subsidiaries. However, even if it would be of great interest, in view of 
the amount of time required, it is not the objective to review the effectiveness of the introduced model. 
 
Further, I will provide indications for the selection of intragroup instruments to sufficiently manage in-
tragroup corporate governance and identify respective success factors and challenges.  
The objective of the research project is not to provide a legal evaluation of the different corporate gov-
ernance regulations, nor to investigate the different corporate governance models and existing theo-
ries. Instead, it is rather about developing an approach that can support a more effective and profes-
sional corporate governance management of financial service subsidiaries to reduce the complexities 
within the intragroup corporate governance management and the interaction between the corporate 
parent and its subsidiaries.  
The objective of this dissertation is to provide a crucial scientific contribution for the further enhance-
ment of the corporate governance management as well as its control and supervision among financial 
services subsidiaries in automotive multinational companies. Due to the cross-functional approach of 
this dissertation, this research project addresses scholars and academic researchers from numerous 
business management related disciplines.7 
In addition, this dissertation supports executives, managers, directors, in-house consulting and internal 
control units (e.g. risk, compliance, internal audit) of automotive multinationals and other corporate 
groups with financial services subsidiaries. Furthermore, it provides valuable information for audit, 
accounting and strategy consultancies, finance, human resources and strategy departments of multi-
national companies, lawmakers, regulators and other national and international standard setters for 
corporate governance.  
This dissertation does not turn to readers that are looking for a legal analysis on the parent-subsidiary 
relationship or a detailed analysis regarding the corporate governance of listed companies. The objec-
tive of this dissertation is not to focus on an isolated in-depth analysis of the selected corporate gov-
ernance topics. The primary objective is rather to investigate the different focus topics as a package, 
to manage the above-mentioned intra-group complexity and to overcome the recent limitations of 
many corporate governance interpretations. 
 
7 For example from finance and banking, corporate governance, regulation, compliance, organizational develop-
ment, general management, international business, human resources, corporate law, accounting and audit. 
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The research of this dissertation is restricted towards multinational groups with numerous wholly 
owned subsidiaries within the automotive industry. Despite this, there are similarities and implications 
found that likewise can be applied to other corporate groups and industries.  
Moreover it needs to be considered that there is currently a high dynamic in this field of research and 
that things can change quickly in the broad field of corporate governance. The research project is 
based on selected information from August 2015 to September 2019. 
To achieve this overarching research objective, I will firstly determine key elements for corporate gov-
ernance as a foundation to identify the respective governance areas and instruments in terms of fi-
nancial subsidiaries. After that, I will develop a management model with the support of expert inter-
views and in a final step, will summarize respective challenges and success factors for the intragroup 
corporate governance management. 
 
1.2 Research methodology 
To investigate the identified research deficits and answer the research questions, this dissertation 
adopts an inductive approach. For the purpose of this dissertation, I will follow a qualitative research 
approach with open orientated methods and a more holistic, inductive way of proceeding, as it is the 
best choice to get access to the needed information. At the same time, several authors outline that 
there is much need for more qualitative research of significant rigor and relevance, which explores 
mechanisms and processes involved in corporate governance and thereby overcomes the current 
research limitations and improves the corporate governance understanding (e.g., McNulty et al., 2013; 
Zattoni et al., 2013; Mat Yasin et al., 2014). Compared to quantitative research, there is only little qual-
itative research found on corporate governance in top journals (cf. McNulty et al., 2013; Zattoni et al., 
2013; Durisin & Puzone, 2009; Zattoni & Van Ees, 2012). 
McNulty et al. (2013) call for more qualitative research in the field of corporate governance as it will 
help researchers, standard setters and also practitioners to improve their understanding of and ability 
to develop more effective and efficient governance mechanisms.  
Qualitative corporate governance research is the foundation for rethinking and challenging the existing 
assumptions and meanings of how corporate governance mechanisms affect organizations. A more 
qualitative corporate governance research will help to explain the corporate governance phenomena 
and will enable to identify effective solutions for both scholars and practitioners to overcome the limita-
tions of the prevalent qualitative research approaches of the last decades (cf. Judge, 2011, p. 294). A 
qualitative research approach enables me to gather in-depth knowledge regarding the intragroup gov-
ernance management and related mechanisms and will support the development of new interpreta-
tions of the corporate governance phenomena. 
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There is also a growing number of scholars, which found that an increasing use of qualitative methods 
would enable the research community to expand their theoretical and methodological scope of their 
corporate governance research projects (cf. Armitage et al., 2017; Boyd et al., 2017). Apart from that, 
Mayer (2013, p. 22 ff.), Roll (2003, p. 315) and Tihanyi et al. (2014) further confirm the importance of 
more qualitative research in the field of management science.  
This research project is based on two rounds of expert interviews and a final group discussion among 
a few of them. At its core, my dissertation follows the initial idea of the Delphi methodology, which so 
far has been hardly used within the field of corporate governance research.8 Among others, Adams et 
al. (2007) and Sultan & Yin Wong (2013) affirm qualitative expert interviews as a suitable research 
method for questions that focus on complex, multi-dimensional research questions with „how“ and 
„why”, as it is the case in this dissertation project. The evaluation of the qualitative expert interviews 
follows the generally accepted method of Meuser & Nagel (2010), who developed an appropriate re-
search method for the evaluation of expert interviews with open guided interview guidelines. 
At first, I will conduct an in-depth literature research as foundation for the interview guideline. The first 
interview session will help to validate the outcome of the previous literature review and the identified 
focus topics, which are essential and will enable me to further expand the results with the provided 
information of the interviewed experts. After that, I will be able to develop a first draft of an appropriate 
management model, which then will be verified by a second round of expert interviews. In a final step, 
I will organize a group discussion among several of the interviewed experts to review and discuss the 
final management model in order to improve the quality of the results. The Figure 1 on the next page 
provides a short overview of the research methodology. 
 
 
8 For further information about the Delphi method, cf. Dalkey (2017); Landeta (2006); Dalkey & Helmer (1963). 
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Figure 1:  Research methodology.  
       Source:        Own illustration. 
 
This way of proceeding helps to respond the increasing demand for qualitative management research 
in general and for corporate governance in particular and connects the theoretical and practical per-
spective within one corporate governance management model.  
 
1.3 Structure of the thesis  
The dissertation starts in chapter 1 by giving a short introduction, illustrating the existing research 
gaps and concluding the research questions. In addition, chapter 1 provides a short introduction of the 
applied research methodology and structure of this dissertation. 
Chapter 2 lays the conceptual foundation for the research project and clarifies important terms, which 
are central for the completion of this dissertation. At first, I investigate in subchapter 2.1 the term mul-
tinational corporate group, clarify the characteristics of subsidiaries, and debate the implications of 
global value chains and increasingly decentralized business units for the parent-subsidiary relation-
ship. In subchapter 2.2 I examine the business model of automotive financial services, illustrate its 
relevance for the automotive industry and show the consequences for the organizational setup. Sub-
chapter 2.3 forms the basis for the corporate governance understanding of this dissertation, debates 
the current corporate governance approaches and illustrates the effects of corporate governance 
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mechanisms and its relevance in banks. Finally, the last subchapter 2.4, closes with the first implica-
tions for the intragroup corporate governance management of financial services subsidiaries. 
After the relevant key terms are clarified and defined, chapter 3 investigates the decisive influencing 
factors of corporate governance in multinational groups with financial services subsidiaries. The first 
subchapter 3.1 debates the theoretical framework determinates of corporate governance and investi-
gates, in terms of efficiency and effectiveness, the benefit of professional intragroup management of 
governance from a comprehensive perspective. Moreover, I analyze the particular role of corporate 
culture for the effects on corporate governance mechanisms and outline the consequences for subsid-
iary governance. 
As another relevant influencing factor for the corporate governance and its underlying mechanisms, I 
concentrate in subchapter 3.2 on the institutional, legal and regulatory framework conditions. Hereby I 
place the priority of my investigations specifically on the institutional and regulatory enforcement in-
struments to manage governance, as well as the latest supervisory approaches for corporate govern-
ance in banks. In addition, the next subchapter 3.3 concentrates on the frameworks and concepts for 
the management of internal governance and especially debates the COSO frameworks and the Three 
Lines of Defense Model. Finally, chapter 3 ends with an investigation of the essential corporate gov-
ernance mechanisms in multinational groups from the parent and subsidiary point of view, to secure a 
holistic understanding of both layers. 
 
Chapter 4 goes beyond the investigations of chapter 3 and investigates the multi-level corporate gov-
ernance management of automotive multinational groups with financial services business units. Sub-
chapter 4.1 clarifies the different intragroup governance structures, processes and responsibilities for 
the strategic governance and the operational governance in complex group structures. Hereafter, in 
subchapter 4.2 I identify the governance focus topics, which are required to ensure a consistent in-
tragroup corporate governance management among the multiple financial services subsidiaries in 
different locations. In subchapter 4.3 I additionally, investigate the multiple merits of a proper in-
tragroup management of corporate governance management, and in a final step draw the first interim 
conclusions in subchapter 4.4 as the initial starting point for the expert interviews. 
 
Chapter 5 describes in detail the applied research concept of this dissertation and the underlying Del-
phi methodology. Subchapter 5.1 explains the applied empirical social research procedure with the 
open guided expert interviews and provides explanatory notes on the general research framework. In 
addition, subchapter 5.2 illustrates the applied evaluation method of the expert interviews according to 
Meuser & Nagel (2010). 
 
Chapter 6 covers the relevant results of the empirical research, discusses and compares the results 
of the expert interviews with the theoretical results of the prior chapters. Thus, subchapter 6.1 high-
lights the results of the first interview session, which primarily aims to verify the previous outcomes 
and identified focus topics that are necessary for the design of a management model and the answer-
ing of the research questions. On this basis, I develop a first draft of the management model, which 
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will be verified by a second interview session among the experts in subchapter 6.2. Those results form 
the foundation to further improve, redesign and adjust the first model draft towards the final manage-
ment model that will be introduced in subchapter 6.3. In essence, the final model consists out of three 
parts, the intragroup governance instruments, the respective focus topics that have to be addressed 
within the subsidiaries, and lastly a customary measurement and evaluation. Hereafter and in a final 
step the entire management model is discussed once again in an open group discussion with few of 
the experts, to de novo improve the overall outcome. Altogether, subchapter 6.4 comprises the identi-
fied success factors and challenges for the intragroup corporate governance management before sub-
chapter 6.5 provides a shot tabular overview of the key findings.  
 
In a conclusive step chapter 7 draws conclusions and summarizes the key findings and lessons 
learned. Moreover, I highlight the additional value for practice and science, implications for the trans-
ferability and illustrate further fields of research. For reasons of clarity and comprehensibility, the Fig-
ure 2 on the next page provides a comprehensive overview about the structure of this dissertation 
thesis. 
 
 
Figure 2:  Dissertation structure. 
       Source:         Own illustration.  
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2. Conceptual foundations 
As a basic prerequisite for this dissertation project, it is necessary to ensure a common understanding 
of multinational group corporations and their organizational setup and to illustrate the current state of 
research regarding the relationship between parents and subsidiaries. I will discuss, as additional im-
portant pillars of this research project, the automotive financial services business, the role of financial 
services subsidiaries and the organizational setup of a financial services organization in the context of 
a car manufacturer. As another crucial prerequisite, I will hereafter clarify my general management 
understanding. In addition, I will debate the foundations of corporate governance and develop a defini-
tion for corporate governance. Moreover, I will summarize the existing governance approaches and 
reflect the effect of corporate governance mechanisms as a further important decisive factor of this 
dissertation project. 
 
2.1 Multinational corporate group  
The following sub-chapter 2.1 investigates the term multinational corporate group and examines the 
parent’s headquarters-subsidiaries relationships. Furthermore, the various drawbacks and organiza-
tional consequences of the growing trend to decentral organizational structures in multinational group 
corporations are explained. 
 
2.1.1 Definition of multinational corporate group 
In the scientific literature there are often different, sometimes unspecific terms (i.e. multinational, mul-
tinational company, multinational corporation, multinational enterprise, group, transnational company) 
used for multinational groups consisting of a parent entity and several hierarchical dependent subsidi-
aries that are either fully or partly owned by its parent. For that reason, I will hereafter shortly outline 
the different characteristics of those definitions to clarify the definition for this research project. 
In comparison to national companies, multinational companies are characterized by a large share of 
cross-border business activities. For example, Pitelis & Sugden (2000, p. 72) define a multinational 
group corporation as a company which has different facilities and other assets in different countries 
outside of its country of origin. Such companies have employment contracts, factories, plants, subsidi-
aries and / or offices in various locations and usually have a headquarters to coordinate the com-
panywide global business management and to achieve common overarching goals (cf. Ghoshal & 
Bartlett, 1990). Pitelis & Sugden (2000, p. 72) state that the unique characteristic of multinational 
group corporations is the usage of hierarchical methods of coordination (managerial directives) to 
organize cross-national interdependencies to gain a competitive advantage. Hansch (2007, p. 7) goes 
beyond that and differentiates by a number of qualitative (e.g. negotiation style, national culture) and 
quantitative characteristics and categorizes the quantitative characteristics in structure related features 
(e.g. organizational structures, ownership rights, foreign direct investment) and performance KPIs (e.g. 
foreign revenue, foreign direct investments, foreign profits, number of employees etc.). Contrary, 
Hoffmann (1993) distinguishes between a legal and a business-related perspective within the defini-
tion of multinational companies. Whereas the legal related perspective concentrates on the corporate 
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structures under company law, this dissertation mainly concentrates on the business-related perspec-
tive. Theisen (2000, p. 18) provides one of the most cited business-related definitions; he defines a 
corporate group as an autonomous decision-making body and unity of action, which includes several 
legally independent and dependent entities and operations. All those companies act as one business 
entity in a personal, institutional and / or functional perspective. Additionally, the different economic 
units of the corporate group are either permanently or temporally directed towards a combined over-
arching economic objective. This definition emphasizes the business entity and describes the specifics 
in a business-related view. A network of legal independent entities is from a business management 
perspective recognized as one company. This complex construct requires a comprehensive mix of 
multiple management instruments, which coordinate, balance and overcome the organizational and 
legal independencies and boundaries (cf. Behringer, 2014, p. 2). 
 
Based on the previous discussion, I argue that there is always a field of tension within the framework 
of a corporate group company: On the one hand, from a global perspective there is a clear single eco-
nomic entity of the corporate group as a whole. On the other hand, there also exists a second per-
spective, which recognizes the different subordinated business units as own, legally independent enti-
ties which are embedded into this global group construct. Yet, exactly this multidimensional nature and 
the unique characteristics of multinational groups need to be taken into account by this research pro-
ject. On the one hand, this dissertation has to balance the multiple influencing factors resulting from 
the different existing legal and regulatory environments and cultural differences in each host country of 
the subsidiaries. On the other hand, it is also requires to recognize the corporate group as one eco-
nomic unity, which has to be organized to ensure the achievement of common goals.  
I will make no distinction among the various terms for multinational groups as they all target on the 
same type of companies described above and follow in this dissertation the introduced definition of 
Pitelis & Sugden (2000) and Theisen (2000). Due to the decisive role of subsidiaries for this disserta-
tion, I will analyze the specific characteristics of subsidiaries in the following paragraph. 
 
2.1.2 Characteristics of subsidiaries 
Subsidiaries are characterized by specific intra-group relationships to another company (corporate 
parent) that controls the subordinate subsidiary (cf. Cambridge Dictionary, 2016). Subsidiaries are 
companies in which another company holds more than 50 percent of the entities voting rights.9 From a 
legal point of view, subsidiaries can be organized as a company, a corporation or a limited liability 
company.10 They act as separate, independent legal entities in terms of taxation, regulation and liabil-
ity and so differ from divisions, which are fully integrated, organizational units of a company organiza-
tion (cf. West's Encyclopedia of American Law, 2016). 
In most jurisdictions, the notion ‘corporate parent’ and ‘subsidiary’ are legal definitions and have far-
reaching consequences on e.g. management, control, accounting and liability issues. According to the 
International Accounting Standard IAS 27.13 corporate parents have to incorporate all direct or indi-
 
9 Those companies are often defined as corporate parent, parent company or holding company in literature. For 
clarification, I apply in this context the term corporate parent. 
10 In other cases, it could be also government or state-owned enterprises. 
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rect controlled subsidiaries in their consolidated financial statement. For example, in Germany those 
company constructs are handled as combined companies and have to prepare consolidated financial 
statements of the different legal entities that are incorporated in the full consolidation (cf. § 271 Abs. 2 
and § 290 HGB).  
 
In the capacity as owner of the independent legal entity, the corporate parent (majority owner) has the 
obligation to designate and recall the management and supervisory organs of its subsidiaries (cf. 
Tröger & Roß-Kirsch, 2015, p. 67 ff.). The parent companies create binding controlling agreements, 
profit transfer agreements or respective bylaws for their subsidiaries to secure the dependency of the 
subsidiary and their control. In addition, other group-internal mechanisms, such as budgeting process-
es, binding group internal corporate rules or other company individual contracts and constellations, 
which secure the dominant influence of the parent towards the subsidiary’s senior management and 
the performed business, must be implemented.  
Werder (2015, p. 68 ff.) explains that the most usual connecting instrument between corporate parent 
and the subsidiaries is the contribution of capital as minimum requirement for a multinational group 
construct. Further, Service Level Agreements (SLAs), terms and conditions and personal interde-
pendencies (e.g. the nomination of the parent’s board members as directors in the subsidiary boards) 
of relevant key functions are not only common control mechanisms, but also strengthen the multina-
tional group framework and define in detail the relationship between the corporate parent and its sub-
sidiary.11 The corporate parent has the duty of care obligations for its subsidiaries and takes responsi-
bility for them as official company owner (cf. e.g., Muscat, 2016; Eckert, 2016; Weber & Baisch, 2015; 
Ji, 2014; McConnell, 2014; Cauffman & Olaerts, 2011; Baierlipp, 2002; Drüke, 1990; Lutter, 1982; 
Müller, 1977). Terms and conditions agreements have to define in detail the relationship between the 
corporate parent and its subsidiary as well as the different roles and responsibilities. Derived from the 
above mentioned definitions, I define subsidiaries as independent companies which are controlled by 
a holding company (called the parent) through the ownership of greater than 50 percent of its voting 
stock. 
 
Subsidiaries can be setup in different ways and for various reasons. The underlying assumption for 
establishing subsidiaries from a macroeconomic point of view, are the theory of absolute economics of 
Adam Smith (1776) and the theory of the relative (comparative) cost advantages of David Ricardo 
(1817). In addition, several of the macroeconomic related approaches follow the neo-classical eco-
nomic theories. The underlying assumption of those overarching macroeconomic theories can also be 
transferred to multinational groups to explain the motivation of parent companies to setup own subsid-
iary networks. In essence, the overarching motivations for the installation of foreign subsidiaries are to 
increase sales volumes and market share, to reduce cost structures or to gain competitive advantages 
within better supply chain processes, improved tax management or through disparities of legal and 
regulatory requirements among the different countries (cf. Faix et al., 2006, p. 74). 
 
 
11 For basic elements of service level agreements, cf. Frost & Morner (2010, p. 242). 
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Conglomerates with horizontal and vertical corporate structures establish subsidiaries to separate the 
different business units and ensure greater transparency. Another advantage of subsidiary structures 
is that it provides the opportunity for the corporate parent to sell them easier towards others and to be 
more flexible in making local customizations. Affiliations are subsidiaries that are set up for the pur-
pose of disposal. Reasons for the acquisition of subsidiaries are often the realization of synergy ef-
fects, transfer of knowhow or increased market power (cf. Guserl & Pernsteiner, 2015, p. 567 ff.). 
In particular within risky business models, such as the finance and banking business, it is a common 
approach to setup subsidiaries for limiting the liability of the corporate parent in connection with a risky 
new business. As discussed later on, this is also a major driver for the OEMs to separate their auto-
motive financial services business from the other business units (cf. Simler, 2010). Another motivation 
for establishing subsidiaries is to get local market access. Many host countries have legal and regula-
tory requirements, which define that local business activities are exclusively allowed for locally regis-
tered companies. All in all, there are various reasons why there is a rising trend among multinationals 
to set up subsidiaries. This trend to more global subsidiary networks also inevitably increases the 
complexity to manage multinational group constructs consisting of multiple natures of subsidiaries in 
different countries with varying business models, sizes and scales. 
 
This subchapter has illustrated the relevance of subsidiary networks for multinational companies and 
provides indications for why intragroup governance management has become an increasingly im-
portant issue. In the following section, I will investigate the parent-subsidiary relationship as a further 
important foundation for this dissertation project.  
 
2.1.3 Corporate parent-subsidiary relationship 
Driven by their global business activities, multinationals have to find ways to manage the increased 
complexity in order to foster the diversification of their business models, global orientation and compa-
ny growth in a volatile business environment. In the past, many of them have implemented business 
unit organizations, which are no longer sufficient to adequately respond to new market realities (cf. 
Riedl, 2013, p. 1 f.).12 Many organizations struggle to manage themselves in an efficient and effective 
way and new organizational concepts influence the design of parent-subsidiary relationships.13 Essen-
tially, those new concepts follow the assumption that organizational efficiency particularly relies on the 
adaptability of the company organization towards the business environment (cf. Roth & Behme, 2013, 
p. 19). Currently, there is a shift away from traditional company structures with clear hierarchically and 
 
12 Business unit organizations are characterized by high administration costs due to large centralization units, high 
complexity costs, tendency to laziness. Those concepts are too inflexible due to e.g. long information and deci-
sion-making processes, little decision-making independence of employees (cf. Roth & Behme, 2013, p. 18; Riedl, 
2013, p. 1 ff.). Thus, new management concepts, such as e.g. the time based management approach to reduce 
the time-to-market of new products, the Total Quality Management (TQM) that focuses on quality (consideration 
of customer demands); Lean management approach for streamlining internal processes to reduce complexity 
have been developed (cf. Roth & Behme, 2013, p. 18 f.; Fiedler, 2018).  
13 Several authors discuss new organizational approaches under the roof of the high performance organization 
(cf. e.g., Vagadia, 2014; Kappe, 2016; De Waal, 2007; Katzenbach & Smith, 2015); team concepts, empower-
ment, modular concepts, tele corporations, or virtual companies. Those concepts are based on modern organiza-
tional theory approaches, such as e.g. the introduced concepts of Mintzberg (1980); Walker & Lorsch (1968); Blau 
& Scott (1962). For further information, cf. Shafritz et al. (2015, p. 169 ff.). 
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functionally clustered organizational structures and rather a shift towards leaner centrally organized 
divisions and increased local responsibilities on subsidiary level. This requires the disintegration and 
reconstruction of existing hierarchies towards decentral, independent, process- and product-orientated 
business units which are more agile and can be coordinated more easily. 
 
Centralization and decentralization are defined by the decision-making concentration versus deci-
sion-making autonomy and play a key role for the management of the group governance as a whole 
(cf. Kostova et al., 2016). A company is centralized if all decisions are made by comparatively higher 
ranked hierarchies or if they are even concentrated on one hierarchically high position. The greater the 
influence of higher-level instances is on the decision-making of the lower-level corporate divisions, the 
greater is the centralization of the organization. In contrast to this, a company is decentralized, when 
decision-making is evenly distributed among the downstream divisions (cf. Reichwald & Koller, 1996; 
Frost et al., 2010, p. 39). In a multinational group context, I interpret this as the allocation scope of 
decision-making competencies between the parent’s headquarters and the business divisions or sub-
sidiaries. Most commonly, it describes the level of autonomy of subsidiaries or regional business units. 
The degree of organizational (de-)centralization directly affects the corporate strategy and competi-
tiveness of a multinational group. On the one hand, a high level of centralized decision-making leads 
to a higher coordination effort among the subsidiaries (cf. Zentes et al., 2013, p. 541). On the other 
hand, a decentralized decision-making also requires much coordination effort to ensure transparency, 
oversight and alignment on a consolidated group level.14  
 
The relationship of the parent and its subsidiaries has been of remarkable interest to international 
business management researchers for several years (cf. Gammelgaard & Kumar, 2016). In the organ-
izational research, for decades authors have been discussing the optimum balance between centrali-
zation and decentralization in the relationship between the corporate parent’s headquarters and sub-
sidiaries (e.g., Bardhan, 2002; Singh, 1986; Alonso et al., 2008; Arcuri & Dari‐Mattiacci, 2010; Wong 
et al., 2011; Recklies, 2011; Hempel et al., 2012; Zentes et al., 2013; Roth & Behme, 2013; Faguet, 
2014; Chen & Zheng, 2018; Tarwneh, 2019; De Jong & Van Vo 2019; Fatehi & Choi, 2019a; 2019b). 
Most of them justify their argumentation based on different theories, notably the principle agent theory 
and the convention theory (cf. Brandl & Schneider, 2017; Li et al., 2016; Kostova et al., 2016a; 2016b; 
2018; Peng & Beamish, 2014). 
The core question is how to coordinate and align decentralized decisions to reach a common objec-
tive. The debate focuses on the allocation of tasks and granting of rights to make decisions within the 
corporate group. Finally, the discussion about the organizational structures of multinational companies 
is directly linked to the centralization and decentralization of decision-making competencies and its 
degree of delegation towards the subsidiaries and will therefore play a key role within the intra-group 
separation of tasks, roles and responsibilities within the developed management model in chapter 6 
(cf. Berndt et al., 2016, p. 555 f.). 
 
14 This perspective is also supported from the network model of Zentes et al. (2005, 195 ff.); Larson, & Starr 
(1993). 
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Already Ghoshal & Nohria (1989) realized that the internal structure in complex, multi-unit organiza-
tions of multinational groups is not homogeneous throughout the organization but is systematically 
differentiated to incorporate the various environmental and resource contingencies addressed by the 
subsidiaries in different host countries. They argue that a professional governance structure for the 
management of the headquarters-subsidiary relationship comprises most of different combinations of 
structural elements such as centralization of authority, formalization of rules and systems, and norma-
tive integration of members. Appropriate subsidiary governance structures are hierarchical and federa-
tive, but also need to be integrative. In addition, Kostova et al. (2016) provide evidence that there is a 
necessity for subsidiary-level variation through internal organizational and external social conditions to 
consider local specific characteristics. That means that there are still significant unresolved issues in 
headquarters–subsidiary relations. There is a satisfactory solution missing for how multinational 
groups can close the gap between parent’s expectations and subsidiary performance. The manage-
ment of the nested hierarchical interrelations across multiple organizational dimensions and the align-
ment of these relationships across diverse subunits embedded in different social contexts is still a 
major obstacle for the management of multinational groups (cf. Foss et al., 2012).15 For the manage-
ment of subsidiaries, characterized by high levels of intra-firm international inter-dependence, monitor-
ing mechanisms and incentive compensation are insufficient (cf. O'Donnell, 2000). In this context, the 
well-known and often applied Agency Theory provides a useful foundation but only limited explanation 
of the phenomena of foreign subsidiary control. For example, Foss et al. (2012) and Lunnan et al. 
(2016a; 2016b; 2016c) identify social control mechanisms as a relevant key driver within the internal 
corporate control. While the business atmosphere significantly reduces both types of organizing-costs 
of the parent-subsidiary relationship, their distance increases bargaining costs (Lunnan et al., 2016c).  
 
In practice, subsidiaries often request more autonomy than headquarters concede. The study of Hom-
burg & Prigge (2014) illustrates that the decision-making centralization strengthens the adverse desire 
for autonomy, while the parent’s decision-making competence can reduce this desire. This means that 
for the minimization of the subsidiaries’ desire for autonomy, parents should credibly display high 
competence while allowing subsidiaries to participate in decision-making whenever possible. Chen & 
Zheng (2018) argue that subsidiary autonomy can be separated in a strategic and operational auton-
omy. In addition, Tarwneh (2019) analyzed that intragroup goal congruence and decision-making au-
tonomy of subsidiary mangers is an important factor that influences subsidiary performance. 
I conclude that there is a field of tension between the advantages of centralization and decentralization 
(cf. Kawai & Strange, 2014). There exists a conflict of objectives with negative interdependency, be-
cause costs do exist for both the centralization and decentralization. Several authors developed con-
 
15 Other challenges for the management of headquarters-subsidiary relationship arise out of the increasing trend 
of mergers and acquisitions (cf. Chalençon & Mayrhofer, 2017; Yuce, 2016) and the thereof resulting heterogenei-
ty of management philosophies and management systems, which need to be aligned in one single group frame-
work. As this has a great impact on operational processes, procedures and used methods (e.g. for risk manage-
ment, full costing, marginal costing, activity based costing, or forecasting), different definitions for many topics 
(e.g. gross or net revenues for revenues) need to be aligned to secure a common language within the corporate 
group, too. Other typical challenges are diverse legal requirements e.g. for accounting (e.g. HGB versus US-
GAAP), different cultural backgrounds of the people (cf. Froese et al., 2016) with different leadership preferences 
(cf. Richter, 2016) or communication problems due to different languages (cf. Feely & Harzing, 2003), time zones 
and geographical distances (cf. Boeh & Beamish, 2015). 
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ceptual models to resolve the optimization problem.16 Those models argue that the optimal (de-) cen-
tralization level is a stress ratio between autonomy and alignment costs.17 Yet, as the analysis of Han-
nah (2013, p. 98) indicates, many firms fail to develop an appropriate balance between centralization 
and decentralization. Consequently, different organizational frameworks developed over the last dec-
ades.18 A further, often ignored influencing factor within this discussion is the legal structure of the 
multinational group, which has a significant impact on the intra-group decision-making and may bear 
compliance risks. The holding type has much impact on the organizational set up of the group and 
therefore the level of (de-)centralization.19 Especially the value creation plays an important role and 
leads to a greater consideration of the resource perspective to increase e.g. the economy of scale 
effects.20 In multinational groups the challenge is to ensure an efficient resource bundle to realize, 
combine and manage the different benefit potentials in an appropriate way. The initial idea is to realize 
a sustainable competitive advantage with specific resource bundles and to expand the organizational 
perspective towards the creation of added value (cf. Frost et al., 2010, p. 74).21 However, there is also 
a rising global trend that core parts of the parents’ headquarters are relocated to alternative destina-
tions while solely the officially legal registered head office location still tends to be kept in their country 
of origin (cf. Baaij et al., 2015).  
The automotive groups follow a middle course depending on the specific business model of each divi-
sion or business unit. In the special case of the automotive financial services divisions however, there 
is a clear trend towards decentralization (cf. Grosche, 2013, p. 94; Stenner, 2015). This requires them 
to transform themselves into a global network of many small, powerful decentralized company units. 
This shift will only be successful, if changes within the decision-making competencies on all hierarchy 
levels are undergone and a professional change management is introduced. It has to be secured that 
decisions in the subsidiaries are still made within the context of the predefined overachieving objec-
tives of their corporate parent (cf. Homburg & Prigge, 2014). Even in decentral organizations, this re-
quires certain levels of hierarchical coordination to ensure organizational transparency and clear in-
tragroup roles and responsibilities. However, the manner of which this coordination function is inter-
preted has changed in the last years. In modern organizations, the superior role of the headquarters is 
more that of a consultant, coordinator or moderator (cf. Roth & Behme, 2013, p. 26). 
 
16 There have been many attempts to identify measures for the perfect level of organizational (de-) centralization 
of a company. Representative for others: Bleicher (1966); Hage & Alken (1969); Lessard & Lorange (1977); Sah 
& Stiglitz (1991). Mintzberg (1992); Faguet, (2014); Harper (2015). 
17 The optimal decentralization level is achieved if the marginal revenue of an additional centralization measures 
are equal towards the marginal costs of this activity. The optimum is reached via the minimum of general cost 
curve out of the alignment plus autonomy costs. The absolute gradient of both curves are equal in this point. The 
general cost curve is as higher, the greater the costs are. In this case, both curves have a steeper development 
(cf. Frost et al., 2010, p. 38).  
18 For example, differentiates Frost et al. (2010) between the functional organization (cf. Mirow et al., 2004; Laux 
& Liermann, 2005); the divisional or product orientated organization; the regional organization; front-end-back-end 
organizational structure or the matrix organization.  
19 The most discussed holding types are the finance and management holding. A comprehensive overview about 
the different characteristics of the various holding types provides Frost et al. (2010, p. 58); Schulte (2013); Werder 
(2015, p. 299 ff.). 
20 Frost et al. (2010, p. 67) particularly mention the value creation via the sum of the maximized value added, the 
realization of economy of scale effects, positive transfer and synergy effects.  
21 For further information of the resource based view of strategy, cf. Peteraf (1993); Freiling (2013, p. 12 ff.). 
 19 
 
The described shift of multinational groups towards decentral organizational structures supports the 
flexibility to increase local responsiveness, but also contains governance and compliance risks and 
favors opacity.  
 
The previous explanatory notes highlight the necessity of a greater focus on group governance and 
mutually agreed uniform intragroup standards, embedded in appropriate structures to secure proper 
intragroup alignment. As the next chapter 2.2 will illustrate, particularly in case of financial services 
subsidiaries, this is of great importance. 
 
2.2 Automotive financial services  
In the last chapter 2.1, I have discussed multinational groups and the field of tension within the rela-
tionship between the parent’s overseas headquarters and its subsidiaries. As this dissertation focuses 
on the corporate governance management of the automotive financial services subsidiaries, in this 
subchapter 2.2, I will examine their business model as another fundamental component for the com-
pletion of this research project. In the following paragraphs, I clarify how the financial services busi-
ness is embedded in the overall business model of the car manufacturer. Thereafter, I will introduce 
the setup of automotive financial services organizations to ensure a solid foundation for the further 
consideration of this research project. 
 
2.2.1 The role of automotive financial services for car manufacturer 
The constellation of financial services and automotive business models started in the early 1920s. The 
original equipment manufacturers (OEM) had realized early, that financial services supports vehicle 
sales and had recognized it as an additional profit driver. Nowadays financial services subsidiaries are 
a part of every car manufacturer and are established as a part of the banking landscape.22 Financial 
services subsidiaries are an important stabilization factor for the automotive industry and provide a 
fundamental contribution for the automotive value chain. Captive structures can be cost- and tax-
effective for their parents, even if their legal structures are non-transparent and often not well under-
stood (cf. Panitz, 2018). In the beginning, the primary purpose was the financing of car dealers and 
therefore a protection instrument for the most important sales channel of the car manufacturers. Later 
on, it changed and the automotive financial services further developed and expanded their business 
towards direct sales with the end customer, by providing own financing products and balloon financing 
(cf. Stenner, 2015, p. 2; Berger, 2007).23 
As the following examinations illustrate, the main objective of financial services subsidiaries is to pro-
vide financing solutions for the connected car dealerships, support vehicle sales and attract new cus-
tomer segments. They play an increasingly important key role for the car manufacturers, ensure inde-
 
22 In the automotive industry is the term ‘finance captives’ predominately used for the OEMs financial services 
subsidiaries. 
23 Balloon financing is a type of loan that does not fully amortize over its contract period, which means that there 
is a balloon payment at the end of the contract required to repay the outstanding amount. Balloon financing prod-
ucts can be attractive to short-term borrowers, as they usually have lower interest rates than loans with longer 
terms. For further information, cf. Keller (2013); Schill & Spengler (2010, p. 106). 
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pendency, financial stability and have a pivotal role in their global car sales strategies. Based on the 
analysis of the AKA (2013) [Arbeitskreis der Banken und Leasinggesellschaften der Automobil-
wirtschaft] I was able to identify key areas that outline the strategic importance of financial services 
subsidiaries for their parent OEMs as summarized in Figure 3: 
 
 
Figure 3:  The importance of automotive financial services for OEMs. 
Source:  Own Illustration. 
 
Financial stability and central bank funding: In comparison to other subsidiaries, financial subsidi-
aries have access to additional refinancing sources through the securitization of debts (ABS: Asset 
backed securities), customer deposits, central bank facilities or the access towards the interbank mar-
ket (cf. VW Financial Services, 2015). Today more than 90% of Fortune 500 businesses own at least 
one captive and more than every second listed DAX company owns a full bank license (cf. Banham, 
2018; Gusbeth, 2010). An own banking license secures the OEMs direct access towards central bank 
accounts and therefore also direct access towards finance recourses and central bank guarantees. 
Finance captives secure appropriate risk diversification within multinationals (cf. Banham, 2018). I 
conclude that such governmental support measures for financial services subsidiaries also influences 
the OEMs credit ratings in a positive way.24 
 
Securitization: Investigations indicate that subsidiaries have a positive effect towards the OEMs bal-
ance sheets in terms of the total assets, revenues, total equity, and EBIT (cf. Mayer et. al., 2012, p. 7). 
Apart from this, car loans and leasing receivables for end customers and dealers can also be securit-
ized in e.g. asset backed securities (ABS).25 They are easy to manage, reliably predictable and pro-
 
24 Standard & Poor’s (2013) consider in their company rating assessments the probability of governmental sup-
port measures. Therefore, they evaluate for the investment rating three factors: systemic importance of the fi-
nance captive; the probability for governmental support measures of “private-sector commercial banks” and the 
rating of the particular country”. 
25 An asset-backed security (ABS) is a financial security collateralized by a pool of assets such as automobile 
loans or leases. For investors, ABS are an alternative to investing in corporate debt. An ABS is similar to a mort-
gage-backed security, except that the underlying securities are not mortgage-based (cf. Castro, 2017; Fabozzi, 
2016, p. 105 f.; Hu, 2011). ABS transactions transfer the default risk towards the buyer and therefore the agreed 
deductible provides the leverage effect for the risk management of the financial services subsidiaries. Hereby it is 
crucial to understand that its value depends on the customer’s default risk and not on the OEM´s credit rating. 
The general low level of credit defaults leads to competitive securitization conditions (cf. Calabro, 2015). 
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vide stable cash flows and are furthermore an important refinancing source for the OEMs (cf. Fiedler, 
2015).26 As already mentioned, an active residual value management provides additional profit capa-
bilities for OEMs and their car dealers. A securitization of residual values is possible, but more com-
plex and costly than the securitization of receivables (cf. Calabro, 2015). 
Apart from that, some studies outline that securitizations have a positive effect on the liquidity situa-
tion. A debit reduction results in a higher equity ratio and reduces the calculated costs of equity. More-
over, the customer relationship is not affected and the financial services subsidiary is responsible for 
the debt collection of the receivables.27  
 
Sustainable credit rating: The OEMs credit ratings are volatile and reflect the cyclical automotive 
business and volatile market dynamics. Strong financial services subsidiaries provide an instrument 
for OEMs to get a more cyclical independent finance rating of external credit rating agencies.28 
OEMs without financial services subsidiaries have to manage the funding by themselves, which is 
often more expensive compared to financial services subsidiaries (cf. e.g., the studies of Standard & 
Poor’s, 2013; Strategy& PWC, 2015). If the OEM shifts his equity capital towards a financial services 
subsidiary with a full bank license, it can arrange refinancing to comparatively favorable conditions.29  
 
Effective risk management: Financial services subsidiaries, which finance products of their corpo-
rate parents, can usually generate better risk assessments than external banks. Automotive financial 
services subsidiaries possess better history databases of their vehicle models, their price develop-
ments and general insights in the automotive industry, which results in better-calculated price estima-
tions and reduced residual value risks for the OEMs (cf. Asyaeva et al., 2016; Pierce, 2011, p. 4 f.).30 
For traditional banks it is more challenging to assess the risk potential of a ‘vehicle’ than for financial 
services subsidiaries of an OEM.31  
 
 
 
26 Typical ABS programs as described above are e.g. the Driver (Volkswagen Bank), Bavarian Sky (BMW Bank), 
Silver Arrow (Daimler Financial Services) or Global Drive (Ford Credit). According to my analysis is the share of 
ABS transaction of the financial receivables e.g. at BMW 14 percent; Volkswagen 15 percent, Daimler 6.8 per-
cent. For further information, cf. Annual Reports of BMW AG (2012-2015); Daimler AG (2012-2015).  
27 The study of Benmelech et al. (2016) provides evidence that the collapse of the asset-backed commercial pa-
per market reduced the financing capacity of nonbank lenders (e.g. captive leasing companies) in the automotive 
industry. They argue that the decline in auto sales during the financial crisis was caused in part by a credit supply 
shock driven by the illiquidity of the crucial consumer finance providers in the auto loan market. 
28 The integration of commission-based products generates additional revenue streams, which are independent of 
the interest rate business (cf. Swoboda, 2013, p. 205 ff.). Financing products (e.g. loans or leasing products) 
generate a stable and predictable cash flow (compared to direct cash purchase) and have usually longer contract 
periods (cf. Haecker & Stenner, 2015, p. 79 ff.). 
29 For example, the Volkswagen Bank was rated in 2015 by Moody’s with the investment grade A1 and the 
Volkswagen Group by A3 (cf. Volkswagen AG, 2015). In this sense, the ratings of financial services subsidiaries 
and their parent companies usually correlate, but can be cushioned by integrating finance instruments, which are 
not covered with the credit rating of the company (e.g. ABS, customer deposits, equity capital). Standard & Poor’s 
(2013, p. 3 f.) outlines that „[…] [a]n auto subsidiary with higher intrinsic creditworthiness than its parent and inde-
pendent, diversified funding could benefit from a favorable rating differentiation.“ 
30 The residual value indicates the calculated market value of the vehicle in terms of resale of the leased vehicle 
after the expired contract. 
31 Consequently, external banks have to calculate with higher risk premiums, which lead to a sustainable competi-
tive advantage for the OEMs (cf. Bennett & Pierce, 2015; Pollhammer, 2010). This better residual value risk cal-
culation provides another competitive advantage for financial services subsidiaries (cf. Pierce, 2011, p. 1). 
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Brand loyalty and holding period: Studies showed three benefits of the upselling of financing prod-
ucts for the OEM in particular: Higher brand loyalty, shorter vehicle holding periods and superior 
equipment of the sold vehicles (cf. Haecker & Stenner, 2013; 2015; Ebel & Hofer, 2014; Diehlmann & 
Haecker, 2013). The BMW Group discovered that the average brand loyalty of their leasing customers 
is, with an average of twelve years, two years longer compared to direct cash purchase customers 
and that, during this period of time, leasing customers enter four new leasing contracts on average 
(compared to two contracts in case of cash purchase) (cf. AKA, 2013).32 
 
Business development and new customer segments: The automotive industry has to face many 
challenges, and continuous changes increase the pressure on the traditional business models of car 
manufacturers.33 Financial services subsidiaries provide OEMs the opportunity to gain new customers 
(cf. BMW AG, 2013, p. 31 f.). The main objective of such a multi-brand approach is to attract new, not 
very brand loyal customers with professional customer relationship management activities and sell 
them the own OEMs vehicles.34 On the one hand, those business models also help to reduce the dis-
count pressure, because own financing products (e.g. car loans or leasing) help to differentiate the 
pricing from competitors. On the other hand, this helps OEMs to limit discount pressure in competition 
with other OEMs (cf. AKA, 2013; Haecker & Stenner, 2013, p. 14). 
In addition, the financial services subsidiaries play an increasingly relevant role within the entire value 
added chain of a car manufacturer. Diehlmann & Haecker (2012, p. 1 ff.) highlight the fact that auto-
motive related financial services help OEMs to expand their products and services among the whole 
value chain of a vehicle.35 
 
Trend from car ownership towards usage: Especially in urban areas with high educational levels 
and among younger people, car ownership is no longer recognized as a status symbol or basic re-
quirement for mobility.36 This is what drives forward alternative user and mobility concepts, like leasing 
or car sharing (cf. Berret, 2016, p. 18). Considering the demographic changes as an increasing num-
ber of smaller households and aging population, there will be an increasing demand for alternative 
mobility and user concepts in future. The trend towards digitalization and car usage brings up new 
competitors and continuously increasing complexity, but also new business opportunities for OEMs 
and their financial services business models (cf. Van Wijnen, 2014; Kessler & Buck, 2017).  
 
32 Ebel & Hofer (2014, p. 532) also illustrated that the upselling potential towards leasing customers for additional 
equipment is on average 26 percent higher compared to a cash buyer. Berret (2016, p. 31) also provides evi-
dence that on average leasing customers buy additional equipment in the total amount of EUR 2000. 
33 Several authors contribute this discussion and examine the various challenges of the automotive industry: Proff 
& Fojcik (2016); Parment (2016); Zingrebe et al., (2016); Gaiardelli et al., (2014). 
34 Different market analyses have shown that many investment customers (e.g. for saving accounts) of financial 
services subsidiaries are driving cars of foreign brands. This insight provides another huge crossover business 
opportunity for the multi brand concept of OEMs and provides a great potential to generate new business income 
(cf. IBM Global Business Services, 2012, p 1 ff.). 
35 Automotive financial services provide an important contribution particularly in the following steps of the vehicle 
value chain: (1) Importer and dealer financing; (2) Finance and leasing of end customers; (3) Insurance services; 
(4) Aftersales, repair and maintenance; (5) Remarketing activities. For further information, cf. Diehlmann & 
Haecker (2012, p. 1 ff.); AKA (2013). 
36 For further information, cf. the latest study results of Burghard & Dütschke (2018); Shaheen et al. (2018); 
Münzel et al. (2019). 
 23 
 
So far most of the OEMs subsidiary models target the demands of the dealers and the end customers 
and gain crucial insights regarding e.g. service culture, customer processes and service products. 
They have realized the key role of service orientation for future sales (cf. Cohen & Kietzmann, 2014). 
Studies confirm the shift of the traditional car manufacturers towards full service providers, where au-
tomotive financial services plays a crucial role (cf. Diehlmann & Haecker, 2012, p. 237 ff.; Kessler & 
Stephan, 2013).37 Some OEMs already go beyond that and have announced the shift towards a mobil-
ity service provider, where financial services will play a decisive key role (cf. Li & Voege, 2017; Van 
Wijnen 2014; Heukrath, 2015). 
 
Stable profit contribution: The automotive industry has to face many challenges and OEMs diversify 
their business models with financial services and target new, profitable business models.38 Financial 
services subsidiaries generate additional profits and help to stabilize the profit situation in economical-
ly uncertain times. The recent financial crisis 2008/2009 illustrated that the creditworthiness and resid-
ual values drop when new vehicle sales weaken (cf. Bodnaruk et al., 2016). The automotive industry 
heavily depends on the overall economic situation.39 On average, solely financial service subsidiaries 
generate between 25 and 40 percent of the overall OEM profits (cf. Haecker & Stenner, 2013, p. 8). A 
newer study of Bodnaruk et al. (2016) calculates that captives generate about 17 percent of parent’s 
net income. In addition, I found out that the expansion to banking and insurance products secures a 
stable profit contribution, as they are not directly affected from cyclical economic fluctuations like the 
traditional car sales business, which has in turn also positive implications on the credit and investment 
rating of the parent OEMs. 
 
To sum up, the different clusters illustrate the importance of the financial services business for car 
manufacturers. It seems that currently particularly the technical product, branding and the close rela-
tionship with the subsidiaries characterize the current value of an OEM. Digital networks between 
driver, vehicle, OEM, commerce and other service providers (e.g. insurer, assistance etc.) on the one 
hand and changing customer characteristics for mobility solutions on the other hand have rapidly 
changed the automotive industry. The financial services business plays a major role within the recent 
transformation of the automotive industry – away from a pure car manufacturer towards a full-service 
mobility provider in the near future – and indicates a value proposition for the OEMs that has to be 
proven in the upcoming years. 
 
After the analysis of the automotive financial services business model, in the next section I will now 
focus on the organizational setup. The in-depth understanding of the automotive financial services and 
its organizational setup are essential prerequisites for the development of a respective corporate gov-
ernance model that fits in regard to the specific characteristics of the automotive industry. 
 
37 This view is also supported from others: Schumacher (2017); Berret (2016); Hung et al. (2016); Becker (2015); 
Bandmann (2015); Brünglinghaus (2015); Berger (2014); Ruthardt (2014); Kessler & Stephan (2013); Meyer et al. 
(2012). 
38 Challenges are e.g. many saturated markets in the most important sales regions, global overcapacities, high 
investment costs for research and development, new competitors, increased competition and shrinking profits (cf. 
Mounce & Nelson, 2019; Crick, 2018; Laurischkat et al., 2017). 
39 For example, in the year of the financial crisis the financial services subsidiary of the Daimler Group generated 
a profit of around EUR 457 Mio. – a share of 32 percent of the total OEM profits in 2008 (cf. Daimler AG, 2008) 
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2.2.2 The organizational setup of automotive financial services entities 
The results of the last subchapter form the foundation of this subchapter, which analyses the organiza-
tional setup of financial services organizations within OEM structures as a further fundamental pillar of 
this dissertation. 
The organizational structure of a company includes the vertical and horizontal divided system of com-
petencies that are defined as general framework to ensure the clear allocation of the regular tasks (cf. 
Von Stein & Terrahe, 2013, p. 17). While the vertical perspective of an organizational structure defines 
the degree of delegation, the horizontal perspective covers the specific division of the competencies. 
The highest hierarchy level of the global organizational model influences the structure of the lower 
hierarchy levels of the specific organizational subdivisions (cf. Schewe, 2015). In other words, the 
organizational structure can be defined as a system of regulations within an organization.  
Nevertheless, each multinational group has its own organizational design, arising out of their company 
history, their performed business model and other company specific factors (cf. Von Stein & Terrahe, 
2013, p. 18 ff.). Particularly in multinational groups the influence and competence adjustments also 
depend on the legal structure of the company and can be differentiated between legal and structural 
variations.40 In line with the results of subchapter 2.1.3, Meyer et al. (2011) also found that there is a 
great necessity for multinational groups to face growing challenges in managing the complexity of their 
large subsidiary networks. Multinational organizations must manage ‘multiple embeddedness’ across 
heterogeneous contexts in the headquarters and the subsidiary level. 
Besides that, Hartmann-Wendels et al. (2013, p. 714) highlights that strict legal and regulatory re-
quirements exist for bank subsidiaries, regarding the design of the organizational structures, business 
processes and control instruments that have to be considered. Those tightened external legal and 
regulatory requirements lead to additional efforts for the general management and monitoring of the 
subsidiaries, including additional supervisory requirements and increased coordination efforts. Com-
pared to other organizations, it is another unique characteristic of banks that their business processes 
have to be designed from a customer´s centric perspective (cf. Hartmann-Wendels et al., 2013, p. 
714). It is expected that there are internal control mechanisms, such as the four-eye principle or a 
clear segregation of duty for credit decisions between sales and operations or finance and risk de-
partments, that are stringently implemented (cf. Ehmanns, 2015). In sum, all those unique characteris-
tics have strong implications on the organizational setup of financial institutes. 
 
The fact that the financial services business has to be embedded into the group construct of an OEM, 
which is traditionally more focused on the value chain of their vehicle, results in additional complexity 
that has to be taken into account.41 On the one hand, the trend towards a stronger interaction and 
more interdependencies between the automotive financial services and the traditional OEM business 
results in greater complexity within the organizational management of the group. On the other hand, 
the increasing professionalization and constantly rising business volumes of the automotive financial 
 
40 A comprehensive overview about the different multinational types provide Emmerich & Habersack (2013); 
Scheffler (2004, 6 ff.); Theisen (2000, p. 6 ff.); Werder (1995, p. 147 ff.). 
41 The combination of traditional car business and financial services business model is characterized by high 
complexity (e.g. due to the high coordination efforts required for the interface management of the global supply 
chain or the interlink between the production and services business), dynamic and comparatively high instability, 
which also affects the organizational structures (cf. Bauer, 2015). 
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services business leads to more attention of the regulators and national supervisory authorities. Driven 
from those developments, many OEMs have started to decouple their financial services businesses 
from the traditional car business to ensure a certain degree of independency. While this secures a 
better management of the risk portfolio and more flexibility to comply with the various legal and regula-
tory requirements for financial institutes, it further helps to serve additional customer groups (cf. Bauer, 
2015).  
Thus, many OEMs transformed their financial services business towards diversified financial services 
providers. They setup different types of subsidiaries for either the professional fleet management of 
their corporate customers, the full service leasing, banking, insurance activities or even the multi make 
car financing of other brands.42 This secures flexibility to respond to local legal and regulatory re-
quirements, but at the same time also adds significant organizational complexity for the typical global 
matrix organizations of the OEMs (cf. Bauer, 2015). 
 
This subchapter 2.2.2 analyzed the organizational consequences for financial services subsidiaries. 
Altogether, the last two subchapters highlight the necessity of a professional governance management 
to ensure transparency, clear roles and responsibilities in such multi-dimensional environment. The 
next chapter 2.3 examines the term corporate governance as another basic prerequisite for the pur-
pose of this dissertation. 
 
2.3 Corporate governance 
This subchapter 2.3 aims to reflect the status of the current corporate governance discussion. The 
subchapter 2.3.1 clarifies the term general management as proper foundation for the definition of cor-
porate governance in subchapter 2.3.2. In the following, corporate governance approaches (subchap-
ter 2.3.3) and the general effects of corporate governance mechanisms (subchapter 2.3.4) are ana-
lyzed. Hereafter, subchapter 2.3.5 debates the importance of functioning corporate governance prac-
tice in financial institutions. 
 
2.3.1 Definition of general management 
This section of 2.3 starts with an examination of the foundations of general management, including the 
value creation as the ultimate maxim of all business activities. A common understanding of the term 
“general management” forms, from my point of view, the foundation for the following discussion about 
the corporate governance definition.  
 
 
42 According to my analysis in Germany, three out of eleven members of the Arbeitskreis Automobilbanken (Ford 
Bank, RCI Banque, Banque PSA Finance, MKG Bank) are working as independent branches of their corporate 
parents. Seven automotive financial services subsidiaries (BMW Bank, Honda Bank, Mercedes Benz Bank, Toyo-
ta Kreditbank, Volkswagen Bank; FGA Bank, GMAC Bank) own a bank license and operate as independent sub-
sidiaries of their OEMs. Related financial services business activities, such as multi-make financing, fleet and full 
service leasing, are usually outsourced in own subsidiaries as the e.g. Alphabet Fleet Management (BMW Finan-
cial Services) or Daimler Fleet Management (Daimler Financial Services) illustrate. 
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To understand the definition of general management, it is at first important to examine the general 
objectives of companies. The long-term orientated production of goods and services is defined as 
the main purpose of companies (cf. Dillerup & Stoi, 2013, p. 4; Hax, 2005, p. 75). According to my 
literature research, there is consensus in management research that companies are a complex sys-
tem of objectives, members and activities, which try to achieve autonomous pre-defined objec-
tives.43 The members build a hierarchical social system, which is fitted to ensure a productive creation 
of services in its environment (cf. Dillerup & Stoi, 2013, p. 5; Ulrich, 2011, p. 42 ff.).  
In the literature, there are two different prevailing opinions regarding company objectives: First, sev-
eral scholars argue that the overall target of companies is to create benefits for the owners, because 
the invested capital has to create a higher return than other investments (cf. Hahn & Hugenberg, 
2001, p. 154 ff.). The shareholder value approach of Rappaport (1994; 1998; 1999) corresponds to 
this view and states that the initial objective is a long-term increase of the company value. A second 
group of authors find that the overarching goal is to manage the strategic main interests of the compa-
ny stakeholders (cf. Grant & Nippa, 2006, p. 63 ff.). This contrary view of some scholars follows the 
stakeholder value approach that is based on the initial assumptions of Freeman (1984) and Kosiol 
(1973, p. 301 ff.).44 Malik (2008a, p. 15 f. and 32 f.) even goes beyond that and outlines that the com-
petitive orientation is the basis for any corporate activity and argues that, for that reason the creation 
of customer value is the overarching objective of companies. Whereas the just mentioned approaches 
usually target one particular group (e.g. shareholders or customers), another group of authors follows 
a rather multidimensional perspective, in which different stakeholder groups are treated equally. 
Khadjavi (2005, p.16 f.), for example, combines both approaches and states that in a long-term per-
spective, the most successful approach is to concentrate on the maximization of the corporate value 
first and then share the created value in a second step. 
 
Besides providing clarity about the corporate objectives, management is an important element of 
general management.45 It covers all functional tasks and activities for the design, steering and devel-
opment of the company system to achieve the set corporate objectives (cf. Dillerup & Stoi, 2013, p .9). 
For the purpose of this dissertation, I follow a modified stakeholder approach that defines manage-
ment as an instrument to create added value (cf. Becker, 1996, p. 60 ff.). Consequently, general 
management is a prerequisite to generate income and increase long-term company value (cf. Becker, 
2009, p. 41 ff.; Becker et al., 2009, p. 267 ff.).  
 
43 Kieser & Walgenbach (2010, p. 26) provide a comprehensive overview about further clusters for companies: 
Targets, industry, product portfolio, legal form or size, d 
44 Freeman (1984, p. 284) summarizes that the business environment gets always more complex and thus, if 
firms aim to successfully meet those challenges, they have to begin to adapt ‘integrative strategic management 
processes’ which take into account external forces within the decision-making of the managers. Kosiol (1973, p. 
301 f.) highlights in his definition for the term ‘company’ that they are primary characterized by concentrating on 
the fulfillment of foreign demand coverage.  
45 The term ‘leadership’ is often applied for ‘management’: This usually includes the development of visions, strat-
egies and meaningfulness orientation for the strategic direction of the company. At its core, leadership motivates 
the employees, defines the purpose of working and lays the basis for a common identification with the company. 
The term ‘management’ covers more the implementation of the strategic measures and has to solve potential 
implementation problems (cf. Kruse, 2013; Northouse, 2015; Daft, 2014). ‘General management’ covers both, 
leadership and management characteristics and in the best case, they supplement each other (cf. Dillerup & Stoi, 
2013, p. 8). 
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Value creation is defined as the harmonization of strategy, culture and structure within the overall 
company framework (cf. Rüegg-Sturm & Grand 2013; Malik 2008b, p. 337). In this context, Ulrich 
(2011, p. 44 f.) outlines that the locomotion function has to concentrate on a permanent value orien-
tated adjustment. 
 
There is no predominant understanding for the term general management among the recent litera-
ture.46 Although there often is a common equal usage of “management” (cf. Drucker, 2008, p. 1 ff.) 
and “general management” there has to be a clear differentiation between those terms (cf. Dillerup & 
Stoi, 2013, p. 6 ff.). Macharzina & Wolf (2005) argue that general management consists of functional, 
institutional and process orientated elements. General management comprises the business man-
agement´s related tasks and activities, institutional aspects including management organs and per-
sons. Process related aspects define certain proceedings, which cover all management activities. 
According to Heinen (1971, p. 429 ff.) general management targets the questions how tasks have to 
be coordinated within the company and how a sustainable corporate development can be organized. 
Ulrich & Probst (1988, p. 233 ff.) are more specific and describe general management with its com-
plexity, openness, connectivity, rules, development capacity and steering ability. 
Nevertheless, Dillup & Stoi (2013, p. 11) define general management more generically and include all 
tasks and responsibilities for the target-oriented planning, control and supervision for the target orien-
tated creation, steering and development of the company. In addition, they incorporate an explicit 
leadership dimension and the consideration of various stakeholder groups within their functional un-
derstanding of a general management.  
Another contrary view is provided by Hungenberg & Wulf (2015, p. 19 ff.), who outline in particular the 
coordination function of the general management. They explain the necessity of the senior manage-
ment to coordinate the actions of the organizational members towards a common objective and to 
align their interaction to ensure an efficient task fulfillment. They argue that general management 
comprises the entire decision-making processes (planning, steering, control) and its execution within 
the organization.47 
 
To secure a comprehensive general management definition, I combine the different understandings of 
Hungenberg & Wulf (2015, p. 19 ff.), Dillup & Stoi (2013, 11), Becker (2007, p. 32) and Ulrich (2011, p. 
44). I argue that general management is a structurally and functionally orientated value creation, pro-
cess-oriented control and regulation as well as a behavior-orientated guidance and coordination, 
based on the flexible business activities of an organization. Moreover, the locomotion function aims to 
secure a sustainable value creation. 
 
 
46 Further common terms are ‘management’, ‘company politics’ or ‘company administration’. A solid foundation 
provides Macharzina & Wolf (2005). Dillerup & Stoi (2013, p. 10) provide also a comprehensive overview about 
the different definitions of the term general management.  
47 Their argumentation is based on the cybernetic model (planning, decision, control) from Wild (1974, p. 37) and 
the explanations of Hahn & Hungenberg (2001, p. 28 ff.). The cybernetic model helps to concrete the steering 
function. 
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In sum, the different functions of general management can be managed with several instruments and 
are clearly subordinated over the whole organization.48 In contrast, the management function uses 
specific management instruments like e.g. the controlling for the locomotion function. Keeping this 
general management understanding in mind, it provides a solid foundation for the next subchapter to 
go further and define what corporate governance exactly is. 
 
2.3.2 Definition of corporate governance 
There is no generally applicable definition about corporate governance found among scholars and 
researcher of business science or entrepreneurial practice (cf. Ntim, 2018; Tricker, 2015, p. 30; 
Wendt, 2011, p. 72; Bassen & Zöllner, 2007, p. 94). Nevertheless, corporate governance is one of the 
most discussed management topics in the last 20 years (cf. Werder, 2015, p. 3; Hopt, 2011a). One of 
the main reasons for this phenomenon is that corporate governance is often explained and investigat-
ed from the perspective of different disciplines, such as legal sciences, audit, accounting, manage-
ment, organizational behavior, politics, philosophy and sociology (cf. Tricker, 2015, p. 30). Conse-
quently, the current governance discussion considers a multidimensional variety of corporate govern-
ance characteristics, which lead to different broad corporate governance definitions.49 In the recent 
past, particularly listed companies have been in the limelight, because they have obvious governance 
problems. Nonetheless, some researchers have already started to investigate other legal forms, SMEs 
and family run companies regarding their specific corporate governance requirements (e.g., Werder, 
2015, p. 5; Ciampi, 2015; Gnan et al., 2015; Hopt, 2003; Weissenberger et al., 2006; Ingley & McCaf-
frey, 2007; Jaskiewicz & Klein, 2007; Uhlaner et al., 2007; Van den Heuvel et al., 2007). The corporate 
governance discussion can be largely divided in the legal and management perspective (cf. Ulrich, 
2011, p. 56; Just, 2007, p. 8 f.; Hopt & Wohlmannstetter, 2011, p. 1). For this dissertation, the man-
agement perspective is relevant and the legal aspects are solely considered if they have relevance for 
business management and will be incorporated into the relevant position in this dissertation.50 
 
In the management literature, both very broad and very narrow corporate governance definitions 
are available (cf. Ntim, 2018; Ballwieser, 2009, p. 93 ff.; Hausch, 2013, p. 34 ff.). It is apparent that 
across all definitions, the basic system of management and control of companies and their involved 
counterparts executing those functions play a crucial role (cf. Ulrich 2011, p. 56). The first corporate 
governance debate started with the insights of Smith (1776) in terms of the separation of work and 
financing. Berle & Means (1932) are the founders of the modern corporate governance understanding 
as well as the starting point of corporate governance discussion in the 70ies, which was primary driven 
from American scholars in the Anglo-Saxon countries (e.g., Oehler & Wendt, 2007, p. 123 ff.; William-
son, 1985, p. 135 f.; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Zingales, 1998, p. 497; Clarke, 
2004, p. 154). 
 
48 A comprehensive overview about suitable management instruments provides Rigby & Bilodeau (2015); Hilb 
(2012); Schawel & Billing (2014). 
49 Further reasons for the different corporate governance definitions arise out of the fact that this phenomenon is 
investigated out of different research perspectives. This leads inevitable to different definitions (cf. McNulty et al., 
2013, p. 183 ff.). 
50 For a similar justification, cf. Koeberle-Schmid (2011, p. 4). 
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Shleifer & Vishny (1997, p. 737) and Gerum et al. (2007) follow a more narrow understanding of 
corporate governance and argue that the increase of the corporate value alone, is the overarching 
goal of the shareholders.51 Wentges (2013, p. 73) outlines that it is a misinterpretation, if their defini-
tion gets limited to the shareholders, because based on a closer examination it also includes all out-
side creditors. The narrow corporate governance definition is dominated by the shareholder perspec-
tive and much discussed.52  
An alternative concept promotes the necessity to consider that all stakeholders of the company, what 
is a rather broad definition of corporate governance.53 Analog to the overarching objective of value 
creation in the shareholder model, the consideration of the stakeholder interests is recognized as 
an essential prerequisite to generate benefits.54 This includes companys’ political structures and 
internal processes, which ensure the economic value creation and legitimacy of the firm (cf. Mason & 
Simmons, 2014, p. 77 ff.; Eisenmann-Mittenzwei, 2006, p. 29). 
 
From a legal perspective, corporate governance also involves the corporate constitution, which 
focuses primarily on the internal regulations of a company (cf. Witt, 2013; Ballwieser, 2009, p. 93 
ff.). Witt (2013, p. 1) and Salzberger et al. (1997) equate the term corporate constitution and corporate 
governance. The corporate constitution covers the responsibilities and action sphere of all relevant 
economic subjects and their interaction (cf. Brose, 1984, p. 39). 55 Bühner (2004, p. 371) specifies the 
corporate constitution as the legal framework related to ownership-, management- and control rights 
within a company. In addition, Gerum et al. (2007, p. 124) complement the individual contract based 
solutions. For that reason, I argue that corporate governance involves the optimized creation and 
steering of all relevant structures and processes of the planning, decision-making and control 
structures within the organization. 
Today the corporate governance understanding goes beyond the purely legally driven interpretation of 
the corporate constitution and also comprises leadership, management-related processes and 
structures (cf. Bain & Band, 2016, p. 25; Berrar, 2001, p. 24; Hopt, 2011, p. 4 f.). Nowadays there is 
no doubt that the other stakeholder interests within the external relationships of companies towards 
e.g. competitors, investors, company owners, suppliers, customers, employees, managers and the 
society have to be considered, too (cf. Witt 2013, p. 6 ff.). 
Consequently, I summarize that corporate governance practice has no clear defined framework. As 
Witt (2013, p. 1), Ulrich (2011, p. 59) and Früh (1999, p. 11) accurately describe, the term of corporate 
 
51 The theoretical foundation for corporate governance is based on the principle agent theory of Jensen & Merking 
(1976). Several others follow this argumentation, e.g. Paetzmann (2015, p. 6); Ulrich (2011, p. 57); Pölert (2007); 
Deakin (2005, p. 12). 
52 For example, Ulrich (2011, p. 57) outlines that the solely consideration of the shareholder interests as the major 
point of criticism. 
53 From a timeline perspective, it seems that the narrow perspective is a further development of the rather broad 
corporate governance definition due to the recognized inefficiencies. Driven from the recent financial crisis and 
several prominent company failures a greater stakeholder orientation gets again more important as the latest 
initiatives of many standard setters and regulators demonstrate (cf. Hopt 2011; Tihanyi et al., 2014). Further sup-
port provides e.g. the conflict theoretical approach of Schewe (2005, p. 200 ff.). 
54 Cf. e.g. the studies of Mason & Simmons (2014, p. 77 ff.); Müller-Stewens & Lechner (2002, p. 10 ff.); Pfriem 
(2008, p. 493). In addition, the Cadbury Committee promotes a broader corporate governance definition as “… a 
system by which companies are directed and controlled” (Cadbury Committee, 2002, p.1). 
55 Brose (1984, p. 44 f.) clustered the corporate constitution into the following elements: Corporate regulations, 
corporate finance, co-determination, employee capital sharing, accounting and publicity, laws and regulation. 
 30 
 
governance is still very vague and under development and depends largely on the different research 
disciplines involved. Regardless, I will introduce an own corporate governance definition at the end of 
this chapter for the purpose of this dissertation. The interpretation of corporate governance and the 
company specific regulations are influenced by the cultural background and micro- and macroeconom-
ic environment of the company. They are the key driver that in general two different corporate govern-
ance systems have been developed, even if they always have different local peculiarities (cf. Tricker, 
2015, p. 31 ff.; Becker & Ulrich, 2008, p. 261; Simberova et al., 2012). 
 
This dissertation makes no detailed analysis of a country specific corporate governance system, but 
for reasons of clarity and comprehensibility, I will shortly outline the differences between the German 
corporate governance system as representative for the stakeholder or control approach (dual 
system) and the American model as prototype for the shareholder model (monistic system).56 
 
Rappaport (1994) transferred the classical capital market theory approaches towards general man-
agement. The hereby-justified shareholder value approach emphasizes the special role of share-
holders among other stakeholder groups.57 The basic assumption is the discount of payment surplus-
es to the present tense. The initial starting point is that company owners have a positive reaction if 
they can expect a company value increase and therefore higher payouts of dividends. This means that 
the company success is directly linked with dividends and the investigations of Fishers separation 
theorem (cf. Fisher, 1930).58 Particularly in Germany critics argue, that the shareholder value ap-
proach ignores other important interest groups like e.g. employees, which provide a significant contri-
bution for the value creation of the company (cf. Ballwieser, 2009, p. 95; Ulrich, 2011, p. 61).59 
The opposite view is the stakeholder-orientated approach.60 Especially Kosiol (1973, p. 301) out-
lined the importance to consider the interests of various stakeholder groups in external financing deci-
sions. Freeman (2010, p. 46) defines stakeholders as “…any group who can affect or is affected by 
the achievement of the company’s objectives”. The initial argumentation is that a company is a coali-
tion of different interest groups with the common target to secure the survival of the company and that 
it cannot be defined by mathematical derivations (cf. Ulrich 2011, p. 62).61 I argue that a joint target 
definition among the different interest groups is difficult or even impossible to formulate, because it is 
not defined how to deal with potential conflicts of interests. A maximization of the stakeholder value for 
selected stakeholder groups is not possible without target conflicts, because the interests of one 
stakeholder group can to a certain degree only be maximized at the expense of others (cf. Jensen, 
2001, p. 297 ff.). However, the consideration of multitude stakeholder interests without prioritization 
 
56 Koslowski (2013) and Skrzipek (2015, p. 9 ff.) provides a comprehensive overview about the recent debate 
among the shareholder value approach. 
57 In addition, several other authors follow the shareholder approach. Representing others: Donaldson & Davis 
(1991), Lewis et al., (1994); Copeland et al.,(1994). 
58 For the Fisher’s theorem and corporate governance, cf. Kelsey & Milne (2008). 
59A contrary view provides Bühner (1993, p. 221 f.) who argues that the often mentioned single shareholder orien-
tation is not correct, due to the fact that the shareholder income (dividend) is a residual figure, which is calculated 
on the basis of the profit loss account (after e.g. the salaries, interest of foreign capital etc.). 
60 For a comprehensive overview about the recent debate of the stakeholder value approach, cf. Skrzipek (2015, 
p. 47 ff.); Mason & Simmons (2014). Merits and limitations are discussed from Pacala (2012). 
61 There are also authors who criticize the stakeholder orientation. E.g. Fritz et al. (1985) argue that they could not 
prove in the target setting of companies a single dominance of the profit orientation. For a comprehensive sum-
mary about critical aspects of the stakeholder approach cf. Bischoff (2013, p. 170 ff.). 
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increases the complexity and requirements for a target-focused general management (cf. Khadjavi, 
2005, p. 15 ff.). While Ulrich (2011, p. 63) states that both approaches follow opposite assumptions, 
Bischoff (2013 p. 82) argues that the stakeholder value approach is solely a modified shareholder 
value perspective. Others argue that the shareholder approach is more favorable due to economic 
efficiency reasons (cf. Karmasin, 2015, p. 341; Wolff, 2013 p. 4 ff.; Khadjavi, 2005, p. 16 f.). The fol-
lowing table 1 provides a tabular comparison of both approaches: 
 
Dimension Stakeholder approach Shareholder approach 
Objective Value maximization for all stakeholders Shareholder value maximization  
General structure Team orientated productivity model Principal agent model 
Performance meas-
urement 
Fair distribution of the created value, maximizing 
the difference between incentives and input of all 
stakeholders 
Shareholder value 
Residual risk holder All stakeholders Shareholders only 
Stakeholder influence More stakeholders with influence of the govern-ance process 
Owners with influence of the 
governance process 
Table 1:  Characteristics of the stakeholder and shareholder approach. 
Source:  Compiled by the author, based on Bottenberg et al. (2017) and Hungenberg (2014, p. 30). 
 
A firms’ corporate governance framework is always defined by the particular corporate governance 
system. In an international perspective, the German corporate governance system is unique. While in 
the Anglo-American monistic model managers get primarily controlled by the market, German manag-
ers are additionally supervised by the different stakeholder groups like e.g. banks, employee repre-
sentatives or important customers (cf. Welge & Eulerich, 2014, p. 41 ff.). In Germany, a system of 
corporate control predominates governance mechanisms that primary aims on stakeholder relation-
ships and company internal control. 
 
In the last few years, some authors argue that only a combination of both approaches towards a hy-
brid model is beneficial to achieve long-term value creation (cf. Ntim, 2018; Hungenberg, 2014, p. 30). 
Hilb (2016; 2009, p. 21 ff.) and Tricker (2015, p. 30 ff.) are supporters of an integrated corporate 
governance perspective and outline the importance to consider elements of both approaches and 
recognize corporate governance as package with elements of both. They highlight the necessity to 
integrate the interests of customers, shareholders, the society and the employees in one framework. 
Hilb (2016, p. 10) defines corporate governance as a system “by which companies are strategically 
directed, integratively managed and holistically controlled in an entrepreneurial and ethical way in 
accordance with a particular context“. Hilb (2016) differentiates between a traditional and new corpo-
rate governance definition. He explains that the traditional corporate governance discussion does not 
distinguish between different national, industry or even company specific cultures and outlines the 
necessity to always design corporate governance in the individual context of the company. In a rather 
traditional view, the supervisory boards are primarily recognized as a control function, while the new 
corporate governance promotes a proactive involvement to support the general management and the 
company structuring.  
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Particularly in listed companies, there is often an isolated implementation of committees with a super-
vision approach that prefers a pure financially driven perspective instead of a more holistic success 
monitoring view, which also considers the different stakeholder groups (shareholders, customers and 
the public) (cf. Hilb, 2016). 
 
In the current business management research, I recognize a shift towards a more holistic and inte-
grated corporate governance perspective. While the traditional corporate governance definitions have 
been undifferentiated, the new understanding focuses on an industry specific, company individual and 
stakeholder oriented corporate governance (cf. Hilb, 2016). In the context of multinational corporate 
groups an integrative approach is crucial to reflect the different business models and the multiple local 
specifics in the host countries of the subsidiaries. Despite this, corporate governance is often equated 
with management and control (cf. Witt, 2001, p. 85; Dillerup & Stoi, 2013; Küting & Busch, 2009). 
However, as Becker (2009, p. 60) outlines, management control and supervision is a basic integrative 
instrument of general management and requires no separation.  
 
Due to the unique characteristics of multinational groups, in this dissertation, I follow the integrated 
view of Hilb, Tricker and Hungenberg. Additionally, I combine it with the general management under-
standing of Hungenberg & Wulf (2015), Dillup & Stoi (2013), Becker (2007) and Ulrich (2011) out of 
the foregone subchapter 2.3.1. I apply the following definition in this dissertation:  
 
Corporate governance is a framework for a long-term orientated general management, based on a 
sustainable and responsible value creation. It defines a system by which companies are strategically 
directed, integratively managed and holistically controlled in an entrepreneurial and ethical way in 
accordance with a particular context. Corporate governance includes structural and processual di-
mensions and covers both technical and behavior related elements. The structural dimension ad-
dresses the company’s internal and external structures that support the long-term value creation. The 
process dimension focuses on the design and value orientated steering of the internal company man-
agement (incl. supervision) and implementation processes.  
 
In the context of this thesis the intragroup corporate governance management comprises all measures 
and solutions that aim to ensure that the above mentioned target picture of corporate governance can 
be achieved on a group-wide basis. 
 
Based on this definition, I will examine different corporate governance approaches in the following 
subchapter 2.3.3. As the next subchapter will illustrate, the often critically discussed principal-agent 
theory plays a crucial role but is only recognized as one approach among several others that supports 
a better understanding of corporate governance.62 
  
 
62 According to Nippa & Grigoleit (2006) and Hilb (2009) are the major critics the assumption of a pessimistic 
human image or the solely consideration of extrinsic motivation.  
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2.3.3 Corporate governance approaches 
In the scientific literature, there are many approaches to explain corporate governance phenomena 
that are described in the prior chapter. Some scholars define approaches also as theories, but it 
seems questionable if all existing corporate governance approaches can really be described as com-
plete theories, when they are analyzed by the general accepted criteria for theories.63 This critic is 
supported by Wendt (2011, p. 75 f.); and Welge & Eulerich (2014, p. 9) who outline, too, that there is 
no general accepted theory to describe and explain the corporate governance criteria. I argue that the 
already mentioned multidisciplinary phenomena of corporate governance hinders the development of 
a uniform and comprehensive theory (cf. Welge & Eulerich, 2014, p. 7). Even so, various approaches 
exist, which have their origin in the diverse definitions, priorities and perspectives among scholars. 
Hilb (2016, p. 5) also critically scrutinizes that scholars often investigate corporate governance from 
the perspective of a certain theory and argues that the numerous undesirable developments in the 
past show that they are not appropriate to explain corporate governance phenomena.  
For that reason, this subchapter will provide a short overview about discussed corporate governance 
approaches and their analytical frameworks. In a first step, I will differentiate between the micro and 
macro perspective. While the macro perspective addresses a firm’s external environment and the 
institutional framework, the micro perspective concentrates on the company and internal corporate 
governance mechanisms and not the involved functions and individuals (cf. Charreaux, 2004; Wendt, 
2011, p. 76). In line with Oehler & Wendt (2007, p. 125 ff.), Letza et al. (2004) Learmount (2003) and 
Bassen & Zöllner (2007), in the internal corporate governance view (micro perspective), I distinguish 
between economic and organizational theoretic approaches. 
 
Economic approaches: Economic or financial approaches are based on the Principle Agent Theories 
and the new institutional economics.64 They address the typical problem of separation between own-
ership and control. They focus on the relationship between company owner and management body 
and the arising conflicts of interests. Economic approaches focus on the shareholder interest phe-
nomena and are usually developed on the assumptions of the shareholder approach or shareholder 
theory (cf. Denis, 2016). From a theoretical point of view, economic approaches can indeed take the 
interests of other stakeholder groups into account, but I found that in most cases solely the relation-
ship with outside creditors is considered. Wentges (2002, p. 146 ff.) analyzed that the majority of the 
economic approaches follow the shareholder perspective. 
 
Organizational-theoretic approaches: These approaches complement the corporate governance 
with organization-theoretic issues, such as the motivation of involved counterparts, organizational 
structures and processes or company-internal coordination. Furthermore, these approaches expand 
 
63 According to the definition of Wacker (1998) a scientific theory is characterized by the following four basic crite-
ria: conceptual definitions, domain limitations, relationship-building, and predictions. Further characteristics of a 
‘good’ theory are uniqueness, parsimony, conservation, generalizability, fecundity, internal consistency, empirical 
riskiness, and abstraction. 
64 For further details regarding the Principle Agent Theory, cf. Braun & Guston (2003, p. 302 f.); Holmstrom & 
Milgrom (1991, p. 24 ff.), Welge & Eulerich (2014, p, 9 ff.); Hilb (2009, p. 5 f.); Laffont & Martimort (2009, p. 347 
ff.); Ulrich (2009, p. 530 ff.); Lubatkin (2007, p. 64); Schneider (1987, p. 481). In particular Hoenen & Kostova 
(2015, p. 104 ff.) and Ambos et al. (2019) provide an interesting study regarding the impact of Principle Agent 
Theory in multinational companies.  
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their objectives beyond financial and efficiency objectives and include e.g. social objectives or the 
impact of power. The most popular approaches are the nominative and instrumental stakeholder ap-
proach of Jones (1995), the Stewardship and Trust Theory of Kay and Silberstein (1995).65 I classify 
the approaches that focus on the phenomena of information asymmetries and divergent knowledge in 
the knowledge-based approaches (cf. Teece et al., 1994, p. 2; Wendt, 2011, p. 91; Charreaux, 2004, 
p. 11). 
It seems impossible to discuss the institutional framework related approaches (macro perspec-
tive) completely independently from the micro approaches, because they influence the design of the 
internal company structures and processes. Micro approaches specify the general framework condi-
tions. The legal and regulatory corporate governance requirements define the general framework con-
ditions for companies, and therefore how corporate governance is managed. Wendt (2011, p. 78) 
points out that also the relationship between e.g. countries or financial systems plays an important role 
here. Inspired from the suggested clusters of Charreaux (2004, p. 18 ff.), I distinguished the ap-
proaches in four sub-peer groups: legal and financial view; political view; endowment view and socio 
cultural impact. 
Legal and financial view: Legal and finance related approaches investigate the consequences of the 
legal framework, the historical development and their possible causes. These studies investigate the 
implications and development of the financial system (cf. e.g., Erkens et al., 2012; Armstrong et al., 
2015). For example, a good investor protection can be used as indicator for the maturity level of the 
financial system (cf. Wendt, 2011, p. 77). In this context, many researchers investigate and compare 
legal systems with an Anglo-Saxon tradition (common law) and the civil law based systems (cf. e.g., 
the studies of Glaeser & Sheifer, 2002; La Porta et al., 1997; 1998; 1999a; 1999b, 2000; Charreaux, 
2004, p. 21; Licht et al., 2005; Lin et al., 2016; Megginson & Sitorus, 2018). Another important topic 
are country specific comparisons of the legal frameworks regarding the rights of investors and their 
role within the strategy-setting process and the impact of co-determination (cf. e.g., McCahery et al., 
2016; Pratheepkanth et al., 2016; Aguilera & Crespi-Cladera, 2016). 
 
Political view: These scholars discuss basic political ideas and potential restrictions in terms of their 
influence of a corporate governance framework in different countries and in their comparison to each 
other (cf. Pagano & Volpin, 2000; Charreaux, 2004). Such authors focus on the strong influence of 
managers on the corporate governance mechanisms as a consequence of the historical strong influ-
ence (control functions) of the shareholders or the limitation of equity shares for certain financial insti-
tutions (e.g. investment banks) (cf. e.g., the analysis of Wendt, 2011, p. 78; Roe, 1990; 1994; 1997; 
Joseph et al., 2014; Blies, 2013; Dicks, 2012; Marquis & Lee, 2013, p. 483 ff.; Dimopoulos & Wagner, 
2016). Further reasons are ideologically and interest driven political issues which have firstly been 
investigated by Charreaux (2004, p. 25) or Roe (1990, p. 24 ff.). However, the strong influence of 
 
65 For further information regarding the instrumental stakeholder approach, cf. Jones et al. (2018); Jones (1995); 
Freeman (1999). For further information regarding the Stewardship Theory, cf. Contrafatto (2014); Madison 
(2014); Davis et al. (1997, p. 20 ff.); Donaldson & Davis (1991). For further information regarding the Trust Theo-
ry, cf. Welge & Eulerich (2014), Oehler & Wendt (2007, p. 132 ff.); Learmount (2002, p. 14); Learmount (2003, p. 
165); Davis et al. (2004, p. 118). 
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managers seems not to be helpful for the economic development, because incentive schemes, acqui-
sition activities and the competition among the market participants have a disciplinary effect and inter-
vene as a corrective for the performed management activities (cf. Wendt, 2011, p. 79; Charreaux, 
2004, p. 25). Other authors investigate the different implications of a more social democratic and liber-
al view and its consequences for corporate governance or the political influence of selected stake-
holders and suitable structures of the political institutions (cf. Roe, 2000; 2001; Rajan & Zingales, 
2003; Pagano & Volpin, 2005). I found that the financial and political view are not always contrary and 
often overlap (cf. Wendt, 2011, p. 79; Roe, 2002; 2003). Other studies indicate that economic and 
political issues are the key drivers for corporate governance and not – as often suggested - the legal 
and regulatory framework (cf. e.g., Siregar & Rudyanto, 2016; Soleimani et al., 2014; Gourevitch, 
2003; Charreaux, 2004, p. 26 f.). 
 
Endowment view: This category considers geographic circumstances and climate conditions like natu-
ral resources or health aspects (e.g. death rate) that provide information about the development stage 
of the countries (cf. Wendt, 2011, p.79). Those proponents assume that less developed countries also 
have less developed and more inefficient (financial) institutions. These researchers link corporate 
governance with those subject areas to the general framework conditions, especially regarding the 
development, access and enforcement of institutions concerning the distribution and protection of 
property rights and private interests as well as expropriation (cf. e.g., ElKelish, 2018; Cosset et al., 
2016; Ho et al., 2012; Epstein & Buhovac, 2014; Bruton et al. 2010; Bell et al. 2012). Those determi-
nants directly or indirectly influence the promotion of investments. 
 
Socio-cultural impact view: These scholars investigate the impact of the socio-cultural factors like reli-
gion, trust or other social and cultural components and norms (cf. e.g., Ezzine, 2018; Bindabel et al. 
2017; Kim & Daniel, 2016; Licht et al., 2005; Love, 2010; Rupp et al., 2010; Griffin et al. 2014; Bae et 
al., 2012, p. 289; Daniel et al., 2012; Abdullah & Valentine, 2009; Huse, 2007; Chan & Cheung, 2012). 
In addition, this peer group covers ethnic-linguistic aspects. The basic assumption of those scholars is 
that e.g. moral values are mainly driven from religion and thus also influence the corporate govern-
ance practice in a country. Nevertheless, the study of Nakpodia et al. (2018) found no strong impact of 
religion on corporate governance. Stronger trust implies on the one hand an efficient legal system, 
less corruption or the acceptance of individual social relationships and less potential for conflicts of 
interest. These scholars also classify cultural aspects as relevant factors for the general attitude. 
Those studies found e.g. that in more harmony-driven cultures shareholders’ rights are weaker than in 
other cultures (cf. Charreaux, 2004, p. 31 f.; Wendt, 2011, p. 80). Despite this, the impact of religion or 
moral and the law and finance perspective are not necessarily in contradiction with each other (cf. 
Wendt, 2011, p. 80). I supplement that there can be situations where strong moral values can substi-
tute deficits in existing legal frameworks or where both are equal. In the second case, it could be that 
the law enforcement gets easier if morality plays a crucial role.  
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Taking into account the new corporate governance understanding of Hilb (2016), I add industry spe-
cific approaches to the prior clusters: Particularly in the last years there have been many scholars 
who examined corporate governance mechanisms in industry specific contexts. They argue that cor-
porate governance mechanisms lead to different manifestations in different industries. 
Those studies make cross-functional examinations of different layers of the mentioned micro and mac-
ro perspectives. So far, the large majority of those authors focuses on the financial industry, but there 
are also authors who investigate e.g. public governance, hospital governance and nonprofit organiza-
tion governance.66 
 
Many mis-developments in the field of corporate governance indicate that the underlying theories are 
often applied in an undifferentiated and one-dimensional way and that there is a severe deficit of cred-
ible analytical as well as integrative corporate governance frameworks (cf. Hilb, 2016). Scholars ana-
lyze corporate governance phenomena in different contexts and underlying assumptions, which in turn 
leads to many different outcomes. The financial crisis and latest company scandals have shown that 
the in-depth research among various topics could not avoid unpredictable developments. I conclude 
that one of the main drivers for the recent shortcomings are missing universal and holistic approaches 
of many scholars, which ignore, on the one hand, existing - often company-individual interdependen-
cies of direct or indirect corporate governance mechanisms – and, on the other hand, imperfect mar-
ket realities in the real world. In complex, multinational organizations with heterogeneous framework 
conditions the mere transfer of existing approaches is not enough and instigates the necessity for 
business model specific corporate governance management models to increase its effectiveness. 
After an overview about the existing corporate governance approaches, I will examine the theoretical 
effect of corporate governance mechanisms and the necessity for a carefully balanced corporate gov-
ernance management, in the following subchapter. 
 
2.3.4 The effect of corporate governance mechanisms  
Corporate governance mechanisms comprise all internal and external decision-making and control 
structures, which reduce corporate governance problems within a company (cf. Zöllner, 2007, p. 4; 
Ulrich, 2011, p. 70). However, Lessing (2009, p. 3) outlines that good corporate governance can only 
be achieved with regulatory checks and balances or appropriate mechanisms to be effective. McAl-
ister et al. (2016, p. 74) supplement that a system of checks and balances is crucial for securing the 
consideration of multiple views and constituencies, a proper allocation of resources, power and deci-
sion authority and the responsibility for initiating change and strategic directions. That is why this sub-
 
66 The following authors concentrate on the financial industry: Goergen & Tonks (2019); Del Brio et al. (2018); 
Felício et al. (2018); Love & Okhunjanov (2016); Anginer et al. (2016); Haan & Vlahu (2016); Avgouleas & Cullen 
(2014); Laeven (2013).The following authors concentrate on public governance: Jia et al. (2019); Drumaux & 
Joyce (2018); Lienhard (2016); Degenhart & Wessel (2015); Ruter (2015). The following authors debate hospital 
governance: Moon (2016); Yang (2016); Clark & Beatty (2016); Brandao et al. (2013). The following authors dis-
cuss nonprofit organization governance: Wellens & Jegers (2014); Hirth (2013); Alexander & Weiner (1998); 
Jegers (2009). 
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chapter 2.3.4 concentrates on the effect of corporate governance problems in the first paragraph and 
briefly summarizes the typical mechanisms as another critical component to gain a better understand-
ing of corporate governance phenomena in a second step.  
 
When taking into account the organizational value-added cycle, information asymmetries and the con-
sequential corporate governance problems can be seen either as deficits, effective instruments, ele-
ments or measures.67 Zipser (2011, p. 56) concludes that those deficits result in a discount to the real 
company value. Other adverse effects within the value-added cycle are the combination of success 
potential, success and liquidity and reduce the efficiency and effectiveness of the business activities. 
In a final consequence, the survival of a company and the achievement of other company objectives 
are at a risk. Strengthening of corporate governance, and therefore the long-term efficiency and effec-
tiveness of the business, requires the implementation of suitable corporate governance mechanisms. 
In this context, scholars differentiate between internal and external governance mechanisms (cf. e.g., 
Walsh & Seward, 1990, Zöllner, 2007, p.15 ff.; Wagenhofer, 2009, p. 7, Hopt & Wohlmannstetter, 
2011; Hausch, 2013). 
 
Internal corporate governance mechanisms can be designed and implemented within the organiza-
tion in an isolated manner and typically depict the owner and capital structures, the establishment of a 
supervisory function and appropriate managerial incentive schemes. In contrast, the external corpo-
rate governance concentrates on a different level, especially on the following six mechanisms: the 
legal environment, the market for corporate control, external auditors, stakeholder activism, rating 
organizations, and the media (cf. Zöllner, 2007 p. 16 ff.; Aguilera et al., 2015). 
Zöllner (2007, p. 20 ff.) additionally mentions disclosure and transparency as further crucial mecha-
nisms, while Labbé & Schädlich (2008, p. 313) become more specific and define it as a hybrid mecha-
nism which unites the internal and external corporate governance to form an entire framework. How-
ever, Aguilera et al. (2015) state that external governance mechanisms act both as independent forc-
es and in conjunction with internal corporate governance mechanisms. I argue that there is a strong 
necessity for a better integration of internal and external governance mechanisms to improve corpo-
rate governance practices. For that reason, this dissertation will explicitly consider elements of both 
internal and external mechanisms to ensure a comprehensive approach for the management of corpo-
rate governance. For the purpose of this dissertation, it is necessary to transfer and adjust the above 
listed mechanisms for the context of multinational groups, taking the hierarchical relationship between 
the parent and its subsidiaries into account.  
 
Information asymmetries between the company owner and employed managers are difficult to reduce 
by contracts, because contracts are always incomplete and therefore remain unpredictable to a certain 
extent (cf. Jost, 2001, p. 13 ff.). Thus, Wagenhofer (2009, p. 8) recommends reducing the principle-
agent problem in particular via the limitation of decision rights, provision of information and the 
reduction of interest conflicts. 
 
67 Becker (2003) provides a good overview about the Balanced Value Map, which is based on the Gälweiler cycle 
(cf. Becker & Holzmann, 2014, p. 4). 
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In a first step, it may be possible to limit the decision-making scope of the subsidiary boards e.g. to 
the parent’s headquarters or the company owners. While this would limit the effects of negative deci-
sions, it will also limit the action scope of the local boards in terms of positive, strategic decisions that 
create additional value. Quite apart from the fact, that the legal and regulatory frameworks set clear 
boundaries for the delegation of decision-making competences. I outline that especially in parent-
subsidiary relationship clear roles and responsibilities are required to secure a common understanding 
regarding the intragroup expectations towards the subsidiary boards. 
The reduction of interest conflicts in key corporate governance areas can be achieved in different 
ways. According to Schaaper & Gao (2018) parents control their subsidiary managers e.g. by share of 
capital for wholly-owned subsidiaries or large majority shares in joint ventures. The implementation of 
decision-making principles, predefined sanction schemes or the promotion of integrity, trust and ethi-
cal behavior can reduce the interest conflicts, but also increase the intragroup costs for bargaining (cf. 
Lunnan et al. 2016a; 2016b; Hubert, 2016). 
Another prerequisite to reduce information asymmetries between different stakeholders is the provi-
sion of information and high level of transparency (cf. Tricker, 2015, p. 23). In multinational com-
panies, a mix of reporting, internal corporate rules, proper documentation, clear structures and pro-
cesses help to formalize the organization and minimize potential risks, misalignment and opacity (cf. 
Schaaper & Gao, 2018). The separation of management and control between the executives and an 
institutional supervisory organ (e.g. board of directors or supervisory board) as additional institutional 
control function and mechanism, are beneficial. Further supportive control functions, such as control-
ling, internal audit, compliance and risk management are obligatory, because they provide the re-
quired information basis to reduce information asymmetries and increase the quality of decisions tak-
en (cf. Welge & Eulerich, 2014).68 
 
In particular, Renz & Böhrer (2012) outline for the mitigation of the principle-agent problem in group 
structures the importance of a comprehensive framework understanding of the involved managers and 
transparency about the subsidiary specific mission within the corporate group network. In addition, a 
proper internal and external stakeholder management supports to minimize information asymmetries, 
enhances transparency and reduces existing governance gaps.  
 
Wagenhofer (2009, p. 11) outlines that the implementation of corporate governance mechanisms are 
always associated with costs and additional effort. Costs can incur for additional instruments and con-
trols like e.g. the implementation of the International Accounting Standards (IFRS), decision-making 
processes, incentive schemes or the enforcement of rights and the provision of contracts. Conse-
quently, it is always necessary to consider that the optimum of corporate governance instruments has 
to be analyzed regarding their additional benefit for the company. There is always a trade-off between 
too much and too little governance mechanisms, which needs to be balanced carefully within each 
 
68 For further information regarding controlling, cf. Oehler (2004); Günther (2004, p. 25); Wagenhofer (2009, 1 ff.); 
Kajüter (2008), Wall (2008); Becker & Ulrich (2010); Sassen (2012); Freidank & Paetzmann (2013); Horváth 
(2015, p. 453 ff.).For further information regarding internal audit, cf. Tricker (2015, p. 394 ff.); Eulerich et al. (2013, 
p. 57 ff.); Eulerich (2012a; 2012b); Geiersbach (2011); Lühn (2009, p. 231 ff.). Further information regarding com-
pliance, cf. Wecker & Galla (2008, p.43 ff.); Kleinhempel (2004); Wieland (2010, p. 15 ff.); Grüninger (2012, p. 3 
f.); Schuchter & Levi (2013). 
 39 
 
organization. The optimum is reached if the costs and benefits for an additional corporate governance 
instrument are equal (cf. Wagenhofer, 2009, p. 12). However, the comparison of direct costs and ben-
efits is usually not possible or only possible by applying indirect and subjective indicators, such as the 
satisfaction rate of the effect and the estimated benefits. There is always a dilemma to find the right 
balance between too much and too little corporate governance mechanisms. Even with the implemen-
tation of the best corporate governance mechanisms insufficient markets will remain and entrepre-
neurial decisions will always be based on partial information and connected to risks. Despite this, both 
are necessary to meet legal and regulatory requirements, increase transparency and minimize the 
principle agent problem.  
 
Based on the prior discussion of the corporate governance mechanisms, the next subchapter 2.3.5 
continues with the debate over why corporate governance plays such an important role particularly in 
the financial industry. 
 
2.3.5 Corporate governance in the financial industry  
On the one side, the financial crisis has illustrated the existing deficits of corporate governance, but on 
the other side, it has also demonstrated the necessity to secure public trust with bank specific corpo-
rate governance mechanisms. Especially wrong incentive schemes, combined with weaknesses of the 
executive board and supervisory board members as well as deficits in the risk management and inter-
nal control systems have been major causes of the recent financial crisis (cf. Tóth, 2016; Hopt, 2011, 
p. 25; Wohlmannstetter, 2011, p. 58). Moreover, the complex and non-transparent bank structures 
further enhanced the crisis (cf. Laeven, 2013). In order to prevent such undesirable developments in 
future, this dissertation, and in particular this subchapter, discusses the important role of corporate 
governance in the financial institutes. I have identified three arguments in particular for the general 
otherness of banks and the thereof resulting greater emphasis for corporate governance within in the 
financial industry:69  
1. Banks play a key role for the overall economic activity within economies. 
2. A banks business model is primarily based on opacity. 
3. Strong external legal and regulatory requirements and state supervision. 
 
The first, often mentioned argumentation for the necessity of specific corporate governance re-
quirements for banks is their important key role for the overall economy (cf. Hüther et al., 2015). 
Banks provide capital for the companies and in return, they expect an efficient resource allocation 
from them. By taking this role, banks fulfill a key function to facilitate economic growth (cf. Hüther et 
al., 2015). As an outside creditor banks play a major role for the corporate governance practice of their 
customers, which likewise means that a defective corporate governance of banks implies a risk for the 
corporate governance of all companies (cf. Capriglione & Casalino, 2014; Nini et al., 2009). While this 
argumentation underpins the overall economic relevance of a functional credit system and the key role 
of banks, it further implies the necessity for a professional general management and functioning gov-
 
69 These arguments are based on the suggested clusters of Haan & Vlahu (2016) and Wohlmannstetter (2011). 
 40 
 
ernance mechanisms of banks. Capriglione & Casalino (2014) argue that improved board structures, 
administrative procedures and disclosure requirements could result in better-governed banks. Effec-
tive boards of directors complete the external oversight of the authorities. Thus, it is crucial for banks 
to get professional and well experienced people to serve on the banks’ boards and senior manage-
ment positions, to manage the complexity of the business environment and new financial products. 
Bank organizations require competent leaders, who recognize new business opportunities, but also 
their risks, who have a healthy skepticism and take fast decisions. Solely regulatory and supervisory 
frameworks cannot guarantee financial stability (cf. Capriglione & Casalino, 2014). 
I state that the corporate governance discussion in banks mainly focuses on the internal, operative 
aspects and requirements for the internal management. I argue that, if the state is seen as the compe-
tent authority to set high standards and to ensure their enforcements, the institutional banking supervi-
sion also can be defined as an entire part of the internal governance at banks.70 
Since the recent financial crisis, the systemic relevance of banks is much discussed (cf. e.g., Amalia, 
2018; Khoury, 2016; Gorton & Tallman, 2016; Hardie & Macartney, 2016; Gormley et al., 2015; Kauf-
man, 2014; Garrison-Kimmel et al., 2013; Drehmann & Tarashev, 2013; Pais & Stork, 2013). Banks, 
which are “too big to fail” because of their size and strong economic links, have a kind of state guaran-
tee for long-term existence given by the governments. These too-big-to-fail institutions operate under 
an implicit government undertaking that, although it is a private business, the governments will bail 
them out with the taxpayers´ money if their existence is threatened due to their own misconduct or 
failures (cf. Gasparetto, 2015). De facto, outside creditors have capital insurance, because govern-
ments will guarantee their existence in case of a potential bankruptcy.71 This deliberate overruling of 
corporate governance mechanisms limits the required caution and attention of the outside investors 
and leads to higher risk taking of the banks (cf. Dam & Koetter, 2012; Westman, 2010, p. 1). Banks 
have no sustainable incentive schemes, which take into account the (negative) effects of their deci-
sions and business activities. The only solution to this problem are internationally aligned and legally 
binding measures, that are defined from the regulators and monitored from external supervisory au-
thorities (cf. Sachverständigenrat, 2009, p. 137 f.). In this role bank regulators and supervisory authori-
ties become an additional key player of a functioning corporate governance system in the financial 
industry.  
 
The second argument why banking specific corporate governance regulations are crucial is because 
of their business model, which is largely based on opacity.72 Information asymmetries between 
capital lender and borrower build the foundation for the business model of banks. Financial institutes 
 
70 For example, the EBA (2017a) defines detailed requirements for internal governance of banks. Further, e.g. the 
German bank supervisory authority (BaFin) documented in detail their view for a functional risk management in 
banks in the MaRsik regulations (cf. BaFin, 2017a) 
71 The bankruptcy of the investment bank Lehmann proves not the contrary. This event illustrates the bankruptcy 
of a bank can be the preferable option compared to a government rescue solution (cetrus paribus effect) (cf. 
Wohlmannstetter, 2011, p. 38). 
72 Empirical studies show different results regarding the increased lack of transparency in banks: Morgan (2000) 
and Iannotta (2006) analyzed that rating agencies rated bank bonds much more often with different banks com-
pared to bonds from industry companies. Iannotta argues that the main reason is the lack of transparency of 
banks and the potential governmental banking liability. In contrast, Flannery et al. (2004, p. 419 ff.) analyzed that 
banking analysts have no other accuracy of their forecasts than analysts of other industries. Polo (2007, p. 5) 
concludes, that both investigations indicate that higher disclosure standards (due to governmental regulation) 
support the disciplining effect of the capital markets. 
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position themselves as independent intermediaries between both parties (cf. Craig & Von Peter, 
2014). I argue that this indicates, that investors of the banks believe, that they cannot evaluate the 
associated risks of the credit business. Moreover, this argumentation is strengthened by the imple-
mentation of deposit protection systems and further state supervision efforts (cf. Srivastav & Ha-
gendorff, 2015). Such investors completely differ from those characterized by the initial corporate gov-
ernance theory. Those investors look for banks that pay higher interest rates, even if higher interest 
rates also mean higher risks (cf. Mullineux, 2006, p. 378). The underlying assumptions of this argu-
mentation goes into the right direction, as it indicates further, that improved risk disclosures and in-
creased control incentives in combination with less regulation can reduce the existing supervisory 
deficits (cf. Levine, 2004, p. 15). This can only be successful, if bank typical risks become transparent 
and the associated profits are based on the real risks.73 Finally, it means that particularly the external 
corporate governance with a better supervision as well as disincentive systems (moral hazard) are 
major challenges.74 This moral hazard problem in combination with a so far unsolved transparency 
problem of the banks’ business model makes it challenging to overcome this obstacle (cf. Hellwig, 
2014). This fact is another unique characteristic of the business model of banks. While manufacturing 
businesses first have to invest cash (e.g. for production, purchasing) to receive solely downstream and 
unsecure income, banks calculate their interest income (risk premiums) in advance before the poten-
tial risk event. I argue that this converse time sequence of income and expenses of banks leads to-
wards two corporate governance problems. At first, it encourages a misguided incentive system for the 
bank managers and, secondly, it compromises monitoring disincentives of the investors. 
I address concerns, that despite several regulatory initiatives, the external accounting regulations to a 
large extent still ignore the overall opacity for external stakeholders to evaluate potential profits in rela-
tion to the assumed risks. Compared to other businesses, it is often ignored that banks calculate their 
assets and liabilities together and this way support an even higher lack of transparency.75 This discus-
sion is not new, as already in the year of 2002, Schilder (p. 2) and Turner (2010) highlighted the need 
for a new accounting debate for banks, because modern finance instruments help banks to rapidly 
change their risk profiles without any notice towards externals that have to secure adequate bank su-
pervision. If such information is not transparent, market-disciplining mechanisms are inadequate and 
also inefficient (cf. e.g., Mülbert, 2009, p. 425). Nevertheless, there are several initiatives to respond to 
the opacity problems in banks, as e.g. the new EBA guideline on credit risk management practices, 
and, accounting for expected credit losses (2017b), the IFRS 9 with its requirement to implement an 
expected credit loss accounting model or the IAS 39 which the incurred loss accounting model exem-
plifies. 
 
 
73 Several authors highlight the importance of risk transparency to increase corporate governance of banks: 
Ratnovski (2013); Bouvard et al. (2015); Zelenyuk et al. (2016). 
74 The scholars of the shareholder value perspective argue to realize profits with risks, which have a considerable 
low probability of occurrence. Even if those risks provide substantial losses in terms of their realization. 
75 A good example is the sale of a bond. The profit exists out of the ratio between the effective interest income 
and its refinancing costs. If the general interest rate level decreases while the maturity, it can be sold with addi-
tional profits before the final maturity date. Further, it is shown on the profit and loss account and can be used e.g. 
for dividends, taxes or bonuses. This means that the reinvestment of the created income can only take place to a 
lower interest rate while the refinancing costs remain at the same level. Otherwise, there would be losses in the 
upcoming years. 
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The third argument for the differentness of banks is their strong regulation and supervision.76 
However, even though this can be seen as a consequence of the above mentioned first and second 
argument, it is finally a unique characteristic compared to other industries. As the last two paragraphs 
have shown, typical corporate governance instruments have solely limited effects in banks and need 
to be supplemented with others. I find that in particular the supervision of banking specific risks is chal-
lenging. To address this control deficit, national and international standard setters and other authori-
ties have setup bank supervisory authorities. In contrast to the typical corporate governance concepts 
that emphasize the equity governance, bank supervisors predominantly concentrate on risk govern-
ance issues (cf. Wohlmannstetter, 2011, p. 42).77 
Accordingly, I argue that bank supervisory authorities are an essential part of a functional corporate 
governance system in banks. In the past, a group of authors discussed the question if the regulation 
replaces or complements the ‘normal’ corporate governance mechanisms (cf. e.g., Horn, 2014; 
Martynova & Renneboog, 2011; Macey & O'hara, 2003; De Jong et al., 2005). I found that the regula-
tion initiatives are in general not the reasons, but rather the conclusion of the unique characteristics of 
banks (cf. Rudolph & Burghof, 2013, p. 115). Nevertheless, in such cases where the supervisory au-
thority requests elements beyond the existing corporate governance mechanisms, it has also a caus-
ing role. While it can be valuable for the economy as a whole, it could have negative effects of good 
corporate governance in the worst-case.78 
 
On the one hand, the foregone analysis highlights the important role of corporate governance within 
banks, but on the other hand, it also demonstrates the difficulties to define and balance the appropri-
ate mechanisms with the desired outcomes. The previous analysis provided essential insights about 
the necessity of appropriate corporate governance mechanisms and their challenges in banks and 
therefore also in financial services subsidiaries. The analysis provides a solid foundation to draw first 
interim conclusions for the intragroup corporate governance management of financial services subsid-
iaries in the next chapter 2.4.  
 
2.4 Corporate governance in financial services subsidiary networks 
Up until now, I have made various rather isolated examinations of multinational group, automotive 
financial services and the term corporate governance. In the following, I will draw some first conclu-
sions for the further progress of this dissertation project.  
In a multinational group it is relevant to define clear responsibilities among the disparate corporate 
governance mechanisms, structures and processes as a key enabler. Chartier (2015) reveals that 
sound governance practices at the top of the organization in the corporate parent is no longer suffi-
 
76 Representing others, cf. the argumentation of Mullineux (2006, p. 378): “…are banks different (special) because 
they are regulated differently and are they regulated differently because they are different (special)?” 
77 So far, the literature only covers the micro or banking specific regulation debate, cf. Lundja (2010, p. 1): “bank 
regulation is then defined as a special case of debt governance”. Mülbert (2009, p. 429) defines regulation as 
“…functional substitute to debt governance of banks”. Solely Wohlmannstetter (2011, p. 43) outlines a dominant 
role of the supervisory authorities as framework setter for the individual banks and a functional financial system.  
78 An often raised argument is e.g. that banking supervision and the deposit guarantee mechanism have counter-
productive effects. The investors signal a false sense of safety and avoid debt governance among the market 
participants (cf. Mülbert, 2009, p. 412). 
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cient, as today regulators, investors and the society expect governance practices that go beyond 
that.79 This becomes even more important in the case of banks that have to cope with even stronger 
legal and regulatory requirements in comparison to other institutions. Since the last financial crisis, 
existing corporate governance mechanisms are critically questioned and further strengthened (cf. e.g., 
Werder, 2015, p.7; Paetzmann & Schöning, 2014a; Hopt & Wohlmannstetter, 2011; Kunz, 2006; 
Grundmann et al., 2009, p. 22 ff.; Möschel, 2009). Those framework conditions with different internal 
and external determining variables bring up several challenges for the intra-group corporate govern-
ance management: 
 The hierarchical structures and decentral organizational setup to meet local requirements indi-
cate the necessity to clearly define which corporate governance elements and mecha-
nisms (i.e. management and supervisory organs, internal audit, compliance, risk manage-
ment) get managed from the parent’s headquarters and which duties are expected to be ex-
ecuted on subsidiary level. Clear defined roles and responsibilities between the headquar-
ters and the subsidiaries help to increase transparency, reduce information asymmetries and 
the principle-agent problem (cf. Chartier, 2015). 
 Mixed multinational groups with financial services divisions, such as car manufacturers, have 
to deal with different levels of regulatory requirements for each of their business divisions. 
The increased business volumes and professionalization of the automotive financial services 
business already resulted in a stronger supervisory focus of the national (banking) supervisory 
authorities and requires appropriate management and steering structures to fulfil their re-
quirements (cf. Stenner, 2015). 
 Multinational organizations have to deliberate and align internal and external corporate gov-
ernance mechanisms in their group and structure the different institutional corporate gov-
ernance frameworks (the one tier and two tier systems), depending on the location where the 
subsidiaries are officially registered. On the one hand, they have to take into account meeting 
international agreed standards and national legal and regulatory requirements in the parent’s 
country of origin and the host countries of the subsidiaries (cf. Szabó & Sørensen, 2018). On 
the other hand, it is expected, that the group secures a certain level of alignment and organi-
zational transparency to achieve the common overarching group targets.  
 The rising trend of stricter legal and regulatory requirements increases the personal man-
agement liability and clawback provisions of the executives and directors (cf. e.g., Liu et al., 
2019). In turn, the management attention for corporate governance topics among companies 
and their senior staff increases (cf. Hitz & Müller-Bloch, 2015; Warning, 2016). 
 Another challenge for multinational companies is that the corporate governance under-
standing and its perception varies among the countries, depending on its role within the local 
legal and regulatory frameworks (cf. Szabó & Sørensen, 2018). Thus, it is a major obstacle to 
gain a common understanding among the entire multinational corporate group. Nevertheless, 
 
79 In many countries have been countless legal and regulatory initiatives to strengthen direct or indirect the corpo-
rate governance practice. For example, in Germany, some of the most important initiatives in the last decade 
have been the following: KonTraG (1998), TransPuG (2002), AnSVG (2004), BilReG (2004), BilKoG (2004), 
VorstOG (2005), KapMuG (2005), das UMAG (2005), EHUG (2006), TUG (2007), FRUG (2007), BilMoG (2009), 
ARUG (2009) and VorstAG (2009). A comprehensive overview about the legal and regulatory initiatives provide 
Welge & Eulerich, 2014, p. 113 ff.). 
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as corporate governance is a cross-functional topic and affects different functions, mecha-
nisms, processes and soft topics, such as leadership or the corporate culture, it makes it more 
complicated to manage a multinational group (cf. Yasui, 2016). 
 
As analyzed earlier, a multinational group exists of various intra-group relationships between the cor-
porate parent and its subsidiaries. I conclude that this duality can also be applied for the management 
of corporate governance within multinational groups. Already the study of Kim et al. (2005) indicated 
that corporate governance of foreign subsidiaries should be designed in response to different levels of 
agency problems that are associated with varying strategic roles of foreign subsidiaries. Differentiating 
governance structures for each subsidiary is a key contingency requirement to achieve a better supe-
rior group-wide performance (cf. Kim et al., 2005). While Vagadia (2014) divides corporate govern-
ance into a strategic governance and operational governance dimension, other researchers, such as 
Renz & Böhrer (2012), propose to implement a separate subsidiary governance dimension or advise 
to differentiate between top governance and unit governance, such as Kaehler & Grundei (2019). To 
overcome the prior mentioned challenges, I follow the duality principle for the corporate governance 
understanding in a multinational group context: 
 
 Corporate governance on parent level (defines how rights, responsibilities and power are 
defined, aligned and controlled within the corporate group). 
 Corporate governance on subsidiary level (defines how subsidiaries deal with their differ-
ent internal and external stakeholders and framework conditions in the multinational corporate 
group and the host country). 
 
To my best knowledge, Hilb (2012) and Lenz & Krag (2008) have been the first who explicitly define 
subsidiary governance as a process-oriented framework that supports the strategical guidance of 
subsidiaries, to manage them in an integrative way and control them by a holistic approach, which is 
based on an entrepreneurial and ethnical-reflecting local adjusted manner. I argue that the subsidiary 
governance is directly linked towards the parent’s corporate governance framework and should not be 
recognized in isolation (cf. Chartier, 2015). At its core, subsidiary governance is responsible for the 
operationalization of the strategy, vision and plans that get predefined from the parent for the entire 
corporate group. The term subsidiary governance is a relatively new research topic and only few pub-
lications discussing this topic exist.80 It is mainly seen as the further enhancement of the corporate 
governance discussion. The existing national corporate governance regulations (e.g. DCGK; Cadbury 
Report etc.) target the listed corporate parents, but not explicitly on their subordinated subsidiaries. As 
chapter 3.2 will illustrate, the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision firstly introduced a chapter 
regarding corporate governance in group structures, in their revised version of their corporate govern-
ance principles for banks (cf. BCBS, 2015). Although many of the recent scandals have been the con-
sequence of mistakes in decentralized subsidiaries and not on parent level, this is still an underrepre-
sented field of study. 
 
80 Particular in the last four years, several scholars apply the term subsidiary governance: Sengul & Obloj (2017); 
Szabó & Sørensen (2018); Grassl (2016); Puri (2016); Farah et al. (2016); Chartier (2015); Cannings & Ward 
(2013); Gibson et al. (2013). 
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The earlier analysis indicates the necessity for more company and industry specific corporate govern-
ance management approaches. Authors like Hung (1998), Htay et al. (2013) or Hilb (2016) outline the 
importance of addressing the recent weaknesses with more integrated, universal corporate govern-
ance concepts instead of focusing solely on an isolated view on single mechanisms. Vagadia (2014) 
also promotes a new corporate governance understanding, away from the historic corporate govern-
ance and towards a broader, strategic and operational governance understanding.81 Until today, cor-
porate governance management of financial services subsidiaries is an underrepresented field of re-
search. For that reason, I outline the importance of an integrated forward-looking corporate govern-
ance perspective, which combines different elements of the shareholder and stakeholder approaches, 
but also integrates industry and company specific characterizations as suggested in the definition by 
Hilb (2016).  
 
However, as Malmi and Brown (2008) outline, the underlying idea of management control systems 
(MCS) operating as a package has existed for several decades. They explain that an appropriate 
management control can solely be achieved by a combination of different instruments of five groups: 
(1) planning, (2) cybernetic, (3) reward and compensation, (4) administrative and (5) cultural controls. 
This concept of Malmi & Brown (2008) goes beyond pure organizational control systems and concen-
trates on all layers, devices and systems which executives use to assure that the staff behaviors and 
taken decisions follow the predefined objectives and strategies. To overcome the intragroup complexi-
ties, multidimensional interrelations and existing information asymmetries, it seems appropriate to 
follow this view of Malimi & Brown (2008). 
 
The gained results of chapter 2 provide a solid fundament to investigate the decisive determinates and 
requirements for the multidimensional management of corporate governance in financial services sub-
sidiaries in the following chapter. 
  
 
81 Vagadia (2014, p. 3) defines the historic-oriented view is top down organized in e.g. ERP systems and focuses 
on segregation of duties, financial management, controls, committees, corruption and compliance to law. He de-
scribes the strategic and operational governance with oversight, insight, direction, alignment and commitment, 
empowerment and accountability, control and compliance, risk assessment and management, decision-making 
processes.  
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3. Decisive influencing factors for corporate governance in multinational groups with finan-
cial services subsidiaries 
In the first section of chapter three, I will analyze the theoretical foundations of the benefits of corpo-
rate governance and the overall institutional, legal and regulatory framework determinants. Subse-
quently I will discuss existing management systems and concepts for the management of internal 
governance. Finally, the last subchapter will identify the critical governance mechanisms from the per-
spective of the corporate parent and its subsidiaries. 
 
3.1 Theoretical influencing determinants 
In the following, I will investigate the theoretical influencing determinants of corporate governance and 
general management in automotive multinationals. The analysis starts at first with the operationaliza-
tion of governance efficiency and effectiveness, which builds the foundation for the subsequent analy-
sis of the relationship between corporate success and corporate governance in the context of multina-
tional groups. In addition, I investigate the embeddedness of corporate culture on the corporate gov-
ernance mechanisms as further crucial pillar. All those influencing variables are relevant underlying 
foundations for the management model that will be developed in this dissertation.  
 
3.1.1 Operationalization of efficiency and effectiveness 
From my point of view, an integrated success analysis is a basic requirement to make an evaluation 
analysis of corporate governance. Yet, for the sake of completeness, it is important to mention, that 
the existing success analysis within the management theory has several weaknesses.82 
Therefore, I will in the following at first discuss the operationalization of the term success via the con-
struct of efficiency and effectiveness. Scholars have summarized these issues in the context of organ-
ization and reality-orientated controlling and have primarily focused on the success and performance 
measurement (cf. Müller-Stewens & Schnupp, 2017; Krüger et al., 2008, p. 4 ff.; Dyckhoff & Ahn, 
2001). Hereby, particularly Becker & Benz (1996, p. 22 ff.), Sill (2009, p. 11 ff.), Daniel (2008, p. 1 ff.) 
and Guserl & Pernsteiner (2015) provide a solid foundation. They find a positive correlation between 
corporate governance, general management and company performance. The general problem within 
the operationalization of success is the initial starting point of the business-related success research. 
There is a debate about the content and about the question if efficiency and effectiveness are different 
elements or if they are both subchapters of a joint construct as promoted by Zloch (2007, p. 61 f.) or 
Gladen (2014, p. 186). While Gladen (2014, p. 186) summarizes the efficiency and effectiveness un-
der the umbrella term of overall company efficiency, Robalo (1992, p. 16) and March & Sutton (1997, 
p. 705) argue that both terms are synonyms for success. A contrary argumentation is provided by 
Bünting (2013, p. 73) and Schulte-Zurhausen (2014, p. 5), who outline that efficiency is a prerequisite 
 
82 Representing others, Wolf (2008, p. 210 ff.) identifies the following weak points: (1) unclear definition; (2) insuf-
ficient consideration of the stakeholders interests; (3) problems with the definition of success KPIs; (4) problemat-
ic sample size of success-related information; (5) multi causality of success; (6) missing definition of the time 
component; (7) unclear definition of time slots; (8) uncleanness about the striven success level of the manage-
ment; (9) lack of appropriate tests regarding the theoretical relevance of the respective concepts. 
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to achieve effectiveness. Then again, scholars like Becker & Benz (1996, p. 25) argue that efficiency 
is always in the foreground of every business management related decision and promote a purpose 
orientated efficiency approach.83 
 
One of the most cited differentiations is by Drucker (1963, p. 54) who explains that „it is fundamentally 
the confusion between effectiveness and efficiency that stands between doing the right things and 
doing things right“. In this context, Mellewigt & Decker´s (2006, p. 54 ff.) argumentation “doing the 
things right” for effectiveness and “doing things right” for efficiency seems to be consistent. The effec-
tiveness describes the orientation on the right objectives, but without an exact definition, and it cannot 
be defined as one single standalone figure (cf. Bünting, 2013, p. 74; Schulte-Zurhausen, 2002, p. 5). 
Efficiency characterizes the degree of achievement of the predefined objectives and considers the 
input-output ratio (cf. Bünting, 2013, p. 74; Häberle, 2008, p. 326). I follow the above outlined under-
standing of this paragraph.  
Ulrich (2011, p. 81) concludes that efficiency and effectiveness have different effects on company 
level. Effectiveness is directly linked to revenues, success and liquidity. Increased efficiency can be 
achieved with cost reductions via the optimization of internal process. Consequently, efficiency and 
effectiveness operationalize the company success as sub-elements. Efficiency and effectiveness are 
crucial for setting the right objectives and therefore, they are important for corporate governance. 
Moreover, it is crucial to consider that the definition of success always depends on the individual per-
spective and varies among the stakeholder groups (cf. Hausch, 2013, p. 61 ff.; Funk & Rossmanith, 
2007, p. 6; Schenk, 1998, p. 64). I define efficient and effective corporate governance as follows: 
 
Efficient corporate governance means that prescribed targets are achieved with a minimum of po-
tential time and costs. The minimum requirement defines that there has to be a higher increase of 
additional benefit of the corporate governance measure than its quantifiable monetary costs regarding 
the implementation into structures and processes. 
 
Effective corporate governance means following the right objectives in the long-term. Subsidiaries 
have to follow a strategy that supports the overall targets of the multinational group for a long-term 
orientated increase of the corporate value and therefore for their company owners (shareholders). The 
effectiveness has to be measurable as absolute or relative scale to analyze potential changes. Con-
sequently, subsidiaries require pre-defined targets as benchmark for the measurement of the degree 
of achievement. In general, effectiveness supports the overall long-term survival of the company, even 
if it is difficult to operationalize. 
 
To ensure the appropriateness of the model, this subchapter has shown the great necessity to con-
centrate particularly on efficient and effective governance mechanisms and instruments in its devel-
opment. On this basis, I will examine the relationship between corporate governance and company 
success in the following subchapter. 
 
83 Sill (2009, p. 13 ff.) provides a good overview about the current literature. As the concrete measurement of 
corporate governance is not in the foreground of the corporate governance management model, I refer to this 
comprehensive literature overview. 
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3.1.2 Relationship between corporate governance and company success  
The initial idea of implementing corporate governance mechanisms is to avoid and prevent company 
crisis, organizational failure, ensure trust of stakeholders and support in a final consequence the con-
tinuous improvement of effectiveness and efficiency and therefore corporate success (cf. Welge & 
Eulerich, 2014, p. 1; Wagenhofer, 2009, p. 11 ff.). Klein (2009) and Wagenhofer (2009, p. 12) outline 
that companies are solely willing to implement additional corporate governance mechanisms if the 
anticipated benefit is higher than the accumulated efforts needed. Zöllner (2007, p. 51 ff.) and Ulrich 
(2011, p. 83 ff.) enumerate four different corporate governance approaches, which may influence the 
company’s success in a positive way: Theoretical orientation, external evaluation, company internal 
rules and internal evaluation. Those elements seem to be reasonable to manage and steer corporate 
governance, which is why I also apply these clusters for the following analysis. As I have already dis-
cussed the underlying assumptions of the theoretical foundations in the prior subchapters, I will con-
tinue with the external evaluation. 
 
External evaluation: A popular approach to evaluate corporate governance is the application of ex-
ternal rankings, ratings or scoring models (cf. Linden & Matolcsy, 2004; Bassen et al., 2006, Alali et 
al., 2012; Li, 2018). The initial approach is to develop corporate governance models, which are based 
on pre-defined attributes and get matched in a suitable index. A good overview of such external rat-
ings is provided by Zöllner (2007, p. 54 ff.), Jarrett & Stokes (2007, p. 10 ff.) and Arnsfeld & Stiglbauer 
(2011, p. 354 ff.). Gompers et al. (2001) performed the first comprehensive investigations in this con-
text. They investigated 24 corporate governance elements of the Investor Responsibility Research 
Center (IRRC), aggregated them to an individual corporate governance index and afterwards analyzed 
1,500 US companies. They clustered them in companies with good and rather poor corporate govern-
ance practices and subsequently analyzed their company performance between the years 1900 and 
1999. The results highlight a much better performance of companies with good corporate governance 
mechanisms. In addition, the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) introduced a rating model, which 
considers 61 KPIs in seven clusters. Despite several studies proving a positive correlation between 
corporate governance and company performance, there are still other studies that demonstrate only a 
weak relationship between company performance and corporate governance ratings.84 Further, there 
are studies, which indicate that corporate governance rankings can have negative effects.85 Rowley et 
al. (2016) conclude that there is a hierarchy of firms' targets, where the target of profitability dominates 
other targets imposed by external ratings and rankings. 
In sum, external ratings usually focus solely on the listed (parent) companies and have therefore only 
a limited direct impact on the evaluation of corporate governance practice in subsidiaries. Neverthe-
 
84 The following studies prove a positive relationship between corporate governance and company performance: 
Danoshana & Ravivathani (2019); Core et al. (1999); Brown & Caylor (2004); Bhagat & Bolton (2008); Acharya et 
al. (2013). In a contrary, Donker & Zahir (2008) also examined popular corporate governance ratings and could 
not prove a strong relationship between corporate performance and corporate governance rating. Also an exten-
sive Standsford study that analyzed 15,000 ratings from 6,872 listed companies found that casts strong doubt 
upon the value and validity of the ratings of governance advisory firms that compile indexes to evaluate the effec-
tiveness of a publicly held company's governance practices (cf. Daines et al., 2010). 
85 For example, Rowley et al. (2016) found that if firms have both a poor governance ranking and poor profitabil-
ity, they are less likely to adopt governance practices. This is contradictory with the initial idea behind such rank-
ings. 
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less, some of the external ratings (e.g. ISS or GMI) have started to also consider KPIs regarding the 
corporate governance practice of subsidiaries.86 This indicates at least an indirect influence of subsidi-
ary governance on the rating of the listed parent company. 
 
Company internal rules: Many companies try to improve their corporate governance practices by 
implementing company-internal regulations (cf. e.g., Schaaper & Gao, 2018; Tricker, 2015, p. 138 f.; 
Welge & Eulerich, 2014, p. 63 ff.; Werder et al., 2005; Pasalic, 2012; Talaulicar & Werder, 2008). The 
underlying foundations are either international best practices, corporate governance standards or na-
tional regulations, as the upcoming chapter 3.2 will illustrate. In other words, the statutory declaration 
of compliance of the listed parent company regarding the applicable corporate governance standards 
is usually the only opportunity for externals to get indications about the performed intragroup corporate 
governance practices. The assumption is that a high level of compliance with those pre-defined rec-
ommendations of external lawmakers indicates a better corporate governance practice.87 However, as 
Bassen et al. (2006) and Ulrich (2011, p. 87) state, this approach says nothing about the quality of the 
corporate governance. In the context of the last financial crisis, Werder (2015) criticizes the strong 
orientation of codices among legal and financial regulations, which have resulted in wrong incentive 
schemes. It is questionable, if self-regulatory corporate governance reforms relying on disclosure 
without monitoring and legal enforcement, are effective (cf. Mahr et al., 2016). On the one hand, cor-
porate governance can prevent bad behavior, but on the other hand, it cannot ensure right action as 
this depends on the individual actions taken from the decision-making bodies and its members. It 
seems that the existing corporate governance codices have in practice just limited influence towards 
subsidiaries, as they are primarily designed for listed companies or stand-alone companies and do not 
consider corporate group specific contexts. 
 
Internal evaluation: Independent and individual developed methods for the evaluation of corporate 
governance are summarized among internal evaluation approaches (cf. Zöllner, 2007, p. 60). Cheng 
et al. (2015) explain that internal governance refers to the process through which key subordinate 
senior staff provides checks and balances in the organization and affects the decision-making. One of 
the most comprehensive examples is provided by the study of Drobetz et al. (2004) who developed a 
model, which consists out of certain elements of the German Corporate Governance Code and some 
elements of the Scorecard of the DVFA. A different approach was introduced from Weichsler et al. 
(2009), who developed an individual ranking for Swiss companies, based on empirical investigations 
of corporate governance and shareholder value indicators and found a positive relationship between 
corporate governance and shareholder value. Others, such as Du et al. (2015) and Strikwerda (2003) 
 
86 ISS (Institutional Shareholder Service) Quick Score is a qualitative driven data solution to identify governance 
risks within portfolio companies (ISS, 2016). GMI Ratings (Governance Metrics International) was in 2010 found 
and is a merger of three independent research providers. They developed three ratings: GMI Environmental, 
Social and Governance (ESG) Ratings; GMI Accounting and Governance Risk Ratings; Forensic Alpha Model (cf. 
Lo-Turco & Katrysh, 2016). 
87 The study of Goncharov et al. (2006, p. 432) has shown that a high degree of compliance with the DCGK is 
meaningful and that there is capital market pressure to adopt the DCGK regulation. Chhaochharia et al. (2016) 
illustrates a better corporate governance performance of US companies after the introduction of the Sarbanes–
Oxley Act. 
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evaluate boards of subsidiaries and the delegation of decision-making competencies in group struc-
tures and draw conclusions for the corporate governance practice of the group. 
 
Research studies related to corporate governance and success: The academic literature has for 
many years already investigated the relationship between corporate governance and success.88 De-
spite the broad consensus about the importance of corporate governance mechanisms for the entire 
performance, there is still clear evidence missing that corporate governance supports the company’s 
success (cf. Baker & Anderson, 2010, p. 99; Bassen & Zöllner, 2014).  
In Germany, the first comprehensive investigation regarding the relationship of corporate governance 
and success can be found in the just mentioned study of Drobetz et al. (2004). Nevertheless, the ex-
aminations of Goncharov et al. (2006) and Mahr et al. (2004) provide contrary results and cannot 
prove beneficial effects free of doubt. Even so, there are also studies like those by Bassen et al. 
(2006) or McConnell & Qi (2016), who find a positive correlation of corporate governance practice at 
board level and performance. Cuñat et al. (2012) also verify a positive effect of internal corporate gov-
ernance mechanisms on the shareholder value, even if this is contradictory to the analysis of Velte 
(2009) or Dabor et al. (2015), who solely provide limited evidence for the positive relationship between 
corporate governance and performance. 
Furthermore, there is a rising interest among scholars to investigate the relationship of corporate gov-
ernance and success among multinational companies. Representing others, Aulakh & Gencturk 
(2000), Andersson et al. (2002) and Hutzschenreuter et al. (2014) provide evidence that the parent-
subsidiary governance structures have a positive effect on the long-term group performance. Most 
studies differentiate between short and long-term effects or investigate the consequences of cultural 
differences or multiple levels of subsidiary autonomy on the performance (cf. Lazarova et al., 2017; 
Farah et al., 2016; Gaur et al., 2017; Oehmichen & Puck, 2016). 
 
I argue that many studies analyze the effect of corporate governance mechanisms, but the empirical 
literature has not yet consistently identified a strong relationship between corporate governance and 
company performance. However, a potential consequence of this is not the assumption that efforts to 
improve corporate governance are a waste of time and effort, but rather that it indicates the existence 
of limitations in research designs, which investigate the effect of solely one company dimension on 
performance, whereas governance mechanisms are numerous and interaction effects are quite prob-
able.89 
Even if the published statement of compliance of listed companies provides some indications for good 
corporate governance of the listed parent companies, they are insufficient and have no informative 
value to draw conclusions about the maturity level of corporate governance in their subsidiaries. 
Many scholars discuss management in regard to a positive business performance under the roof of 
corporate governance and associate it with KPIs such as EVA (economic value added), return on eq-
 
88 A comprehensive overview provides Zöllner (2007, p. 51 ff.) and Mustaghni (2012). Additional studies are pro-
vided by McConnell & Qi (2016); Kato et al. (2016); Yilmaz & Buyuklu (2016); Domadenik et al. (2016); Rose 
(2016). 
89 This argumentation is based on the analysis of Bassen & Zöllner (2014); Baker & Anderson (2010, p. 99); 
Larcker et al. (2007). 
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uity, share price increases or dividend payouts (cf. Hutzschenreuter, 2015, p. 93; Weichsler et al., 
2009, p. 138 ff.). Despite this, Strenger (2002, p.118) already summarized, that corporate governance 
proves no perfect orientation for the search of “true values”. Corporate governance is an interaction-
orientated approach, which is based on the shareholder and ownership orientated management and 
should be integrated in a much broader context of performance based general management (cf. e.g., 
Buckingham & Goodall, 2015; Bhasin, 2015; Brunner et al., 2013; Piser, 2013; Stiefl & von Westerholt, 
2008, p. 1; Pölert, 2007; Rappaport, 1999, p. 15 f.). It is too short-sighted to assess corporate govern-
ance solely among e.g. financial KPIs, it rather has to follow a comprehensive perspective considering 
multiple internal, external, direct and indirect determinates to adequately assess its multi-dimensional 
character. 
I argue that an evaluation methodology with different elements of the external and internal evaluation 
approaches fits best for a corporate governance analysis of multinational corporate groups with sub-
sidiaries in different locations. To consider the various natures of the subsidiaries it seems inappropri-
ate to apply solely the generic corporate governance standards for listed companies, but instead to 
develop a corporate governance approach that fits to the business model and group structure specif-
ics. To avoid an arbitrary and comparison free evaluation of intragroup corporate governance, I will 
develop a multidimensional management model, which considers various group internal and external, 
legal and regulatory related factors. 
 
In the following subchapter I will investigate the relationship between corporate culture and corporate 
governance, before I thereafter analyze the implications between subsidiary governance and group 
success. 
 
3.1.3 Relationship between corporate governance and corporate culture 
The corporate culture plays an important part for the effectiveness of corporate governance mecha-
nisms.90 In the business management related literature, several approaches exist to explain the corpo-
rate culture phenomena (cf. Robbins, 2001, p. 594 ff.). Even if the corporate culture research first 
started in the 1980s, corporate culture already exists since the setup of companies as a social, pro-
ductive and autonomous system.  
The initial starting point of the recent corporate culture research is the investigation of Ansoff (1979). 
Six years later, Schein (1985) published one of the most discussed studies for firm culture.91 Accord-
ing to his research, three different patterns play a crucial role for corporate culture.92 On the highest 
level, there are predominant behavior schemes, the so-called artifacts.93 They are the most obvious 
 
90 Davó et al. (2019) provide an overview about the impact of culture and law on corporate governance models. 
Among others, particularly Arjoon (2005) argues that legal compliance mechanisms are insufficient to secure 
corporate governance behaviour and may not be addressing the relevant issues that are important to ensure 
ethical behaviour. 
91 Schein (1985, p. 9) defines the corporate culture as “a pattern of basic assumptions – invented, discovered, or 
developed by a given group as it learns to cope with its problems of external adaption and internal integration – 
that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct 
way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.” 
92 For a further debate of the Schein model, cf. Hogan & Coote (2014); Yilmaz (2014); Schein (2010; 1991). 
93 Definition Artifacts: According to Trice & Beyer (1993), the visible artifacts can be clustered in six elements: 
Symbols, buildings, language, stories, rituals and ceremonies. 
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part of any corporate culture. The second level are joint values and norms and give guidance for 
appropriate conduct.94 The third level are basic assumptions, which form the foundation of the com-
pany values that are never questioned by the employees.95 Schein (2010) describes corporate culture 
as a “pattern of assumptions” that are defined for an organization. 
A well-known alternative approach was introduced from Robbins (2001, p. 595 ff.), who identified pri-
mary characteristics that help to evaluate corporate culture: Innovation, risk taking, accuracy, target 
orientation, person/individual orientation, team orientation, aggressiveness and stability. Another ap-
proach implicates that culture impresses the unspoken code of communication among people within 
an organization (cf. Crémer, 1993). A similar view expresses that culture is a convention that provides 
guidance and coordination. The managerial literature highlights culture as “a set of norms and values 
that are widely shared and strongly held throughout the organization” (cf. O'Reilly & Chatman, 1996). 
Hereby the culture is associated with a kind of ‘social control’. According to Pfohl (2006, p. 89 f.), cor-
porate culture can be ranked as part of the behavior dimension of the normative management. In the 
context of general management the corporate culture is an important element for behavior steering (cf. 
Welge & Al-Laham, 2013). This view is supported from O'Reilly (2008, p. 85 ff.), who outlines that 
most individuals care about the people who surround them. A concrete form of the internal and exter-
nal orientated corporate culture is the corporate behavior. Scholz (2010, p. 187) clarifies that behavior 
influences culture and culture controls the behavior. Altogether, there are several other definitions for 
corporate culture available, but only with minor deviations (cf. Wien & Franzke, 2014, p. 13). So it 
seems appropriate to apply for this dissertation the above mentioned definition of O'Reilly & Chatman, 
(1996). 
One of the major challenges is that culture cannot be described as a fixed or flexible controllable de-
terminant. It is always lively, dynamic, and created from a social group, which makes it difficult to im-
plement in a short time. Hofstede published a popular study, in which he analyzed the different mani-
festations and characteristics of corporate culture since 1980 (cf. Hofstede, 2016; Hofstede et al. 
1991). Hofstede (1983, p. 46 ff.) analyzed 116,000 employees of the global IBM Group in 50 different 
nations via a standardized questionnaire and identified similarities and differences of cultural groups. 
Since then, many researchers have further developed his findings (cf. e.g, Hofstede, 2016; Hofstede 
et al., 1991). Hofstede’s main results have illustrated that important cultural dimensions can arise from 
power distance, individualism vs. collectivism, masculinity vs. feminism, uncertainty avoidance, long-
term vs. short-term orientation and indulgence. 
 
The overarching objective of corporate culture is to support the organization to manage the alignment 
towards the external business environment and the internal implementation, and it can have different 
functions, too.96 A company culture is effective if it supports the organization to achieve its core job. 
 
94 Definition norms and values: The level of norms and values include legal and regulatory regulations, which 
need to be applied within a company or help the involved organization members to differentiate what is right and 
wrong in terms of the corporate culture (cf. Schein, 1985; 2010). 
95 Definition basic assumptions: Basic assumptions build the foundation of a firm culture and provide basic guid-
ance for the involved counterparts. They influence the thinking and behavior patterns and cover the unwritten 
rules of an organization that all employees know and (partly) follow without a critical questioning of them. 
96 Kotter (1996; 2008) connects corporate culture and organizational performance. A good corporate culture is the 
foundation for a good organizational performance. Typical functions of culture are the following: (1) Identification; 
The values and assumptions of the corporate culture are shared among all members are shared and have a 
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There are numerous studies available, which illustrate a positive correlation between a good corporate 
culture and organizational performance (cf. e.g., Polychroniou & Trivellas, 2018; Calori & Sarnin, 
1991; Cox & Blake, 1991; Wilkins & Ouchi, 1983; Shahzad et al., 2012; Awadh & Alyahya, 2013; 
Schneider et al., 2013). A well-known study is provided by Kotter (1996), who examined 200 compa-
nies and proved that those with a good corporate culture increased their turnover, profit and share 
price much better in comparison to companies with a worse corporate culture. This is consistent with 
the findings of others, who also outline the importance of joint company values, norms and behavior to 
provide managers and employees’ guidance and orientation. If employees perceive the management 
as trustworthy and ethical, it has a positive effect on the company’s performance (cf. Guiso et al., 
2014). Despite the fact that 92% of the executives feel confident that improving their corporate culture 
would increase their firm's value, only 16% believe their culture is where it should be (Graham et al., 
2017). 
 
Homma et al. (2014, p.178) outline that corporate culture is an instrument to support good corporate 
governance and that it helps to bridge non-regulated areas, as it is simply impossible and without 
sense to define rules for every single case. An appropriate corporate culture provides guidance for the 
question about ‘what is right and what is wrong’, which implies that the company culture directly influ-
ences corporate governance and bridges existing regulation and compliance gaps (cf. e.g., McBarnet, 
2019). In a corporate governance context, especially the functions of steering and orientation are im-
portant.97 The study results of Aggarwal et al. (2016) suggest that governance mandates can tighten, 
but not eliminate, the value gap between poorly and well-governed companies. Müller et al. (2016) 
analyzed that behavior control, as a governance mechanism at the organization level, reduces the 
frequency of ethical failures. Fotaki et al. (2019) provide evidence that ethical, instrumental and organ-
izational values increase corporate governance effectiveness. Corporate culture largely influences the 
acceptance and effectiveness of internal corporate governance mechanisms (cf. Schiehll et al., 2014).  
So far, there are selected studies available that explicitly focus on the inter-relation of corporate cul-
ture and corporate governance (one of the rare studies are Kumar & Zattoni, 2018, Bushman et al., 
2016; McAlister et al., 2016). Most of the reviewed studies compare national culture and their impact 
on corporate governance mechanisms and illustrate that national culture influences the understanding, 
legal and regulatory corporate governance framework (cf. e.g., Humphries & Whelan, 2017; Li & Har-
rison, 2008; Bae et al., 2012; Daniel et al., 2012; Breuer & Salzmann, 2012). 
 
 
 
meaningful and motivational factor. (2) Orientation: Corporate culture is an inner compass of the organization to 
give guidance for its members regarding their decisions and behavior. (3) Steering: From a management perspec-
tive, corporate culture supports the achievement of the set targets and minimizes the risk for deviant behavior in 
the organization. (4) Stability: Corporate culture strengthens the internal cohesion and provides in this ways a 
certain level of predictability and continuity. (5) Differentiation: Joint values indicate internally a uniform meaning 
and a differentiation among external members of the organization. (6) Sensibility: this ensures that important 
developments, trends and changes within the organizational environment get realized and considered in internal 
processes. For an overview about the function of corporate culture cf. Baetge et al. (2007); Homma & Bauschke 
(2015); Homma et al. (2014, p.10). 
97 For further information about the impact of corporate governance and corporate culture: Bae et al. (2012, p. 
289); Guiso et al. (2014). 
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In the last few years, there is a rising interest of the research community on the risk culture as a sub-
element of corporate culture (cf. e.g., Nguyen et al., 2019; Mourouzidou-Damtsa et al., 2019; Sheedy 
& Griffin, 2018; Carretta et al., 2018; Ring et al., 2016; Palermo et al., 2016; Ellul, 2015; Iqbal et al., 
2015; Roeschmann, 2014; Li et al., 2013). In the financial industry the active steering and manage-
ment becomes an entire part of a forward-looking corporate governance management approach (Koh 
et al., 2016). While in the past, the regulators and scholars primarily focused on the remuneration 
practice as steering and sanction instrument to avoid misguiding behavior, nowadays rather the risk 
culture is in the foreground (cf. e.g., EBA, 2017a; 2017c; IRM, 2012; APRA, 2016; FSB, 2014c; CIMA, 
2014). 
 
As my prior analysis illustrates, corporate culture affects the effectiveness of corporate governance 
mechanism. Corporate culture embeds the individual action and is for that reason a crucial element for 
the effectiveness of corporate governance. Only if corporate rules are compatible with the individual 
values of the person, the risk of non-compliance behavior can be minimized. Nevertheless, if a person 
feels confident that a particular behavior is in accordance to the organization, the ‘official rules’ will be 
secondary. Informal rules overlap the official rules and regulations. A compliant behavior with the cor-
porate culture is more favorable than only being compliant with internal rules. I outline that a culture 
change cannot be achieved through top-down mandate or external regulations. It lives in the collective 
hearts and habits of people and their shared perception of ‘how things are done around here’ and 
develops over time. The top management can demand compliance, but they can’t dictate optimism, 
trust, conviction, or creativity (cf. Walker & Soule, 2017). Executives create a governance culture by 
performing strategic leadership, ensuring policy-based intragroup decision-making monitoring and 
reviewing and securing intragroup compliance (cf. Goldsworthy, 2019).  
Corporate culture can make an important contribution to strengthen corporate governance, particularly 
if the formal regulations are equal to the staff’s informal rules. In case of non-conformity of the formal 
and informal regulations, the corporate culture can increase the risk of non-compliance and the infor-
mal regulations will become general usage. As several examples showed, the sole focus on sanctions 
is not enough to solve the field of tension between formal rules and the impeccable behavior in busi-
ness life. A functional corporate governance system needs to cover the right implementation of struc-
tures and incentive schemes (inclusive reward and punishment) as well as the compatibility of the 
‘formal, written’ and ‘lived reality’ of the corporate values. 
 
Even if many scholars outline the necessity of an appropriate corporate culture, it remains difficult to 
proactively manage culture to avoid individual misconduct. This illustrates the dilemma of the recent 
discussion – many scholars, regulators and authorities call for appropriate cultural changes, but at the 
same time struggle to provide conclusive guidance for a respective cultural target picture. Despite this, 
it remains to ascertain cultural and leadership related topics, that are becoming increasingly important 
within an integrated holistic and forward-looking corporate governance understanding. 
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After the analysis of the theoretical relationship between corporate governance and company success 
as well as the relevance of an appropriate corporate culture, I will transfer and consolidate the gained 
results towards the context of subsidiary governance in the following subchapters. 
 
3.1.4 Consequences for subsidiary governance 
Whether a multinational group is locally successful or not is largely decided on subsidiary level. The 
broad subsidiary literature indicates that variations in subsidiary success mostly depend on the 
entrepreneurial context of the organization (cf. O'Brien et al., 2019b; Strutzenberger & Ambos, 2014; 
Reilly & Scott 2014). Renz & Böhrer (2012) in particular identified competitiveness, innovation, sus-
tainability, leadership and organizational performance as the key advantages of subsidiary gov-
ernance. They found that those dimensions play a key role for the headquarters - subsidiary relation-
ship. I follow this argumentation and conclude that those layers operationalize long-term value crea-
tion in multinational groups. Even if there are some studies available, which have analyzed the differ-
ent individual layers in the context of corporate governance, there is no research found, that sets all 
those dimensions in a common context. Siller & Stierle (2017) complete, that the prerequisite for the 
full development of capabilities and skills, as well as commitment of the organizational members, re-
quire clear governance structures and processes. They highlight the necessity that corporate govern-
ance has to be strengthened from a corporate culture, which fosters innovation and integrity. There is 
the need of an emphasis of commonalities, e.g. in form of a common company vision that can be 
transferred to challenging corporate targets and competitive strategies. 
The competitiveness of a company reflects many different important input factors for company suc-
cess like e.g. market share, product potential, innovation potential, employee quality, quality of the 
company system, structure and processes. Few studies illustrate a positive relationship between cor-
porate governance and competitiveness (cf. e.g., Ho, 2005; Haldar et al., 2016; Larcker & Tayan, 
2015). There is evidence that particularly clear internal governance structures support the competi-
tiveness of a company.98 
Successful innovation is the source for long-term company survival, has a positive effect on the per-
formance and thus results in long-term orientated profitable growth (cf. Möller et al. 2016).99 Especially 
within the last four years, scholars have started to examine the relationship between innovation and 
corporate governance (cf. e.g., Jia et al., 2019; Sharma et al., 2018; Belloc et al., 2016; Yar Hamidi & 
Gabrielsson, 2016; Amore & Bennedsen, 2016) and found a positive correlation between both ele-
ments (cf. e.g., Sapra et al., 2014; Belloc, 2012; O’Connor & Rafferty, 2012; Teece, 1996). 
Apart from that, it is also important to strive for internal and external sustainability as an important 
driver for the corporate success to balance the short-term profit maximization and support the long-
term value creation. Today there is a broad consensus across the scholars, that the consideration of 
the society and other stakeholder groups is essential to generate sustainable company success (cf. 
Salvioni et al., 2018). The following studies provide evidence for the positive correlation between cor-
 
98 For sake of completeness, I outline that Goshen & Levit (2019) argue that governance structures are irrelevant 
to improve firm value. 
99 This can be particularly achieved by a professional innovation performance management, consisting out of a 
professional innovation portfolio management, innovation assessments and audits, technology forecasting as well 
as a proper innovation accounting (cf. Möller et al., 2016). 
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porate governance and sustainability: Schwalbach & Schwerk (2014; 2008); Günther & Ruter (2012); 
Schaltegger (2015, p. 199 ff.). A sustainable approach for corporate governance can be a source of 
competitive advantage and a long-term success factor (cf. Salvioni et al., 2016). Eccles et al. (2012) 
provide evidence that sustainability companies significantly outperform their counterparts over the 
long-term, in both terms - stock market and accounting performance. In addition, the study of Salvioni 
& Gennari (2016) found out that transnationally acting companies, who promote the 'de facto conver-
gence' between the different corporate governance systems, perform better, increase shareholder 
value and contribute to the sustainable development of the societies in which they operate. 
Leadership is also recognized as a key determinant for the long-term success of companies. Among 
others, the studies of McColl-Kennedy & Anderson (2002) and Shin et al. (2015) show that there is a 
significant impact of leadership on a firm’s financial performance. Other studies have proven that the 
way employees, subsidiaries, business partners and others are directed and controlled, affect the 
company performance. The following studies provide evidence for the positive correlation between 
corporate governance and leadership: Keasey et al. (2005, p. 183 ff.); Doh & Stumpf (2005); Wong & 
Laschinger (2013); Breevaart et al. (2015); Leroy et al. (2015); Arjoon (2015, p. 53 ff.); McAlister et al. 
(2016). Directors’ personal moral values are often an underestimated, but powerful driver in ethical 
decision-making and provide guidance for the execution of the individual governance role (cf. Grant & 
McGhee, 2017). Nahum & Carmeli (2019) found evidence that the leadership style of directors plays a 
key role in the strategic decision-making. Mainly during the last decade many scholars investigated 
the positive relationship between leadership, company success and corporate governance. 
Another key driver for long-term success is the design of the operational and organizational structures 
(cf. Wu et al., 2015). Despite the fact that the organizational performance is a key driver for modern 
high-performance organizations, it is still an often neglected factor. Belle & Belle (2016) state that de-
spite the meaning of the topic, a progressive and shared understanding of the link between organiza-
tional learning and governance is currently missing. Structural embeddedness is an important driver of 
governance choice (cf. Kim & Jin, 2016). Despite this, there are some new studies, which underline 
the major role of aligned organizational structures and processes for the internal governance and state 
that they are strongly related with the entire corporate success (cf. e.g., Wu et al., 2015; Brocke & 
Rosemann, 2014; Oyemomi et al., 2016; Moon, 2016). 
Further, it is a prerequisite that stakeholder interests have to be considered and an efficient and effec-
tive capital allocation needs to take place (cf. Ulrich, 2011, p. 89). Taking into account the examination 
of the prior subchapters, I connect the term efficiency and effectiveness of subchapter 3.1.1 with the 
above-described dimensions of Renz & Böhrer (2012). Those five dimensions are key drivers for a 
holistic, integrative and comprehensive corporate governance understanding and will play a crucial 
role in the introduced management model later on. That embeddedness provides an important contri-
bution for the better understanding of the relevant intragroup mechanisms and its effects, as Figure 4 
on the next page illustrates. 
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Figure 4:  Key drivers for long-term corporate success. 
Source:  Own illustration. 
 
In the specific case of the parents-subsidiary relationship, a professional intragroup corporate govern-
ance management can provide a sustainable competitive advantage, which means a better competi-
tiveness, increased innovation readiness, sustainability, leadership and organizational performance. 
Moreover, it is also a legal requirement for various types of companies in many countries. This under-
standing goes beyond the traditional corporate governance definition of most organizations by putting 
it into a company-wide context and combines it with a forward-looking view to overcome mentioned 
shortcomings of the current debate. 
 
The subchapter 3.1 provided an in-depth analysis about the operationalization of the term efficiency 
and effectiveness and corporate success in relation to corporate governance. Moreover, this chapter 
outlined the crucial role of a supportive corporate culture and made initial conclusions for the relation-
ship between subsidiary governance and the success of multinational groups.  
The legal and regulatory dimension builds another crucial influencing factor on the management mod-
el. As the prior discussion in subchapter 2.3.5 illustrated, particularly in bank subsidiaries the external 
regulation plays a key role. Thus, in the next subchapter 3.2, I will discuss the relevant institutional, 
legal and regulatory framework determinants. 
 
3.2 Institutional, legal and regulatory influencing determinants 
In many cases the term corporate governance is linked directly or indirectly to the legal and regulatory 
framework, which is why I will investigate this for the sake of completeness. Further, especially in the 
financial industry the regulation plays a much more crucial role compared to other industries, which 
also indicates the necessity to go more into detail, even if the primary focus of my dissertation does 
not rely on the legal discussion. As a starting point of the discussion, I will identify general core princi-
ples of the corporate governance regulation. The next subchapter 3.2.1 concentrates on the institu-
tional, legal and regulatory framework and debates typical group-internal governance enforcement 
instruments. Hereafter, the subsequent subchapter 3.2.2 additionally investigates the changed super-
visory approaches of regulators and the authorities, to further advance their supervision among banks. 
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Corporate governance is a complex framework that covers both obligatory and voluntary measures. It 
includes complying with the legal provisions (compliance), following general agreed standards and a 
set of corporate rules within the company. As discussed in chapter 2.3, another element of good cor-
porate governance is the structure and implementation of administrative management and control 
mechanisms. Doh & Stumpf (2005, p. 42 ff.) highlight that successful organizations focus on a strong 
interaction between leadership and governance. However, to ensure good corporate governance, 
different approaches are possible. The adherence within the daily business as well as of supportive 
formal structures is equally important to secure a constituency. In all corporate governance concepts, 
the starting point forms a separation between the management and its supervisory body, even if a 
close collaboration between those two organs is required. Besides, Werder (2015, p. 18 ff.) explains 
that a common corporate governance understanding and implementation in the organization plays a 
pivotal role. In sum, proper corporate governance practice is a major contributor for a responsible, 
qualified, transparent and long-term oriented general management. 
 
Originating from the initial governance challenges (incomplete contracts, different interests of stake-
holder groups, and opportunistic behavior of the involved counterparts) it is possible to identify various 
concepts for the management of corporate governance. Aras et al. (2008, p. 6) define transparency, 
accountability and responsibility as the core principles of good corporate governance. Vagadia (2014, 
p. 22) goes beyond that and, in a more specific manner, covers eight elements: He points out that 
engagement is the basis for good governance. Further, he argues that standard setters have to secure 
that the different stakeholder groups can participate and challenge in the decision-making processes 
within the legislative process that determines the corporate governance regulations. Also, effective 
corporate governance needs to be fostered by appropriate legal and regulatory frameworks, including 
enforcement structures like independent court proceedings, to secure public’s faith in the acting peo-
ple. Another prerequisite to make sure that affected stakeholders can understand and steer the taken 
decisions and activities, is transparency and accessibility to information. Vagadia (2014, p. 22) out-
lines that a proper stakeholder management focuses on responsiveness among the stakeholders. A 
society’s well-being relies on the principle that all of its members are taken into account and are not 
excluded from the societal changes. There is a necessity that good governance focuses on the effec-
tiveness and efficiency in terms of resource usage and societal needs of a new public management 
approach. Accountability secures answerability and target-oriented enforcement practices in case of 
misconduct. In essence, I outline that both, public institutions and the private sector, need to be ac-
countable to the society, other institutions and other stakeholder groups.  
Werder (2015, p. 18) agrees with the defined principles of Aras et al. (2008, p. 6) and adds, as further 
important principles for good corporate governance, the separation of powers as well as the minimiza-
tion of conflicts of interests. As a further prerequisite, it is from great importance to assure appropriate 
qualification and motivation of the organ members to support a value-orientated behavior.  
The above-mentioned principles follow a broader perspective and focus on involvement, collaboration 
and transparency to achieve good corporate governance. The interpretation and measurement of 
good corporate governance practice strongly depends on the individual definition of corporate govern-
ance and is still subject of ongoing discussions among scholars, although most of them can be linked 
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to corporate social responsibility drivers and are recognized as an entire element of a value based 
management approach.100 In this context Günther et al. (2016) outline that the company’s individual 
interpretation of good corporate governance practice further depends on the different types of compa-
ny specific situations. In the following paragraphs, I will discuss the suggested principles of Werder 
(2015, p. 18), as those principles form the underlying fundament of corporate governance regulations: 
 
Separation of powers: A consequent separation of powers among the involved counterparts avoids 
and prevents power concentration to avoid a self-interested misuse of opportunistic options. It is nec-
essary to implement systematic ‘checks and balances’ to secure that actions and behaviors of se-
lected persons are steered from a second party (cf. e.g., Ingley et al., 2013; Li, 2014; Larcker & Tayan, 
2015; Lessing, 2009). This principle has to be reflected in the corporate structures, processes and it is 
an inherent part of effective internal control. A typical example is the German dual board system of 
e.g. listed companies, where a clear separation of management (executive management board) and 
control (supervisory board) takes place (cf. Tricker, 2015, p. 489; Werder, 2015, p. 18). At its core, 
most corporate governance regulations, such as the Basel Corporate Governance Principles for 
Banks (2015), the German Corporate Governance Code (DCGK, 2015) or the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(2002) aim for measures that strengthen internal checks and balances and finally the corporate ac-
countability as a whole (cf. Pirson & Turnbull, 2015; Kim & Yoon, 2016). For multinational groups this 
means that there must exist defined clear roles and responsibilities between the parent and its subsid-
iaries and the operational and processual structures should be defined under the general premises of 
appropriate ‘checks and balances’. 
 
Transparency: A high level of transparency minimizes information asymmetries and opacity within the 
organization and among its stakeholders (cf. Stein et al., 2017). Organizational transparency defines 
the intra-organizational information sharing and the perceived information quality shared (cf. Albu & 
Flyverbom, 2019). I argue that the significance of transparency is strengthened by several legal re-
quirements in terms of publicity, capital market and labor-law provisions that require companies to 
disclose important information. A high level of transparency about the company, its structures and 
interaction processes for externals builds the foundation to facilitate a fair market valuation, trust in the 
integrity of the management and other governance related key persons (cf. Baraibar-Diez et al., 2015; 
Armstrong et al. 2015; Hess, 2007; Böcking, 2003). Higher transparency standards ensure that indi-
vidual opportunistic behavior soon becomes visible and leads towards a reduction of non-compliant 
behavior with potential sanctions. Multinational corporate groups use differential supervision to 
strengthen company internal transparency via global coordination.  
Multinational hierarchical structure, which resides within a company’s boundary but across national 
borders, is one of the most crucial features (cf. Zhou, 2014). 
  
 
100 Aras et al. (2008, p. 6) provide a comprehensive list about the objectives of good corporate governance: Creat-
ing sustainable value, ways of achieving the company targets, increasing shareholder’s satisfaction, efficient and 
effective management, increasing credibility, ensuring efficient risk management, providing early warning system, 
controlling performance, developing control and internal audit, keeping board independent from management etc. 
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Avoidance of conflicts of interests: The basis for typical governance problems is the different or 
even contrary interest of the stakeholders (cf. Werder, 2015, p. 7). The reduction of interest con-
flicts is one of the most important tasks for corporate governance. From a principle-agent perspective, 
in particular the executives, senior managers and other directors require increased attention. Due to 
their hierarchical position and privileged authority to dispose, they have the most opportunities to prior-
itize their own interests before the overall company interests (cf. Lin & Yang, 2013). It also addresses 
potential interest conflicts among the members of the supervisory body or external auditors (cf. 
Werder 2015, p. 19).101 Altogether, there are different ways to reduce information asymmetries, such 
as e.g. independency requirements for organ members to target on an independent, unbiased compa-
ny interest perception. Those regulations are supposed to avoid that organ members getting pressur-
ized to consider unreasonable personal or extraneous interests that may affect the overarching target 
of corporate wellbeing in a negative manner. I outline that there should also be mechanisms that avoid 
potential interest of conflicts in regard to conflict sensitive actions (e.g. the separation of consulting 
and audit function) or a right to reserve approval in obvious potential interest conflicts (cf. DCGK, 
2015, 4.3.5; Ringleb, 2014, Rn. 847 f.). This can be a major dilemma for the subsidiary boards, e.g. if 
there are situations in which the parent and the subsidiary represent contrary interests that must be 
taken into account. 
 
Management qualification: Another underlying principle of regulation is that members of the man-
agement and supervisory bodies need to be competent and committed to specify the company inter-
ests. The organ members and other governance related key functions (e.g. compliance, risk or internal 
audit) have to evaluate decisions taken regarding their contribution towards a sustainable value crea-
tion for the company as a whole.102 Kaehler & Grundei (2019) highlight HR governance as an increas-
ingly relevant part of corporate governance. To fulfill the expectations regarding the professional man-
agement and monitoring as an adequate management qualification, professional experience and regu-
lar training activities of the top managers are necessary (cf. Siebens, 2002.). Especially the key gov-
ernance function holders have to contribute with their individual professional knowledge and experi-
ence towards the relevant factual issues.  
Kirkpatrick (2009) found evidence that one of the reasons for the failure in the banking industry during 
the last financial crisis was an inappropriate board oversight, due to a lack of qualified directors. Fur-
ther Faleye et al. (2014) found evidence that the industry specific expertise of managers is positively 
associated with firm value. Thus, an appropriate management qualification, professional experience 
and regular training activities of key function holders are necessary prerequisites for improved corpo-
rate governance practice. In addition, several national regulators started to tighten the requirements 
for the nomination of board candidates within the last years.103 
 
 
101 For further information regarding interest conflicts, cf. DCGK (2015, 5.4.2 and 5.5) and Kremer (2014). In the 
literature discuss scholars particular the equal consulting and audit practice of external auditors: Tepalagul & Lin 
(2015); Hommelhoff & Mattheus (1998); Loitlsberger (2002); Quick (2002); Werder (2012). 
102Hinterhuber et al. (2013, p. 41 ff.) provide an overview about core competences of managers. 
103 For example, many countries have implemented fit and proper criteria for managers within bank institutes: 
FMA (2014) EBA (2017c); BaFin (2017b); FCA (2018). 
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Motivation: Another crucial key driver, that is however difficult to regulate, is the motivational aspect. 
The motivation of the key governance actors can be recognized as a preventive measure to avoid 
opportunistic behavior and encourage the intrinsic and extrinsic motivation to follow good corporate 
governance practice.104 In this context, particularly the variable or the performance related remunera-
tion plays a key role (cf. DCGK, 2015, 4.2.2; Ringleb, 2014). According to Werder (2015, p. 19) this 
also involves legal liability provisions to minimize contract and unlawful forms of opportunism with 
relevant sanctions. Until today, most compensation packages for CEOs are solely related to the finan-
cial performance and ignore long-term developments and sustainability aspects within the decision-
making (cf. Maas & Rosendaal, 2016). Yet, the analysis of Maas & Rosendaal (2016) and Emerton & 
Jones (2019) shows, that a growing number of scholars, regulators and practitioners are acknowledg-
ing the need for inclusion of sustainability targets in the remuneration packages of mangers as a rele-
vant supportive driver of good corporate governance. 
 
I go beyond the identified clusters and argue that good corporate governance mainly depends on the 
inner conviction of the involved persons as well as a good interaction between governance and lead-
ership. To achieve this, there is a common target picture required, which has to be supported by ap-
propriate formal structures, processes and a good relationship between the management and the su-
pervisory organs. In the end, it depends on the individual governance understanding and the taken 
actions throughout the company - from the board level to every single employee. Those above-
mentioned core principles are of great importance in multinational companies as well, even if it seems 
challenging to secure a consistent implementation among all hierarchy levels and in different host 
country contexts. Nonetheless, the exact meaning of ‘good’ corporate governance remains vague, and 
as such, supports my argumentation in chapter 2.3.1. 
Keeping those underlying core principles in mind, the following subchapter debates the institutional, 
legal and regulatory enforcement instruments that largely influence the intragroup management of 
corporate governance. 
 
3.2.1 Institutional, legal and regulatory enforcement instruments 
The solution of corporate governance problems and the combined creation of an appropriate system 
relies on market mechanisms (market for company supervision) or on target measures of the respon-
sible regulating authorities (cf. Kübler, 1994; Grundmann, 2001; Watrin, 2001, p. 23 f.). While the first 
case solely provides an institutional framework for the overall market-related processes (e.g. local 
Takeover Acts), the second case provides more specific regulatory requirements (e.g. prohibition of a 
personal union of board mandates as e.g. mentioned in § 105 German Stock Law). 
As the subchapter of 2.3.4 illustrated, regulation is always associated with additional costs and affects 
the corporate efficiency.105 Consequently, market-orientated solutions are more favorable. Neverthe-
less, markets are usually incomplete and result in typical allocation problems or welfare losses (due to 
e.g. management failure). For that reason, at least some governance regulations are necessary.  
 
104 For the differentiation of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, cf. Ryan & Deci (2000); Reiss (2012). 
105 Costs arise e.g. for the enforcement of the regulation, cf. Braithwaite (1982); Watrin (2001, p. 103 ff.); Kirchner 
(2002). 
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As analyzed in chapter 2.3.4, it is important to concentrate on the optimum equality between regula-
tion benefits and its additional costs. In essence, governance regulations lower agency costs and al-
low firms to grant less incentive pay (cf. Dicks, 2012). 
 
Werder (2015, p. 20) and Siebens (2002) distinguish between different levels of corporate governance 
regulation. Another differentiation takes place between legally binding and non-legally binding (sub-
statutory) regulations. While regulations adopted by parliamentary law-making procedures are binding 
for the addressors, sub-statutory regulations or ‘soft law’ regulations usually have a voluntary charac-
ter.106 They are based on different community initiatives with representatives’ out of the society, poli-
tics, management and science. Even if they go beyond the legal requirements in certain aspects, they 
are voluntarily self-binding principles for the addressed companies. 
Regarding their influencing sphere the sub-statutory regulations are separated into general standards 
and company-internal regulations. (International) standards are usually defined as a framework for a 
particular group of company types or a specific industry. I found that the demarcation of the compa-
nies as well as the design of the standards depend on the degree of obligation. Most of the existing 
corporate governance regulations focus on capital market orientated companies or other stand-alone 
companies, and have for that reason only an indirect impact on wholly owned subsidiaries. Other 
standards address e.g. all listed companies on a certain stock exchange or firms in a particular coun-
try. Altogether, the level of obligation can be either voluntary, a ‘comply or explain’ approach, or legally 
binding. While a ‘comply or explain’ approach on the one hand provides flexibility for its application, a 
comparison among firms becomes a little more difficult (cf. DCGK, 2015). The additional value seems 
to be questionable, if standards are solely voluntarily applied without a legally binding character. In 
addition, many companies define internal corporate rules, which specify external legal and regulatory 
requirements towards the company specifics (cf. e.g., EBA, 2017a). Some scholars even go beyond 
that and define another, more personal dimension, which emphasizes the individual behavior and 
attitudes (cf. Tricker, 2015, p. 235 f.; Welge & Eulerich, 2014, p. 35). 
 
Thus, there are different and sometimes even contrary views available of corporate governance on 
national and international level, which in some cases creates uncertainty about the interpretation and 
implementation (e.g. the interpretation of independency principles of directors) for the management of 
subsidiaries (cf. Szabó & Sørensen, 2018; Welge & Eulerich, 2014, p. 127; Stiglbauer, 2010, p. 14). 
Multinational groups have to consider both national and international standards. For the purpose of 
this dissertation, in the following paragraphs I analyze the different corporate governance standards 
and regulations.107 I will hereby follow the suggested clusters of Werder (2015, p. 20 ff.) and differenti-
ate among international standards, national regulations, industry-specific standards and com-
pany-internal standards. 
 
106 Strauß (2016) argues that the academic literature is quite familiar with the concept of “soft law” as such, 
whereas the missing definition of the term often leads to insecurity regarding handling the legal challenges arising 
out of operating with soft law. Cf. also the argumentation of Lutter (2001); Kirchner (2002); Werder (2015, p. 20). 
107 The corporate governance frameworks play an important role for the general framework conditions of compa-
nies, but it is not the scope of this dissertation to prove a comprehensive analysis of them. A comprehensive 
overview provides e.g. Welge & Eulerich (2014, p. 113 ff.). Szabó & Sørensen (2018) provides analyses the im-
plications of corporate governance codes on corporate groups. 
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International standards 
Particularly the published white papers and corporate governance principles of international standard 
setters build the basis for national standards and provide guidance for multinational companies to 
define their internal standards and regulations (cf. Welge & Eulerich, 2014, p. 127; Gerum et al., 2007, 
p. 42). The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) published its first 
OECD Corporate Governance Principles in the year 1999 and updated it in the years 2004 and 
2015. Despite the fact that this transnational framework is not legally binding, it provides guidance to 
national regulators and helps to identify potential objectives and approaches for the implementation 
(cf. OECD 2004, p. 14). They form the basis for the national legislation among the G20 and the OECD 
countries, are widely used as statutory benchmark and are recognized as one of the main pillars for 
securing a sound financial system (cf. Welge & Eulerich 2014, p.128). 
Since 2010 the 8. EU Guideline on corporate governance requires all EU member states to trans-
position their recommendations into national law. In 2011 the European Commission published anoth-
er discussion paper for a further improvement of corporate governance among European companies, 
where particularly the audit committee was highlighted (similar like in the Sarbans Oxley Act) as a 
crucial corporate governance instrument. This EU Green Paper for Corporate Governance gives 
guidance for new regulation and initiatives and it aims to set a uniform regulatory framework for corpo-
rate governance in Europe. According to the EU Green Paper, particularly the board of directors, 
shareholders and the ‘comply or explain’ approach are at the heart of good corporate governance (cf. 
European Commission, 2011; EU Green Paper 2011, p. 3; Humphrey et al., 2011). 
All those international standards help to secure a common understanding of corporate governance, 
but in a contrary perspective, their recommendations remain vague and target stand-alone companies. 
They avoid formulating clear expectations regarding the corporate governance in a group context and 
don’t regard the parent-subsidiary relationship or clearly differentiate between the one- and two-tier 
systems. In sum, they generally argue that corporate governance defines the relationships between 
the company’s management and supervisory bodies, its shareholders and its other stakeholders and 
formulate premises in which way companies should generally be managed and controlled. 
 
National standards 
Embedded in the internationally agreed corporate governance frameworks and common agreed 
standards, national standard setters formulate their individual country specific standards for corporate 
governance. The first country to published national corporate governance standards in Europe was 
the United Kingdom with the ‘Cadbury Report on Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance’. 
The Cadbury Commission is an association of the London Stock Exchange, the Financial Reporting 
Council and several economic representatives. The initial objective was to develop a single standard 
framework for corporate governance (cf. Schwalbach & Schwerk, 2014). After its completion, the 
‘Greenbury Report’ in 1995 and the ‘Hampel Report’ in 1998 advanced the framework towards the 
“Combined Code on Corporate Governance” (cf. Bress, 2008, p. 31). Other European countries have 
followed this proceeding and have developed further national corporate governance frameworks. For 
example, in 1995 France introduced the ‘Viénot Report’; in Austria Schenz & Eberhartinger (2006) and 
their members developed the first Austrian corporate governance standard (cf. Gerum et al., 2007, p. 
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43). Also in Spain, Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands there have been initiatives following the Cad-
bury Report (cf. Bress 2008, p. 31; Ringleb et al., 2010, p. 27). 
In Germany in the year of 2000 a governmental commission started to develop recommendations for 
corporate governance. The German Corporate Governance Code (GCGC) is a result of the corpo-
rate governance discussion since the early 1990s. In the year 2002, the first draft of the GCGC includ-
ed the results of several initiatives, such as the code of best practice of the ‘Grundsatzkommision Cor-
porate Governance,’ the DVFA Corporate Governance Scorecard and the recommendations of the 
‘Berliner Initiativkreis’ (cf. DVFA, 2000; Bassen et al., 2006). Since its publication, all listed companies 
have the legal obligation to follow a ‘comply or explain’ principle and they have to publish a declaration 
of conformity with the GCGC in their annual corporate governance reporting.108 Since 2015, other 
capital companies are also asked to adopt the GCGC. Yet, there are also contrary views about the 
additional value of the GCGC. On the one hand, Kaspereit et al. (2015) provide empirical evidence 
that a higher level of GCGC compliance is associated with lower cost of equity capital. On the other 
hand, the study of Bassen et al. (2006) illustrates, that there is only weak empirical evidence on a 
better performance if there is a high level of compliance with the GCGC.  
In the USA, all listed and foreign companies have to apply the standards of the Sarbans-Oxley Act 
(SOX), which primarily consolidates and modifies existing laws (Menzies, 2006, p. 14 ff.).109 In the 
year 2002, the US Congress adopted the SOX to increase the corporate governance requirements, 
particularly in the case of internal control mechanisms, documentation, and disclosure standards. Yet, 
the overarching objective of the SOX is to increase the investor protection with tightened disclosure 
standards, and a functional internal control system should secure proper financial reporting (cf. 
Coates, 2007, p. 91 ff.). Some authors provide studies that find clear beneficial effects of the SOX 
implementation (e.g., Gu & Zhang, 2017; Ahluwalia et al., 2016; Chang & Choy, 2016; Abdioglu et al., 
2015; Blair, 2016), but there are also others, such as Hostak et al. (2013), who argue, that the costs 
for the implementing and ensuring compliance with SOX standards motivates firms to withdraw from 
the U.S. market. 
I argue that there is no doubt about the necessity and usefulness of such standards and regulations. 
However, many of the national standard setters solely reproduce already existing laws and regulations 
and disregard e.g. international best practices or recommendations on how to avoid mismanagement 
in companies for the future. All those standards largely ignore guidance about appropriate corporate 
cultures or leadership. Despite the fact that those topics are difficult to regulate in standards, I point 
out that these are the building blocks for its effectiveness. For me it is questionable, if a regulation 
concerning e.g. a maximum limit of board mandates, really helps to improve corporate governance.  
 
108 Welge & Eulerich (2014, p. 114) provide a comprehensive overview about the legal and regulatory initiatives 
regarding corporate governance in Germany. Bottenberg et al. (2017) argue that the advantages of the German 
system particularly are the active integration of stakeholder knowledge, focus on strategic decisions, and a long-
term orientation on firm performance. 
109 The Sarbans-Oxley Act was developed after the Enron and Worldcom scandals, where the US supervisory 
body SEC and investors have not realized the criminal activities of the management and the external auditors. 
Hereafter, there was a huge distrust against executives, directors and audit companies. National regulators had to 
intervene with new law and regulatory initiatives to avoid further mistrust and opacity within in the capital market 
(cf. Welge & Eulerich, 2014, p. 132 f.). The Sarbans-Oxley Act exists out of the following sections: (1) Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board; (2) Enhanced financial disclosures; (3) Analyst conflicts of interests; (4) 
Commission resources and authority; (5) studies and reports; (6) Corporate and criminal fraud accountability; (7) 
White-collar crime penalty enhancements; (8) Corporate tax returns; (9) Corporate fraud accounting. 
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I state, that those standards should no longer solely orientate themselves to e.g. the existing Stock 
Corporation Acts, but rather orientate themselves to the management logic and should answer con-
crete questions of the daily management business. Most national standards predominately focus on 
external investors, but in future, there will have to be more emphasis to secure a broader acceptance 
among companies and the society by also taking their interests into account. 
 
Financial industry specific standards 
In the last years, standard setters have started to modify and adjust the existing corporate governance 
standards either towards special industries or towards different types of companies to improve their 
effectiveness. Corporate governance problems of financial institutes are qualitatively and quantitatively 
different from those of other companies (cf. Macey & O'Hara, 2016). In the year 2006 the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) published, on basis of the OECD principles, modified 
guidelines to improve the corporate governance of banks and updated them after the recent financial 
crisis in the years 2010 and 2015 (cf. BIS, 2015). The main objective is to address the corporate gov-
ernance specifics in banks, taking into account the specific role of banking supervisory authorities.110 
They clarify the responsibilities of the parent and subsidiaries and the obligation to secure group-wide 
transparency, as complex and opaque structures may pose financial, legal reputational risks. 111 How-
ever, Wright et al. (2018) criticize that the reform is incomplete and Thelen-Pischke (2015) explains 
that most of the mentioned topics are also covered by other regulations. In 2017 the European Bank-
ing Authority (EBA) published a revised guideline for internal governance to harmonize the financial 
institutions internal governance across the European countries, taking into account the new require-
ments (such as e.g. the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV)).112 As Goergen & Tonks (2019) and 
the Figure 5 on the next page summaries, there have been numerous initiatives of different regulatory 
bodies within the last years to strengthen corporate governance practice. In particular, the Group of 
Thirty, European Central Bank, European Banking Authority, Financial Stability Board and others have 
published whitepapers, discussion papers and industry standards, in which softer topics, such as ap-
propriate risk cultures become increasingly important. 
 
 
110 The revised principles particularly stress the importance of risk governance and internal control functions and 
the value of strong boards and board committees. The revised BCBS principles included for the first time a sec-
tion about subsidiaries in group structures (cf. BIS, 2017). Critics argue that BCBS principles focus too much on 
company internal mechanisms and do not differentiate between listed banks and banks with a unique ownership 
structure (cf. Derleder et al., 2008, p. 230). I argue that a ‘one size fits all’ approach is not suitable. Bank individu-
al adjustments are required to ensure flexibility for the implementation, considering the individual bank size, risk 
profile, structures and complexity. 
111 The BCBS principles outline, that the parent’s boards have the overall responsibility for the entire group, in-
cluding a clear and functioning governance framework appropriate to the structure, business and risks of the 
group and its subsidiaries. They state that the parent´s board and senior management have to know and under-
stand the group’s organizational structures and associated risks. At the same time, they have to secure adequate 
subsidiary oversight, while accepting the independent legal and governance duties of the subsidiary boards. In 
contrary, subsidiary boards and senior staff are responsible for effective risk management processes in their enti-
ty and have to support the effectiveness of the overall group-wide risk management. Whereas the parent compa-
ny should design the strategic, group-wide governance standards, design appropriate tools and reporting formats, 
subsidiary boards have to provide input towards their local application. In essence, it is expected that subsidiary 
boards secure compatibility with both, group standards and local legal and regulatory requirements. 
112 The framework for business conduct has further been developed and more emphasis is given to the estab-
lishment of a risk culture, a code of conduct and the management of conflicts of interest. 
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Figure 5:  Overview of post crisis corporate governance regulation initiatives for banks. 
Source:  Own illustration. 
 
Regardless of the numerous publications there are just some standards that in particular focus on the 
governance management of group structures and subsidiary governance. Palermo et al. (2017) and 
Gozman & Currie (2015) confirm that financial institutes face increased pressures to reform their gov-
ernance structures and (risk) cultural frameworks. At the same time, Schenkel (2016) criticizes that 
most of the defined measures are appropriate for large institutions but ignore the specifics of small 
and mid-sized institutes. To counter such criticism, the BCBS (2015), EBA (2016; 2017d; 2017e) and 
the FSB (2017) highlight the principle of proportionality within the design of internal governance struc-
tures to reflect the individual firm’s characteristics. Whereas on the one hand, this could increase the 
effectiveness of internal governance, this on the other hand leads to additional complexity, a lack of 
transparency and room for interpretation among both, firms and supervisory authorities. 
 
Compulsory self-regulation of companies 
According to the legal and regulatory requirements, regulated companies have to define statutory self-
regulations for their organization in most countries (cf. EBA, 2017a). Those internal corporate rules 
have to formalize the business model, internal procedures, the organizational setup and processes of 
the company to secure a reliable fundament (cf. Schaaper & Gao, 2018). They set the boundaries to 
perform the daily business, give guidance to the employees and increase organizational transparency 
to avoid organizational failures. Those internal rules aim on securing a transparent, consistent, guiding 
and standardized framework for the operational business. External regulations and the different inter-
ests of stakeholders influence the internal governance framework. In multinational groups, a profes-
sional group internal regulation management system that secures compliance of the performed busi-
ness activities with the applicable local laws and regulations in the different host country locations, is 
of great importance to prevent the corporate group from any reputational and financial damages (cf. 
Guserl & Pernsteiner, 2015). Group internal corporate rules and regulations are the foundation to clari-
fy the roles and responsibilities between the corporate parent and its subsidiaries, but also among the 
various governance functions and departments. To reflect the different hierarchical structures of multi-
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national groups, they apply multi-level internal rules with different scopes, levels of details and addres-
sors to secure global alignment and local responsiveness, as illustrated in the following Figure 6:  
 
 
Figure 6:  Corporate rules framework in multinational groups to ensure corporate governance. 
Source:  Own illustration. 
 
The corporate core values and the code of conduct of the corporate group are the foundation of the 
general management principles and the staffs’ behavior. Due to the different hierarchy structures, 
there are usually different levels of responsibility. The parent company formulates its expectations in 
certain focus topics in respective guidelines, which are applicable for the entire group (cf. Schaaper & 
Gao, 2018). Based on those group guidelines, there is a further detailing with business specific or 
individual subsidiary guidelines and standards by following a risk-based approach to secure transpar-
ency and increase intra-group alignment. Internal corporate rules are a key instrument for an appro-
priate compliance and governance communication (cf. Rademacher & Möhrle, 2014). The self-
regulation should address gaps, which may arise out of unclear responsibilities, inadequate mecha-
nisms of accountability or simply missing (external) legal and regulatory guidance (cf. Ojo, 2016). 
Nonetheless, it is crucial to understand to which extent the integration of regulations is appropriate, to 
avoid any additional bureaucracy (cf. Wei et al., 2017). 
 
Despite the countless studies that analyze the effectiveness of corporate governance regulations, 
there is still no uniform picture whether they are as beneficial as generally assumed. Among Christen-
sen et al. (2015), the prior paragraphs have also shown that compliance with corporate governance 
standards is not systematically associated with an improved performance. Even so, there is empirical 
evidence that a high level of compliance with national corporate governance standards is generally 
beneficial for the companies (cf. Cuomo et al., 2015). In addition, there is evidence that banks with 
more effective and professional organized boards are less likely to lend to riskier borrowers (cf. Faleye 
& Krishnan, 2017). I outline, that neither the regulators alone, nor the companies, provide the best 
mode for corporate governance management for all circumstances (cf. Or & Aranda, 2017).  
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Instead, it has to be hybrid and dynamic and it depends on the circumstances of the individual actor. 
Whereas corporate governance regulations set the institutional and regulatory framework, their effec-
tiveness depends largely on their individual implementation on company level.  
So far, most of the standard setters have just begun to develop specific standards for subsidiary gov-
ernance and ways to overcome intragroup opacity challenges (cf. Cuomo et al., 2015).113 The majority 
of the existing corporate governance standards do not fit and have solely partial or indirect conse-
quences for subsidiaries, as they are primarily designed for stand-alone entities and ignore constella-
tions with strong parent companies beyond them. This is a dilemma and clear guidance is still missing 
for many corporate governance topics in an intragroup context. Those partially unclear legal and regu-
latory framework conditions further increase the complexity to manage subsidiary networks. On the 
one hand, it is the legal obligation of the corporate parent to oversee the group-wide governance 
framework, but on the other hand, it is difficult to secure subsidiary governance if the separation of the 
governance duties among the parent and subsidiary boards are blurring, not clearly defined or even 
contrary in many jurisdictions. The current group governance regulations are fragmented and superfi-
cial (cf. Szabó & Sørensen, 2018).114 
Despite all critics, I found that many of the topics, which were held responsible for the last financial 
crisis, are observed in the latest legal and regulatory initiatives.115 At the same time, my analysis 
showed that there is greater attention to behavioral dimensions among regulators and a shift towards 
a broader understanding that underpins my promoted holistic, integrated and comprehensive corpo-
rate governance definition. It is important to understand that there are also other equally relevant 
company internal drivers (e.g. culture), which are impossible to be fully evaluated from external par-
ties. It remains a dilemma that a high level of compliance with external standards does not necessarily 
lead to good corporate governance or prevent future crisis. Even so, the following subchapter ad-
dresses the changed supervisory approaches, which also started to put greater emphasis on the soft-
er key drivers. 
 
3.2.2 Supervisory approaches for corporate governance 
As the previous analysis highlights, current developments in the corporate governance regulation are 
multiple and advancing rapidly, which leads to changed supervisory approaches of the authorities. On 
the one hand, the financial crisis has illustrated the deficits of the recent corporate governance prac-
tice, but on the other hand, it has also demonstrated their necessity to secure public trust with more 
bank specific corporate governance regulations and stricter external supervision. 
 
113 Calzolari et al. (2016) outline that there are already discussions about the necessity of a supranational super-
vision authority for bank subsidiaries.  
114 Szabó & Sørensen (2018) examined 48 corporate governance codes regarding group governance. They 
found some recommendations for group governance, but they are often found in different codes, often apply to a 
broader category of situations, not specifically group situations, and sometimes they are contradictory. Current 
recommendations for group governance are fragmented and superficial. 
115 The major drivers for the last financial crisis have been overcompensation, short termism and the related in-
centives for extensive risk taking, manipulation of managers, weak disclosure standards and lack of comprehen-
sive oversight of the supervisory boards (cf. Marcinkowska, 2014). Those shortcomings are addressed e.g. in the 
revised corporate governance principles for banks (BCBS, 2015) or the latest update of the EBA guideline for 
internal governance of banks (EBA, 2017a). 
 69 
 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Hopt (2011, p. 24) differentiate between internal and external mecha-
nisms of corporate governance in banks. Primarily for the supervisory authorities, the internal corpo-
rate governance mechanisms of banks are important. In the last years, the regulators and supervisory 
authorities modified their view on corporate governance, which inevitably resulted in changed ap-
proaches for the bank supervision. Five years ago, the assessments of the supervisory authorities 
were mainly executed backward-looking and concentrated on financial risks, systems and controls as 
the following Figure 7 demonstrates: 
 
 
Figure 7:  Pre-crisis approach for bank supervision. 
Source:  Covered in Kellermann et al. (2013). 
 
Nevertheless, since then, the supervisors realized that some of the quadrants have been comparative-
ly empty and that alternative approaches were required for comprehensive institutional assessments. 
On this occasion, supervisors examined recent research about behavioral science to better under-
stand the implications of behavioral and cultural drivers. This aimed at a new forward-looking perspec-
tive and more comprehensive assessment of financial and non-financial risks to ensure an overall 
view on the bank organizations (cf. Ring et al., 2016; Raaijmarkers et al., 2015, p. 15).  
 
As the Figure 8 on the next page illustrates, those new supervisory approaches require changes in 
both methodical procedures and content wise of the supervised focus topics. 
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Figure 8:  Post-crisis approach for bank supervision. 
Source:  Own illustration based on Kellermann et al. (2013) and Raaijmarkers et al. (2015, p. 16). 
 
The post crisis supervision of banks follows an integrated approach, which combines the forward- and 
backward-looking view, considering the lessons learned from the shortcomings of the last financial 
crisis. This highlights the necessity of an increased attention on risk culture, behavioral elements and 
business model specific characteristics (cf. Roeschmann, 2014; Ring et al., 2016). Also, Lim et al. 
(2017) suggest focusing more on the behavioral dimensions instead of the traditional standard based 
approaches. All international standard setters (i.e. FSB, 2017; EBA, 2016; 2017; BCBS, 2015) outline 
the necessity for financial firms to implement adequate governance structures and culture frameworks 
to mitigate conduct-related shortcomings and activities. At the same time, they acknowledge the diffi-
culties to evaluate and assess culture concerns, behaviors and attitudes. They state that all mentioned 
elements should not be considered in an isolated way (e.g. FSB, 2014a; 2014b). Even if this makes 
sense, it makes it even more challenging for banks to meet the regulators’ expectations. Apart from 
that, I raise the question if integrity or appropriate risk behaviors can be achieved, if they are ordered 
legally or by written policies. Integrity or a healthy risk behavior develops over time, depends on lead-
ership, the business environment and is difficult to pretend. Schwarcz (2019) summarizes that much 
has been achieved by the latest regulatory reforms to reduce systemic risk, but there is still much to 
be done. 
Assessing the internal governance structures and culture of financial institutions is a major challenge 
for executives, boards and supervisory authorities, and an even greater challenge for outsiders such 
as creditors, depositors or investors. Because of the difficulties of assessing, elements that can only 
be judged by insiders, regulators and supervisory authorities typically use imperfect proxies like the 
risk governance structures that can be assessed externally. I emphasize that these proxies are imper-
fect measures for a complete assessment of a bank’s corporate governance practice. In this method 
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there is a risk that banks might appear (on the basis of external governance measures) to have a 
stronger internal governance than is in fact the case. Despite this, there is no doubt about the necessi-
ty of strong internal governance.116 Srivastav & Hagendorff (2015) also underline the need for internal 
governance mechanisms to safeguard that the needs of shareholders, creditors, and the taxpayer are 
taken into account.  
From a financial stability perspective, a strong relationship between governance and risk is of central 
relevance. I argue that there is also a misalignment of incentives across different supervisory authori-
ties regarding the oversight of cross-border banks. By law, national bank supervisory authorities have 
to focus primarily on national financial stability concerns, and thus do not necessarily internalize exter-
nalities of their decisions on others outside of their regulatory perimeter. As theoretically and empirical-
ly shown, this may lead to distortions in the regulatory decision process (cf. Beck, 2016). Nonetheless, 
I feel confident that the tendency to a single European Banking Supervision Authority (EBA) and the 
recently discussed structural reforms in banks will help to further increase corporate governance and 
the homogenization of international standards.117 In a contrary perspective, it is also clear that super-
vision and regulation has been unable to prevent the last global financial crisis. 
 
Corporate governance in banks and their supervision have become the focus of a flurry of recent re-
search and heated policy debates, combined with increased supervisory activity. There is widespread 
recognition that the quality and the awareness for corporate governance depends much on the in-
volved persons (Hilb, 2013, p. 217 ff.). That is why regulatory requirements increasingly focus on the 
profile and competence of the board members as well as their independence.118 The individual 
qualification becomes more important within the selection process for new board candidates (cf. 
Körner et al., 2016; Paetzmann & Schöning, 2014). Moreover, the changed supervisory approaches 
require boards to transform their roles to a more proactive, future orientated, advising and co-decision-
making role (cf. Stein, 2016, p. 89). 
 
Altogether, the expansion of much needed, but comparatively high-regulated corporate governance 
requirements for the banking industry should not be the standard for other companies, as this would 
lead to an over regulation and affect the market mechanisms in a negative manner (cf. Hopt, 2011, p. 
26). I suggest implementing, especially in the financial services subsidiaries, a modified corporate 
governance approach which differs neither from those of stand-alone entities nor from the earlier men-
tioned too big to fail institutions.  
The efforts from the supervisory authorities aim for the right direction, but even so, I feel confident that 
they will neither prevent from future company crisis, nor from individual misconduct. Nonetheless they 
 
116 Kalodimos (2017) argues that the effect of internal governance on performance is economically significant but 
often difficult to identify because of confounding external disciplinary mechanisms and the endogenous choice of 
internal governance. 
117 Representative for other developments: The EBA published in the last years several guidelines to harmonize 
the supervisory culture among the competent national supervisory authorities within the European Union: Guide-
lines for common procedures and methodologies for the supervisory review and evaluation process (SREP) 
(EBA, 2016); the guidelines on stress testing and supervisory stress testing (EBA, 2017d) or guidelines on super-
vision of significant branches (EBA, 2017e). 
118 There are further studies that argue that professional experience and qualification are equal important than the 
independency of the supervisory board members, cf. e.g., Hopt (2016); Werder & Bartz (2014); Theisen et al. 
(2004). 
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provide an important contribution to further strengthen corporate governance and help to recover from 
the corporate governance crisis – also if many of the published requirements are not that straightfor-
ward as they might seem at first glance. The changed supervisory approaches highlight the necessity 
for banks to rethink and adjust their corporate governance management with new approaches. Hereby 
my later developed management model will be beneficial, as it will demonstrate an appropriate way to 
handle the changed requirements on a global scale. 
 
After the discussion of the institutional, legal and regulatory corporate governance framework determi-
nants and the changed supervisory approaches, I will examine the frameworks and concepts to man-
age internal governance in the next chapter 3.3. 
 
3.3 Frameworks and concepts for the management of internal governance 
To enhance organizational efficiency and transparency, different concepts and frameworks have been 
developed over the last years. Such concepts ensure an efficient steering in organizations via different 
methodical, process and organizational approaches (cf. Schwager, 2012). It is essential for the devel-
opment of my corporate governance management model to analyze the strengths and weaknesses of 
prevalent concepts to subsequently integrate e.g. selected elements into the development of the mod-
el. Therefore, in the following subchapter, I discuss the internally accepted and well-known COSO 
frameworks for internal control and enterprise risk management. Hereafter, I debate the Three Lines of 
Defense Model as appropriate approach for the management of governance, risk and compliance in 
complex organizational structures. At the end of the chapter, I draw my attention to further-reaching 
concepts for the management of corporate-internal governance. 
 
3.3.1 COSO Frameworks for internal control and enterprise risk management 
In the early 1990s, the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) 
released their COSO frameworks (COSO’s Enterprise Risk Management Integrated Framework 1 and 
Internal Control Integrated Framework 2) to improve organizational and financial performance and 
governance of firms. Both frameworks provide guidance for management on how to implement and 
evaluate effective enterprise risk management (ERM) and internal control processes, to enhance 
management and governance processes. Both COSO frameworks build a standard leadership um-
brella for governing and managing a successful organization (cf. DeLoach et al., 2014, p. 1). 
Particularly the COSO Internal Control Integrated Framework, builds the international foundation for 
internal control systems of companies. It is recognized as a leading framework for designing, imple-
menting, and conducting internal control and assessing the effectiveness of internal control (cf. COSO 
2013).119 Moreover, the EBA defines an adequate internal control framework as a requirement for the 
 
119 The COSO defines internal control as “a process, effected by an entity’s board of directors, management, and 
other personnel, designed to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of objectives relating to 
operations, reporting, and compliance” (COSO, 2013, p. 3). I argue that this is a broad definition, but captures 
crucial concepts that are required to how organizations design, implement, and conduct internal control. At the 
same time, it provides solid fundamental principles for the application across organizations that operate in differ-
ent entity structures, industries, and countries. 
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internal governance management of European banking institutions (e.g., Solvency II Guideline, Article 
46). The overall objective is to enable the management to secure the achievement of the organiza-
tion’s overall operational and financial performance objectives, while safeguarding compliance with the 
relevant laws and regulations.120 Internal control aims to enable firms to deal more effectively with 
changing economic and competitive environments, leadership, priorities, and evolving business mod-
els (cf. DeLoach et al., 2014, p. 21). 
Contrarily, the COSO’s Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) Framework discusses its components in 
the context of what management does in running a business (cf. Brünger, 2009; Moeller, 2007; 
Krause, 2015). The ERM Framework is the foundation for internal control and its reporting, and it pro-
vides clear structures and a transparent communication basis between the operative business, the 
management and its control functions (cf. King, 2016; Hamacher, 2015, p. 44 f.). The ERM Framework 
asserts that management judgments, with appropriate board oversight, guide the implementation of 
strategy, risk management and control. The elements of the COSO ERM Framework emphasizes to 
include all relevant elements within the management process that enable the management to make 
well-informed risk-based decisions (cf. DeLoach et al., 2014, p. 19). At its core, the ERM addresses 
the concern that company-wide risks might not be managed adequately or that they are even ignored 
due to a lack of risk ownership and transparency (cf. Sweeting, 2017, p. 2 ff.). That is why the COSO 
ERM Framework defines different roles, responsibilities and accountabilities for each corporate gov-
ernance element and supports in that way organizations to design, operate, and assess the effective-
ness of their internal control systems over financial reporting (cf. Pett et al, 2015; Schwager, 2012). 
The Figure 9 on the next page clarifies how internal control is an inherent part of the ERM, while the 
ERM is an integral component of company’s business model and consequently a key driver to en-
hance internal governance. 
 
 
120 Among others, especially Blumenberg (2014, p. 98) highlights that a functional internal control system is an 
obligatory legal and regulatory requirement for banks. 
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Figure 9:  Relationship of ERM and Internal Control to Contextual Business Model. 
Source:  Covered in DeLoach et al. (2014, p. 5). 
 
It seems accurate to argue that if taking into account a simple but holistic view of governance and 
management processes, the implementation of the ERM Framework contributes to achieve a better 
organizational performance (cf. DeLoach et al., 2014, p. 3). The overall governance environment relies 
on the organization’s vision and mission. Embedded in the governance environment, the strategy set-
ting has to be executed. This defines the process by which the management body in its management 
function (and, if implemented, its supervisory function) defines a strategy on how to achieve the goals 
that are consistent with the overall organization’s mission. The close interlink of those two elements 
(governance and strategy setting) build the basis to ensure long-term corporate success and to influ-
ence internal business planning, execution, monitoring and adapting.121 
 
The ERM Framework has become subject of many investigations among the academic community 
within the last years (cf. Kaya, 2018). There is no doubt that implementation of the COSO ERM 
Framework improved particularly the effectiveness of internal controls in banks and strengthened the 
internal governance management (cf. Altheebeh & Sulaiman, 2016). The COSO ERM Framework has 
become increasingly relevant due to an increasing complexity of risks and the further development of 
national regulatory frameworks (cf. Fraser & Simkins, 2016; Lai & Shad, 2017). Many studies provide 
evidence that organizations can strengthen their corporate governance with ERM processes and 
 
121 Inside the business model are four elements based on the time-honored cybernetic concept of the ‘Plan, Do, 
Check, Act Cycle’. De Loach et al. (2014, p. 3) highlight that these four elements are the prerequisite for the oper-
ational management to manage successfully the execution of the set defined corporate strategy. 
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demonstrate that it has a (significant) positive impact on corporate value and performance (cf. e.g., 
Lechner & Gatzert, 2017; Farrell & Gallagher, 2019; Viscelli et al., 2016; Soltanizadeh et al., 2016; 
Gatzert & Martin, 2015; Beasley et al., 2015). Other positive effects of the COSO ERM are a general 
greater awareness about risk-related topics and an improved internal audit performance (cf. Mohd-
Sanusi et al., 2017; Tsai et al., 2017). Even though this risk focused planning and control are often 
promoted as the fundamental elements of an ERM, there are also surveys, which indicate that their 
adoption is relatively limited (e.g., AFP, 2014; Milliman, 2014; PWC, 2015; 2017). Ittner & Keusch 
(2017) found that the limited adoption of the ERM, on average, is not beneficial. Challenges arise par-
ticularly out of defining the organization’s risk appetite and tolerances, limitations in the quantitative 
risk assessment and forecasting methods or the general inability to anticipate infrequent or external 
events can hinder effectiveness of the risk-focused planning and control procedures (cf. Ittner & 
Keusch, 2017; Mikes, 2009; Power, 2009; Danielsson, 2008; Taleb, 2007). Even so, many empirical 
studies found that there is a positive relationship among the triangle of value creation, ERM and inter-
nal control (cf. Kaya, 2018). 
 
To sum up, in the same way as risk can mean different things to different people, so is ERM able to do 
the same. The ERM aims to secure a management of all risks on a holistic basis and not just on the 
individual management of each risk, taking into account any easily quantifiable risks, but also risks 
that are more difficult to quantify, such as the negative financial consequences of reputational damag-
es. Furthermore, I outline that the ERM focuses on a holistic assessment of all risks across the entire 
organization to recognize the diversification and concentration of potential risks and avoids silo think-
ing within the different organizational units. I point out that it prevents different applied risk levels and 
risk appetites in different organizational units of the same organization. Consequently, the implemen-
tation of the COSO provides a valuable contribution to enhance the internal governance management. 
Even so, I raise the concern if the top-down planning and control as promoted from the COSO 
Frameworks alone, is as effective and straight forward as it may seem at a first glance. I argue that 
especially in multinational group structures, in which various internal and external forces are influenc-
ing a firm’s business environment on different levels, a combined top-down and bottom-up approach is 
more preferable to secure an effective and comprehensive risk management. 
Risk management does not need to look the same in different organizations. It should be fit for pur-
pose, having the level of sophistication, formality, and transparency that is needed for the significance 
of the objectives and associated risk potential. In this particular case, I feel confident that the COSO 
frameworks support firms to enhance their risk management practice. 
 
In the following subchapter 3.3.2, I concentrate on the Three Lines of Defense Model as a compara-
tively new, but often applied approach for the steering of governance, risk and compliance related 
topics in multinational groups.   
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3.3.2 Three Lines of Defense Model 
Besides the introduced COSO Frameworks, other organizational concepts have also been developed 
within the last decades to strengthen governance, improve organizational efficiency and reduce the 
probability for organizational failures and respond to tighter regulatory requirements.122 Hereby, in 
particular the Governance, Risk and Compliance (GRC) Framework is an often applied frame scaffold 
that includes the necessary action levels for a successful management of a company (cf. Long, 2017; 
Blythe & Machold, 2011).123 
For the management of the integrated governance, risk and compliance management system and for 
monitoring the entire corporate risks, the comparatively new Three Lines of Defense Model provides 
an appropriate framework. In 2013, the Three Lines of Defense Model for internal governance was 
introduced by the European Confederation of Institutes of Internal Auditing (ECIIA) to respond to the 
continuously rising complexity of organizations. As the number of business sub-units, divisions and 
departments of corporate organizations is increasing constantly, the necessity remains to coordinate 
and align the different parts with each other and to identify company-wide risks. Hereby, the Three 
Lines of Defense Model plays a key role to coordinate the various teams, departments, or even single 
persons to enable the identification and assessment of risks as early as possible (cf. IIA, 2013). Spe-
cifically, banking organizations implemented this management and steering logic and customized it to 
their individual organizational setups, even if its effectiveness is still untested (cf. Davies & Zhivitska-
ya, 2018; Mabwee et al., 2016). Respective authors highlight that this model helps to define, explain 
and clarify the different governance management, oversight roles and accountabilities (cf. e.g., Euler-
ich, 2012a; 2012b; Boella et al., 2014; Welge & Eulerich, 2014, p. 60 f.). The Three Lines of Defense 
Model consists out of three pillars as illustrated in Figure 10 on the next page. 
 
 
122 For example, in Germany the KonTraG and AktG (§ 91 (2) and the § 93 (1) AktG) and the § 43 (1) GmbHG lay 
the legal basis. It defines that the executive management is held responsible for the risk management and legally 
obliged to implement a risk management system. 
123 Racz et al. (2010) provided the first scientific validated definition and described the GRC Framework as “an 
integrated, holistic approach to organizational governance, risk and compliance that ensures that the organization 
behaves ethically and in accordance with its risk appetite and internal and external policies, by aligning policies, 
processes, people and technology, thereby increasing efficiency and efficiency."  
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Figure 10:  Three Lines of Defense Model for companywide risk management. 
Source:  Own illustration, based on Eulerich (2012b) and ECIIA (2011).  
 
 First line of Defense: The operative business functions are responsible and have to account 
the assessment, management, monitoring and reduction of risks. The initial approach is to in-
crease efficiency and effectiveness of internal processes via regular controls in IT processes 
or the middle management. Welge & Eulerich (2014, p. 61) explain that this secures that every 
function is permanently controlled by the superior hierarchical level. 
 Second line of Defense: In a second step, a risk management function and other supporting 
functions (e.g. compliance, governance etc.) have to steer and regulate the efficient imple-
mentation of risk management methods of the operative business management in the first line 
of defense (cf. Bungarz, 2017). The second line supports and gives ‘risk guidance’ to opera-
tive functions and risk owners. The second defense line consolidates the results of the opera-
tive business, draws potential conclusions, measures for risk reduction and prepares regular 
management reporting (cf. Welge & Eulerich, 2014, p. 62; IIA, 2013). 
 Third line of Defense: The third line is responsible for a further risk reduction of the risks that 
are not identified by the first two lines of defense. The internal audit function acts as inde-
pendent control and consulting function for the first two lines of defense (cf. Bungarz, 2017). In 
this role, the internal audit function supports the executives, managers and the institutional 
supervisory organs to fulfill their governance duties.124 
 
 
 
124 The internal audit provides regular monitoring activities to ensure the appropriateness and effectiveness of the 
supervisory, risk and control structures within the organization (cf. Bungarz, 2017; Welge & Eulerich, 2014, p. 62; 
IIA, 2013; 2009; 2016). 
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Some authors argue to implement other external influencing factors and to define the external audit 
function as fourth line of defense, which ensures external stakeholders a true and fair view of the fi-
nancial reporting.125 Again, others argue to also consider other legally binding supervisory organs that 
supervise the company in the model.126 
 
Even so, scientific studies about the effectiveness of the Three Lines of Defense approach are rare. 
Davies & Zhivitskaya (2018) ask the critical question if the model diffuses risk management responsi-
bility and reduces risk accountability. I attribute this to the fact that this conceptual framework is initially 
applied for developing situation-specific management control, which makes it difficult to make compar-
ison analysis between different organizations. The model promotes risk ownership and a stronger risk 
management culture while eliminating inefficiencies, gaps and overlaps that often occur in the man-
agement of risk and compliance by multiple counterparts. Organizations, that have implemented a 
strong Three Lines of Defense thinking, are generally more risk intelligent.127 
 
On the downside, the layers largely influence and depend on each other, which could also limit their 
effectiveness. If people know about existing redundancies, they tend to relax their vigilance and as-
sume someone else is on full alert. In addition, the overall ignorance about the functioning of the 
Three Lines of Defense remains to end up in the duplication of roles in many organizations, gaps in 
coverage, opacity and may create in that way new risk potential (cf. Seago, 2015; Mabwee et al., 
2016). Also Arndorfer & Minto (2015, p. 7 f.) argue that the model has several core weaknesses. On 
the one hand, there is often a misalignment of the risk takers in the first line. Whereas those experts 
act as the most crucial control function, this responsibility is contrary to their usual objective to gener-
ate sufficient revenues and profits for the company. Historically, most of the compensation schemes of 
those first line functions are more orientated on the financial performance than on control targets.  
On the other hand, there is often a lack of organizational independence of the second line functions. 
Most risk functions usually have a formal reporting line towards the board, but in the day-to-day busi-
ness most of the reporting, communication and collaboration takes place with the senior staff instead 
of the board, which could affect their independence. In this context, too, the compensation is a critical 
factor, as many organizations struggle to incentivize risk and control awareness and generate profits 
at the same time (cf. Arndorfer & Minto, 2015, p. 7 f.).  
A further weakness is the lack of skills and expertise of many second line functions regarding the 
business of the first line functions.  
 
125 For example, Bungarz (2017) argues that the external auditor provides an independent overall view regarding 
the effectiveness of the Three Lines of Defense approach. On a contrary, I outline that the external auditor prima-
ry focuses on financial related risks and evaluates not the ways in which the executive management board or 
other managers handle other management related risks (e.g. strategically, operative or compliance risks). 
126 For example, Welge & Eulerich (2014) state that this ensures transparency about a comprehensive action 
framework, which considers internal and external requirements and defines clear relationships among the in-
volved parties. 
127 Potter & Toburen (2016) found out that those organizations tend to be capable of quickly identifying and react-
ing to risk, are more efficiently deploy scarce resources to manage risk on a prioritized basis, and have better 
internal risk transparency. 
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Arndorfer & Minto (2015, p. 8) raises critique that there are often inadequate and subjective risk as-
sessments of the third line of defense which also hamper the effectiveness of the model.128 Davies & 
Zhivitskaya (2018) criticize that there is no possibility of external evaluation of the implementation 
stage in firms. 
 
Nevertheless, I outline its necessity and beneficial effects. Especially in decentrally organized multina-
tional group structures it is an appropriate way to enhance group governance as a whole, define clear 
risk responsibilities on subsidiary level and secure transparency in the consolidating parent entity. 
Financial services companies should implement the Three Lines of Defense approach and adjust it 
towards their size and organizational complexity (cf. BCBS, 2015; EBA, 2017a; 2017b). While the 
situational implementation could increase the effectiveness, it also leads to less comparability on the 
other hand. To overcome the above mentioned weaknesses, I follow the argumentation of Arndorfer & 
Minto (2015, p. 8 ff.) and Bungarz (2017) that it is to enlarge the model with the external auditor and 
the regulatory supervisor as combined fourth line of defense. 
I underline the necessity to implement competent internal control functions in multinational group 
structures (in particular risk, compliance and internal audit) on parent and subsidiary level, that are 
held responsible to align the central defined group standards with local legal and regulatory require-
ments of the host countries. Central internal control functions on parent level have to secure in-
tragroup consolidation and coordination to secure a holistic risk overview of the parents’ management 
board for the entire corporate group (cf. Wulf, 2012, p. 89 f.). 
 
Despite its weaknesses, the Three Lines of Defense Model and its underlying principles for the man-
agement of risks and the collaboration of the different governance functions, provides crucial infor-
mation for the later development of the intragroup governance management model. To complete 
chapter 3.2, I debate additional concepts and frameworks in the following subchapter 3.3.3, which are 
widely used to manage and strengthen internal governance of companies. 
 
3.3.3 Further concepts for the management of governance 
Besides the rather methodical COSO approaches or the organizational steering model of the Three 
Lines of Defense, there are also process concepts, which contribute to a better governance in organi-
zations. One of the most popular concepts is the EFQM Excellence Model, which was developed by 
the European Foundation for Quality Management (EFQM) in the year 1988.129 Initially, it is a system 
based on quality management and defines appropriate financial and non-financial KPIs for the general 
management and organizational oversight (cf. Bruhn, 2013, p. 382 f.). Whereas most companies apply 
the EFQM system for their quality management, others modified this approach to other management 
purposes. An advantage of this model is the possibility to apply it for all companies, regardless of their 
 
128 The effectiveness of the internal audit activity relies on a well-established audit planning, which is based on a 
comprehensive, objective annual risk assessment of the entire organization. If there are failures in identifying or 
auditing high-risk areas and processes, it will lead to false audit scopes, focusing on wrong risk areas or underes-
timated risks, which limit the effectiveness of the third line of defense (cf. Arndorfer & Minto, 2015, p. 8). 
129 Further information regarding the EFQM Model provides Pfeifer & Schmitt (2014); Moll & Kohler (2013); Hoh-
mann (2012); Felchlin (2009). 
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size, structure or industry. The EFQM Model helps to evaluate the internal strengths and weaknesses 
in order to identify the relevant factors (“enabler”), which primarily drive the company to excellence.130 
There is evidence that the EFQM Excellence Model helps organizations to generate a sustainable 
competitive advantage (cf. Calvo-Mora et al., 2017). Consequently, the EFQM Model can be used as 
a comprehensive governance instrument that supports managers to identify strengths and opportuni-
ties for improvement, which every member of the organization can address to achieve realistic goals 
(cf. Duarte et al., 2017; Mocanu, 2015). Despite this, Suárez et al. (2017) outline that there is still miss-
ing longitudinal quantitative research regarding the effects of its implementation in organizations. Oth-
ers criticize, that the EFQM Model ignores cultural aspects and different maturity levels of organiza-
tions, which makes it particularly challenging for multinational group companies to implement (cf. 
Bolboli & Reiche, 2015). More barriers to its implementation are those related to the lack of time and 
the lack of physical and financial resources (cf. Gómez-López et al., 2017). I argue that even if the 
application of the EFQM Excellence Model for corporate self-assessments is popular, the non-
existence of industry specific evaluation scores also limits the accuracy and effectiveness of the eval-
uation results. The model application as assessment instrument seems to be complex and it depends 
largely on the individual interpretation of the personal conjectures within the assessment of the criteria 
(e.g. leadership), which in turn could lead to varying results. 
 
Other often-applied management systems are the balance scorecard and the ISO 9001 and ISO 
14001, which provide further valuable insights for the general management (cf. Zech, 2015). The In-
ternational Standard for Organization (ISO) is a well-accepted set of rules for an international quality 
standard (cf. Hinsch, 2015). ISO provides requirements for the design of quality assurance, evaluation 
criteria and processes to reach those quality targets. Regardless of the company´s size, all companies 
can apply the ISO norms (cf. Wagner & Käfer, 2013, p. 119 f.). Critics argue that the ISO primarily 
concentrates on norm conformity, which is associated with high bureaucratic burden and documenta-
tion requirements instead of prioritizing on further improvement potential. 
To overcome the challenges of multidimensional target systems, many multinational companies use 
the balance scorecard (BSC), originally developed from Kaplan & Norton (1996, p. 53 ff.).131 The 
BSC helps to coordinate, manage and steer the target operationalization and provides a framework on 
how the overachieving company targets can be achieved by lower hierarchical subunits. Gleich (2012, 
p. 76) outlines, that the BSC is a management cockpit to illustrate the relations between business 
activities, results and the defined strategy. The BSC provides a comprehensive tool for the strategy 
development, involves stakeholder groups and also considers the financial consequences. I argue 
that, whereas the BSC provides a comprehensive tool for information provision, communication and 
 
130 The model consists out of eight main criteria (leadership, strategy, employees, partnerships, resources, pro-
cesses, products and services) and 32 sub-criteria, to evaluate a firm´s framework conditions (cf. Lorentschitsch 
& Walker, 2015, p. 399 f.). The criteria provide guidance for measures and solutions to improve the excellence 
and competitiveness of companies (cf. Sommerhoff, 2013, p. 29 ff.). 
131 The introduced balance scorecard of Kaplan & Norton (1996, p. 53 ff.) consists out of four dimensions (cus-
tomers, finance, potential (learning and development) and processes. For example, the BMW Group uses the 
balance scorecard as effective instrument to break down the entire group targets towards the different subsidiar-
ies (cf. Bauer 2010, p. 275 ff.). For further studies which also confirm the importance of the balance scorecard as 
management instrument, cf. Weber & Schäffer (1990; 2000); Lawrie et al. (2015); Hoque (2014); Niven (2014); 
Paul (2014, p. 193 ff.); Schlag & Runzheimer (2013); Bischof (2013). 
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target measurement, its implementation is often expensive and complex and linked to high administra-
tive efforts. In addition, it is often not consistently implemented among all hierarchy levels within or-
ganizations, which limits the informative value of the BSC. Despite its weaknesses, there exist various 
versions of BSC for multiple purposes today. For example, Welge & Eulerich (2014, p. 281 ff.) adjust-
ed the balance scorecard towards an executive management board scorecard and a scorecard for the 
supervisory organ as an instrument to measure the governance performance. Eisenberg (2018) dis-
cusses a balanced scorecard for board of directors in banks. 
 
The analysis of this chapter 3.3 has shown that different concepts, frameworks and other systems 
exist, to enhance the internal governance of organizations and respond the continuous rising organi-
zational complexity, but also meet the tighter legal and regulatory requirements. My analysis also high-
lights the necessity for appropriate, integrated and company-individual governance solutions to ensure 
effectiveness within the day-to-day business. While consistent company-wide approaches are from 
great importance, their local adaptability also has high priority – even if it is often associated with huge 
implementation and administration efforts, especially in large multinational group structures. As anoth-
er weak point of the discussed concepts, I found that not one of those concepts takes into account the 
integration of subsidiary networks, as they are prevalent in almost all larger corporate organizations. 
This confirms my earlier stated perception that most parent companies solely manage their subsidiar-
ies via terms and conditions, target agreements, yearly budgeting or simply personnel interrelations. 
For that reason, the next subchapter 3.4 examines intra-group corporate governance mechanisms in 
particular with financial services subsidiary structures. 
 
3.4 Corporate governance mechanisms in multinational group corporations 
The prior chapters have illustrated the numerous determinants that influence the corporate govern-
ance practice in group structures. The next two subchapters will consolidate the consequences for the 
group governance of the last chapters. At first, subchapter 3.4.1 debates the challenges in group gov-
ernance of cross-border financial services subsidiaries out of the parents´ perspective. Second, the 
subchapter 3.4.2 reflects the challenges that arise out of a subsidiary perspective to ensure a dual 
view on the group internal corporate governance mechanisms. 
 
Entering the debate, I clarify in the following Figure 11 the disparate determinants, which affect the 
intragroup management of corporate governance and which provide indications about the complexities 
of ensuring effective group governance. Due to the fact, that corporate governance is often defined as 
either a concept or specific part of the company, it is possible to dismantle corporate governance 
(equal to other functions like controlling) in a system of theoretic issues and a system of elements, 
which get affected from multiple direct and rather indirect influencing factors as illustrated on the next 
page in Figure 11.132 
 
 
132 This dissertation follows the understanding of Harbert (1982, p. 140) who defines a concept as general frame-
work that determines the baselines of the fact design. 
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Figure 11:  Influencing determinants on a firm’s corporate governance practice and its outcome (horizontal  
              perspective). 
Source:  Own illustration. 
 
Environmental framework conditions influence the corporate governance management, because 
they set the boundaries for the design of the company specific governance mechanisms, processes 
and organization. The external framework comprises different aspects, such as e.g. legal and regula-
tory requirements, internal and national non-binding and/or comply or explain approaches or also in-
dustry specific standards. Industry specific determinants like competition, customer characteristics, the 
environment or general social or cultural circumstances also impact the management of corporate 
governance. Based on those environmental conditions, a joint corporate governance philosophy 
builds the fundament and it is the first step within the operationalization of governance (cf. Hilb, 2012, 
p. 97). Organizations often communicate this as part of their individual mission statement to secure a 
common understanding among all members of the organization and to provide them guidance.133 As 
mentioned earlier, the mission is further specified in company individual targets and operationalized in 
individual governance structures. Those include among functions (e.g., supervision, control, man-
agement, leadership) and objects (e.g., processes, projects, products), key persons, task managers’ 
methods and instruments.134 In addition, the governance structures influence the design of the (gov-
ernance) processes (cf. Purdy, 2012). As chapter 4 will demonstrate, the governance structures and 
processes prejudice the operational and organizational structures, which in large multinational organi-
zations can be divided into a strategic and operative governance layer with different tasks and re-
sponsibilities of the parent and its subsidiaries (cf. Lötscher et al. 2015, p. 341). I state that this gener-
ic multi-level governance construct helps to better understand the complexities, interrelations and de-
pendencies of organizations. I found that it improves the general management and supervisory mech-
 
133 This dissertation follows the definition of mission statement of Leuthesser & Kohli (1997, p. 59) who defines it 
as a future orientated illustration of a target state of the corporate culture. It includes the way in which an organi-
zation reveals its philosophy and strategy via communication, behavior, and symbolism and is an important in-
strument to communicate this identity to key internal and external stakeholders. A mission statement covers the 
company purpose, values, goals and strategies, corporate creed, corporate philosophy and can be structured in 
different ways.  
134 According to Becker & Baltzer (2009, p. 6) tasks are the concretization of functions at objects. 
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anisms, and in doing so, enhances the execution processes. Finally, as my prior investigations have 
shown, this will lead to greater efficiency and better effectiveness of the organization.135 It contrib-
utes to a better competitiveness, increased innovation readiness, sustainability and organiza-
tional performance improvements of the corporate group as a whole.136 
 
Numerous authors already investigated corporate governance mechanisms, but most of the research 
mainly focused on comparisons of national corporate governance systems in an international perspec-
tive. Thus, there is only little research available regarding governance mechanisms in group structures 
with financial services subsidiaries.137 For that reason, I will analyse those mechanisms in more detail 
in the next two subchapters. 
While scholars distinguish between internal and external corporate governance mechanisms, I argue, 
that in a group context there are no clear boundaries between the internal and external mechanisms 
and some mechanisms even overlap (cf. e.g., Welge & Eulerich, 2014; Hausch, 2013; Huyghebaert & 
Wang, 2012; Zöllner, 2007). Thus, I prefer to differentiate between the parent (subchapter 3.4.1) and 
subsidiary (subchapter 3.4.2) perspective, in the next two subchapters about group governance 
mechanisms.  
 
3.4.1 Subsidiary governance from the perspective of the parent company 
For many multinational companies it is a challenge to track their subsidiaries, due to the large number 
within their portfolios. In most cases, they have different business models and governance policies 
and operate in different markets with different framework environments. One major governance risk for 
the corporate parents is a lack of transparency about the subsidiaries (cf. Cetorelli et al., 2014). 
Among others, in particular corporate governance principles for banks of the BCBS (2015) outline the 
necessity that parent boards have to be aware of their overall responsibility for adequate governance 
structures and processes within the entire group. The parent’s board is responsible for their implemen-
tation and effectiveness. Particularly in large group companies it will be unavoidable to ensure any 
wrongdoing on the level of subsidiaries and to clarify how to regulate liabilities in this case. In general 
there are two options possible: On the one hand the potential personal liability of the parent compa-
ny’s directors and managers towards their company owners for a missing or inappropriate control of 
the subsidiaries, and on the other hand the parent companies’ liability for its subsidiaries (cf. Petrin, 
2016). Liu et al. (2019) provide evidence that clawback provisions significantly lower corporate risk-
taking. The headquarters is capable of accurately tracking the subsidiary governance (cf. Bühner, 
2013, p. 6). Potential risks need to be identified and transparent and headquarters should regularly 
 
135 For further information, cf. chapter 3.1.1. This view is supported e.g. from Aguilera et al. (2008), who argue 
that interdependencies between the organization and diverse environments lead to variations in the governance 
effectiveness. In contrast to the often promoted ‘closed systems’ approaches, they developed a framework based 
on ‘open systems’ approaches, which examines the organizational interdependencies in terms of the costs, con-
tingencies, and complementarities of different corporate governance practices and its implications for the efficien-
cy and effectiveness. 
136 For further information, cf. subchapter 3.1.4. 
137 A comprehensive overview about typical corporate governance mechanisms provides e.g. Bushee et al. 
(2013, p. 123 ff.); Huyghebaert & Wang (2012, p. 308 ff.); Zöllner (2007, p. 16 ff.). The following studies debate 
national corporate governance systems in an international perspective: Grapsas & Powell (2013); Salterio et al. 
(2013); Ulrich (2011, p. 133). 
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evaluate their capabilities to perform effective governance of the subsidiaries. In the following, I briefly 
highlight the key elements of subsidiary governance from the parent perspective among the suggested 
clusters of the World Bank and the IFC (International Finance Cooperation) (cf. e.g, Frederick, 2014, 
p. 21 ff.; IFC, 2015). 
 
System for subsidiary governance tracking: The corporate parents should develop appropriate 
systems to track the subsidiary governance practices throughout the decentral networks (cf. Petrin, 
2016; Bühner, 2013, p. 5). According to Frederick (2014, p. 21 f.), such a tracking system for financial 
services subsidiaries should allow the group’s headquarters to have transparency about key govern-
ance elements within the subsidiary network.138 Further, he points out that such an intra-group gov-
ernance database can be necessary to meet the regulatory requirements in the home countries of the 
parent entity. Beresford-Wood & Buringa (2018) recommend an intragroup board portal system to 
manage and align the multiple boards in the corporate group. 
 
Uniform policies and governance guidance: Gruhlich (2016) and Petrin (2016) highlight that direc-
tors and subsidiaries can profit from uniform group policies (e.g. manuals, internal rules, guidelines) 
from the parent, because it provides them guidance. I outline that guidance is particularly helpful for 
the following topics: clarification of the role and expectation of the directors, the parent’s expectations 
of the local subsidiary boards, escalation procedures for conflicts between the headquarters and the 
subsidiary or the clarification of the responsibilities regarding strategy, risk, management, and control. 
Moreover, the information provision regarding the subsidiary boards, including the relevance of active 
and engaged subsidiary directors, expertise and required skillsets for the directors, nomination proce-
dures, the specific roles of directors in subsidiaries or information regarding effective board sizes also 
have to be clarified. It is recommended to implement a uniform intra group guideline landscape that 
provides guidance for the day-to-day business of the subsidiaries, by following a risk-based approach. 
This enables the entire group to secure business continuity among the different business units. How-
ever, uniform policies should be adjusted locally by the subsidiary boards and directors to increase 
their acceptance and effectiveness on subsidiary level (cf. Ansari et al., 2014). To achieve a consistent 
and uniform policy management, proper induction programs, intragroup mentor programs with experi-
enced managers and external trainings are basic prerequisites for the directors of the subsidiaries (cf. 
Bain & Band, 2016). 
 
 
 
 
 
138 According to Frederick (2014, p. 21) relevant information which should be available on parent level are e.g. (1) 
the exact number of subsidiaries within the portfolio of the group. (2) Real-time information about the local legal 
and organizational structure of the subsidiaries. (3) Assurance that the subsidiaries comply with both parent poli-
cies and host country legal and regulatory requirements including director appointments, officer appointments, 
minutes of the subsidiary board meetings. (4) Tracking of who directors are and how they are selected and nomi-
nated. (5) Tracking of the availability of secretaries who are in charge for providing policies on proper governance 
practice. (6) Proactive information provision of reporting to regulators, supervisory authorities, management and 
directors. (7) Information about the consistent implementation of policies and procedures. 
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Center of competence on parent level: It is recommended to create a separate governance func-
tion (center of competence) at group level to track and promote good governance, to enable and to 
support the subsidiaries and their senior staff.139 Such a governance function can be located in the 
legal counsel or as staff function of the board within the corporate secretary. Mills & Haines (2015, p. 
22) explain that most financial services organizations operate with a mixed approach of central and 
local governance functions. Frederick (2014, p. 24) shows that such a dedicated subsidiary function 
should be responsible for setting company-wide governance standards, creating a center of compe-
tence for subsidiary governance, maintaining companywide subsidiary governance policies and pro-
moting corporate governance best practices. In addition, such kind of function should report directly 
towards the executive management board of the parent and collaborate with an internal subsidiary 
governance and oversight committee. 
 
Proportional governance: Also, experiences have shown that subsidiary governance should always 
reflect the nature, scale and complexity of the subsidiary’s business and related risk profile.140 They 
have to be consistent with the adopted principles of the parent as well as be aligned with the site and 
nature of the subsidiary and local governance requirements. I recommend that the headquarters 
should execute a regular risk-based assessment to identify the most critical subsidiaries in their portfo-
lio.141 
 
Centralized versus localized management and control: The parent’s responsibility includes an 
aligned intragroup risk management (cf. Kajüter, 2014, p. 147 f.). The parent has to carefully balance 
between a central oversight and local accountability of the subsidiaries (cf. Ansari et al., 2014). On the 
one hand, Diederichs (2013, p. 36 ff.) and Merbecks (2013, p. 45) outline that a centralized control 
function is obligatory to secure transparency about the group-wide risk situation. On the other hand, it 
is required that the local risk management systems are adjusted to the needs of the parent’s head-
quarters to ensure consistency and high quality standards. I found that the central risk and control 
functions rely largely on the local expertise to be effective and that it should be a direct responsibility 
of the local management. 
Some authors promote a better separation between management and control functions. Frederick 
(2014, p. 26) suggests that the local internal audit function should report to the local management but 
also directly towards the Head of Corporate Audit on parent level, who has to consolidate the infor-
mation of the subsidiaries and report on a regular basis towards the parent’s audit committee on group 
level. The local internal auditors should also report directly towards the subsidiary board to avoid that 
their estimations are filtered through the local senior management (cf. Kajüter, 2014, p. 210). 
 
139 Mills & Haines (2015, p. 22) provide an overview about the advantages of the central and decentralized ap-
proach for governance and compliance functions. 
140 This argumentation is based on several authors, such as e.g. Arnold (2015b) and Frederick (2014, p. 25).It is a 
conclusion of the situational corporate governance understanding of Hilb (2016). Meuleman (2014) also recom-
mends considering local market specifics in an integrated governance framework. 
141 Such risk based assessments are common practice for performing internal audits in an effective and efficient 
way. They are also recommended in the SOX regulations, cf. Coetzee & Lubbe (2014); Li et al. (2015). 
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In addition, direct reporting lines for ad-hoc information towards the parent’s board are crucial to be 
aware for any risks and issues affecting the entire group. The parent should define uniform escalation 
processes, but the local board has to be held accountable for it (cf. Graf et al., 2016). 
 
The next subchapter 3.4.2 investigates the opposite view out of a financial services subsidiary to en-
sure a holistic, dual view on the governance management in the environment of a multinational group. 
 
3.4.2 Subsidiary governance from the perspective of the subsidiary 
There is a general perception among local regulators, that subsidiary governance should always follow 
the standalone approach (cf. e.g. BCBS principles). Yet, as already demonstrated in this dissertation, 
financial services subsidiaries are characterized by large heterogeneity: Some own a full bank license, 
others a leasing license, some have to apply the full set of governance requirements and others are 
more similar to family businesses than with listed companies, etc. Consequently, the expectations of 
subsidiary governance must be carefully adjusted towards the nature of the individual subsidiary. This 
subchapter investigates the drivers, which distinguish the corporate governance proceedings in finan-
cial services subsidiaries and other stand-alone entities. As in the previous subchapter, the structure 
of this one also follows the highlighted focus topics that have been identified by the World Bank and 
the IFC (International Finance Cooperation) in its publications and supplements it with further topics 
(cf. Frederick, 2014, p. 21 ff.; IFC, 2015). 
 
Clarification of local board responsibilities to the parent versus subsidiary: There may be situa-
tions in which the local subsidiary’s management is challenged regarding their loyalty towards the 
parent. From a pure company-law perspective, they have to represent, as the official legal representa-
tives of the local legal entity, solely the interests of the subsidiary. There do exist laws in some coun-
tries, that explicitly include obligations to act in the interests of the company owners (shareholders) (cf. 
Lorenz et al., 2014, p. 164 ff.). Frederick (2014, p. 30) explains that bank subsidiaries are a special 
case, as the general public expectation is that they act responsible and avoid risks which may affect 
the whole group or even the health of the local financial system. There may be situations in which the 
local management is obliged to take decisions, which are contrary to the interests of the parent if neg-
ative effects are to be expected towards the subsidiary (cf. Eccles & Youmans, 2016). Parent interests 
may prejudice the subsidiary via various options, in either more or less visible ways.142 Conflicts of 
interests may also affect the human resources management.143 Thus, I outline that from a local per-
spective it may be challenging to understand the limits of loyalties and to define the right balance be-
tween the subsidiaries as an integral part of a group versus acting as independent, autonomous legal 
entity with differing obligations beyond the parent interests (cf. Yasui, 2016; Eccles & Youmans, 2016). 
 
142 Such actions can include granting a loan for other subsidiaries in the home country, loan transfers within dif-
ferent group functions for accounting or tax reasons, low interest loans, pricing decisions for shared services that 
the group executes for the subsidiaries etc. 
143 For example, a group-wide HR hiring process could lead to the fact that subsidiaries are faced to deal with 
managers or staff which are selected on the group needs instead of orientating itself on the needs of the local 
subsidiaries or potential local legal requirements for bank managers. Lazarova et al. (2017) found out that subsid-
iary autonomy for human resources topics is associated with higher subsidiary performance. 
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I argue that there is no universal standard possible to serve as blueprint on how to perform proper 
subsidiary governance, as this must be decided on a case-by case basis. In addition, I highlight the 
necessity to provide training and guidance for local managers on how to deal with situations where the 
interests of the parent and subsidiary differentiate.  
 
Clarification of the directors’ obligation towards stakeholders: There has already been a large 
debate about the issue to whom the subsidiary board owes its loyalty. In its core, there is consensus 
that the board of financial services subsidiaries has to act in the interest of various stakeholders and 
broader interests. However, there are different views on how this responsibility should be executed.  
Financial services entities are strongly regulated, require special business licenses and are supervised 
from the national supervisory authorities which primarily focus on safeguarding the interests of the 
depositors and debt holders, whereas the interests of the company owners seem to be secondary. 
Another unique characteristic of banks is that they have to serve the multiple interests of different 
stakeholder groups. According to the analysis of Avraham et al. (2012), more than 90 percent of the 
balance sheet of banks can be in form of debts. The OECD principles as well as the BCBS Principles 
highlight that the board has to act on behalf of various stakeholders and not primarily on behalf of the 
company owners (shareholders). They rather outline the legal obligation to act in the interest of the 
bank and a sustainable business development and to consider the substantial interest of the custom-
ers. From a subsidiary perspective, this is a dilemma, as they have to equally serve different parties 
with somehow contrary interests. Another distinctive feature of banks is the legal obligation of the 
board towards the supervisory authorities to ensure compliance with applicable rules and regulations 
(cf. Filatotchev & Nakajima, 2014). 
 
The subsidiaries board role in the strategy setting: The strategy definition is one of the most im-
portant tasks of boards and the implementation occurs on the lower hierarchy levels and business 
units (cf. Furrer, 2016, p. 106 ff.). Although in a local context the subsidiary board is the highest institu-
tional organ, it has cooperatively less relevance within a group-wide perspective. In general, the par-
ent companies pronounce their overall strategic decision-making responsibility (cf. Blake, 2016, p. 10). 
The parent boards have concerns that there is a misalignment of the group strategy and its implemen-
tation on the lower hierarchy levels and for that reason focus on instruments to secure that the strate-
gy is properly cascaded down to the subsidiary levels. Chen & Zheng (2018) found that strategic sub-
sidiary autonomy is negatively related to subsidiary performance. According to O'Brien et al. (2013) it 
is unrealistic that small subsidiaries design their own strategy without involvement of their parent. In 
subsidiaries the local boards usually do not actively develop the own strategy, but provide important 
input towards the parent’s headquarters that the developed strategy on higher hierarchical levels is 
practical and represents the local needs. Local boards have to be engaged in the strategy setting pro-
cess and should provide regular feedback to ensure the strategy viability in the host country and in-
crease the effectiveness of the local group strategy (cf. O'Brien et al., 2013).  
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Subsidiary boards’ role in internal control and risk management: The prior chapters raised the 
question about the control framework of subsidiaries. Risk management and control are complex top-
ics and should be embedded in a group-wide governance framework.144 Nevertheless, the effective-
ness of control and risk management depends largely on local knowledge and involvement. According 
to the analysis of the IFC and EBRD (2012), parents usually centralize their risk management, compli-
ance and internal audit functions in the parents´ headquarters (cf. Apostolov, 2013).145 The reason 
behind it is to secure a companywide approach, but Frederick (2014, p. 35) argues that the risk analy-
sis and control should not only be executed in the overseas parent. To ensure a comprehensive view 
and secure fast reactions to local circumstances, they should be supported by local expertise of the 
subsidiary’s risk function. Virtually every bank has a Chief Risk Officer today (cf. Rajgopal, 2019). Lo-
cal boards should enhance the internal control and risk management via contextualizing of infor-
mation, ensuring that central policies are adjusted towards the local subsidiary specifics and to make 
clear that the ultimate responsibility and accountability for internal control, compliance and risk man-
agement always relies on the local management (cf. Petrin, 2016). Consequently, local boards have to 
ask themselves if they execute a sufficient oversight of the local risk, compliance and internal control 
functions, or if they rely mainly on provided information of the group’s headquarters. Whereas financial 
services subsidiaries should always develop and execute their own risk assessments to reflect their 
local circumstances, they should also share information and should collaborate with the responsible 
parent functions (cf. Kajüter, 2014, p. 128). 
 
Subsidiaries director independence: As mentioned earlier, in the widespread one tier system (board 
of directors) the announcement of independent directors is a legal obligation.146 Hard and soft laws 
outline the importance of independent directors, because of their integrity, objectivity and supposedly 
unbiased eye. Independent directors should secure objective reasoning and should monitor potential 
conflicts of interests.147 However, in practice it may appear to be impossible or even unrealistic to meet 
all those expectations, especially in the context of subsidiary boards. Director independence at con-
trolled companies is a much-discussed conundrum (cf. Strampelli, 2018). Frederick (2014, p. 38 f.) 
explains that this already starts with the nomination process, which is often solely a checkbox ap-
proach in many groups and ignores the independency, the personal fit and the character of the indi-
vidual candidates. This practice is often insufficient and limits the requested independency to deliver 
objective local subsidiary monitoring. I argue that for subsidiary boards the formal independence is not 
that important, but rather the ability of the selected candidates to think objectively and challenge the 
management’s decisions that are taken. This argumentation allows more flexibility and enables groups 
to nominate candidates, which are not completely independent of the subsidiary. Consequently, this 
 
144 For further information, cf. chapter 3.3. 
145 According to my analysis, there are some countries (e.g. Germany or Poland), which explicitly prohibit the 
outsourcing of risk management and internal audit functions to the parent company.  
146 For further information, cf. chapter 2.3. 
147 They are expected to play a central role in committees that supervise typical conflicts of interest areas (audit, 
remuneration and nomination) and they need to have well developed skills and competencies about the business 
specifics and the local market environment. They also have a representing role for the external supervisory au-
thorities which means that they are tasked to take over even a pseudo-regulatory role for the bank monitoring. 
Moreover, they should be experienced managers with diplomatic skills to involve proactively in cases in which 
contrary interests arise between the parent and subsidiary. 
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means that managers of the group, but outside of the subsidiary, can also be suitable candidates for 
such mandates (for a similar argumentation, cf. Crespí-Cladera, & Pascual-Fuster, 2014). 
 
Subsidiary board composition and directors’ profiles: The board composition is a relevant key 
factor for the quality of the management and its supervision. On the one hand, there are local legal 
requirements that define and specify different board parameters in many countries (e.g. composition, 
board size, need for independence, fit and proper testing, member nationality, professional back-
ground). On the other hand, there are also expectations from the group that need to be taken into 
account from the subsidiaries. In conclusion, the parents select directors who are operationally effec-
tive, but do not develop independent strategies or challenge the fundamental practices of the group, 
as this could end up in potential interest conflicts between the parent and local subsidiary. Senior staff 
in subsidiary boards primarily focuses on the steering of the daily business of the subsidiaries (cf. Du 
et al., 2015). I argue that there should be a mix of senior staff with local expertise and experiences 
within the group network to ensure an overall perspective. Altogether, the role of subsidiary boards 
can be summarized as control, strategy, coordination, and service and helps to manage the headquar-
ters–subsidiary agency problem (cf. Du et al., 2015). Even so, the different reporting relationships 
within a group network should not be underestimated and should influence the board behavior (cf. 
Frederick, 2014, p. 39).148 For selected board members it is a prerequisite to understand their roles 
and responsibilities and to have transparency concerning the expectations of the group and local sub-
sidiary (cf. Koveshnikov et al., 2017). Likewise, there should be regular trainings, which sensitize the 
management, directors and other key functions in regards to the challenges of subsidiary governance. 
 
Subsidiary board committees: Committees are recognized as a helpful instrument to make deci-
sions of great importance. Board committees enhance efficient and transparent decision-making and 
the consideration of different perspectives, as well as address issues with potential for a conflict of 
interests. The most common committees in listed companies are the remuneration, audit and nomina-
tion committee (cf. Jones, 2017). However, I raise the question if such board committees generate 
additional value in subsidiaries. Many national regulators request the implementation of audit commit-
tees and some even define that they have to be directed from independent directors (cf. Chambers & 
Odar, 2015; Chambers, 2014). Because the parent decides on both, the directors´ nomination and 
local executive nomination, those committees seem to be obsolete and are rarely recognized in finan-
cial services subsidiaries. The relevance of local risk committees is increasingly recognized as a cru-
cial element of subsidiary governance (cf. Haan & Vlahu, 2016). Yet, I found that it is fundamental to 
differentiate between compliance in form, versus compliance with the spirit of those applicable laws 
(cf. Weibel, 2016). Even if all local legal and regulatory duties are fulfilled, committees can only be 
effective if the right mentality and supportive committee culture exist (cf. Jalal, 2017). The ultimate 
responsibility for the effectiveness of implemented committees lies with the subsidiary. Even if the 
parents feel confident that all needed decision-making purposes are covered via other control and 
reporting instruments, they should keep in mind the potential of committees to protect their interests.  
 
148 Sometimes there is local senior staff, which has reporting lines towards other directors of the group with other 
executive mandates within the group structures or even has to decide in their positions about the performance 
evaluation or even the individual remuneration. 
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Subsidiary board evaluations: Board evaluations have developed a crucial tool to improve board 
performance (Nordberg & Booth, 2018). Board evaluations evaluate the board´s function and provide 
indications on how the board performance can further be improved. Whereas in listed companies such 
regular board evaluations and efficiency audits are common practice, they are far less common in 
subsidiaries.149 Within a subsidiary board evaluation not only the internal function should be ad-
dressed, but rather the relationship towards other group internal and external stakeholder groups and 
shared authorities, as well (cf. Blake, 2016, p. 72). In addition, it should investigate the level of in-
tragroup autonomy of the subsidiary. Minichilli et al. (2007) and Frederick (2014, p. 42) explains that 
self-evaluation approaches are most effective and often used as internal governance tools. 
External governance evaluations of the supervisory authorities mostly rely on minute’s reviews, at-
tendance records, fit and proper tests and on the statements regarding the directors’ independence. I 
criticize that none of those measures help to overcome potential governance gaps in the subsidiaries 
nor provide recommendations for the further improvement of the subsidiary governance. However, the 
requirement for subsidiaries to conduct self-evaluations can force them to consider and reform their 
governance programs. As with other aspects of governance, the subsidiaries will solely take those 
evaluations seriously and foster changes if there is a strong “tone from the top” who also “walks the 
talk” (cf. Morrison & Shapiro, 2016). 
 
The subchapter 3.4 provides a comprehensive overview on the challenges of the subsidiary govern-
ance. It also describes the field of tension that the parent and subsidiary boards have to deal with from 
a group internal, but also group external perspective. The subchapter 3.4 consolidates the prior analy-
sis and their consequences for financial services subsidiary governance. Based on those findings, the 
next chapter 4 will examine the universal management of corporate governance in multinational 
groups with financial services subsidiaries. It will illustrate that the intragroup corporate governance 
can be best managed, coordinated and monitored if it follows an integrated tripartite approach with a 
strategic, operative and subsidiary governance dimension. 
  
 
149 Due to the enormous risk potential, some regulators (e.g. the FCA in UK, Capital Requirements Directive IV in 
Europe) already started initiatives to promote regular board evaluations for banks, which also includes regulated 
bank subsidiaries. 
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4. Intragroup corporate governance management in automotive multinational groups with 
financial services subsidiaries 
The previous chapter 3 provided a comprehensive overview of different decisive influencing variables 
of corporate governance in multinational groups. The preceding chapters have demonstrated the field 
of tension that parents and subsidiary boards have to deal with. Those initial conclusions provide a 
solid foundation to investigate the corporate governance management in multinational groups with 
financial services subsidiaries in chapter 4. As priorly shown, the core idea of corporate governance is 
to provide the legal and factual regulatory framework for the management and supervision of a com-
pany. So far, the legal requirements of the management and supervision are much debated under the 
roof of the corporate constitution but have also strong inter-relations with corporate governance. This 
chapter 4 primarily addresses the intragroup management of corporate governance, especially taking 
into account the relationship between the parent company and the subsidiaries. Hereby, it is particu-
larly important to discuss, if different parts can use imperfect contracts and in which ways the subordi-
nated interests of the corporate parent are guaranteed. The organizational management and its con-
trol are fixed components of each corporate governance system and they are the beginning of further 
discussions. In essence, organizational regulations of the parent aim to limit opportunistic behavior 
and strengthen the motivation of the subsidiaries (and their management organs). 
 
To ensure organizational transparency in the decentralized structures, it is essential to differentiate 
between the central coordinated governance by the corporate parent and the locally executed govern-
ance by the subsidiary. These days a global presence for many companies is a basic precondition to 
be competitive and successful in the long-term. The corporate parents have to decide if the subsidiar-
ies are handled as independent companies or in relationships with clear hierarchical subordination. 
Clear roles and responsibilities have to be defined between the corporate parent and subsidiary, and 
proper decision-making processes need to be implemented. Moreover, ethnical values and cultural 
core principles for the subsidiaries and collaboration with each other in the group network are essen-
tial. The increasing legal and regulatory pressure of local (banking) supervisory authorities makes it 
mandatory for multinational companies to professionalize their management of the group governance. 
In some countries, companies have to make regular reporting about their efforts towards the authori-
ties. Driven by the prior analysis, I outline that comprehensive subsidiary governance ensures a good 
integration, collaboration and monitoring of the subsidiaries, reduces management liability and reputa-
tional risks and also contributes to a better group performance. 
 
Thus, I define three different governance dimensions. The overall responsibility for corporate govern-
ance relies on the group board (board of directors / supervisory board), that sets the boundaries, con-
trols and provides expert advisory for the group executive management. The suggested multi-level 
approach for the management of corporate governance is based on some authors, who also distin-
guish multinational organizations in organizations with different hierarchical levels and mutual interde-
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pendencies.150 For that reason, in this dissertation, I apply the following three governance dimensions 
for multinational groups: 
 Strategic governance dimension: The group executive management board on parent level 
is responsible for the strategic governance. It provides orientation for the entire group and sets 
the strategic direction and targets for the entire multinational group and its affiliated subsidiar-
ies (cf. Lunnan et al., 2016a; 2016c; Du et al., 2015). 
 Operative governance dimension: The divisional head (e.g. CEO Financial Services) in the 
corporate parent is responsible for the business model specific governance coordination 
among the subsidiaries. He defines strategic plans and he is in charge for the internal com-
munication and information flow towards the subsidiaries in the respective division (cf. Wich-
arz, 2015). As well, he and his team provide guidance and suitable governance instruments 
for the subsidiaries that are aligned with the overall governance framework given by the stra-
tegic governance.  
 Subsidiary governance dimension: The third dimension addresses the governance man-
agement and implementation among subsidiaries in the host country locations. Ensuring com-
pliance with the applicable laws, regulations and corporate governance requirements are a 
clear management responsibility of the local subsidiary boards (cf. Petrin, 2016). The subsidi-
ary governance has to ensure common standards across all subsidiaries regarding certain 
governance related key topics (e.g. the organizational structures, systems and processes) and 
has to clarify the task allocation between the parent and its subsidiaries. This dimension com-
bines the different elements of the strategic and operative governance dimension towards the 
context of the subsidiaries. Subsidiary governance management is a prerequisite to secure 
governance consistency across all hierarchical levels, but also to avoid organizational failure 
and mitigate the risk potential of the entire group. 
 
It is important to understand that there are several interactions between the different dimensions and 
hierarchies, which reflect the complexities of the real world in multinational groups. Although, these 
dimensions may be recognized as clear and logical, there must also be alignment among the different 
instruments within and between each dimension. The partition of corporate governance into different 
layers (even if they are named differently) is also applied from others (cf. e.g., Hilb, 2016; Vagadia, 
2014; Renz & Böhrer, 2012; Bache & Flinders, 2004; Schmidt & Brauer, 2006; Van der Walt & Ingley, 
2000).  
 
While the prior Figure 11 concentrates more on the horizontal view of one single company unit with its 
multiple external influencing determinants, the Figure 12 on the next page summarizes the different 
hierarchical dimensions (from a rather vertical perspective) of intragroup governance with multiple 
business units and highlights the intragroup governance gap.  
 
 
150 Few authors suggest following multi-level approaches in multinational group structures: Representative for 
others: Hilb (2016); Vagadia (2014); Renz & Böhrer (2012); Kaehler & Grundei (2019); Ciabuschi et al. (2012). 
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Figure 12:  Multi-level corporate governance management in multinational companies (vertical perspective).  
Source:  Own illustration. 
 
While the strategic and operative governance dimensions are often located in the parent, the concrete 
implementation has to take place in the different subsidiaries on site. Hereby, especially cultural, geo-
graphical and institutional distances need to be overcome to safeguard the effectiveness of corporate 
governance (cf. Gooris & Peeters, 2014). 
 
I outline that it is impossible to develop a universal, holistic process and governance framework, which 
fits to all types of subsidiary structures. A corporate governance framework always needs to be ad-
justed towards the individual organizational structure, the institutional framework environments in the 
host countries and the degree of autonomy and empowerment of the operational units in the multina-
tional group. An accepted and effective corporate governance framework also has to be compatible 
with the type of people in the organization, their behavior and the prevalent corporate culture. Individ-
ual roles and decision-making bodies within the group have to be aligned with the leadership style of 
the executive management and the promoted corporate culture in the subsidiaries.  
 
Thus, I analyze in the following subchapter 4.1 the strategic and operative governance dimension and 
possible instruments how to manage them. Following this, subchapter 4.2 investigates the different 
governance related focus topics to secure a professional management and steering of the governance 
in subsidiaries. Subchapter 4.3 will then examine the associated corporate benefits arising therefrom, 
before I close chapter 4 with the conclusions for financial services subsidiaries in subchapter 4.3.  
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4.1 Management of corporate governance in multinational group structures 
This chapter debates the strategic governance dimension (chapter 4.1.1) at first and thereafter inves-
tigates the operative governance dimension on parent level in subchapter 4.1.2. 
 
4.1.1 Strategic governance dimension 
The strategic governance dimension focuses primarily on the governance role and responsibility of the 
parent’s CEO and the other group board members and it is directly linked with their leadership role. 
Hitt et al. (2012) define strategic leadership as multifunctional and managing via others. It helps organ-
izations to accomplish change and incorporates the internal and external business environment to 
manage, guide and engage in complex situations. At its core, strategic leadership describes the abili-
ties to anticipate, challenge, interpret, decide, align, and learn (cf. Schoemaker et al., 2013).  
On the one hand, the executive management board is primarily responsible for creating a group-wide 
vision for the entire organization, deriving the strategic targets for the corporate group and providing 
orientation for lower hierarchy levels. On the other hand, they are responsible for development of a 
corporate culture and competencies which enables the lower hierarchies to develop own strategies (cf. 
Plakhotnik, 2017; Hill et al., 2014, p. 10.). Koh (2014) summarizes that the main output of the strategic 
governance instruments has to be awareness, agility, adaptability and alignment. I conclude that those 
are the core governance tasks, which the executive management board should promote. In the follow-
ing Figure 13, I illustrate the different roles and respective governance instruments with which the 
parent’s management body can contribute to sustainable intragroup corporate governance manage-
ment: 
 
 
Figure 13:  The strategic governance responsibilities and instruments of the parent’s board. 
Source: Own illustration. 
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The management of the strategic governance covers different elements and focus areas, which are 
the building blocks for an integrated intragroup governance framework.  
 
Definition of strategic targets and direction: Strategic management defines the decisions and ac-
tions to define, implement and control plans in accordance with the organization’s vision, mission, 
strategy and its objectives (cf. Hill et al., 2014, p. 15). However, despite the core role for the business 
performance, it has to be noted that many companies struggle with the implementation of their strate-
gies. Executive boards have to implement organizational accountability frameworks to secure that for 
each strategic core activity a responsible function is defined to reach the agreed targets (cf. Thistle & 
Molinaro, 2016). Boards have to perform strategic leadership with charismatic, dynamic leaders who 
set high but reachable standards (cf. Koh, 2014). Good leaders get role models and have to ensure 
productive, effective policy-making and implement a deliberative process via constructive involvement, 
healthy relationships and positive emotional environment. Strategic leadership also influences the 
strategy development process, in which a compelling and appropriate vision is a central governance 
instrument. The combined vision for the entire group should be central in the governance process and 
formally incorporated into the group-wide governance system. A comprehensive group vision provides 
a common understanding and articulates a future state of the multinational group for all employees. 
My argument is that if employees are involved and engaged in its development it will raise the ac-
ceptance right from the beginning. Especially in multinational groups, a common vision is a central 
element to overcome geographical distances and cultural gaps between the subsidiaries around the 
globe (cf. Lunnan et al., 2016b). 
On the one hand, a strategy planning process indicates that company strategies are the output of a 
plan, which follows a rational and highly structured top-down approach. However, on the other hand, 
there are also authors who criticize such kind of formal planning procedure. At its core, they argue that 
today successful strategies are rather the outcome of serendipity and the unpredictability of the real 
world and the role of lower management hierarchies make a rational strategizing procedure impossible 
(cf. Hill et al., 2014, p. 20). Altogether, those are all comprehensive reasons, but at the same time, I 
outline that in large multinational organizations there is the necessity of a formalized strategy planning 
process to ensure consistency among the strategic direction of the corporate parent, different busi-
ness divisions and its subsidiaries. However, to secure an effective strategy communication is particu-
larly challenging for group executives and should be bridged by a multidimensional strategy communi-
cation approach among all hierarchies (cf. König et al., 2017). 
 
Setting and managing expectations: On the other hand, the parent’s management board is also 
responsible for the internal and external expectation management and has to define appropriate pro-
cedures to set and manage them in an ever-changing and uncertain business environment. Hereby 
the regular strategy definition, planning, monitoring and continuous adjustment as an inherent part of 
good corporate governance, play a fundamental role (cf. Tricker, 2015, p. 447). Thus, a prerequisite 
for effective and aligned intragroup planning processes are transparent and clearly defined group ob-
jectives of the parent’s management board, taking into account the interests of the major stakeholder 
groups (cf. Durand et al., 2017). Therefore, I found that a participative management approach that 
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focuses on the triangle relationship between the organization, their employees and external stake-
holders is important, because it increases effectiveness, productivity, innovativeness, culture of con-
structive criticism, acceptance for change and identification with the company (cf. Räber, 2013, p. 
11).151 Apart from that, a higher employee’s engagement increases the intrinsic motivation in a com-
petitive business environment. However, cross-functional decision-making can be challenging and 
time consuming, but as Gast & Zanini (2012, p. 82 ff.) point out, it is crucial for effective organization-
wide decisions. In particular, structured methods can help to aggregate information and balance power 
dynamics among the engaged stakeholders.  
In a volatile, uncertain, complex and fast changing business environment, management boards also 
have to give guidance, must be a sense maker for their employees and explain them coincidental 
events and sequences in plausible contexts (cf. Scott-Jackson & Mayo, 2018). For example, Peng et 
al. (2016) provide empirical evidence that CEOs’ intellectually stimulating behavior increases the em-
ployee’s work meaningfulness and in that way affects the organizational performance. The authors 
conclude that effective leaders use internal and external information and that they are interested in 
real time information. They prefer operative information instead of taking decisions only based on ac-
counting or financially based information and set them in a broader context with external information 
sources (cf. Hill et al., 2014, p. 17). Conflicts in the decision-making process and feedback loops stim-
ulate innovative thinking, create a better understanding of options and improve decision effectiveness 
(cf. Hill et al., 2014, p. 20). The studies of Phadnis et al. (2016) and Ramírez & Selsky (2016a) indi-
cate that scenario planning enhances the decision-making quality of executives.152 Good leaders sup-
port an environment where discussions are used to practice and define rules for the decision-making 
(e.g. via pre-alignment matrixes, time limits for the strategy process etc.). Strong leaders focus on 
common and clear defined targets and connect them to areas of individual responsibility and trust. 
 
Development and reshaping core competences: At the same time, it is expected that the manage-
ment boards challenge, steadily redefine, and further develop the core competencies of the multina-
tional group to ensure a sustainable competitive advantage. In the past an outside-in perspective as 
promoted from the assumptions of the Porter’s Five Forces Model was dominant, but globalization and 
digitalization changed this towards a new strategic perspective that primarily focuses on the compe-
tences and capabilities of an organization, which is described as resource-based view or competence 
based perspective (cf. e.g., Nason & Wiklund, 2018; Zupic & Drnovsek, 2014).153 While competencies 
 
151 Participative management methods focus on a higher level of intragroup participation and information sharing 
and includes internal and public information. Further, knowledge development and training to empower employ-
ees to understand the business and proactive participate to improve the performance. Rewards and remuneration 
schemes, which are linked to the organizational performance help to motivate employees for their pro-active col-
laboration. Moreover, power sharing in terms of decision-making (e.g. via quality circles, committees, survey 
feedbacks, suggestion systems, job enrichment and redesign) supports to enable employees to use and apply 
information and knowledge more efficiently (cf. Vagadia, 2014, p. 154). 
152 Scenario planning is an often used management instrument where teams systematically develop different 
future states and discuss them afterwards. It enables firms to manage environmental uncertainty by being “men-
tally prepared” to address the future by evaluating the critical uncertainties and its consequences for their busi-
ness. For further information, cf. e.g., Lew, et al. (2019); Oliver & Parrett (2017); Ramírez & Wilkinson (2016a; 
2016b); Amer et al. (2013); Peterson et al. (2003); Schoemaker (1995, p. 25); Goodwin & Wright (2001). 
153 For further information regarding the Five Forces Model, cf. Porter (1979; 2008a; 2008b). The following au-
thors use the terminology of resource-based view: Wernerfelt (1984); Peteraf (1993); Mahoney & Pandian (1992); 
Seifert (2013); Barney (2001); Lin & Wu (2014); Bromiley & Rau (2015); Hughes et al. (2016). Instead, the follow-
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are the resources, the capabilities define the probability of the company to involve those resources. I 
argue that management boards have to understand that the competitive advantage of a company is 
no longer bundled in the products, but rather in its core competencies.154 Thus, competencies need to 
be transferred in processes and products, because otherwise it is impossible for them to support the 
value creation. High performance organizations understand and evolve core competencies in a clearly 
defined, but limited scope and support the differentiation, which in turn, results in competitive ad-
vantages and regular reviews, redefinitions and constant adjustments of the company’s core compe-
tencies (cf. Worley et al., 2014). However, I point out that this also requires a culture of performance 
improvement and an agile learning environment within the organization. To understand those key 
drivers within their multinational group is a core responsibility of the parent boards, that have to make 
sure that each of the subsidiaries knows its core competencies within the group-wide network. The 
management board has to secure that there are group-wide processes to enhance performance, but 
also has to make sure that the gained knowledge delivered by those processes is used for decision-
making and constant improvement. Further, the management boards have to support the adoption of 
greater intragroup agility, which means that they constantly review and adjust how to prepare their 
workforce for the future e.g. via putting the right people in the right places with the right incentives and 
reachable targets (cf. Chung et al., 2014). In essence, agile organizations aim to expand their talent 
base by increasing productivity and not by hiring new employees (cf. Worley et al., 2014). I supple-
ment that agility also means delegation as part of a promise culture. People require a feeling of appre-
ciation. They need to believe that they are acknowledged for what they do and they would like to be-
lieve in what the organization tries to achieve. Organizational agility is the basis to cope with rapid, 
relentless, and uncertain changes in a competitive business environment (cf. Schrempf & Schwaiger, 
2018). 
 
Sharpening culture:155 Another fundamental governance feature for the management board is to 
ensure the framework conditions for a common intragroup corporate culture. Culture depends on core 
values, beliefs and codes of practices which make a community to what it is, influenced by individual 
and collective influences of the company. If employees feel engaged by the culture, they will be best 
committed towards the organization, the product or services (cf. e.g., Kompaso & Sridevi, 2010; 
Taneja et al., 2015; Pandita, 2019). An effective culture differentiates measurably from competitors, 
leads to a better organizational performance and firm outcome and thus creates a sustainable compet-
itive advantage (cf. Berner, 2012; Plakhotnik, 2017; Polychroniou & Trivellas, 2018). Whereas the 
corporate culture has to involve common group-wide elements, it is equally important that the parent’s 
management board makes sure that the subsidiaries have enough flexibility to enrich them. There is a 
great necessity of subsidiary-level variation through a set of internal organizational and external social 
conditions in which the headquarters-subsidiary agency dyad is embedded (cf. Kostova et al., 2018). 
 
ing authors follow the terminology of a competence-based perspective: Baden-Fuller & Volberda-Henk (1996); 
Freiling (2004); Hülsmann & Müller-Martini (2006); Jeong et al. (2015); Kersiene & Savaneviciene (2015). 
154 Hamel & Prahalad (1994) define core competences as customer value, competitor differentiation and extenda-
ble. Quinn & Hilmer (1994) define it as skills and knowledge set, flexible and long-term platforms, which are capa-
ble for evolution, limited in numbers, areas where organizations can dominate and elements, which are in a long-
term perspective important for the customer. Prahalad & Hamel (2006, p. 279) define the company’s core compe-
tences as the collective learning of an organization. 
155 For further information, cf. chapter 3.1.3. 
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Kostova et al. (2016) highlight the necessity to consider both, shared core values among the whole 
group and supplementing local host country specific cultural elements of the subsidiaries. However, 
culture can only be changed in a long-term perspective with much effort in changing corporate atti-
tude, values and images. This needs a clear management board responsibility and has to be part of 
the management process. Employees require empathy; otherwise, they will leave sooner or later. Re-
search has proven that the combination of the organization’s purpose, its goals and values are more 
important than the specific purpose of the organization (cf. Berner, 2012, p. 135 ff.). Management 
boards have to understand that companies, that focus on shared purposes, have a greater perfor-
mance, more employee engagement and a better understanding of their core purpose (cf. Miller et al., 
2010).  
 
Designing systems and structures for alignment and oversight: The parent’s management board 
is responsible to increase the organizational performance by providing the strategic direction and 
oversight about management decisions (Becker & Botzkowski, 2016, p. 84). While proper alignment 
procedures play a key role to increase the organizational value, they also have to ensure that all rele-
vant functions and departments are involved into the realization of its purpose (cf. Zerfaß et al., 2014). 
Organizational alignment has to secure the appropriateness and effectiveness of the core business 
procedures and suitable organizational mechanisms to manage them. It includes governance mecha-
nisms that enables management and guarantees accountability as a prerequisite for the definition and 
control of performance targets (performance management) (cf. Kneuper, 2015). For that reason, effec-
tive oversight processes and strategic planning policies and procedures are a basic pre-condition for 
effective intragroup governance. This requires also a definition, documentation and monitoring of all 
internal processes to secure process quality (cf. Kneuper, 2015).156 Moreover, internal controls and 
appropriate organizational structures have to safeguard effective alignments between the parent’s 
headquarters and subsidiaries (cf. Schiel, 2014, p. 91 f.). Contrarily, effective oversight processes 
should primarily secure a balanced risk reward assessment of management decisions. Whereas too 
risky adverse decisions indicate the ignorance of value creation potential, too risky decisions means 
that the management endangers the value creation. Thus, oversight should motivate the management 
for taking the initiative and take over the responsibility for their decisions. Besides, a proper target 
prioritization ensures a successful implementation of strategic directions and the alignment challeng-
ing (cf. Voggenreiter & Jochen, 2002). Effectiveness of internal control means that every decision 
maker is capable to make explanations for his decisions. For ensuring effective checks and balances, 
I argue that not only transparency, fairness and learning’s from mistakes in particular are essential, but 
also different approval levels for different management roles. 
The strategic and operative planning should be a clearly defined group-wide process on a regular 
basis to assure that potential changes that affect the future business environment are considered. 
Channon & Jalland (2016, p. 69) demonstrate the importance of understanding that the planning pro-
cess in multinationals is a behavioral and political process that requires clear top management re-
sponsibly and commitment, and Porck et al. (2018) outline the importance of reaching intragroup stra-
 
156 Kneuper (2015, p. 305) provides a comprehensive overview about quality measures for internal processes. 
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tegic consensus.157 Further, policies and processes are an inherent part of many management sys-
tems. As mentioned earlier, group-wide policy landscapes help to secure organizational oversight and 
provide guidance to the subsidiaries. The scope of the different policies should depend on the function 
or activity, the degree of risk potential and the organizational structure (cf. Harper, 2015, p. 68 f.). This 
requires a professional business process management, because it describes how people think and 
manage their business (cf. Harmon, 2015, p. 37).158 In essence, policies guide the achievement of 
predefined targets, whereas strategies and processes describe their way of implementation (cf. Har-
mon, 2015, p. 37). Consequently, parent’s policies should always allow implementation options, re-
quire regular reviews and adjustments towards the subsidiaries business model, local regulations and 
business environment.159 This duality approach safeguards that policies fit with the overall group vi-
sion, the group strategy, but also consider local subsidiary specifics (cf. Op't Land et al., 2008, p. 15). 
Adequate internal control processes are another crucial management board responsibility. The par-
ent’s management board has to assess the organization from holistic, group-wide perspective.160 
 
Intelligence, empowerment, delegation: As the prior analysis have illustrated, intragroup corporate 
governance management defines a group-wide approach that engages stakeholders and employees, 
and it supports a debate and consensus orientated culture. The parent’s management board has to 
carefully balance confidence, dissent and commitment and aim on empowerment of all hierarchy lev-
els. Empowered management boards should use their freed capacities to continuously question the 
business model via feedback loops and ongoing analysis of the business environment (cf. Hill et al., 
2014, p. 20 f. & 31). 
At its core, large multinational companies work efficiently because of the different opinions, independ-
ency (people think independent), decentralization (all people have different local gained knowledge), 
checks and balances and aggregation, which transfer individual judgment into a multinational group 
decision. (cf. Hillebrecht, 2016). I underpin that to be successful in the long-term as a one multination-
al group, a professional management, coordination and monitoring of the subsidiary networks, but also 
a regular exchange between the parent and the subsidiaries are essential.161 The engagement and 
empowerment of stakeholders provides a creative environment due to their diverse access towards 
e.g. knowledge, skills or tools. This motivates employees, results in positive change and supports the 
cross learning between the headquarters and the subsidiaries. Opinion diversity and independence in 
decision-making are of great importance and should be regularly promoted by the parent’s manage-
ment board. Despite the increased alignment efforts, decentralization increases independency and 
specialization and it allows people to organize and solve problems by their own individual approach. 
 
157 Channon & Jalland (2016, p. 69) provide a comprehensive overview about the ten most important planning 
pitfalls in international organizations.  
158 The modern business process management consists out of six critical core elements: Strategic alignment, 
governance, methods, information technology, people and culture (cf. Rosemann & Vom Brocke, 2015, p. 110 f.). 
159 Vagadia (2014, p. 165) outlines that effective policies consider at least six elements: Purpose and objective, 
operational parameters which define in which scope the management and staff are excepted to operate, delegat-
ed authorities towards the management, authorities which are not delegated towards the management, process to 
address exceptions, reporting requirements. 
160 Eichler (2015) and Vagadia (2014, p. 166 f.) point out that the control environment is largely influenced by the 
management philosophy, organizational structures and applied methods, the implemented IT management sys-
tems and the internal and external audit programs. 
161 This argumentation is underpinned by the Wisdom of crowds’ theory of Surowiecki (2005). 
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Accordingly, Hempel et al. (2012) argue that the decentralization requires a general formalized frame-
work, which also ensures enough flexibility to secure the advantages of the decentralization, too. Fur-
ther, I supplement that a decent culture is at least as important to secure critical evaluations and has 
to be regularly promoted by the parent’s management board. 
 
Stimulating creativity and innovation: Another core task of the parent’s management board is the 
promotion of creativity and innovation.162 To transform the company means to lead a way into an un-
known environment, but with engagement and great effort for learning and taking new action, even if 
the future state at the end of the transformation is yet not clear. Successful top managers continuously 
transform the organization by always questioning and challenging e.g. the organization’s strategies, 
core beliefs and assumptions and focus on how to drive innovation. Management boards have to sup-
port innovation, what means that they also have the will to take the connected risks and create a cul-
ture in which innovation is normal and rewarded (cf. Rainey, 2010, p. 13). Therefore, it is a prerequi-
site that the management board ensures that the organizational framework guarantees the flow of new 
ideas and minimizes cross-organizational boundaries to avoid silo thinking. Depending on the organi-
zational setup, innovations should be directly reported to the respective divisional head or other senior 
staff, which have to reward effective innovation (cf. Hauschildt & Salomo, 2011, p. 25/215). Apart from 
that, the group-wide human resources policies should make sure to identify innovators among the 
employees and new job applicants, even if they often have a controversial career and correspond to 
no stereotype of the standardized human resources processes in many multinational companies. 
 
Effective quality delivery via operations management: Another important element of the strategic 
governance addresses the operations units and quality management (cf. Vagadia, 2014, p. 186; Ha-
feez & Ruzevicius, 2011). The operational units are responsible to secure an efficient resource alloca-
tion within the multinational group. Especially in corporate groups with different business models in 
different divisions, a group wide operations strategy is a central element of the group strategy (cf. 
Grünig & Morschett, 2017).  
However, to ensure implementation and interaction between the different divisions (e.g. production – 
sales – financial services), an accountability framework and clear performance expectations of the 
parent’s management board are essential. In the year 1957, Feigenbaum introduced the Total Quality 
Management (TQM) with 14 core topics to ensure effective quality management. Those elements can 
also be applied for good corporate governance.163 
Another often underestimated key determinant for delivering good quality and performance is a pro-
fessional HR management (cf. Meyer & Xin, 2017). Kaehler & Grundei (2019) rank HR management 
as crucial part of corporate governance practice. A successful integration of human resources man-
agement practices and TQM targets reduce costs, increase product reliability, lead to greater custom-
er satisfaction and end up in shorter product development cycles (cf. Bou & Beltrán, 2005, p. 71). 
 
162 Zuraik & Kelly (2019); Prasad & Junni (2016) and Sariol & Abebe (2017) highlight in their studies the crucial 
role of CEO leadership behavior for the organizational innovation readiness. 
163 In essence, Feigenbaum outlines that quality and productivity improves if process variability decreases, and he 
argues that a company-wide responsibility, participative decision-making, empowerment and an improvement 
culture, builds the basis for good corporate governance (cf. Feigenbaum, 1957, p. 22). 
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However, this means that there are strategic workforce planning procedures in place to support effec-
tive service delivery and reduction of operational risks. Group-wide HR policies and delegation 
schemes have to be reviewed on a regular basis to assure that they are adjusted to the changing 
workforce needs and provide the framework for the definition of the local HR policies in the subsidiar-
ies.164 In addition, it is essential that there are intragroup escalation procedures for issues that cannot 
be resolved of the local management on subsidiary level. 
 
Intragroup trust management: Any corporate governance effort aims to create trust among stake-
holders.165 Trust in an organizational context requires trust between people, between teams and be-
tween organizations within a clearly defined governed institutional framework (cf. Fassin, 2012). This 
involves strong KPIs that support positive behavior, a common understanding and equal targets that 
are based on open communication, clear escalation procedures and flexibility (cf. Frey, 2011). A basic 
requirement for trust of stakeholders is a general positive expectation about the others behavior, the 
created output and clarity of purpose. Increasing trust means closer collaboration, cultural alignment, 
shared control, time and combined accountability. Even if this seems to be obvious and easy to im-
plement, building trust needs time to develop, but reduces the risk of opportunistic behavior and trans-
action costs among all involved participants in the long-term. Few authors outline the importance of 
intra-organizational trust within the parents-subsidiary relationship and argue that trust can reduce the 
principle agent dyad (cf. e.g., Koveshnikov et al., 2017; Lunnan et al., 2016c; Lunnan & Zhao, 2014; 
Williams & Du, 2014). Boards have to understand that, in multinational groups with differentiated sub-
sidiary networks trust and a shared understanding between the headquarters and the subsidiaries 
regarding, each’s purpose and goals are the building blocks for the collaboration (Ahlvik et al., 2016). 
Thus, Blank (2011, p. 51) states that from a governance perspective, trust requires a climate based on 
fairness among all stakeholders, open dissent and a clear differentiation between constructive profes-
sional conflict and not being loyal. Even if most executives are aware about it, I argue that it often gets 
ignored in the daily business. 
In addition, intragroup trust can be strengthened by promoting diversity to avoid typecasting individu-
als, individual accountability and transparency about the required strategic issues. Clear processes, 
which delegate strategic topics from management board to lower hierarchies, also contribute to build 
confidence and trust throughout the group. In multinational organizations stakeholder management 
and a common language play a crucial role to overcome the geographical distance and cultural differ-
ences (cf. Ciabuschi et al., 2017). To sum up, institutional trust covers target congruence, collabora-
tion, cooperation and communication.  
The parent’s management board can improve institutional trust by implementing a group internal poli-
cy that provides guidance about how to collaborate with stakeholders. 
 
 
164 The changed workforce needs are currently much debated among scholars in the context of industry 4.0. Cf. 
e.g., Gebhardt et al., (2015); Prifti et al. (2017); Fuchs et al. (2017); Sun et al. (2018); Hartmann & Wischmann 
(2018). 
165 The DCGK defines trust as an explicit target of the codex. For an overview how trust in an organizational con-
text can be interpreted: Cf. Schnackenberg & Tomlinson (2016); Shaw (1997); Vagadia (2014, p. 191). Welge & 
Eulerich (2014, p. 139) also outline the importance of creating trust as part of good corporate governance. 
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Effective controls and risk management: Internal control and risk management are an important 
element of the strategic governance responsibility. On the one hand, internal financial controls are 
important to ensure that ongoing financial obligations are fulfilled, and they support continuance and 
the achievement of objectives (cf. Götze et al., 2013, p. 47 ff. and 385 ff.). On the other hand, also 
financial planning and budgeting processes are required for the strategic and business planning to 
facilitate an efficient resource allocation and are required for the target monitoring against financial 
targets. The parent’s management board is in charge to define operational budgets, capital manage-
ment planning / budgets and to install regular monitoring procedures of the financial performance for 
the entire corporate group (cf. Gladen, 2014, p. 17 f.). This supports to assure that those activities are 
robust, timely and congruent with agreed policies and external regulations. Hereby especially proper 
internal control mechanisms, but also an independent internal audit, are essential (cf. Raiborn et al., 
2017). In addition, risk management is also a critical element of the strategic governance, because it 
has to secure a proactive and continuous assessment and management of strategic and operational 
risks to mitigate the risk of undesirable events (cf. Welge & Eulerich, 2014, p. 64).166 The management 
board should consider risks as inherent element within its responsibility scope and its regular internal 
discussions within their board meetings, and it should secure a holistic group-wide risk oversight with 
appropriate systems and processes which support its decision-making. Thus, the management board 
has to secure an appropriate and functioning holistic group-wide internal control framework and risk 
management framework. 
 
Altogether, the strategic governance is comparatively high level, but not less important than the others 
are. It defines the conceptual framework for the lower management levels to properly execute their 
governance roles and responsibilities. The management board largely influences the group-wide cor-
porate culture and an appropriate ‘tone at the top’ as well as ‘walk the talk’ is a basic prerequisite. To 
avoid organizational failure and increase the effectiveness of the governance structures, it is essential 
that the corporate culture allows reporting potential issues or undesirable developments in an open 
way across all hierarchies. This has to be supplemented with clear alignment procedures and respec-
tive oversight structures. Apart from that, an adequate risk management is a prerequisite to define the 
acceptable level of risk taking and internal control systems are necessary to identify group internal 
weaknesses and potential threats, but also to secure that employees follow the intragroup rules. 
 
This subchapter has also illustrated the heterogeneity and complexity of the strategic governance. It 
requires strong leaders to define the general framework conditions for the headquarters-subsidiary 
relationship. In turn, this is also a dilemma, as most of the described forces need time to develop and 
often depend to large extent on the individual interpretation of the managers.  
Furthermore, there is no doubt that an effective evaluation of such rather informal driven governance 
elements by externals is difficult. 
 
 
166 In this context, scholars particular mention the earlier debated COSO ERM Framework and the Three Lines of 
Defense Model as central intragroup governance instruments. For further information, cf. chapter 3.3.1 and sub-
chapter 3.3.2. 
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Based on this analysis, I examine in the next paragraph the implications on the operative governance, 
which is in the primary responsibility of the lower management levels, such as the divisional heads. 
The operative governance operationalizes the strategic governance framework towards the specifics 
of the subsidiary networks to secure effective and group-wide aligned subsidiary governance. 
 
4.1.2 Operational governance dimension  
According to Vagadia (2014, p. 37) operational governance is the missing linkage between the effort 
to follow good corporate governance practice and its implementation into the day-to-day business 
operations. Multinational organizations without well-defined administrative governance structures and 
instruments to manage the operational governance and procedures, lack in efficiency and support 
opacity. Operational governance covers all characteristics of decision-making, considering all ele-
ments, like the decision-making preparation, potential decision makers, its documentation and execu-
tion. However, also on the operational level of governance in a multinational group, there may be con-
flicts between the corporate parent and the subsidiary. On the one hand, there are personal politics of 
involved stakeholders, which may influence the working environment. On the other hand, there are 
large geographical distances, cultural differences and sometimes even divergent interests between 
the counterparts that may lead to struggles and increased alignment effort. For such reasons prede-
fined rules for the decision-making are required, as they improve operational performance and prevent 
conflicts. I argue that it correlates with a greater efficiency, consistency and commitment among all 
organizational members to have a clear predefined decision-making framework.  
In respect to the corporate governance definition of this dissertation, I define decision-making in its 
broadest perspective. Insufficient decision-making processes and missing decision-making compe-
tence schemes will be costly, increase bureaucracy (meeting culture, hierarchical complexity) and 
management liability, and they can bear a significant risk potential for the entire multinational group. 
Organizations without clear defined rules and a high degree of individual decision-making support 
opacity and favor a growing predominance of informal social networks. I underline that this informality 
also affects the governance visibility and legitimateness in a negative manner.  
Subsequently, the main function of the operational governance is to plan, coordinate and deliver the 
strategic targets set by the parent’s management board. The divisional head and governance func-
tions on headquarters level are responsible to enable and assist the subsidiaries with appropriate 
governance instruments to perform their governance role within the day-to-day business. Another 
crucial function of operative governance is monitoring of the progress via performance metrics (e.g. 
who is doing what, why, when, by when, etc.) as the following paragraphs will illustrate. 
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Taking into account the strategic governance responsibilities, I have clustered different core govern-
ance processes for securing an effective operative governance management in multinational groups 
as shown in the following Figure 14: 
 
 
Figure 14:  The operational governance determinates within multinationals.  
Source:  Own illustration.  
 
In the following I will describe each of the eight core processes in more detail.  
 
Policy development and management processes: Group-wide and division specific policies give 
guidance for the behavior in organizations and should be designed as business processes. Policies 
are a governance instrument to align the business towards the operational aspects of the company 
and provide for the management the opportunity to control and to run the organization in a better way 
(cf. Tricker, 2015, p. 164 ff.). However, I criticize that most of the policies in multinationals are written 
as text in a document, which makes it complicated to monitor and enforce their observance within the 
daily business. This means that it is not possible to automatically monitor the defined policies or poten-
tial overlaps towards other existing corporate policies. I suggest to implement policies which are rather 
designed as a set of controls and checklists than solely written in a documentation of the business 
rules. In the particular case of financial services organizations, it has to be additionally secured that 
the external legal and regulatory requirements are taken into account. At the same time, Vagadia 
(2014, p. 41) finds that there has to be a proper documentation and review process defined as an 
inherent part of the group-wide compliance process and starting point for the internal and external 
audits.  
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Risk management processes: In this context, risk management can be described as taking deci-
sions that support the realization of the organizations overarching objectives by defining individual 
activities within functional and cross-functional areas of the organization. It has to encourage the daily 
decision-making with a standardized process to identify a best possible action procedure under uncer-
tain conditions by the identification, assessment, understanding and communication of potential risk 
issues. A prerequisite for an effective risk management is an appropriate group-wide risk culture, 
which can be fostered by leadership, involvement, learning, accountability and communication (cf. 
Hopkin, 2017, p. 293; Diederichs, 2013, p. 52). Even if an appropriate risk culture is crucial to support 
the overall vision, mission and targets of the multinational group, it is also difficult to pre-define, im-
plement or even to evaluate it.167 Despite this, it seems appropriate to define a group-wide risk culture 
statement as a starting point to gain a common understanding of the expectations and the limits about 
accepted risks and outcomes of the management board (cf. Glaser, 2015, p. 347; Diederichs, 2013, 
p.15). In essence, risk management is directly linked towards future uncertainty, and all planning pro-
cedures have to include certain risk management elements (cf. Kajüter, 2014, p.17 f.). However, it is 
clear that corporate success is always linked towards the conscious assumption of risks. In addition, 
being innovative always means taking risks. Without risks there are no innovations. That is why, on 
the one hand, the divisional heads should focus on trust, but on the other hand, they also have to set 
clear boundaries with e.g. appropriate risk appetite frameworks to give guidance to employees.  
Even in a rapid changing environment, many organizations follow a defensive risk approach. They 
solely focus on the controlling of potential risks and limit their growth potential in that way. Vagadia 
(2014, p. 42) promotes an alternative approach and argues that risk management has to concentrate 
on the evaluation of opportunities, which drive forward the organization (upside risk) and solely man-
age things which may affect the organization in a negative manner (downside risk). Risk management 
needs to be recognized as a shared activity of all organizational members. The management board 
has to give guidance for the risk taking and the treatment of expected risks within an appropriate 
group-wide risk policy, which delegates the design and implementation of the risk management strate-
gy and framework towards the divisional heads and the lower ranked subsidiaries (cf. Glaser, 2015, p. 
347). As debated earlier, there is no doubt that especially in banking institutions competent risk man-
agement functions are of great importance and an inherent part of good internal governance. Never-
theless, the ‘tone at the top’ largely influences the awareness and priority of risk management (cf. 
Mtaki & Ganesh, 2016).168 
 
Control and compliance management processes: In a broad definition, control covers different 
things to different people. The board predefines the group-wide internal control framework, but its 
management and steering across the affiliated subsidiaries is delegated towards the respective divi-
sional heads and their supportive governance functions. Lu & Wenchang (2015) argue that control 
should be part of the organizational culture, because this affects how risk is recognized and how the 
 
167 For further information, cf. chapter 3.1.3. 
168 I argue that the risk communication especially in multinational organizations plays a crucial role, in which em-
ployees with diverse cultural background and differ risk sensibility have to collaborate with each other. An offen-
sive, transparent internal communication is the key and it ensures, that the ‘tone at the top’ can promote a climate 
of trust, which builds the fundament to secure that employees report potential risks without any feat of blame. 
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employees are aware about control. Concisely it covers ‘the ways things are done.' However, every 
organization operates in different ways and is affected by different organizational ethics, values, struc-
tures, reporting lines, authority, rules and documentation procedures. The Chartered Institute of Inter-
nal Auditors (2016) defines control processes as “the policies, procedures and activities that are part 
of a control framework, designed to ensure that risks are contained within the risk tolerances estab-
lished by the risk management process”.169 As previously explained, in many companies corporate 
governance is solely translated in terms of control and compliance issues to secure the fulfillment of 
legal and regulatory obligations, but ignores that this can only be achieved with adequate internal gov-
ernance structures. In Germany, the Institute of External Auditors (IDW) published a general accepted 
auditing standard (IDW PS 980) of an adequate compliance management system.170 Moreover the 
ISO Standard 19600 ‘Compliance management systems’ specifies the requirements and provides 
recommendations for the implementation to set a global uniform framework for compliance manage-
ment in organizations (cf. Seidel & Wendt, 2017; Jonas, 2016). 
A broader perspective defines this as process that encourages the organization to increase business 
performance and that goes far beyond the intention to secure the obligation of legal and regulatory 
requirements. In modern value driven organizations, there has to be a direct relationship between 
group-wide policies, the used processes and respective controls to ensure that the processes and 
policies are correct implemented. A compliance process has to cover externally driven (legal and regu-
latory) requirements, but concurrently it has to secure the implementation of group internal policies 
and processes to increase the organizational value creation, by securing that the organization works 
correctly and initiating improvement initiatives where needed (cf. Welge & Eulerich, 2014, p. 67). This 
approach expands the role of control and compliance towards wider operational processes and has to 
be embedded into the existing group-wide compliance management systems as a fundamental deter-
minant of the group-wide internal governance management system. 
Despite the challenge that there are different internal or external driven control categories that have to 
be taken into account, one of the main obstacles is the linkage between compliance, policies and pro-
cesses.171 While Sackmann et al. (2018) recommend to use digital business process compliance ap-
proaches, Bannenberg et al., (2013, p. 177) suggest to concentrate on automation and IT supporting 
tools, where policies, processes and controls can be connected, monitored and reviewed on a regular 
basis. Even if the COSO Frameworks provides a comprehensive basis, so far, a general accepted 
approach for control in complex multinational structures is still missing.172 Thus, corporate groups have 
to develop their own company specific control frameworks. 
 
 
169 The Chartered Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) is a professional body focused exclusively on internal auditing. 
They have been active for over 70 years and unite a global community of 180,000 internal auditors globally. 
170 The IDW Standard consists out of the following seven elements: (1) compliance culture, (2) compliance tar-
gets, (3) compliance risks, (4) compliance organization, (5) compliance program, (6) compliance communication, 
(7) compliance steering and improvement. Seidel & Wendt (2017, p. 26) provide a comprehensive overview about 
each of the seven elements. 
171 Typical control categories are segregation of duties, authorization (authority levels, spending limits), physical 
(door entry systems, file access controls) and accounting (reconciliation) (cf. Simons, 2013; Welge & Eulerich, 
2014, p. 70). 
172 For further information regarding the COSO Framework, cf. chapter 3.3.1. 
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Apart from adequate compliance processes, internal audit processes are also an important internal 
governance mechanism (cf. Ege, 2014; Raiborn et al., 2017). Internal auditors have an important con-
trol function for the boards. One the one hand, the corporate audit function aims on a holistic evalua-
tion of the entire organization by standardized, group-wide audit processes and properly defined audit 
plans and it encourages the board within their oversight role to allocate organizational weaknesses 
and associated risks within the entire group. On the other hand, especially in the last years, the inter-
nal audit role has developed from a pure identification of risks to a control consultant. In some multina-
tionals, the internal audit department is even used as training for executive candidates and other gov-
ernance related key positions (cf. Albrecht, 2007; Carcello et al., 2016).173 However, to secure the 
effectiveness of group internal audit processes, it requires a close group-wide collaboration between 
the internal, external audit, controlling functions and the audit committee (cf. Welge & Eulerich, 2014, 
p. 69; Ege, 2014) 
 
Issue management processes:174 Another important process to manage operative governance is a 
process that organizes, maintains and tracks the solution of issues, which have to be resolved in col-
laboration with different organizational units. Whereas there has to be a clear group-wide issue man-
agement process implemented, it should equally be defined as a core management task. A group-
wide issue management system has to secure transparency about identified audit issues and taken 
management actions in the subsidiaries towards the divisional head and in severe cases even towards 
the parent’s management board.175 
On a subsidiary level, the local management boards are responsible for the definition of appropriate 
management actions to solve identified weaknesses. Moreover, there should be a regular reporting of 
the subsidiaries internal audit functions towards both, the local management board and the divisional 
head in the parent’s headquarters. In any case, I outline the necessity to secure that there are no con-
flicts of interests for the internal audit function of the subsidiaries, if they have dual reporting obliga-
tions. Apart from that, there have to be implemented intragroup whistleblowing procedures in which 
every single employee has the opportunity to report governance breaches or other unlawful behaviors 
(cf. Ingenhoff & Röttger, 2013, p. 481). Whistleblowing mechanisms encourage the principals to over-
come the problem of informational asymmetries in hierarchical organizations and they are a regulatory 
obligation for banks in most jurisdictions (cf. Mavrakis et al., 2017; Beim et al., 2014). 
 
173 Berwanger & Kullmann (2012, p. 57) and Füss (2007, p. 62) differentiate between audit services: (1) Financial 
Auditing describes the formal check of the finance and accounting regarding the adequacy, correctness, and 
responsibility of the provided information. (2) Operational Auditing focuses on system checks and has to ensure a 
future orientated institutional and process-oriented structure. The overarching target is to check if the design of 
company processes, structures and systems is appropriate. (3) The Management Audit is responsible for the 
evaluation of management processes and institutions. (4) Non-audit related internal consulting. 
174 Synonyms for the term issue management are topic management or opportunity management. There are 
studies that debate the benefits of an issue management in multinational companies: Armbrecht & Hollweg 
(2001); Kuhn (2001); Kuhn et al. (2003); Ingenhoff (2013). 
175 According to Röttger (2013, p. 15 ff.) and Ingenhoff & Röttger (2013, p. 468) issue management has the fol-
lowing governance targets: (1) Identifying potential issues in the organization with a great necessity for manage-
ment actions. (2) Understanding and prioritizing of issues to reduce costs and minimize other potential impacts. 
(3) Ensuring management attention for higher priority issues. (4) Taking issue related decisions at the proper level 
of authority. (5) Securing a clear stakeholder communication about relevant issues. (6) Implementing clear and 
accurate follow up processes of issues and related actions over the time to ensure progress. 
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In essence, an issue management system helps to predict potential risks to future performance and 
acts as early warning indicator of potential future problems. A group-wide issue management aims on 
the management processes and provides important information about the health of the organizational 
setup. The issue management is a central mechanism of intragroup corporate governance. It is vital to 
define clear responsibility, ownership and accountability for each identified issue and regular perfor-
mance reviews, and sanctions are needed mechanisms for non-eliminated issues.176 The manage-
ment boards should request regular status reporting about the issue management in their organiza-
tion. For that reason, adequate group-wide IT systems are beneficial with respective access rights for 
all mangers to identify, to assess and to consider issues within the broader strategic planning process 
(cf. Ingenhoff & Röttger, 2013, p. 482 ff.). 
 
Decision-making processes: Effective decision-making is another key element of operative govern-
ance in multinational companies and it affects various levels (cf. Loorbach, 2010, p. 163 ff.). In litera-
ture, there are different technical and theoretical papers, which analyze effective consensus based on 
decision-making in a volatile environment.177 In a business management driven perspective, it covers 
the business strategy alignment on the business unit level, multi-level collaboration for the collective 
strategy, cross-functional synergies and the corporate level for the general strategic direction of the 
company (Cf. Eisenhardt, 1999; Papadakis & Barwise, 2012). Concisely, strategy formulation means 
strategic decision-making and that becomes more significant in a complex and volatile business envi-
ronment (cf. Chiclana et al., 2015).178 It is a sustainable competitive advantage to make fast, widely 
supported and high-quality decisions on a regular basis. Especially in large organizations, good lead-
ers interpret their role as ‘making’ strategic decisions rather than ‘taking’ strategic decisions and pro-
vide strategic direction. They take responsibility for the strategic decisions and lose the right to act as 
arbitrator if things go wrong.179 Among others, Benson & Lawler (2016) indicate the multiple benefits of 
employee involvement in terms of productivity, profitability, and employee well-being.180 
 
176 The basis for an effective issue management are documented policies and procedures that secure the issue 
management with roles and responsibilities across all hierarchies. Ingenhoff & Röttger (2013, p. 482) point out 
that hereby a formal impact and prioritizing matrix, risk assessment and information of its tracking, status quo and 
lessons learned are essential components. 
177 Several scholars introduce technical driven approaches: the trust-based consensus model for social network in 
an incomplete linguistic information context of Wu et al. (2015); consensus models with utility preferences and 
limited budget of Gong et al. (2015) or the multi-agent fuzzy consensus model in a situation awareness framework 
of D’Aniello et al. (2015). Further, decision-making approaches that include both, fuzzy decision-making and con-
sensus are introduced from e.g. Zhang et al. (2015); consensus in innovation contest categorization by means of 
fuzzy Partitions of Armisen et al. (2015) or the publication web tools to support decision-making in the housing 
market using hesitant fuzzy linguistic term sets of Montes et al. (2015). 
178 Papadakis & Barwise (2012, p. 2 ff.) outline five reasons for the importance of strategic decision-making: (1) Its 
scale, risk and long-term significance; (2) strategic decision-making bridges between deliberate and emergent 
strategy, (3) strategic decisions are an important source for organizational learning, (4) strategic-decisions are 
crucial in individual development (5) strategic decision-making goes across functions, divisions and academic 
disciplines. 
179 Vagadia (2014 p. 91) outlines that in this case the strategy and strategic decision becomes the ruler of the 
leaders, rather them ruling the strategy, which in turn, means that it gets even more difficult to correct strategic 
decisions. Leaders should concentrate on propose and make decisions without moving responsibility of the deci-
sion towards the leaders. As more important the decision is, as more the top managers should position their 
selves to ratify them instead of being the decision maker. Whereas this helps that people and employees get 
involved, it also enhances the acceptance of made decisions and raises transparency and documentation. 
180 The following studies provide evidence about the positive effects of employee involvement in the decision-
making: Bosak et al. (2017); Bayraktar et al. (2017); Grawitch & Ballard (2016). 
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Multinational companies have to simultaneously generate profits for shareholders, while satisfying the 
legitimate demands of their employees and other multiple stakeholders. They have to deal with many 
strategic partners all over the world, which leads to additional complexity, more and sometimes even 
contrary stakeholder interests, which need to be coordinated, aligned and involved in the strategic 
decision-making processes (cf. Yin & Jamali, 2016; Banks et al., 2016). Altogether, on the one hand, 
within their decision-making, mangers have to overcome the pure complexity of the relevant key deci-
sion factors, the vagueness and the lack of clarity about the current and future outcomes. On the other 
hand, they have to deal with the volatility of the business environment and the uncertainty about the 
effects of potential changes (cf. Bruch & Feinberg, 2017). Kaner (2014, p. 99 ff.) suggests that a 
standardized decision-making process should involve consultation, collaboration, consensus building 
and engagement of all affected stakeholders and hierarchies.181 Whereas this could help to get a 
greater picture of an improved decision-making, it could also decelerate the entire process in an inap-
propriate way. Nevertheless, authors outline that it is essential to understand that decisions made by a 
high degree of consensus and a rational standardized procedure, are key success factors for their 
acceptance. The decision-making procedure should be documented in detail to demonstrate a trans-
parent rationale decision audit, and affected stakeholders should be informed about decisions taken 
and the reasons behind them. Based on theoretical underpinning theories for decision-making, Vaga-
dia (2014) defines a comprehensive decision framework as follows:182 
 
Characteristics of a good decision-making framework 
Facility Enabling role 
Decision transparency Enabling and documenting develop responsibility and accountability for decisions amongst decision stakeholders  
Decision understanding Comprehensively examining the breadth and depth of the factors that affect the decision 
Decision rationalization Understanding rationally, decision scenarios, priorities and options 
Decision implementation  Connect decision process and decision outcome 
Decision process  
systemization 
Bringing order, standardization and knowledge transfer to the process of 
decision-making across the organization 
Decision knowledge Creating a knowledge bank of decision analysis over time, leading to repeatable and efficient decisions across the organization 
Decision focus Focusing on the critical decision data and analysis requirements early, avoiding data paralysis and unnecessary data collection 
Decision consensus Identifying and resolving conflicts to reach consensus on decision choices across key stakeholders  
Decision collaboration Enabling focused discussion of critical issues between dispersed parties (remote in time and/or spaces) 
Decision visualization Making complex decision choices more comprehensible through graph-ical interpretation and representation 
Decision analysis  Enabling automated and instantaneous evaluation and comparison of diverse scenario options  
Table 2:  Characteristics of a good decision-making framework in multinational companies. 
Source:  Own table based on Vagadia (2014, p. 100). 
 
181 Saaty (1990) and Papadakis & Barwise (2012, p.17 ff.) provide a comprehensive overview about a decision-
making process. Power et al. (2015) recommend to implement in large organizations decision support systems. 
182 Vagadia (2014) refers on the Behavioral Decision Theory (cf. Slovic et al., 1977; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981); the 
Game Theory from Von Neumann & Morgenstern (1944); the Theory of Games and Economic Behavior of Von 
Neumann & Morgenstern (2007) and the Analytic Hierarchy Process Model from Saaty (1994).  
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Saaty & Peniwati (2013) state that collaborative decision-making is the basis for sustainable strategic 
decisions.183 This means that mangers have to aim on a balance of trust, promote dissenting opinions 
and commitment in their organizations. Kaner (2014, p. 99 ff.) agrees and supplements, that a culture 
of constructive dissent is essential and is the basis for critical evaluation of decision alternatives. He 
implies the need for the top management to make sure that final taken decisions have to be accepted, 
to be supported and implemented from everyone. Nevertheless, a prerequisite for this is that every 
participant has a fair and equal option to address his opinion in the decision-making process. Critics 
should be considered in the decision-making, and the rationale (and the reasons behind) for the final 
decision should be transparently explained. Whereas these approaches enable the management 
board to encourage divergent thinking, it also increases afterwards the acceptance for the decisions 
(cf. Bressen, 2007, p. 213). However, I point out, that consensus always requires a spirit of compro-
mise and implies that the achieved decisions are somewhere ranked between the perfect agreement 
and total discord. Poor decisions are either in the one or in the other extreme. In a well-organized con-
sensus-based decision-making, the outcome usually increases, and the decisions taken have a 
broader acceptance and better support for implementation and ensure the consideration of multiple 
perspectives.184 I outline that decisions taken have to be monitored and regularly reflected and can be 
solely achieved by clearly defined decision-making structures and processes. Moreover, clear deci-
sion-making processes are a crucial element of the risk management (cf. Slovic et al., 2005, p. 35; 
Meidell & Kaarbøe, 2017). The regular examination of good practice and failures helps to further im-
prove a consistent, efficient and effective decision-making. 
 
Organizational alignment processes: The organizational alignment aims on the intentional congru-
ence between targets, functions and activities among all hierarchy levels to avoid intragroup fragmen-
tation, segregation and isolation (cf. O’Brien et al. 2019a; Meyer et al. 2011). This is a major obstacle 
for large organizations and is still often not well understood (cf. Friesl & Silberzahn, 2016). It deter-
mines the level to which the components of an organization are ordered and designed to facilitate the 
alignment of strategic objectives, the organization, organizational roles, policies and processes, man-
agement structures and metrics (cf. Frederick, 2014). The modeling of targets and suitable processes 
in an integrated way enhances transparency among strategic and operative layers and simplifies 
alignment obstacles (cf. Sousa & Do Prado Leite, 2014). In multinational organizations it is required 
that all members have a practical and common understanding of the corporate vision, but also of the 
business division they are referring to, because this defines their governance framework within the 
day-to-day business to a large extent. 
Alignment processes start with a clear understanding about the origin purpose, the values and behav-
iors of the organization. Particularly a proper alignment culture, but also clearly communicated strate-
gic group objectives of the management board, and the embedded division specific strategies are 
essential key drivers. This formulates the expectations of the parent’s management board towards the 
lower ranked subsidiaries. If this should not be the case, there is a high risk that decisions taken be-
 
183 An alternative approach promotes Rescher (1993), who argues that pluralism decision-making is better than 
consensus-based decisions. For a critical discussion of the consensus reaching models, cf. Pérez et al. (2018). 
184 Several authors argue that employee engagement is a key element of modern high performance organiza-
tions: Alfes et al. (2013); Anitha (2014); Shantz, et al. (2013). 
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come ‘unaligned’ with the overarching group strategy, the organizational structure and its manage-
ment processes (cf. Rondinelli et al., 2001). Therefore, it is essential that the subsidiaries are held 
responsible to align their strategies with the respective governance functions of the consolidation par-
ent to create and to foster a group-wide understanding of how the group and division specific strate-
gies has to be interpreted and implemented (vertical and horizontal) across the entire organization.185 
Organizational alignment requires consistency between strategic and cultural aspects of an organiza-
tion. Targets have to reflect the values, and behavior should be consistent with the stated values. 
Statements of mission, vision and culture are worthwhile if they do not fit with the core components of 
the organization. The organizational alignment has to connect the entire vision, mission, strategy, cul-
ture, people, leadership and systems of the entire group to the best possible fit to safeguard value 
creation (cf. Hitt et al., 2016). Employees have to understand the set strategic targets of the manage-
ment board and how they can be transferred into their individual actions, but this is only possible if 
there is an effective intragroup communication available and comprehensive information processes 
implemented (cf. Quirke, 2012, p. 7). I argue that the personal alignment efforts should also be a fixed 
component of each management evaluation. There are studies that provide evidence that there exists 
a positive, significant, and impactful linkage between IT governance mechanisms and strategic align-
ment and further, between strategic alignment and organizational performance (cf. Wu et al., 2015). 
 
Oversight and insight processes: This oversight understanding includes all facets of oversight 
about what is going on across the entire organization and what measures are performed to achieve 
the strategic targets.186 Oversight not only means monitoring, but also having transparency about the 
entire company system. A key governance responsibility of the management board is to have organi-
zational oversight, which builds the indispensable precondition for organizational effectiveness, 
productivity, integrity and alignment (cf. Gast & Zanini, 2012). Despite this, in multinational organiza-
tions a balanced combination of central oversight and consistency with pre-defined group standards 
and enough flexibility for local adjustments is crucial. The increased complexity of organizations 
makes the execution of oversight more challenging and requires greater governance and oversight 
structures.187 While this helps to prevent organizational failure and reduce other risks, it also contrib-
utes to overcome geographical distances and to take into account cultural differences between the 
home and the host country locations. A drawback of such oversight processes is often recognized as 
additional bureaucratically burden from the parent, even if they are also legally and regulatory required 
for bank entities (cf. Reinalda, 2013, p. 184; Capriglione & Casalino, 2014). Today the management 
boards are held responsible for proper risk governance and the assessment of the risks identified by 
those procedures and processes (cf. Fraser, 2016, p. 283 ff.; Viscelli et al., 2016). 
 
185 Parisi (2013, p. 71 ff.) found out, the alignment processes between the board and the middle managers plays a 
crucial role that for the company performance and commitment of the employees’. 
186 This includes e.g. to make the moard transparent who has the authority to do what; what are those authority 
holders doing; what ‘s about the degree of strategic target achievement; what initiatives, measures and projects 
have been initiated and why; what is the current level of risk exposure; what is the degree of compliance with the 
internal policies and standards? (cf. Vagadia, 2014, p. 123).  
187 In this context refer scholars towards the ERM system and its positive effects in terms of oversight and firm 
performance: Al-Amri, & Davydov (2016); Callahan & Soileau (2017); Florio & Leoni (2017). In particular the study 
of Gates et al. (2012, p. 28 ff.) proves that a proper risk management oversight (e.g. the implementation of enter-
prise risk management) leads towards increased management consensus, better informed decisions, enhanced 
communication of risk taking and greater management accountability. 
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At the same time insight into what is happening and where and why it is happening is probably even 
more important. Harper (2015, p. 68 ff.) underlines the relevance that specific policies, processes, 
decisions, controls, issues, risks, etc. are aligned and adjusted towards pre-defined strategic objec-
tives on the different levels. As several studies imply, the integration of appropriate IT systems can 
lead to a major source to gain competitive advantage and enhance the required insight and oversight 
on the organization (cf. e.g., Wu et al., 2015; Kniese & Bülchmann, 2015; Welge & Euerich, 2014, p. 
70). 
Information systems have developed from administrative, functionality oriented support systems to an 
integral part of modern management. IT governance not solely acts as a higher order capability by 
directing and monitoring the use of other organizational resources and capabilities, it also enables 
companies to act dynamically to achieve competitive advantage through exploiting opportunities cre-
ated by competitive and environmental pressures. Today Business Intelligence (BI) and Business 
Analytics (BA) systems are appropriate supporting tools to enhance organizational knowledge culture 
and improve internal governance and organizational performance (cf. Ahmad & Hossain, 2018; Hiek-
kanen et al., 2013, p. 82). Even if BI and BA provide solid information, they still need to be set into the 
specific context and in the decision-making. Consequently, BA and BI can enable organizations to 
have a better decision-making basis and strengthen the group internal governance management. 
 
Project governance processes: Another element to secure operational governance are clear in-
tragroup project governance processes. Many problems exist because of too little management sup-
port, non-alignment or poor oversight; however, poor decision-making and risk management also ex-
ists in many projects (cf. Karavul, 2016). Projects usually operate along with the daily business, out-
side of the usual business processes and internal rules. Often projects are recognized as something 
special and they are not defined as an entire part of the day-to-day business. That is why often there 
are solely weak governance standards found for projects, resulting in additional risks, time and cost 
efforts. Especially in multinational organizations there exist multiple projects at the same time in differ-
ent locations and different levels of complexities and interdependencies to each other and make a 
professional management of the project portfolio necessary. Gutiérrez & Magnusson (2014) state that 
rational and formal decision-making processes within the project portfolio management are often ex-
perienced as more legitimate than informal and non-rational ones. Yet, the governance function has to 
differentiate the project management techniques. To ensure project governance there are often im-
plemented sub-committees who steer and advise the projects with additional expertise. Altogether, in 
particular the portfolio management, a project sponsor, a professional project management office and 
proactive project management are of great importance (cf. Too & Weaver, 2014). The Association for 
Project Management (APM) (2016) defines project management governance based on the project 
activities that are directly linked to corporate governance.188 Effective governance of projects ensures 
 
188 APM (2016) defines the following key elements of effective project governance: (1) Clear defined accountabili-
ties for resources and clear defined roles and responsibilities among different participants and a clear decision 
making process. (2) Implementation of an effective, transparent and understandable decision risk assessment 
process. (3) Implementation of a strategic project selection framework for the selection and prioritization of pro-
jects under the consideration of strategic company targets and investment. (4) Focus on managing risks and 
rewards in the right balance and efficient use of resources. (5) Securing of effective project reporting, progress 
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that the projects fit to the company strategy, are executed on time and budget and generate sustaina-
ble value. Studies regarding project governance indicate that project success in multinationals corre-
lates with increasing stakeholder orientation of the corporate parent (cf. e.g., Joslin & Müller, 2016; 
Andersen et al., 2006).189 For the sake of completeness, I outline that numerous methodologies and 
standards do exist to professionalize project management, but as this is not the initial focus of this 
dissertation, I will not go into further detail.190 
 
As the debate of the last paragraphs has shown, the operative governance management in multina-
tional organizations is challenging, complex and multidimensional. The numerous operative govern-
ance layers have to operationalize the strategic governance framework, which is primarily defined by 
the parent’s management board. In sum, chapter 4.1 provided a comprehensive debate about the key 
layers of the overall intragroup governance framework. However, I emphasize that without the com-
mitment and the support of the subsidiary boards the effectiveness of the management of those inter-
nal governance processes is limited. Thus, the following chapter 4.2 will examine the conclusive key 
activities to manage the intragroup corporate governance within subsidiary networks. 
 
4.2 Subsidiary governance management 
The last chapter 4.1 investigated a strategic and operational governance dimension in multinational 
companies to ensure a holistic group-wide governance framework and debated the different intragroup 
governance management instruments. In this chapter 4.2 I focus in the next step, in particular on the 
parent-subsidiary relationship. The subsidiary governance dimension focuses largely on how the par-
ent can steer and manage the strategic and operational governance of their financial services subsidi-
aries to overcome the typical parents-subsidiary dyad and how to close the existing governance gaps. 
The subchapter 3.4 has shown that there is a close alignment obligatory to minimize governance vari-
ances and the principle agent problematic within the financial services division. Principles (parents) 
cannot assume absolute self-interest and perfect rationality of agents (subsidiaries) but should allow 
them to vary. Thus, Kostova et al. (2016) explain the subsidiary-level variation through a set of internal 
organizational and external social conditions in which the described parent-subsidiary dyad is embed-
ded. 
Based on the earlier chapters, the following subchapters define the different governance-related focus 
topics to ensure proper internal governance in the subsidiaries that are expected from their parents. It 
helps to define and allocate the roles and to achieve a consistent approach within the execution of 
good intragroup corporate governance practice. Whereas this enables the parent to gain transparency 
 
and performance. (6) Ensuring with change management and organizational support for the change the intended 
benefits. 
189 Multinational groups usually rely on the required project competences ‘in-house’ in the headquarters and get 
usually implemented by international project teams located at the headquarters location (cf. Koveshnikov et al., 
2017). Chanda & Ray (2015) suggest to rethink the headquarters as the appropriate design place for projects 
which target on subsidiary related issues, because the headquarters staff often lacks a nuanced understanding of 
the micro issues in the subsidiaries. 
190 Among others, I highlight in particular the Portfolio, Programme and Project Management Maturity Model 
(Kwak & Ibbs, 2002; Sowden, 2008); Portfolio, Programme and Project Office (Reiss & Rayner, 2012), OGC 
gateway review process (Williams et al. 2010) and the Multi-factors Integration Management Method (cf. Anbang, 
2002). 
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and the legally obliged oversight about the entire corporate group, it also encourages the subsidiaries 
to meet the local legal and regulatory requirements in the host country and provides the foundation to 
establish a certain level of group-wide minimum standards for governance. 
The local subsidiary board is responsible to guarantee the subsidiary governance and is accountable 
for the corporate parent and local authorities (cf. Frederick, 2014). Even so, the subsidiary governance 
aims to close the intragroup governance incongruences. 
Altogether, the core responsibilities of subsidiary boards are all activities that are related to control, 
strategy, coordination, and service to reduce the headquarters-subsidiary agency problem (Du et al., 
2015). Moore (2015) outlines that the group-internal management of corporate governance is all about 
managing the entire group structure within a maze of regulatory, tax, risk and compliance obligations - 
locally, and also across the globe. Referring to the foregone examinations and the introduced subsidi-
ary governance clusters of Renz & Böhrer (2012), I apply in particular six focus areas, which are the 
key components to achieve good subsidiary governance: framework management, mission man-
agement, integrity management, stakeholder management, compliance and regulatory man-
agement, as well as governance management, risk and corporate audit management.191 Each of 
those key areas will be subject of a further debate in the upcoming paragraphs and lay the foundation 
for the execution of the interviews with subject matter experts and on the final development of the 
corporate governance management model for financial services subsidiaries. 
 
4.2.1 Framework management 
Framework management covers the question how subsidiaries can manage their business in the con-
text of or in the multinational group system. Due to the opacity in many corporate groups arising out of 
the huge number of different subsidiaries, the framework management addresses the holistic under-
standing of the multinational group, its environment, the stakeholder groups, different interests and 
resources. 192 Distance affects the effectiveness of the headquarters network management capabilities 
by affecting headquarters-subsidiary interaction and, consequently, shaping headquarters knowledge-
ability about the subsidiaries’ operations (cf. Mykhaylenko et al., 2017). Accordingly, an extensive 
governance framework is fundamental and supports a deeper systematic understanding of the subsid-
iary context. While this increases organizational transparency, it also creates a better understanding of 
 
191 Several authors outline the relevance of ‘framework management’: Taggart (1997); Rugman & Verbeke 
(2001); Meyer & Estrin (2014); Phelps & Fuller (2016). Several authors use the term ‘mission management’: 
Strikwerda (2003); Cornforth & Spear (2010); Renz & Böhrer (2012); Palmié et al. (2014). Several authors outline 
the relevance of ‘integrity’ in this context: Jones (2017); Yasui (2016); Kumar & Gammelgaard (2016); Moore 
(2015). Several authors outline the relevance of ‘stakeholder management’: Ackermann & Eden (2011); Crilly 
(2011); Jensen & Sandström (2011); Renz & Böhrer (2012); Frederick (2014); Benn et al. (2016); Loi (2016). 
Several authors outline the relevance of ‘compliance and regulatory management’: Weber (2016); Moore (2015); 
Boella et al. (2014); Yovev (2014), Renz & Böhrer (2012). Several authors outline the relevance of ‘governance 
management’: Otremba (2016); Moore (2015); Welge & Eulerich (2014, p. 227 ff.); Frederick (2014). Others out-
line the relevance of ‘risk management’: Rüstmann (2017); Frederick (2014); Kajüter (2014, p. 251 ff.). Renz & 
Böhrer (2012). Again others outline the necessity of ‘corporate audit management’: Sunderland & Trompeter 
(2017); Alessandra et al. (2016). Marks & Fox (2015); Chambers & Odar (2015); Frederick (2014); Renz & Böhrer 
(2012). 
192 The St. Galler Management Model provides a solid foundation for the overall framework: The model differenti-
ates between the nominative, strategic and operative management and incorporates stakeholder groups and 
other environmental factors of the company. Moreover, it considers the interaction topics like values or norms. For 
further information, cf. Hoffmann et al. (2016); Rüegg-Stürm (2002; 2004, p. 65 ff.); Rüegg-Stürm & Grand (2015); 
Gassmann et al. (2013). 
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the roles, interests, and dependencies of the different actors within the entire group. On the one hand, 
a subsidiary is part of a local system, which is influenced by the country, its culture, market system, 
legal and regulatory environment, local competitors etc. (cf. Paul & Steiner, 2013). Nevertheless, on 
the other hand, a subsidiary is also part of a multinational group system with its company specific self-
statutory internal rules, processes, values, company cultures etc. that also have to be taken into ac-
count. In essence, systems consist out of several sub-systems, and having transparency about those 
relationships is a prerequisite for good governance. Target orientated subsidiary governance means 
that mangers apply the group specific system knowledge to position the subsidiary in this system, 
combined with the flexibility needed for an optimal adaption to local market conditions while allowing 
the group to attain its strategic goals. 193 However, this means in turn that the parent company requires 
transparency about individual subsidiary roles to secure global alignment to reach the joint overarch-
ing strategic objectives. Egelhoff & Wolf (2017) highlight, that at one time, the parent must hierarchi-
cally lead the subsidiary network, but at other times, it also has to assume a more passive, facilitative 
role that allows direct interaction and decision-making among the subunits to coordinate intragroup 
interdependencies. I outline that an extensive framework understanding is an imperative prerequisite 
to design effective target level agreements for the subsidiaries. A good framework management re-
quires regular exchange between the parent and the subsidiaries, aiming to create a common target 
picture. As prior research has already acknowledged, the interaction-based coordination and target 
definition between the subsidiaries and headquarters is most effective (cf. Friesl & Silberzahn, 2016).  
I argue that the key enabler to achieve an extensive intragroup framework management is clarity 
about the subsidiary business model, oversight about dependencies and relations and transpar-
ency about local legal and regulatory structures and requirements. Moreover, group wide sys-
temic processes, systemic structured oriented thinking, combined with clear separation of the 
core competencies between the parent and the subsidiaries, and consensus about the leadership 
role helps to strengthen the framework management. For that reason, each of those sub-topics, pay-
ing into the entire framework management, are discussed within the following paragraphs. 
 
Subsidiary business model: Every subsidiary requires an own business model that describes the 
business approach within the group context to secure an aligned value creation (cf. Andersson et al., 
2015).194 For example, financial services subsidiaries in automotive groups have to support vehicle 
sales, ensure low cost funding for the group and provide financial services for the car buyers (cf. 
Haecker & Stenner, 2015, p. 79 ff.). Yet, this requires that the managers on every hierarchy level un-
derstand the groups’ business model on the one hand, and the consequences for the local subsidiary 
on the other hand. Nevertheless, according to Christensen et al. (2016), many executives do not have 
enough in-depth understanding how business models develop through predictable stages over times. 
Moreover, many local MDs or FDs in the subsidiaries do not have the required experiences in e.g. 
 
193 The study results of Ahworegba (2017) provide evidence that foreign subsidiaries are only successful if they 
can modify the pre-defined policies from the multinational group towards the host country specific business envi-
ronment. The study highlights that multinational groups manage local specifics by combining the different ele-
ments of their home and host country environments. 
194 Osterwalder & Pigneur (2013) concrete the required elements of a business model. They found that a compre-
hensive business model should always exist at least out of customer segments, the value proposition for custom-
ers, sales channels, customer relationship, revenue streams, cost structures, key resources, key activities and 
key partners. 
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strategic decision-making as they are often sent abroad by the headquarters in which different job 
characteristics are required. This builds the fundament that employees can put processes, structures, 
the role of other departments and functions as well as their own actions in a group-wide context. In 
essence, the business model of subsidiaries usually follows the system or is at least system orientat-
ed.195 There exists clear evidence that subsidiaries of business groups with a clear subsidiary specific 
business model perform better (cf. Gaur et al., 2016). Consequently, it is essential for multinational 
groups to define a clear competence scope between the parent and its local subsidiaries. This posits a 
key subsidiary dilemma to interacting in this field of tension considering all group internal and external 
dependencies, but also makes a clear subsidiary specific business model to an even more crucial 
element of the intragroup governance management (cf. Reilly & Scott, 2016). 
 
Dependencies and relations: Multinational groups have to deal with complex internal and external 
stakeholder frameworks, with different direct and indirect relations and dependencies, which in turn 
influence the interaction, information flow, capital flow and provided services (cf. Kostova et al., 2016; 
Gammelgaard et al., 2012; Schotter & Beamish, 2011a; 2011b; Freeman, 2010, p. 53 f.). I outline that 
to ensure efficient supply chain management, it is important to manage processes and the internal and 
external networks in a holistic and systematic way. Of course, there is no doubt that some dependen-
cies can be better influenced and controlled compared to others. Another challenge is, that the earlier 
mentioned duality of multiple intragroup and external interdependencies still exist, which have to be 
properly coordinated. Financial services subsidiaries act on the one hand as a sales supporter for the 
national sales subsidiaries, on the other hand they are also responsible for the re-financing of the en-
tire group (cf. Stenner, 2015, p. 1 ff.). It is a basic prerequisite that the boards have transparency 
about this system of dependencies and relationships to manage, review and optimize them on a regu-
lar basis (cf. Geppert & Dörrenbächer, 2011). Opacity within the different dependencies and relations 
leads to an incalculable risk potential for the entire group and it is a crucial element of a group-wide 
risk management. While complex systems result in greater flexibility on the one hand, they end up in a 
more complex and difficult monitoring in the corporate parents on the other hand (cf. Schotter & 
Beamish, 2011a). To achieve flexibility and local responsiveness, many multinational groups decen-
tralized their organizational structures and transferred competencies to their subsidiaries (cf. Holm et 
al., 2015, p. 245 ff.; Geppert & Dörrenbächer, 2011.; Kreikebaum, 1998, p. 147 ff.). There exists evi-
dence that a greater subsidiary autonomy increases inter-organizational relationships and improves 
the performance of subsidiary inter-organizational relationships (cf. Gammelgaard et al., 2012). 
 
Legal and regulatory governance requirements: Multinationals have to manage multiple legal and 
regulatory requirements in the different locations where subsidiaries are officially registered (cf. 
Madhani, 2015b). However, transparency about the local legal and regulatory requirements is a crucial 
prerequisite regarding the setup of management and supervisory bodies in the different local legal 
 
195 Gassmann et al. (2013) provide a comprehensive overview about 55 different innovative business models. 
Further, referring on the St. Galler Management Model, I interpret the system orientation in a way that the busi-
ness environment has to be involved in the entire business model development. This ensures positive network 
effects, because it helps to identify synergy effects, complementary actors and safeguards a group-wide holistic 
alignment towards the business environment and changes in customer requirements (cf. Meyer et al., 2011). 
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entities (e.g.one tier versus two tier board systems) (cf. Fiechter et al., 2011, p. 7 ff.). As debated ear-
lier, most countries have special regulatory requirements for either bank managers (e.g. fit and proper 
tests of local authorities), key governance functions or for the board structures (e.g. bank entities re-
quire at least a CEO, CFO and CRO). Thus, Frederick (2014, p. 21) recommends to implement gov-
ernance tracking systems of bank subsidiaries and Beresford-Wood & Buringa (2018) outline the need 
for intragroup board portals to monitor the multiple governance requirements.  
In addition, it is critical to take potential business limitations into account regarding the local business 
license of the subsidiary (e.g. banking license, leasing license, banking intermediary, loans vs. deposit 
business, insurance business) and its consequence for the local offered product portfolio (cf. McCoy, 
2015). The different financial services business models determine different governance structures and 
practices. A decentralized business model requires more independent and autonomous board struc-
tures, local governance and risk functions, local decision-making competences and market strategies 
(cf. Frederick, 2014, p. 17). There is no doubt that no single governance approach can adequately 
cover the different legal and regulatory requirements of each country.  
Closely related to the regulatory requirements in many countries is the handling and the potential limi-
tations of outsourcing activities (e.g. IT) towards other subsidiaries, shared service centers, functions 
in the headquarters or even towards external third party providers (cf. McCahery & de Roode, 2018; 
Zakierski, 2015).196 There are gaps in most governance arrangements and financial institutes mainly 
rely on their own internal monitoring efforts (cf. McCahery & de Roode, 2018). Thus, I underline the 
necessity to have clarity about the locally required legal and regulatory requirements and the allowed 
business scope of the hold business license in the host country. 
 
Core competences:197 In essence, the source of competitive advantage for contemporary multina-
tional groups is their ability to leverage distinct competencies among their subsidiaries (cf. Dimitratos 
et al., 2014). There are various classifications of generic subsidiary strategies or roles in multiple con-
texts, which have to be coordinated (cf. Morschett et al., 2015, p. 55). Especially the environment of 
the automotive industry is changing drastically and leads to fundamental changes of the traditional 
OEM business models and their traditionally built up core competencies (cf. Komplalla et al., 2017). 
Thus, the creation, group-wide alignment and management of strengths and core competencies are a 
core management responsibility (cf. Reid, 2015). To manage such complexities, subsidiaries allow the 
corporate groups to tap into many local systems of innovation to access diverse knowledge bases and 
integrate them in the creation of new competencies. In essence, core competencies are the special 
skills of the group to create success drivers and therefore also the overall competitiveness (cf. Slack, 
2015; Dimitratos et al., 2014).  
 
196 Schoofs (2015, p. 45 ff.) outlines that it is obligatory to have a local provider management, which monitors 
service level agreements and any local legal and regulatory outsourcing restrictions for strong regulated bank 
entities. For example, in Germany are entities with a full bank license not allowed to outsource risk management, 
internal audit or the compliance function towards a third party (e.g. parent company) (cf. Schoofs, 2015; Dreher, 
2015). 
197 Criteria for core competences are valuable (core competences increase efficiency, effectiveness, customer 
benefit and success), rare (core competences differentiate from other competitors), inimitable (core competences 
provide a clear edge), not substitutable (core competences cannot be replaced with similar skills) (cf. Barney, 
1991; Fearns, 2013, p. 35 ff.; Marquardt, 2013, p. 31). 
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As Hilb (2001) accurately describes, there is great importance that both, the parent’s and local subsid-
iary boards, should regularly identify and monitor the important internal finance, market, environmental 
and HR related strengths and weaknesses of their organization. Clarity about the core competencies 
define tasks and is therefore closely linked to the subsidiary’s role within the multinational group and 
on top of this, it is a mandatory prerequisite to define subsidiary specific strategies (cf. Morschett et al., 
2015).198  
 
Systemic thinking: Systemic thinking defines the ability to solve challenges in a systemic manner 
and a structured approach including group-internal stakeholder alignment and taking into account 
different opinions (cf. Bieger, 2012; Schumacher & Rüegg-Stürm, 2012, p. 4).199 A common agreed 
systemic thinking has to be encouraged independently of any intragroup hierarchy level, because it 
builds the fundament of the design and implementation for the entire corporate group system (cf. 
Giachetti, 2016). Additionally it needs to be considered that network thinking is another necessity for 
managing a subsidiary organization. In bank subsidiaries, this plays an even more crucial role, as this 
lays the foundation to secure a holistic identification and evaluation of systemic risks in the consolida-
tion parent within the bank subsidiary network (cf. Frederick, 2014). 
While there is no doubt that a network or systemic thinking culture helps to reduce complexity and 
increases organizational alignment, it is impossible to implement it in a short term (cf. Kirchhof, 2013, 
p. 38). In a long-term perspective it supports the entrepreneurial thinking, ensures a better identifica-
tion of market potentials and contributes to achieve the joint group targets of the parent (cf. Baumfeld 
et al., 2014). For that reason, many corporate groups implement the scenario planning as manage-
ment instrument to enhance the network and systemic thinking within the strategy processes (cf. Von 
Reibnitz, 2013, p. 22). 
 
Systemic processes: As equivalent of the systemic thinking, the intragroup process landscapes also 
have to be designed in the same systematic approach (cf. Kirchhof, 2013, p. 38). Effective subsidiary 
governance is only possible to achieve if there are uniform organizational structures and processes 
implemented to a certain extent.200 Clear processes and standardized process maps are crucial in-
tragroup governance mechanisms and entire parts of the group-wide risk management system (cf. 
Rahimi, 2016).201 Vom Brocke & Mendling (2018) make clear that it is the prerequisite for companies 
to master digital transformation and innovate their business models. Moreover, it is a prerequisite for 
 
198 Morschett et al. (2015, p. 56) describes the role of subsidiaries along the following different dimensions: The 
external context of the subsidiary (e.g. the relevance of the host country or complexity of the environment); the 
internal context of the subsidiary (e.g. the strategic orientation of the multinational group, local level of resources 
or competences of the subsidiary), coordination variables (e.g. level of autonomy), the strategy or task of the 
subsidiary (e.g. motive for the subsidiary establishment, internal or external sales, products offered, knowledge in- 
and outflow). 
199 According to Ulrich (2001) is systemic thinking characterized by the following elements: Holistic thinking in 
open systems, analytical and synthetic thinking, thinking in cycle processes, thinking in structures and information 
transforming processes, interdisciplinary and practical thinking. 
200 Hausner (2014, p. 369 ff.) suggests a guideline for the development of a standard organization model and 
debates implementation challenges in subsidiaries. 
201 A proper business process management (BMP) ensures a continuously enhancing subsidiary governance and 
maximizes the structures to a maximum extent and ensures enough flexibility for individual adoption (cf. Vukšić et 
al., 2013). Also, Dijkman et al. (2016) provide evidence that a higher BPM maturity leads to better process and 
firm performance. 
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group internal control and coordination of the affiliated companies. It is relevant to consider dependen-
cies and relations and to illustrate how the business model is embedded in the business environment. 
Buckley & Carter (2016) explain, that the latest management literature interprets aligned and system-
atic business processes as team entrepreneurship to underline that they act on behalf of their internal 
‘customers’ (namely the organizational members). In global subsidiary networks, it is essential to im-
plement alignment and feedback loops in the processes to safeguard a close intragroup collaboration 
(cf. Reilly & Scott, 2016). Contrarily, standardized processes may also hinder the agility and innovation 
capacity and support the inertia within the group due to bureaucratic and time-consuming processes. 
However, I find that the advantages of a certain process standardization clearly overweight, as in large 
organizations there is no other way to ensure organizational alignment, transparency and accountabili-
ties – but also operational efficiency and effectiveness. In sum, the existence of functional systematic 
processes and ‘target operating model’ implies increased efficiency and a better collaboration between 
the different functions towards a better resource allocation. 
 
Altogether, there is the great necessity that managers focus on those above-mentioned focus topics in 
their respective context (cf. Renz & Böhrer, 2012, p. 28). In recent years, many multinational organiza-
tions encouraged their management teams to design and implement business continuity strategies to 
minimize the mishandling of an internal crisis and build organizational resilience (cf. Adamou, 2014). 
Even so, systemic thinking can only be achieved, if it is continuously demanded, challenged and pro-
moted by the senior management. While the local management bodies have to understand the group 
framework and how to influence group initiatives in a proactive and continuous approach, the parent’s 
management body is responsible for defining the overall strategic direction and ensuring alignment of 
the subsidiary network as a whole. Thus, the management bodies have to understand that this is an 
ongoing and never-ending process, and that they have to ensure that this self-understanding is 
properly communicated and continuously deepened to ensure the further intragroup development 
(Kostova et al., 2016b).  
The framework understanding provides the basis for subsidiary governance. However, as the following 
discussion will illustrate, this has to be completed with an adequate mission management to be effec-
tive.  
 
4.2.2 Mission management  
The mission management covers the triangle of strategy, structure and culture as interface between 
corporate parent and the subsidiary organization.202 The mission management sets the overall regula-
tory boundaries for the subsidiaries and its elements are based on the St. Gallen Management Model. 
In essence, the mission management is responsible for establishing group internal borders to secure 
the group-wide alignment and interaction to reach the overarching group objectives. Although the sub-
sidiaries are an integral part of a multinational group, their interests do not necessarily converge with 
those of their parent. Gammelgaard & Kumar (2016) aptly describe the relationship with the simulta-
 
202 The triangle interaction between the dimension´s strategy, structure and culture are often used structures 
within the management research for the assessment of business interrelations: Alvesson & Sveningsson (2015, p. 
14); Probst (2013); Seghezzi et al. (2013); Bleicher (1992); Sattelberger (1996).  
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neous presence of cooperation and competition. On the one hand, subsidiaries and its senior manag-
ers are dependent on the parent’s resources to fulfill their mandate. On the other hand, the subsidiar-
ies and its managers have their own particular objectives, which may or may not coincide with the 
objectives of the corporate parent. This is challenging and can be a dilemma for the involved manag-
ers to act in this field of tension. Consequently, I argue that the individual mission of each subsidiary 
must be clearly predefined by the corporate parent. While a common group strategy of the parent pro-
vides guidance about the common objectives, it also has to secure their achievement with suitable 
organizational and operational structures, which are necessary for the coordination. It is essential to 
have joint values and common understanding as entire part of a common group-wide corporate cul-
ture.  
However, in case of subsidiary governance this triangle can be assessed by the following issues: 
subsidiary specific strategies, steering and monitoring of the subsidiaries with a comprehensive KPI 
system, aligned operative and organizational subsidiary structures, professional subsidiary board 
structures and nomination procedure of respective key persons. As the following paragraphs illus-
trate, it also includes a professional succession planning and the appropriate management aware-
ness regarding their role for sharpening a common corporate culture. 
 
Subsidiary specific strategy: As a part of a multinational group, subsidiaries operate in distinct host 
countries and have to manage their external context locally (cf. Klopf & Nell, 2018). It is important to 
have a group-wide strategy that serves as an umbrella and defines how the multinational group should 
be internally organized and externally positioned in the market. The parent should be engaged in sub-
sidiaries’ strategy-making processes, as this provides a combination of formal direction for global effi-
ciencies and autonomy for effective local responses (cf. Andersen et al., 2015). It is critical to deter-
mine, which qualifications and resources have to be allocated in the corporate parent and which 
should be executed or transferred towards a subsidiary.203 Simultaneously, it is vital to analyze which 
additional resources need to be acquired via business partnerships, company mergers or acquisitions. 
In most cases, the local strategy process is pretended by the parent and is characterized by both, a 
combination of formal direction for global efficiencies and autonomy for effective local responses.204 
While strategic guidance from the corporate parent ensures that subsidiary decisions are aligned with 
the overarching group priorities and a distributed decision power - coupled with informal exchange of 
information – it facilitates strategic responses in line with local market requirements (cf. Andersen et 
al., 2015). Parent managers usually favor the autonomy of local subsidiaries due to their local market 
understanding (De Jong & Van Vo, 2019). Thus, many parent companies develop strategy tool kits 
under the umbrella of the group strategy, where subsidiaries can choose the elements, which fit best 
for their specific situation and, if needed, supplement them with additional elements (cf. Kotler et al., 
2016). Nonetheless, a close interaction within the entire strategy process is required and local boards 
 
203 A typical example is the Sony Corporation: Sony was one of the first multinational groups, which implemented 
a high degree of independency towards their subsidiaries to increase flexibility and market specific strategies 
around the world. In the management literature is this approach often defined as ‘local globalization’ (cf. Roost, 
2008, p. 75). 
204 Hollensen & Schimmelpfennig (2014, p. 36) use in this context the terminology ‘glocal’: They argue that multi-
national groups have to ensure that there is the right mix between global standardization (e.g. to reduce complexi-
ties, realization of economy of scale effects, global brand perception) and localization (e.g. consideration of local 
cultural and customer specifics, regionalization of products etc.). 
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have to deliver essential input to secure that the developed group strategy on higher levels of the 
group is sound and practical for the subsidiaries. In mixed group structures with different types of sub-
sidiaries and business models, division specific strategies are also of great importance. I conclude that 
the strategic planning procedure is a crucial steering and control instrument for the parent, even if the 
subsidiaries have a large extent of decision-making autonomy. Even so, as studies illustrate, it is most 
beneficial to follow a more collaborative approach within the strategy process and to execute regular 
local strategy reviews (cf. Verbeke et al., 2016; Matolcsy & Wakefield, 2017). At its core, activity shar-
ing within the corporate strategies, low cost competitive strategies, and higher internal integration, lead 
to greater degrees of control of wholly owned foreign subsidiaries (cf. Matolcsy & Wakefield, 2017). 
 
Subsidiary specific key performance measures: Parents combine multiple mechanisms, such as 
planning, standardized procedures and intragroup trainings to control their subsidiary networks (cf. 
Sageder & Feldbauer-Durstmüller, 2018; Harzing & Sorge, 2003). Issues like the financial manage-
ment, refinancing and budgeting of subsidiaries are an important task of the corporate parent and 
require appropriate KPIs. Thus, there are required planning and performance management systems, 
which incorporate both, local specific and central defined KPIs (cf. Schäffer et al., 2010). In a group 
context particularly investment controlling plays a key role for the control of subsidiary networks (cf. 
Paul, 2013, p. 1 ff.). Even so, the intragroup financial reporting, which is primarily based on local re-
quirements, can be also a major obstacle in a global organization. Appropriate group-wide IT systems 
are required, which have to increase cross-border convergence among the subsidiary controlling and 
have to help overcome the obstacle of aligning local controlling specifics (e.g. for taxation, accounting 
etc.) (cf. Hoffjan & Endenich, 2016). For that reason, regular intragroup as-is analysis, management 
reporting and forecasting procedures are required. While the KPIs should cover different dimensions 
that allow differentiation from other competitors, they also have to provide information about potential 
risks and their probability of occurrences to support the holistic group-wide risk management.205 Espe-
cially for financial services subsidiaries of OEMs such KPIs should reflect the interrelations towards 
the other (car sales) subsidiaries in the group network.  
In addition, I argue that customized KPI systems strengthen the individual responsibility of the subsidi-
aries and decentral organized controlling units enable them to execute their own target monitoring. 
Renz & Böhrer (2012, p. 31) clarify that subsidiary control provides necessary guidance for the local 
subsidiaries to achieve a better performance. KPIs are an effective and efficient instrument to regu-
late, manage and monitor the governance of subsidiary networks, even if there are also governance 
topics that are not possible to reflect properly in KPIs.206 However, controlling lays the foundation for 
external group reporting, but also internally for a better information basis within the decision-making, 
comprehensive board reporting, and provides relevant information for the group-wide risk manage-
ment (cf. Reichmann et al., 2017; Vanini, 2016; Becker & Ulrich, 2016). 
 
 
205 Typical dimensions could be i.e. customers, personal or financing. Potential KPIs could be number of new 
customers, number of contracts, retention rates, fluctuation rate, asset debt ratios, residual values, cross-selling 
rations etc. A comprehensive overview about further KPIs for the automotive and banking industry are provided 
from Losbichler et al. (2015, p. 382 ff. and 507 ff.). 
206 Schäffer et al. (2010, p. 310) recommend the implementation of an additional balance scorecard, which covers 
at least KPIs regarding financials, customers, processes, innovation, employees. 
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Subsidiary operational and organizational structure: Intragroup competence creation is only pos-
sible if there is an appropriate balance between internal and external embeddedness ensured among 
the foreign subsidiaries (cf. Narula, 2017). Appropriate structures and processes are a prerequisite to 
coordinate and manage internal resources to ensure an efficient and target orientated value creation. 
Clearly defined organizational and operational structures are of central importance for the manage-
ment of subsidiary governance in multinational groups (cf. Reilly & Scott, 2016). Globally acting organ-
izations require joint values and predefined management structures to secure the integration of the 
subsidiary structures within a preset group landscape and close collaboration (cf. Fink & Hartmann, 
2009, p. 5). This forms the foundation to ensure oversight and organizational transparency on the one 
hand, and intragroup harmonization on the other hand.207 Particularly bank subsidiaries are highly 
diverse and intensely affected by external regulation which makes a simple one-size fits all approach 
impossible or only possible on a comparatively high level (cf. Frederick, 2014, p. 13 f.). Subsequently, 
the already mentioned transnational approach, that combines the efficiency of global organizational 
structures with flexibility for local adoption of local specifics, is more favorable. However, also in that 
case, it is challenging to find the right balance between centralization for synergy effects and localiza-
tion for local responsiveness (cf. Müller-Stewens & Brauer, 2009; Bouquet et al., 2016). In essence, it 
is important to create structures and processes that promote trust and delegation as well as enough 
supervision for the corporate parent (cf. Paliszkiewicz, 2011). As change is a usual practice, the or-
ganizational structures have to be flexible enough to adopt them on time. Parents, that are able to 
transfer those principles into their subsidiary structures, are more flexible and innovative (cf. Bouquet 
et al., 2016). 
 
Subsidiary board role and supervision: Another essential part are subsidiary boards (cf. Du et al., 
2015). To comply with host countries’ legal and regulatory requirements, in many cases parents setup 
legal entities that only exist on paper (cf. Fatehi & Choi, 2019a; 2019b). While the local MD and FD, 
out of a local perspective, are the legal representatives of an independent entity, out of a group per-
spective they are the official representatives that have to represent the interests of the parent compa-
ny. The success and effectiveness of the local subsidiary depends largely on the local management 
board members. Even if the individual role of the subsidiary boards differs in each corporate group, 
they are usually held responsible for the subsidiary control, strategy, coordination, and service (cf. Du 
et al., 2015). We can generally conclude that subsidiary boards are in practice often more passive to 
ensure compliance with local legal and regulatory requirements (cf. Du et al., 2011). Even so, there 
are also active subsidiary boards, which are actively involved in the strategy setting process and follow 
a local specific market approach.208 Altogether, there is no general impact direction recognized and 
some multinationals also apply a mixed approach, depending on the strategic relevance of the market 
or their local market experiences (cf. Böhrer, 2011). 
 
207 The implementation in an consistent way is time consuming and complex, as there are multiple influencing 
determinates (e.g. company size, business model, industry, product characteristic, business and banking regula-
tion etc.) that limit the design variations of the local subsidiary setups (cf. Böhrer, 2010; Alwert et al., 2009, An-
dresen & Gronau, 2005). 
208 A study of Du et al. (2011) across 83 subsidiaries in 14 different countries highlights that a foreign subsidiary is 
more likely to maintain an active board if it is a world mandate subsidiary. Particularly, if it has worldwide respon-
sibility for a product line and performs a broad scope of value-added activities, if it is larger relative to the multina-
tional enterprise, if it has a higher level of local responsiveness, and if its past performance is poorer. 
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In financial services subsidiaries, the local boards play a fundamental role for good corporate govern-
ance (cf. Yasui, 2016). Since the financial crisis, many bank regulators favor greater board autonomy, 
but independence of the subsidiary boards can be a dilemma for the corporate parent, the subsidiary 
as well as the supervisors itself (cf. Frederick, 2014, p. 15).209 There has to be clarity about local re-
quired subsidiary board sub-committees and procedures for the regular board evaluation. I summarize 
that it is central that the corporate parent defines requirements for the allocation, expectations and 
responsibilities of the local subsidiary boards. Thus, to mitigate governance gaps, there should be 
defined mandatory bylaws for each board committee as well as for the sub-committees. It has to be 
determined whether members of the corporate parent must be in the local boards, if there are other 
stakeholder representatives in the subsidiary boards, and how the subsidiary boards communicate 
between each other and towards the corporate parent. Even if personal interlocking relationship within 
corporate groups are common practice and can be beneficial, it seems questionable how such direc-
tors should secure an independent and objective control if e.g. their personal career or variable bonus 
may depend on certain decisions which he has to take as director. 
I outline that an effective subsidiary supervision further includes that there are regular reviews of the 
subsidiaries’ operational and organizational structures to reduce complexity, opacity and mitigate the 
probability for organizational failure. At the same time, regular board meetings should be arranged (at 
least four per year) to communicate, discuss and align subsidiary specific topics (cf. Ruhwedel, 2012, 
p. 13). 
 
Key persons: Governance key function holders (e.g. MD, FD, chief risk officer, head of internal audit, 
head of compliance) or also leading specialists (e.g. IT experts, R&D experts) can be key persons for 
a company. Companies have to carefully recruit such talents regarding their skills and their company 
specific strategic fit (cf. Lakshman & Jiang, 2016).210 The perfect fit for the individual subsidiary varies 
and depends on the local culture, subsidiary size, stage of the local organization development, busi-
ness scope, external factors (e.g. regulation requirements) and the desired position (cf. Wegerich, 
2015). Since the recent financial crises, many regulators implemented ‘fit and proper tests’ for senior 
management positions in financial institutes to evaluate their professional suitability and integrity for 
those positions. In many markets the local supervisory authorities have to give their approval for the 
nomination of new managers, which can be challenging for corporate groups in which the local man-
agement is usually send as expatriate without the obligatory local market experience (cf. Paetzmann & 
Schöning, 2014; Finesi, 2015). It is from great importance, that the diverse (local specific) stakeholder 
needs are considered within the nomination process of key persons on subsidiary level. In general, a 
greater subsidiary autonomy within the human resources management is associated with a better 
subsidiary performance (cf. Lazarova et al., 2017). Williams & Lee (2016) argue that establishing a 
participative climate within the subsidiary enhances both knowledge in and outflows at the level of the 
subsidiary. Multinational groups comprise a geographically dispersed and culturally differentiated 
 
209 For further information cf. chapter 3.4 
210 According to the study of Lakshman & Jiang (2016) multinational companies prefer parent country nationalities 
for key positions. They provide evidence that that size of operations in the subsidiary, mode of entry, knowledge 
transfer, and talent development requirements are key determinants of the choice between parent country nation-
alities and host country nationalities. 
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workforce that embodies both firm-specific and location-specific human capital (cf. Morris et al., 2016). 
Talents should be identified and developed in special group-wide leadership programs and consider 
employees from the headquarters and local subsidiaries (cf. Fink & Hartmann, 2009). While most mul-
tinational groups naturally follow a top-down approach for managing leadership development, there is 
also the necessity to find the right balance between a top-down and bottom up approach (cf. Evans et 
al., 2016). Singh et al. (2019) found evidence that cultural friction, arising due to a large share of home 
country managers in culturally distant locations, has a negative effect on subsidiary performance. In 
any case, it is essential that there is transparency about the required governance key functions and 
their group-internal but also group external requirements in the subsidiaries to secure a target-oriented 
HR recruiting. To create value and reflect the diverse cultural backgrounds, the perfect combination of 
different personal profiles is challenging but also a crucial success factor for the subsidiary govern-
ance. 
 
Succession planning: Succession planning is an essential key element for every organization to 
safeguard its future and consists of developing a plan for individuals who might fill key functions if they 
are vacant (cf. Ballhausen, 2015, p. 93; Evans et al., 2016). Watson et al. (2015) also make clear that 
in a bank governance perspective an increased attention should rely on the depth of executive-level 
succession planning. Local key persons play an important role for the organization, because of their 
professional experience and corporate insights that are often a key driver to ensure business continui-
ty. As legal representatives of the subsidiary, in particular the members of the subsidiary’s manage-
ment body (mostly the MD and FD) require an increased awareness within the succession planning 
(cf. Kobi, 2012, p. 73). Not solely due to the ever tighter personal requirements in many markets, but 
also due to the fact that those functions require outstanding management and leadership skills, which 
further implies the relevance for long-term orientated intra-group leadership and talent management 
programs.211 At the same, such programs provide a crucial contribution for the intragroup knowledge 
storage and support the earlier mentioned systemic network approach.212 On the contrary, I outline 
that the required executive knowledge for the management of a subsidiary is largely based on implicit 
knowledge of the local key persons, develops over time and is challenging to teach in standardized 
program formats. Despite this, those skills have to be transferred to younger executive candidates, 
which will succeed the key persons in future.213 For multinationals leadership continuity with managers 
who can operate effectively in various cultural contexts gets increasingly important (cf. e.g. Sharma & 
Sengupta, 2018). Optimal succession planning periods are between 3-5 years, and a systematic suc-
cession planning for key positions should always be recognized as a clear management responsibility 
(cf. Stracke & Wilke, 2016, p. 181 f.; Rompelberg, 1997; Goodwin & Graebe, 2017; Wala & Miklavc, 
2007, p. 5 f.). 
 
 
211 Talent and leadership programs are important to provide guidance, introduction in future responsibilities, cor-
porate values and commits high potentials in a long-term perspective to the company (cf. Kunz, 2013, p. 11 ff.; 
Walsh, 2013). 
212 For further information, cf. chapter 4.2.1. 
213 There are also studies, which underline the positive effect of a systematic succession planning. For example 
Furkel (2004, p. 10 f.) investigated 110 European companies and found that companies which focus on a system-
atic succession planning have a better performance. Other studies provide similar results: James Kehinde et al. 
(2012); Rothwell (2011); Heinen & O'Neill (2004, p. 67). 
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Creation of a common corporate culture: There is broad consensus that a common corporate cul-
ture is essential, but also challenging to create among the different subsidiary locations with own sub-
cultures. Thus, the corporate culture can be only limitedly influenced and controlled among distance 
between the different locations of the subsidiaries (cf. Moore, 2015).214 Godiwalla (2016) provides 
evidence, that host country national culture of a foreign subsidiary unit has a major impact upon the 
unit's organizational culture and cross-cultural communications and negotiation styles. At the same 
time, national culture does create a major barrier to the transfer best practices from the parent’s head-
quarters to its foreign subsidiaries (cf. Tallaki & Bracci, 2017). Even so, many authors pronounce the 
pivotal role of a common cultural understanding and indicate positive effects on the subsidiary perfor-
mance (cf. e.g., Bhatti et al., 2016; Farah et al., 2016; Fang et al., 2010; Colakoglu & Caligiuri, 2008; 
Delios & Beamish, 2001). Thus, common corporate core values should be jointly developed, have to 
be regularly communicated and strengthened via reciprocal on-site visits to secure that those agreed 
corporate values are visible and lived. Evidence exists that a strong subsidiary's entrepreneurial cul-
ture strengthens the effect of headquarters knowledge transfer on its capabilities (cf. Li & Lee, 2015).  
The existence of various sub-cultures across subsidiaries requires the working in inter-disciplinary 
teams, in which a global mindset culture with joint corporate core values and norms is necessary. This 
requires the support by the boards, and it needs structures and processes for global alignment, coor-
dination and the infrastructure for global communication (cf. Henson, 2016). Harzing & Pudelko (2014) 
and Chan & Holbert (2001) supplement that it has to be fostered by regular assessments, short-term 
assignments for employees and regular job rotations to encourage the creation of a global mindset 
culture and to dispel the assumption regarding the parent’s headquarters as the ‘single center of com-
petence.’ In addition, a global talent pool and appropriate rewards for employees with a global mindset 
should be supportive. 
Nonetheless, senior managers of the corporate parent should create a minimum homogeneity and 
feeling of togetherness among the group as a whole. Bhatti et al. (2016) point out that the manager's 
experiential learning advances the subsidiary's knowledge, helps to improve trust in the group network 
relationships and contributes to identify new business opportunities which altogether leads to a better 
corporate performance. While appropriate expatriate exchange programs can strengthen this, they 
also sharpen a common culture and support the intra-group knowledge exchange (cf. Berry, 2015). On 
a contrary, Tao et al. (2016) state, that the level of subsidiary autonomy is reduced if the number of 
expatriates increases. 
Apart from that, many parents use double mandates to secure their influence in subsidiaries (cf. Holle, 
2015, p. 212 f). On the one hand, this also strengthens the cultural and knowledge transfer, but on the 
other hand, potential interest conflicts and cultural differences have to be discussed transparently and 
openly. 
In sum, a common group-wide business culture defines the boundaries for subsidiary sub-cultures or 
the accepted risk-taking behavior and joint leadership principles help to guide the subsidiary’s leader-
 
214 The dimensions of company cultures are future orientation vs. past orientation, culture of mistrust vs. trust 
culture, efficiency orientation vs. effectiveness orientation, centralistic vs. federalist, contextual adoption vs. identi-
ty development, consensus orientation vs. confrontation orientation, cf. Hilb (2001); Bleicher (1990); Gomez & 
Zimmermann (1993). Deal & Kennedy (2000) differentiate between four company culture types: ‘all or nothing’ 
culture (risk orientation), hard-working and pleasant celebration (turbulent, grasping outside orientation), analytical 
project culture, process culture. 
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ship teams (cf. Volkens & Bosse, 2017; Meyer, et al., 2011). I highlight that the promotion of strong 
sub-cultures in subsidiaries is equally important and assists to better adopt local characteristics or 
specifics of the business models. So said, as the upcoming debate implies, this has to be supple-
mented with an adequate consideration of integrity among all hierarchy levels to be successful in the 
long-term. 
 
4.2.3 Integrity management 
As shown in the prior debate, nowadays organizations pay ever more emphasis on ethics, integrity 
and other best practices for good business conduct as a crucial element of corporate governance (cf. 
Hoekstra, 2016; Fotaki et al., 2019). Since the last financial crisis, regulators have increased their 
attention towards the impact of those mechanisms within organizations (cf. Soltani & Maupetit, 2015). 
It is not only expected of managers to act in compliance with existing rules and regulations, but rather 
to even go beyond that and orientate their behaviors to the generally accepted ethical and moral val-
ues agreed upon by the society. Ethical standards are important to close potential legal gaps or exist-
ing room for interpretation. A major driver of the company’s desired sustainable competitive advantage 
originates in the managerial potential to integrate the behavioral manifestations of the employee´s 
engagement and involvement, transparency, economic sustainability with a model of business integrity 
(cf. Drakulevski & Nakov, 2016). A comprehensive business integrity management affects the strate-
gy, good practices, code of conduct, as well as the general business integrity policy of the company. 
Integrity is the guiding principle for the collaboration and lays the ethical foundations of management 
decisions. Strong ethical values are the prerequisite for effective corporate governance (cf. Fotaki et 
al., 2019). Renz et al. (2015a, p. 1 ff.) explain that organizations have integrity, if they continuously 
reflect their behavior regarding its ethical consequences and define it as a common management re-
sponsibility.215 I promote the necessity of a group-wide integrity management approach, which pro-
vides a comprehensive framework for the employees, that in turn formulates the expectations for the 
individual staff behavior.216 
Several authors outline the importance of integrity for the collaboration between the parent’s head-
quarters and the subsidiaries (cf. e.g., Abrashi-Smajli & Baum, 2017; Gurkov, 2015; Renz & Böhrer, 
2012, p. 39). In essence, the foundation for an effective integrity management are joint values and a 
collaboration based on equality, fairness, trust and cooperation.217 Intercultural challenges need to be 
proactively addressed and have to be implemented across all hierarchies’ integrity supporting pro-
cesses (e.g. as regular agenda point in management meetings, cf. Renz et al., 2015b, p. 96 ff.). 
 
215 Oates & Dias (2016) provide evidence that there is a growing concern that moral failure preceded the global 
financial crisis with waves of ethical scandals overwhelming the global banking industry highlighting a lack of 
integrity could happen again. Moreover, the latest diesel emission scandal illustrates integrity deficits of the in-
volved managers. 
216 According to Renz et al. (2015b, p. 95 ff.) integrity management consists out of principles, processes, and 
people: The principles dimension focuses on topics like corruption, bribe payments, gifts and other favors, trans-
parent product information, fair value for money, equality or discrimination. The process dimension focuses e.g. 
on suppliers, procurement processes, product quality, health and safety at the workplace. The people dimension 
focuses on core beliefs, values, whistleblowing, loyalty towards the employer and the dealing with misconduct. 
217 For further studies regarding corporate governance and integrity, cf. Said et al. (2016); Hajduk & Schank 
(2016); Soltani & Maupetit (2015); Arjoon (2015; 2017). 
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Good leaders recognize that integrity is a clear management responsibility and distinguish integrity 
management and compliance management from each other, even if there is a strong interlink between 
them.218 To reflect the importance of compliance management, this topic is debated at a later stage.219 
For the sake of completeness and clarification, the following Table 3 provides an overview of the dif-
ferences between compliance and integrity programs: 
 
 Compliance programs Integrity programs 
Objective To comply with external code of conducts, laws and regulations 
To achieve moral self-steering of the 
employees 
Steering approach Avoidance of criminal behavior Enabling of ethical / moral actions 
Human behavioral 
assumptions 
Humans have materialistically 
self- interest, extrinsic motivation  
Social being, self-interest with ideals 
and values 
Measures 
Training, restrictions of action 
scope, supervision, control, sanc-
tions 
Training, ideals, personal responsibil-
ity, organizational measures, supervi-
sion, control, sanctions 
Table 3:  Differences between compliance and integrity programs. 
Source:  Compiled by the author, based on Göbel (2010) and Barlow (2014, p. 6 f.). 
 
Multinational groups with integrity have clear principles for their internal and external collaborations 
and are supported by appropriate processes, which ensure ethical reflection within the processes and 
integrate integrity as a fixed component in their leadership programs. This can be proactively influ-
enced via the implementation of a problem-solving culture, and by employees, which take over re-
sponsibility and focus on a respectful collaboration that is based on mutual trust and fairness. Inte-
ger organizations sharpen the awareness for the consequences of ethical failure and define integrity 
as clear management task among all hierarchy levels (cf. Renz & Böhrer, 2012, p. 42 f.; Renz et al., 
2015a; 2015b). The following paragraphs will debate those sub-elements in detail. 
 
Problem solving culture: Organizations with integrity have a culture, which allows addressing prob-
lems in an open way without fear and focus on a solution-oriented environment. This builds the foun-
dation of transparency about difficulties, in order to intervene as fast as possible and identify prompt 
solutions. Matveev (2017) highlights the necessity of intercultural competence for implementing a 
problem-solving culture in multicultural teams as a prerequisite to develop coherent and effective cul-
turally diverse teams. However, a problem culture can only be implemented if the employees and all 
management levels have an honest interest to identify, communicate and solve potential problems 
without any bias (cf. Renz & Böhrer, 2012, p. 42). Yet, to secure integrity within the subsidiary net-
work, the corporate parent’s management body should actively request and promote an open commu-
nication of sensitive issues and solution orientation within the entire subsidiary network. At the same 
time, they have to encourage their local senior managers to promote this within their local teams, as 
well. Moreover, it should provide the basis for intragroup collaboration and communication. Hence, it is 
vital to implement standardized communication, reporting processes and escalation procedures for 
sensitive issues, which cannot be solved on subsidiary levels (cf. Harzing & Pudelko, 2014; Renz & 
 
218 For further information regarding the current integrity debate, cf. Orlitzky (2016); Heissner (2015); De Bruin 
(2014). 
219 This argumentation is based on Hein (2016) who provides an overview about the development of the compli-
ance discussion within the last decade. For further information, cf. chapter 4.2.5. 
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Böhrer, 2012, p. 42). Yet, as outlined earlier, it is difficult to prescribe the implementation of a problem 
solving culture or integer behaviors solely via written instructions, as they have to grow over time and 
depend largely on the inter-human relationships of the involved persons and furthermore has to be 
interpreted differently in regard to diverse local peculiarities. 
 
Accountability culture: An entire part of integer organizations is that all organizational members take 
responsibility for their actions. Dekker (2018) outlines the need of a just culture, which is based on 
trust, learning and accountability, which is especially crucial if an incident has occurred. Accountability 
is a prerequisite for integrity and implies being true to others: this forms the basis for each inter-human 
business relationship, inside and outside of the organization (cf. Robinson, 2016). It is a basic prereq-
uisite to create a sense of belonging towards the company (cf. Dekker, 2012, p. 83 f.). Especially for 
the intragroup collaboration across different business units or subsidiaries, the simple definition of 
tasks, competencies and responsibilities (TCR) is not enough and has to be completed by a group-
wide accountability culture. On the one hand, this requires clarifying the accountabilities between the 
different governing bodies within the group, but on the other hand also the separation of accountabili-
ties between e.g. the members of the subsidiary’s management board. As earlier mentioned, princi-
ples, such as delegation, empowerment and enrichment, are necessary to create a feeling of account-
ability.220 If employees feel accountable, this is what supports entrepreneurial thinking and enhances 
innovativeness. If subsidiaries are managed by ‘internal entrepreneurs’, this will create accountability, 
increases employee motivation and drive performance (cf. Li & Lee, 2015). The subsidiary’s managers 
entrepreneurial behavior largely depends on the division head (middle managers) (cf. O’Brien et al., 
2019a). The entrepreneurial orientation in subsidiaries also depends on structural conditions of deci-
sion-making autonomy and the local decision-making structure (cf. Hakala et al., 2016). While it further 
supports critical thinking, it also implies that submitted orders from the parents get more challenged 
and do not get executed without any questioning. Even so, internal entrepreneurs manage pro-active 
crucial decisions regarding the local market, local innovation potential or its communication.221 
 
Mutual trust: The foundation for any collaboration between humans is mutual respect. Likewise this 
applies for the relation between the parent and its subsidiaries. A central element for successful com-
panies is trust (cf. Mollenhauer & Sommerlatte, 2016). Being respectful of cultural differences and 
avoiding misunderstandings are central in intercultural management of multinational organizations (cf. 
Ooi, 2014). Mutual understanding and trust emerge from a close intragroup collaboration between 
home and host country mangers and minimize goal incongruence and agency problems (cf. Kong et 
al., 2018). Trust means fairness, loyalty towards the company superiors, subordinates and other 
stakeholders (cf. Cäker & Siverbo, 2014). However, trust is influenced by language and local culture, 
which implies that it is a critical issue particularly in multinational organizations (cf. Zhang & Harzing, 
2016; Tenzer et al., 2013; Andersson et al., 2005; Li, 2005). At its core, multinational groups are multi-
lingual communities in which language is a key ingredient for shaping mutual trust and organizational 
 
220 For further information, cf. chapter 4.1. 
221 There exists evidence that market launches of new products are best performed by the employees who are 
close to market, who are committed and feel responsible, and who achieve appreciation of their managers (cf. 
Amberg & McGaughey, 2017). 
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change processes, information exchange, competitive activities, global coordination, and intra-
corporate value creation (cf. Luo & Shenkar, 2017). To respond to the different local interpretations, it 
is essential to define clear principles on how to interpret and understand those terms from both, a 
group-internal, but also group-external perspective in the cooperation with the different stakeholders 
(e.g. customers, suppliers, authorities etc.). The greater the cultural difference between the parent and 
its subsidiaries, the greater is the necessity for guidance and clarity about the expectations. I argue 
that this understanding can influence e.g. the marketing, communication or sales activities on a local 
level, and the local management should inform the parent proactively about potential local specifics. In 
essence, keystone of trust is the character of global leaders to influence how employees work together 
across borders (cf. Morrison & Black, 2014). Even if trust is difficult to grasp and leaders have to face 
a huge challenge of generating and maintaining trust throughout the organization because of the phys-
ical distance, language, and cultural differences and diversity of the subsidiary networks, it is one of 
the most crucial fundaments for a functioning intragroup collaboration. 
 
Awareness for ethical failure: Organizations, in which managers and employees are aware of the 
consequences of ethical failure and understand its associated risks, indicate the existence of an integ-
rity culture (cf. Ferrell & Fraedrich, 2016). Consequently, the management bodies have to raise the 
awareness for the consequences arising out of cultural difference and related ethical failures. The 
parent should implement applicable rules of conduct and business relationship principles to define 
behavioral standards for the entire staff (cf. Kolk & Van Tulder, 2005, p. 1).222 However, such internal 
standards require local specifications to be accepted and they should be trained with regular aware-
ness trainings and predefined sanction mechanisms for misconduct to help to underpin their relevance 
(cf. Biegelman, 2008, p. 100/201; Shavell, 2002). Integrity issues should be an inherent part of the 
intragroup communication. It is essential that the ethical behaviors are regularly reflected in manage-
ment discussions on both, subsidiary and on parent level, because ‘responsible ethical’ behavior re-
quires continuous management attention and demonstrates the supervisory authorities the legal and 
regulatory required duty of care (cf. Francesco, 2015; Renz & Böhrer, 2012, p. 44; Sethi, 2002). Fur-
ther, it contributes to mitigate the risk of reputational damages and misconduct and in the long term 
also leads to a higher creditability among other stakeholders (cf. Alina, 2014).223 
 
Integrity is a clear leadership task that cannot be delegated to others (cf. Hinterhuber, 2014; Schwartz 
& Seitz, 2014). If integrity is defined and integrated as a clear management responsibility, it will ensure 
that ethical dilemmas get adequately resolved, regularly evaluated and secures that integrity topics 
are taken seriously. All management hierarchies have to be sensitized for the necessity of a high level 
of integrity and should regularly reflect the internal ethical behavior, their consequences and define, if 
needed, potential countermeasures to strengthen the integrity (cf. Renz & Böhrer, 2012, p. 46).  
 
 
222 A overview with elements of code of conduct provides Kaptein (2004, p. 13 ff.). 
223 McAlister et al. (2016) and Butt et al. (2016) argue that ethical leadership is a part of good corporate govern-
ance and positively related to a firm´s corporate social responsibility, which in turn positively influences the organ-
izational performance. 
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While Walumbwa et al. (2017) provide empirical evidence that ethical leadership significantly relates to 
group learning behavior, there is also consensus that integrity cannot be fully delegated from the par-
ent’s management body towards the lower hierarchies (Schwartz & Seitz, 2014). Francesco (2015) 
and Alina (2014) argue that members of management bodies have to act as role models, but also 
have to delegate certain integrity topics towards lower hierarchies. Nonetheless, I highlight that the 
senior managers of the subsidiaries should have an obligation to report local specific insights and 
share their local knowledge to continuously enhance the intragroup integrity management that gets 
centrally coordinated from the parent. 
In addition, an adequate internal and external stakeholder management is of great importance for 
effective intragroup governance and will be discussed in the next subchapter.  
 
4.2.4 Stakeholder relationship management 
Corporate stakeholder responsibility considers stakeholder engagement and its management as a key 
enabler for achieving sustainable corporate success (cf. Kujala et al., 2017). Multinationals are con-
fronted with ethical dilemmas and have to manage a diverse stakeholder landscape with different and 
sometimes even contrary interests on a global and local level (cf. Filatotchev & Stahl, 2015). The dif-
ferent stakeholders have either a more positive or more negative, direct or indirect influence towards 
the corporate group as a whole. At the same time, the organization itself also influences their stake-
holders. Embedded in these confused circumstances, it is relevant to have transparency about the 
individual – sometimes even opposing - goals of the diverse stakeholders and to take into account 
their particular concerns within the overall business activities, globally and locally (cf. Freeman, 2010, 
p. 53 f.). Nonetheless, the adequate response of the different legal systems, regulatory approaches or 
the dissimilar long- and short-time orientation of economies can hereby be a major challenge. Like-
wise, there are also different power allocations between the different stakeholders that have to be 
considered. While in the US shareholders have comparatively more influence than in Europe, in Ger-
many the legal employee co-determination plays a much more prominent role than in most other coun-
tries (cf. Blair & Roe, 2010; Bottenberg et al., 2017).224 Yasui (2016) and Frederick (2014) highlight 
that specifically the bank supervisory authorities are getting increasingly crucial stakeholders for regu-
lated bank entities, as they have the primary mission to protect the investors, which means that they 
clearly expect their boards to adequately take into account the legitimate interests of stakeholders 
while pursuing the interests of the bank. 
All in all, such diverse interests have to be balanced by the parent’s executives in a global perspective 
and by the subsidiary management bodies in the local host country perspective. In multinational 
groups particularly bank subsidiaries require a certain degree of independence, because the stake-
holder landscape largely differs from the others parts and are imposed towards the activities of com-
parably strong banking authorities as a dominant external stakeholder. The parent has to coordinate 
the group as a whole and must set the intragroup framework conditions for the stakeholder manage-
ment. While it should enable the subsidiaries with e.g. suitable instruments (e.g. appropriate customer 
 
224 For further studies about the employee participation in Germany, cf. Hopt (2016); Sandrock (2015); Müller-
Jentsch (2015); Elson et al. (2015); Bramucci & Zanfei (2015); Jackson & Sorge (2012). 
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relationship management (CRM) systems), to professionalize their own local stakeholder manage-
ment, they should also take over accountability to coordinate cross-border global stakeholders and 
customers across different subsidiaries (cf. Shi & Gao, 2016). As this approach is successfully applied 
in many multinational groups by their global brand communication or marketing departments, there is 
currently too little attention to follow this approach also within the stakeholder management.225 Based 
on my corporate governance definition, this dissertation applies its broadest perspective for the stake-
holder management, including the definition, identification, management and control of the numerous 
stakeholder groups that affect the entire multinational group system (cf. the framework management) 
in any possible way. It consists of all hierarchy levels, as well as the strategic, operational and ethical 
aspects and aims to secure the adequate consideration of the multiple stakeholder interests within the 
entire decision-making processes. Renz & Böhrer (2012, p. 47) explain that universal stakeholder 
management includes eight different dimensions, which build the foundation for the further argumenta-
tion to reduce the governance inconsistencies between the parent and its subsidiary as the following 
paragraphs illustrate.226 
 
Stakeholder interest analysis: As prerequisite to consider the different stakeholder groups, organi-
zations have to implement a stakeholder landscape, that ensures transparency of the relevant stake-
holders, who set the framework conditions, who provide input and output and who are directly or ra-
ther indirectly effected of the supply chain. As later discussed within the risk management chapter, 
having lucency about the numerous stakeholder interests is also an important element of an in-
tragroup ERM system (cf. Price, 2016). While it seems obvious to concentrate primarily on external 
stakeholder groups, the group-internal stakeholder management among the employees, the parent 
and other affiliated companies is also of central importance for the subsidiaries (cf. Tropschuh & 
Wadé, 2016; Park & Choi, 2015; Künzel, 2013; Veser, 2004; O'Shannassy, 2003). Park & Choi (2015) 
outline that the interests of both, the parent and the subsidiary and their involved managers should be 
explicitly incorporated in the local stakeholder analysis. This can solely be achieved, if the stakehold-
ers and their interests are lucent and are embedded in a proper stakeholder landscape. As this raises 
transparency and helps to manage the multiple stakeholder interests, it also has to be kept up-to-date 
to minimize intragroup governance gaps and misalignment. Hayes & Watts (2016, p. 4) conclude that 
a proper stakeholder interest analysis level is a prerequisite for balancing expectations and helps to 
better enforce own interests. 
 
Customer centricity processes: For companies, organizational and process frameworks that enable 
them to reach more customer centricity, become an increasingly important key driver to gain a sus-
tainable competitive advantage and leads to marketing innovativeness, and indirectly to a better finan-
 
225 For further information about the design of global brand strategies in multinational companies, cf. Kapferer 
(2012, p. 405 ff.); Grewal et al. (2013); Khojastehpour & Johns (2015); Verčič et al. (2015). 
226 According to Renz & Böhrer (2012, p. 47) the stakeholder management exists out of the following elements: 
(1) The existence of a stakeholder interest identification; (2) Transparency about the buying processes; (3) Trans-
parency about the roles of the involved counterparts; (4) The existence of a aligned sales process; (5) Opportunity 
to measure customer satisfaction and employee satisfaction; (6) Existing employee evaluations and development; 
(7) Integration of other stakeholder groups and (8) The awareness that stakeholder management is a clear man-
agement responsibility. 
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cial performance (cf. Osakwe, 2019; Bonacchi & Perego, 2015).227 Although it is a key driver to lead 
companies, many organizations still struggle and inadequately integrate this within their intragroup 
business networks (cf. Viljanen et al., 2017). Customer centric organizations constantly strive to serve 
their customers better with CRM programs to improve their satisfaction and loyalty. A professional 
knowledge management regarding the product, customer, brand, and competition is mostly important 
to understand the customers’ needs and develop the right products (cf. Bedarkar et al., 2016). Cus-
tomer centricity is a fast-emerging norm across industries and enhances the competitiveness of firms 
(cf. Gaurav & Shainesh, 2017). Despite this, many companies tend to ignore also considering wider 
stakeholder groups, such as customers (cf. Mason & Simmons, 2014). Others may take into account 
their obvious customers, but neglect that the purchase decision is often made by the customers’ envi-
ronment (cf. Horstmann, 2011).228 In essence, a customer-centric culture in an organization leads to 
customer-centric knowledge creation and thus, it improves organizational effectiveness through an 
increase in customer satisfaction (cf. Bedarkar et al., 2016). Consequently, the parents have to safe-
guard that their subsidiaries analyze and optimize their local end-to-end customer influencing and 
buying processes. On the one hand, the parent has to provide guidance with central developed stand-
ards for local customer and enabling processes to ensure a group-wide customer centric driven ap-
proach, alignment and a common database to perform data analytics about the global customer base 
(cf. Adeyemi et al., 2014). On the other hand, particularly in regard to the banking business tightened 
data privacy laws, consumer protection and antitrust regulations have to be taken into account within 
the intragroup data sharing and data analytics and bear risks if those are not are not adequately man-
aged. 
 
Sales processes: A professional process interaction and good process quality are essential to gener-
ate new orders and ensure customer centricity (cf. Chuang & Lin, 2013). On the one hand, multina-
tional groups have to aim for global process standardization, on the other hand, they have to ensure 
flexibility on subsidiary level to adequately address local market specifics (cf. Colakoglu et al., 2014). 
Therefore, a dual sales approach, with global account managers for global customers and local ac-
count managers with individual market specific sales procedures, fits best (cf. Birkinshaw et al., 2001). 
Driven by greater market proximity, there have to be processes, which secure that locally gained mar-
ket knowledge on subsidiary level gets shared with the parent and can be fostered e.g. via cross func-
tions and international diverse team works, regular training activities or customer workshops on a local 
and global level (cf. Boscari et al., 2016). Even if it is challenging in subsidiary networks, subsidiaries 
should facilitate regular knowledge transfer to the overseas headquarters to ensure local customer 
proximity and the appropriate consideration of local needs (cf. Desouza et al., 2008).229 Hereby, par-
ticularly automated information exchange processes, a professional CRM system and close interaction 
between parents headquarters functions and local subsidiaries (e.g. R&D function and local sales 
 
227 The necessity of customer centricity is a much-discussed topic among scholars within the last years, cf. e.g., 
Vandermerwe (2014); Krishna et al. (2014); Capon & Senn (2017); Parniangtong (2017); Fader & Toms (2018); 
Shainesh (2018). 
228 For example, the local car dealer plays a central role for a customer’s car financing decision, because he can 
significantly influence the customers buying and selection process. 
229 The study of Asakawa & Aoki (2016) found out that granting legitimacy to R&D subsidiaries does not neces-
sarily lead to a reduction in headquarters’ control. Furthermore, they provide evidence that R&D subsidiaries’ 
legitimacy does not influence the effect of headquarters’ knowledge about them on the level of control. 
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persons) are fundamental for the innovation capability of the entire group (cf. Colakoglu et al., 2014; 
Mudambi et al., 2014; Borini et al., 2012). Despite this fact, the global coordination is difficult because 
of their multiple customer characteristics, and thus set priorities, the striving for a consistent position-
ing of products and services is of great importance. At its core, aligned sales processes are essential, 
but despite this, the availability of sales approaches may vary by the different markets due to their 
infrastructure, regulations or different competitive life cycles (cf. Sexton, 2016). This is, in particular for 
the financial services subsidiaries, of great importance, as they have to collect sensitive personal cus-
tomer data within their sales processes (e.g. personal income situation for a car loan approval) and 
have to cope with varying legal and regulatory requirements in each country (cf. Kiron, 2017; Ahmada-
linejad & Hashemi, 2015). However, there is evidence that financial institutes that have proper sales 
processes and a professional customer lifetime management, have a better bank performance (cf. 
Ekinci et al., 2014). 
 
Measurement of customer satisfaction: The degree of customer satisfaction is a key driver for the 
overall financial performance.230 Customer satisfaction depends on the individual and institutional cus-
tomer orientation, which is directly linked towards the staff’s behavior, the organizational structures 
and the entire corporate systems and indicates the degree of customer trust. Particularly in the finance 
and banking industry trust builds the foundation for doing business. Van Esterik-Plasmeijer & Van 
Raaij (2017) explain that integrity is the most important determinant of bank trust, which is the conclu-
sion of transparency, customer orientation and competence. Trust is a strong predictor of loyalty. Bank 
loyalty of customers depends on competence, stability, transparency, and value congruence. As the 
integration of standardization and customization of service offerings is critical for improving service 
quality, customer satisfaction significantly increases customer loyalty (cf. Kasiri et al., 2017). In multi-
national groups the customer satisfaction largely depends on the coordination of the parent and its 
subsidiaries and adds further complexity (cf. Li et al., 2016). It is essential that the corporate parents 
know the degree of customer satisfaction and have to demand from their subsidiaries local market and 
customer orientation. Thus, appropriate governance instruments come in the form of regular customer 
surveys to gather customers’ voice in order to fully understand their perceptions, judgments, attitudes, 
intentions, and behaviors and get their feedback (cf. Mittal, 2017). On the one hand, such customer 
analysis provides crucial customer insights and builds the foundation to define appropriate target 
group specific measures. On the other hand, it is the basis to realize a better customization, improve-
ment and finally a sustainable corporate success. 
 
Employee satisfaction: Comprehensive framework conditions, which secure employee’s satisfaction 
are another relevant key driver (cf. Welge & Eulerich, 2014, p. 292 f.). Employee satisfaction improves 
employee loyalty, builds and contributes towards long-term business success, while it further reduces 
the overall systematic risk (cf. Lu, 2016; Mollenhauer & Sommerlatte, 2016, p. 96). Managers should 
emphasize a group-wide identity and search for individuals with multicultural identity (cf. Björkman et 
al., 2017). In addition, multinational companies should place emphasis on recruiting employees that 
 
230. There is broad consensus among scholars that customer-oriented companies perform better, cf. Golovkova et 
al. (2019); Mithas et al. (2016); Terho et al. (2015); Rodriguez et al. (2015); Saeidi et al. (2015). 
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speak the companies’ functional language and offer language training for the staff. Luo & Shenkar 
(2017) and Rozkwitalska et al. (2017) make clear that, situated in the multilingual community, those 
are the key ingredients, which can further shape organizational change processes, information ex-
change, competitive activities, global coordination, and intra-corporate value creation, and that in the 
end they will lead towards improved employee satisfaction. If parents know about the local employee 
satisfaction, it is a crucial control mechanism and instrument for them, but it also helps the subsidiar-
ies’ senior managers to reflect their own leadership skills, assure the evaluation of their management 
skills and provide an indicator about the employee loyalty (cf. Vollmuth & Zwettler, 2015, p. 43).231 I 
outline that in multinational groups frustrations can arise due to e.g. differences in the local employee 
participation and co-determination rights between the host country locations of the subsidiaries. Differ-
ent compensation schemes and disparities among salaries of the employees in the different subsidiar-
ies are another influencing determinant for the employee satisfaction. The corporate parent should aim 
at harmonizing such differences via e.g. uniform group-wide standards that are independent of the 
host country locations and a high degree of transparency for decisions affecting such topics.232 Fried 
et al. (2018) found out that if in high performance organizations corporate cultures of the subsidiary 
and parent are consistent it will lead to a greater employee commitment and job satisfaction and thus 
performance. As a regular employee survey is a crucial and efficient instrument to measure the em-
ployee satisfaction, it can also act as an early alert system for undesirable developments (cf. Dallwitz-
Wegner, 2016, p.69 f.). 
 
Personnel development: As the strategic human resources management is another key driver for 
corporate governance, there are also certain challenges, which have to addressed in multinational 
groups (cf. Zuckweiler et al., 2016; Kaehler & Grundei, 2019).233 Particularly, the interest in talent 
management has proliferated within the last years, driven by the global shortage of leadership talents. 
Although approaches vary, talent management usually focuses on a pool of employees who rank at 
the top in terms of performance and competencies, and therefore they are identified as either present 
or future leaders or key professionals. Group-wide talent programs should include employees regard-
less of whether they are parent-country nationals, expatriates or local employees working in the sub-
sidiaries (cf. Björkman et al., 2017). The subsidiary’s senior staff should discuss personnel develop-
ment plans in a transparent manner and illustrate individual career opportunities to foster the motiva-
tion and engagement of local employees (cf. Arnold, 2015a, p. 2). Cultural differences among the host 
countries are one major obstacle in multinational groups and might have detrimental effects if they are 
not managed adequately (cf. e.g., Singh et al., 2019). While e.g. western orientated cultures prefer 
learning by regular trainings, most Asian employees tend to prefer more training on the job (cf. Hilb, 
1984). In multinational groups, particularly the harmonization of the different needs of the corporate 
 
231 This also demands the openness for change and the earlier debated problem-solving culture from all senior 
staff. For further information, cf. chapter 4.2.3. 
232 A typical example is Volkswagen, who defined companywide standards for the employee co-determination 
within their subsidiaries (cf. Whittall et al., 2015). 
233 Typical challenges for multinational companies are e.g. how to manage personnel development across coun-
tries? Which regions, country and functions require how much HR resources? How can the strengths and core 
competences be developed across different countries? The international HR Management Model from Morgan 
(1986, p. 44) provides guidance and differentiates between the HR management on three levels: local employees, 
employees of other countries (expatriates) and employees of the headquarters. 
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parent, the subsidiaries and the individual employees are a field of tension and often challenging to 
manage (cf. Ueerblick, 2013). As the parent is responsible to define a group-wide HR framework, the 
local subsidiaries have to implement and adopt it and need to ensure that local talents get identified. 
Ribeiro & Machado (2017, p. 115) point out that the success of each talent management system de-
pends on each particular situation in the subsidiary, the organizational context, the ability to innovate 
and on the creativity of the implemented policies. A global, transnational or multidomestic strategy of 
intragroup talent management will lead to a better group performance (cf. Collings et al., 2018). The 
parent is responsible for the group-wide strategic HR development, senior staff development and other 
crucial key governance functions on parent and subsidiary level. Whereby operational human re-
sources management usually gets delegated towards the subsidiaries through the process of hybridi-
zation to consider on the one hand an group-wide standard and secure on the other hand their adap-
tation to the subsidiaries’ local context (cf. Yahiaoui, 2015).234 Thus, the rising local requirements for 
senior staff of banks makes it difficult for parents to continue with their conventional HR strategies in 
which senior managers are solely sent as expatriates from the corporate parents partly without in-
depth local knowledge and professional experience into the host country (cf. e.g., Varga, 2017; Mora 
& Sharma, 2016; Capriglione & Casalino, 2014). 
 
Other stakeholder groups: Global companies operate in complex transnational organizational fields 
with multiple, diverse, and possibly conflicting institutional forces where corporate diplomacy becomes 
ever more important to support the mission of the multinational group (cf. Marano & Kostova, 2016; 
Henisz, 2016). As such, corporate diplomats play an important role in sensing risks and opportunities 
in the external environment, they also help to shape short- and long-term strategic responses across 
all functions of their organizations. Finally, senior managers across all levels have to enhance their 
skills as corporate diplomats to enhance their stakeholder management. Some of the stakeholders 
may have different power and, sometimes, much more influence on the local subsidiaries than is rec-
ognized in the overseas headquarters. Multinational groups have to consider those interests within 
their strategy processes in the subsidiaries. However, to secure a sufficient consideration, the corpo-
rate parent and subsidiaries should implement a stakeholder and influencing radar that makes all 
those external forces apparent (cf. Katz & Grösser, 2013).235 Parents make huge investments in cor-
porate social responsibility (CSR) to build a global ‘social brand’ as intragroup insurance against laps-
es of responsible conduct, taking over their moral responsibility and ensuring that the subsidiaries 
‘walk the talk’ (cf. Asmussen & Fosfuri, 2019). A typical governance instrument for securing the inter-
ests of the parent is to appoint host country citizens as members of the subsidiary boards. While local 
host country managers are often associated with specialized local knowledge, superior responsive-
ness, and higher legitimacy, they often lack intragroup experiences and personnel networks within the 
parent organization (cf. Muellner et al., 2017). In addition, local familiarity of host country managers 
 
234 This promoted global integration versus local responsiveness is primary based on the global standardization / 
integration versus local adaption / responsiveness framework, originally introduced by Doz & Prahalad (1991) 
within the international human resources management research.  
235 Terms like corporate social responsibility or corporate citizenship are originally created by global companies to 
consider such interests in the local markets. For further information, cf. recent studies of Petit (2019); Manasakis 
et al. (2018); Filatotchev & Stahl (2015); Hah & Freeman (2014); Jackson & Rathert (2015); Yin & Jamali (2016); 
Aguilera-Caracuel et al. (2015); Aßländer & Curbach (2015); Han (2015). 
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can also be perceived as risky or harmful by the parent. Others strengthen the local subsidiaries' rela-
tionship with its local stakeholders by nominating prominent locals in the boards of directors of their 
subsidiaries (cf. Kostova et al., 2016). 
 
The management bodies have to institutionalize the awareness for a professional stakeholder man-
agement among the local staff. The corporate parent is responsible for providing framework condi-
tions, which allow the subsidiaries to consider the numerous stakeholder interests in the best possible 
way, and has to define rules of conduct for dealing with competitors and local supervisory authorities 
(cf. Marano & Kostova, 2016). Moreover, it needs to be defined how different subsidiaries within the 
same market interact and collaborate together within the same market environment, but also in an 
intragroup context (e.g. the collaboration of a local car sales subsidiary and local financial services 
subsidiary of the same OEM). Apart from that, I argue that there is a need for regular monitoring of the 
different stakeholder interests. The boards should regularly debate about how they can improve their 
customer centricity, upcoming trends and their consequences on the business model, the customer 
base and the reactions of the competitors. In addition, sufficient HR processes and an adequate (ex-
ternal) stakeholder management are an ordinary management responsibility across all hierarchy lev-
els. However, as the following chapter will illustrate, an adequate compliance management is of great 
relevance, too. 
 
4.2.5 Compliance and regulatory management 
Compliance management is a prerequisite for regulated entities and some authors even state that 
compliance is the new corporate governance and is increasingly becoming a major focus. At first, it is 
essential to clarify the term compliance from an intragroup perspective, but also in regard towards the 
specific business model of the subsidiaries. Driven by the ever greater pressure of complex legal and 
regulatory requirements, it is becoming ever more crucial for the management boards to ensure re-
sponsible and lawful conduct within their organizations (cf. Gärtner, 2018, p. 1 ff.; Wecker & Galla, 
2013, p. 29). At its core, compliance comprises all measures and activities that help to ensure that a 
company, its boards, managers and employees act systematically in accordance to existing laws and 
regulations (cf. Jonas, 2016). There is consensus among regulators that compliance is a clear man-
agement board responsibility, which cannot be delegated solely to a compliance function (cf. Mills & 
Haines, 2015, p. 19). The compliance function supports the management body to execute their duty of 
care obligations and it performs a regular legal risk management to mitigate and to avoid legal risks. 
When assessing the direct and indirect consequences of being non-compliant, it will help to under-
stand the importance of compliance. As compliance fosters trust of stakeholders, non-compliance with 
legal and regulatory requirements may lead to the exclusion of contractors from participating in the 
contracts, loss of the business license, significant reputational damage and a loss of credibility of the 
top management. Moreover, there is a personal liability of organ members for refrain or premeditated 
management actions (cf. Wecker & Galla, 2013, p. 24/35). The IDW PS 980 is a generally acknowl-
edged best practice approach for a compliance management system (cf. Schach & Christoph, 2015, p. 
6; Ahn et al., 2014). Ehrler (2013, p. 112 ff.) summarizes that a comprehensive group-wide compli-
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ance management system is the basis for long-term success, good reputation and therefore share-
holder value. Similar to other governance areas, most multinational groups follow a hybrid approach to 
compliance management (cf. Mills & Haines, 2015, p. 21 f.). A compliance function is a legal and regu-
latory prerequisite for regulated entities holding a banking license. Taking those tightened framework 
conditions into account, the following paragraphs illustrate, that subsidiary governance requires a 
properly aligned intragroup compliance management among all different hierarchy levels. In particular 
a compliance organization with a network approach, but also appropriate instruments and 
measures and a sufficient regulatory management are crucial sub-elements to secure oversight and 
ensuring an aligned compliance management. 
 
Compliance network organization: According to most national laws and regulations, legal entities of 
a certain size and complexity are required to implement a compliance function (cf. Meissner, 2017). 
However, to be effective, the responsibility for compliance has to remain within the respective func-
tions and subsidiaries.236 On the one hand, the subsidiary boards and other local senior staff have a 
closer proximity towards the local legal and regulatory frameworks and are the official representatives 
of the company owners (parent) towards the local authorities. On the other hand, this also secures the 
awareness for compliance topics within the personal areas of responsibilities. 
Equally towards the subsidiaries, an obligatory compliance function in the corporate parent enables 
the parent’s board to fulfill their duties of care (cf. Ehrler, 2013, p. 177 ff.; Frederick 2014).237 In bank 
subsidiaries the responsibilities of the compliance function are more precisely defined than in other 
industries and have to adopt the group compliance efforts and follow a stand-alone approach (cf. 
Meissner, 2017; Peemöller, 2014). To respond that, multinational groups also install group compliance 
committees and consolidating compliance functions on parent level, which support to evaluate group-
wide compliance risks, consult the management bodies on complex group-wide compliance issues, 
raise group-internal transparency and perform quality assurance among the network of the affiliated 
companies. 
To increase intragroup efficiency and cross border collaboration, multinational groups implement a 
compliance network approach among the competent compliance functions (cf. Gärtner, 2018, p. 21 
ff.). This helps to foster intra-organizational trust, but also best practice sharing and it helps to set a 
common compliance standard across all subsidiaries. To avoid any conflicts of interests, I highlight 
that local compliance functions should have a dual reporting line towards the parent´s compliance 
function as well as towards the local subsidiary board. 
 
Compliance management system: A comprehensive group-wide compliance management system 
includes numerous aligned instruments and measures to secure the fulfillment of laws and regulations. 
An implemented group-wide compliance management system secures a uniform intragroup stand-
 
236 This argumentation is based on the Three Lines of Defense Model. For further information, cf. chapter 3.3.2. 
237 A central compliance unit on parent level has to coordinate and consolidate the management of ethical stand-
ards, internal directives and guidelines in the group-wide company processes and provides legal advice towards 
the organization. Meissner (2017) analyzed the senior management accountability and outlines that the account-
ability of the chief compliance officer and his deputy for compliance failures is not set forth in regulatory law, but 
the personal responsibility arises out of the principles of civil law, criminal law or employment law. Gärtner (2018, 
p. 21 ff.) provides an overview about five organizational designs of intragroup compliance organizations. 
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ard.238 As such, a group compliance management system sets common standards and secures a reli-
able setup for the management of compliance, but it also needs time to develop and it can be solely 
effective if it is continuously further developed and strengthened through an appropriate corporate 
culture as basic fundament. It is also clear that the sole implementation of compliance management 
system cannot guarantee that the organization will always stay fully compliant, especially in very sales 
driven organizations, in which financial and performance related targets often get more favored by the 
individual compensation schemes than e.g. compliance targets, which are also much more difficult to 
formulate. 
 
Regulatory and financial services compliance: As a consequence of the last financial crisis, (su-
pervisory) authorities expanded their oversight activities to minimize overall banking risks, increase 
consumer protection and mitigate the risk of organizational failure (cf. Hungerland, 2014; Mohammed 
et al., 2016). While those initiatives aim to prevent another financial crisis, they are also associated 
with huge implementation efforts to keep on track with regulatory changes and their intragroup implica-
tions. The numerous regulatory initiatives, such as CRR, CRD 4 or Basel 4, have great impact on the 
equity funding, liquidity management, risk management or governance structures of bank institutes 
and require a professional management and organizational embedding in the corporate group struc-
tures. According to Santangelo et al. (2018) “low and high levels of regulatory competitive constraints 
are associated with greater subsidiary external embeddedness.” Further, rather indirect consequences 
of the changing regulatory environments, such as e.g. the implications of the increased requirements 
for investor and customer credit protection, anti-money laundering or data privacy protection, also 
have to be taken into account. 
I underline the necessity to have a dedicated function on parent level, which focuses on group-wide 
financial services specific compliance and regulatory topics and defines adequate group-wide stand-
ards.239 To avoid a duplication of work, such a function can also be allocated within the compliance 
departments. Those functions on parent and subsidiary level should be also held responsible to per-
form regular legislative and regulatory monitoring to be prepared for upcoming compliance and/or 
regulatory initiatives. In addition, there should also be a regular reporting towards the senior staff to 
ensure awareness, transparency and oversight. 
 
 
238 On the basis of IDW PS 980 and the elements of the BMW Compliance Management System a compliance 
management system has to consist out of the following core elements (cf. Schach & Christoph, 2015, p. 6, BMW 
Group, 2017): (1) A group-wide compliance strategy (2) Management of monitoring of relevant legal requirements 
for compliance (3) Regular assessment of the internal business units and external compliance-relevant develop-
ments (4) Management of internal rules and regulations (5) Regular compliance communication towards the em-
ployees (6) Compliance trainings. (7) Implementation of compliance processes, tools and IT systems to mitigate 
compliance risks (cf. Sadiq & Governatori, 2015, p. 265). (8) Compliance case management (9) Regular and ad-
hoc compliance reporting (10) Regular compliance controls and monitoring (11) Implementation of an independ-
ent whistleblowing system (cf. Kolk & Pinkse, 2010; Süße, 2014). 
239 Typical financial services related compliance topics in strong regulated financial services entities are: Anti-
money laundering (cf. Levin et al., 2016; Nicoletti, 2017); information protection (cf. Desai 2016) or data privacy 
protection (cf. Sipes et al., 2016). 
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4.2.6 Operative governance management 
Driven by the fact that subsidiary governance becomes increasingly important, there is an increasing 
necessity for a professional management of operative governance (cf. Moore, 2015). Today aligned 
headquarter-subsidiary governance structures are fundamental to increase the long-term performance 
(cf. Farah et al., 2016). Intragroup governance processes and structures aim to define common gov-
ernance standards by considering host country and local governance specifics (cf. Gugler et al., 
2013). In subsidiary networks it is essential to have transparent decision-making structures, local 
governance instruments, clearly defined responsibilities and deputy regulations, but also sanction 
and restriction mechanisms for non-compliant behavior. Furthermore, particularly in financial ser-
vices subsidiaries, aligned group-wide remuneration and incentive schemes as preventive 
measures for inappropriate short-term orientation are required, too (cf. Yasui, 2016). Driven from the 
trend of intragroup IT outsourcing, also a professional management of IT governance is getting in-
creasingly important for the operative governance management (cf. the argumentation of Hodosi & 
Rusu, 2019). Each of those determinates of professional subsidiary governance management are 
discussed in the following paragraphs. 
 
Decision-making structures: While decentrally organized subsidiaries directly contribute to the com-
petitive advantages of multinational groups, they also highlight the importance of intra-firm collabora-
tion and alignment with clear, standardized decision frameworks. The division of decision-making au-
tonomy is a key element of the management of parent–subsidiary relationships and part of intragroup 
control (cf. Schaaper & Gao 2018; De Jong et al., 2015). Good leaders help to overcome a misalign-
ment of followers' incentives that inhibits coordination, while adapting the organization to a changing 
environment (cf. Bolton et al., 2013). To secure intragroup corporate governance, it is a prerequisite to 
define which decision-making body is responsible for which topics on individual, team, local senior 
management and on the parent’s headquarters level. Even if standardized intragroup organizational 
and alignment processes for decision-making are necessary, they should not be oversized and should 
reflect the different sizes and organizational maturity levels of the subsidiaries. It has to be clear which 
local decision-making sub-committees are required (e.g. HR committee, customer committee, product 
committees, audit committee, remuneration committee, compliance or risk committee) to support the 
subsidiary’s management body and/or supervisory body, and how they are embedded in the group-
wide committee landscape. Despite the decentralized structure, a uniform decision-making with deci-
sion-making committees for topics of a group-wide relevance is strived by the parent’s headquar-
ters.240 Standards for a joint committee culture are recommendable and potential conflicting interests 
of committee members should be transparent and minimized wherever it is possible. Moreover, four 
eye principles and predefined escalation and mediation procedures ameliorate the intragroup organi-
zational alignment. In addition, the implementation of specialized sub-committees on local, regional 
and global level safeguards the consideration of stakeholders and expert opinions, and will lead to a 
sophisticated and democratic approach of decision-making. On the one hand, discussions in commit-
tees support the intragroup transparency, improve alignment and secure a better information ex-
 
240 Hoffmann (2013, p. 197) outlines that 58 percent of multinationals use institutionalized committees for organi-
zational alignment. 62 percent of those committees are established for advisory reasons. 
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change among the participants. Committee structures help to overcome geographical distances and 
contribute to a better management of cultural disparities (cf. Morrison et al., 1991). On the other hand, 
it also has to be clarified who is finally responsible and accountable for the decisions taken in such 
committees. Subsequently, the decision-making in subsidiary networks should follow the subsidiarity 
principle.241 Even if committee solutions are time consuming and require administrative efforts, they 
also raise the acceptance of the taken decisions. Thus, the following Figure 15 provides the exemplary 
overview of a typical intragroup committee landscape in an automotive financial services division with 
global subsidiary networks: 
 
 
Figure 15:  A typical committee structure for intragroup alignment. 
Source:  Own illustration. 
 
As the above-illustrated committee overview indicates, clear definitions are required regarding the 
committee topics, its participants, decision-making responsibilities, communication and alignment pro-
cesses between the committees and follow up procedures for decisions taken. Such a committee 
landscape requires, that competences and decision rights of the committees are clearly defined (e.g. 
via a competence matrix). 
 
Governance instruments and internal regulations: In most countries, internal self-statutory regula-
tion landscapes and appropriate, internal governance instruments are a regulatory requirement for 
regulated financial services entities (cf. Gibson et al., 2013).242 While it is of great importance that the 
subsidiaries have transparency about the applicable centrally defined intragroup standards, policies, 
principles or guidelines, there should be additional subsidiary specific internal rules defined (cf. 
 
241 The subsidiarity principle means that most of the decision-making should be executed on a subsidiary level 
and solely topics of a global relevance should be decided and discussed in global committees. 
242 Representing others: EBA guideline for internal governance on EU level; MaRisk and KWG regulations (Ger-
man Banking Acts) on national level in Germany. For further information, cf. chapter 3.2.2. 
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Schaaper & Gao, 2018).243 Mechanisms are required to secure that the different self-statutory regula-
tions of the corporate parent are consistent with those on subsidiary level and regularly get reviewed 
and updated. A typical group-wide applicable regulation landscape for financial services subsidiaries 
follows a risk-based approach and predefines relevant governance topics out of the parent perspective 
which have to be adopted on subsidiary level, but secure a reliable fundament, aiming on business 
continuity among the entire group: 
 
 
Figure 16:  Example for an internal regulations landscape in a financial services division. 
Source:  Compiled by the author based on BMW AG (2018) and EBA (2017a). 
 
The subsidiary self-statutory regulations have to observe legal and regulatory requirements and the 
group-wide standards. Such governance instruments are essential, as they provide staff guidance and 
reduce the probability of non-compliance behavior, but usually they are also the starting point for in-
ternal and external audits (cf. Filatotchev & Nakajima, 2010). 
 
IT Security and governance: Despite the fact that IT Security and governance have already been 
viewed from multiple perspectives, they are getting increasingly important regarding corporate gov-
ernance (cf. Griffiths et al., 2014). The global IT management and the governance of the related de-
mands, investments and resources is getting increasingly crucial as an integral part of each business 
model (cf. Selig, 2018). Van Grembergen & De Haes (2016) explain that IT governance has to ensure 
that “the definition and implementation of (IT) processes, structures and relational mechanisms in the 
organization enable the organizational members to exercise their duties”, support their alignment and 
the creation of business value to achieve the set business targets (cf. Van Grembergen & De Haes, 
2016; Ali & Green, 2012). Multinational groups usually aim to centralize and standardize their IT gov-
ernance and decision-making infrastructures to increase transparency, effectiveness and efficiency 
 
243 Schach & Christoph (2015, p. 24) provides a comprehensive overview about different internal regulation types: 
Code of conduct, Guiding principles, responsibilities, instructions, guidelines, competition regulations etc. 
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(cf. Thompson et al., 2014).244 Despite the advantages of proper IT governance, it also brings new 
challenges, such as cloud-based services, boundary-crossing use of data and new system develop-
ment practices that have to be taken into account. Governing information within - as well as outside - 
the organization, balancing access and security, and aligning investments with corporate goals, are 
becoming crucial for today's increasingly digital driven business models of car manufacturers (cf. 
Borgman et al., 2016). Information technology supports multinationals to balance global integration 
and local responsiveness, because it is a key enabler to achieve this earlier debated desired dual fit 
(cf. Chou & Liao, 2015). 
Closely linked to this topic is also the information protection of sensitive data (cf. Berry, 2017). If unau-
thorized persons get access to highly protected and sensitive business information, it will lead to incal-
culable consequences, if there is an abuse of relevant information. This refers in particular to the au-
tomotive and the banking business, in which trust is a fundamental asset of their business models. In 
this context, data governance is a basic prerequisite as critical control mechanism and consists of 
processes, which ensure that crucial data assets are formally stored and managed throughout the 
entire multinational group.245 It is still largely ignored by many organizations, that there is the need for 
an intragroup framework for managing data.246 Thus, the parent should define proper group standards 
for the securing of information protection, IT and data governance. 
 
Remuneration and incentive schemes: In the past unregulated remuneration practices in banks 
exposed serious weaknesses, such as short-term thinking to increase own compensation without con-
sidering the related risks. There is a great need to avoid misguiding incentive schemes as this could 
lead to incalculable danger for the complete multinational group (cf. Frederick, 2014). Financial ser-
vices organizations require compensation schemes that incentivizes a sustainable, long-term compa-
ny success instead of short-term profit maximization, with a carefully balanced ratio between fixed and 
variable pay (cf. Sassen & Schnier, 2013; Krahnen & Mayer, 2013; Paetzmann & Schöning, 2014; 
Yasui, 2016). Hohmann, (2017, p. 4 f.) argues that the overall variable component has to be linked to 
the employees’ and banks’ performance and, that they should consider financial and non-financial 
criteria for a certain timeframe over several years. 
I highlight that the variable compensation should be used as a malus and clawback instrument for e.g. 
a serious loss of the banks or failure of complying with fit and proper standards. In the last years regu-
lators implemented regulation initiatives that require banks or listed companies to publish e.g. a regu-
lar remuneration report to ensure transparency (cf. Welge & Eulerich, 2014, p. 113 ff.).247  
 
244 Thompson et al. (2014) outline that the definition of global standards for enterprise systems may reduce total 
IT costs, but global standards may also limit local responsiveness and innovation. Consequently, subsidiaries in 
dynamic markets should select and control their own enterprise systems. 
245 Data governance ensures that data can be trusted and people are accountable for any adverse event because 
of low data quality. It is about putting employees in charge of fixing and preventing issues with data that the whole 
organization can work more efficient. In multinational companies with different sources of data is crucial to have a 
holistic intragroup data management framework. 
246 Typical data governance fields in companies are enterprise connectivity, customer management, corporate 
management and control, fulfillment of legal and regulatory requirements (cf. Otto & Weber, 2011). 
247 Representing others: CRD IV; MaRisk, InstVergV, principles of the Financial Stability Board (FSB). For further 
information regarding the regulatory and legal compensation requirements of managers, cf. Wagner et al. (2014); 
Zöbeley (2014); Evteev (2014). 
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However, as latest incidents illustrate (e.g. Diesel Gate, Libor case, etc.), many companies still strug-
gle to design appropriate targets that hinder inappropriate or even fraudulent behaviors. 
Another complexity driver is the necessity to reflect the multiple compensation and benefit practices 
across countries.248 Yanadori (2014, p. 195) remembers that most managerial positions on subsidiary 
level are usually held by host country individuals, parent country individuals or third country individuals 
and are further influencing the compensation and benefit schemes. Tekieli et al. (2018) analyzed that 
parent managers recognize a centralized approach as being more effective, while subsidiary manag-
ers prefer a local reward management decision-making. Hence, the parent entity should define group-
wide compensation standards that allow subsidiaries to supplement these with local host country spe-
cific components and meet national regulatory requirements. 
 
In sum, to reflect the increasing relevance of proper governance frameworks, it is a clear responsibility 
of the local management bodies to make sure that the subsidiary structures are properly embedded 
into the group landscape. I outline the necessity to define a dedicated function which encourages the 
management bodies to fulfill their multiple governance obligations. 
However, as the next subchapter will illustrate, also an aligned risk management among all hierarchies 
is another key enabler for subsidiary governance. 
 
4.2.7 Risk management  
In multinational groups various risks arise out of their global business activities, which have to be ade-
quately managed. Frederick (2014) and Yasui (2016) highlight the relevance of an aligned risk man-
agement in group structures with bank subsidiaries, as the combined risk is more concentrated and 
may affect the soundness of the whole multinational group. 
The risk management should be proactive, sharpen the risk awareness and must follow a comprehen-
sive group-wide ERM approach.249 Yasui (2016, p. 19) explains, that the second line of defense is a 
group-wide risk management system. For that reason, an integrated group-wide risk management 
approach is essential. It is in most countries a legal obligation that compliance, risk management and 
internal audit functions are conducted by an independent legal entity.  
Yasui (2016 p. 19) outlines that many financial groups organize their risk functions in a centralized 
way.250 In most cases the parent’s board or solely the CFO is responsible for the risk management, 
but is supported by group-wide functional units.251 However, as those parent functions cannot work 
efficiently and effectively without local knowledge, they usually implement dual risk functions on both, 
the parent and subsidiary level (cf. Yasui, 2016 p. 19). Proper risk governance further reduces a firm’s 
litigation probability and improves the financial and stock price performance of financial institutions (cf. 
 
248 Cross-national variations to different country specific factors include e.g. labor market, social security (e.g. 
public health insurance), governmental regulations or cultural differences have a major impact towards the com-
pensation and benefit practices on subsidiary level (cf. Yanadori, 2014, p. 192). 
249 For further information, cf. subchapter 3.3.1. 
250 Among others, the BCBS Principles for Corporate Governance (2015) and the EBA Guideline for Internal Gov-
ernance (2017a) outline the necessity to install both, a CRO on group level of the consolidating parent and addi-
tional risk functions on subsidiary level. 
251 The study of Ittner & Oyon 2014 found evidence that if the CFO has risk ownership on the firms’ finance units 
(i.e. compliance, internal audit, risk management, and treasury functions report to the CFO) it makes significantly 
greater contributions to a wider range of strategic and operational risks. 
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Amoozegar et al., 2017). For the reduction of the governance variances, I argue, that especially a 
common group-wide risk understanding, consistent strategic risk assessments, common risk 
culture and properly aligned operative risk management practices on subsidiary level, are essen-
tial. For that reason, each of those sub-elements will be further debated in the next paragraphs.  
 
Risk understanding: There is no doubt that entrepreneurial success and innovations cannot be 
achieved without consciously taking risks (cf. Kajüter, 2014, p. 1). Managerial risk taking is an im-
portant aspect of strategic management and essential to improve competitive advantage and perfor-
mance (cf. Hoskisson et al., 2017). Despite consensus that risk oversight is a clear governance re-
quirement, it can be confusing, multidimensional and complex and can bring up challenges for the 
management bodies, e.g. due to various methodologies for approaching risks (cf. Fraser, 2016). Sub-
sequently, it is essential to ensure a common risk understanding and group-wide framework, which 
defines which risks are allowed to be taken. There is a rising trend that management boards get more 
involved in the risk oversight, insight and its management, as they held ever more accountable for the 
business strategy, the success or failure of their organizations (cf. Fraser, 2016). In response, many 
management bodies consistently implement risk committees to define risks, secure risk oversight and 
a comprehensive enterprise risk management throughout the organization, thereby obtaining an ade-
quate due diligence. As a risk categorization is useful to secure a consolidated overview about the 
risks, it also requires joint risk reviews on a regular basis. An end-to-end risk management approach 
helps to ensure that risk management is designed as a continuous process to adopt new risks within 
an ever-changing business environment (cf. Hopkin, 2017, p. 60).252 
The national cultures also largely influence the risk management behavior, which implies the necessity 
of a common risk understanding in multinational companies (cf. Liu et al., 2015). High performance 
organizations focus on a continuous risk adaption, which secures continuous further improvement, 
critical self-reflection and in this way strengthens the group-wide risk understanding.253 While a group-
wide risk strategy provides clarity and guidance for the risk functions and the expectations regarding 
the appropriate levels of risk taking, it also builds the basis for the development of a locally adopted 
risk strategy. I underline that a common risk understanding among all hierarchies is a basic precondi-
tion for an effective intragroup risk management. 
 
Risk culture: Since the last financial crisis, particularly the risk culture of organizations has come to 
be regarded as a key issue for both financial organizations and their regulators (cf. Ring et al., 2016). 
Due to the fact, that risks cannot be avoided, it is crucial to define the awareness of risks as an entire 
element of the corporate culture (cf. Hopkin, 2014, p. 109 f.). The corporate culture has to support a 
conscious approach to deal with risks, identify, report and reduce potential weak points and be com-
pliant with existing internal rules. Risk culture defines the way how people handle risks in a specific 
social context and forms the foundation to enhance risk competence (cf. Streicher et al., 2018).  
 
252 The earlier debated enterprise risk management (ERM) is a comparatively new approach of regulators, but 
proposes the integrated management of all the risks faces an organization (cf. Bromiley et al., 2015). For further 
information, cf. chapter 3.3.1 
253 In this context is the earlier debated framework management dimension a prerequisite to gain a comprehen-
sive risk understanding. For further information, cf. chapter 4.2.1. 
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In sum, a strong risk culture is generally valuable to an institution as it strengthens the institution’s 
resilience (cf. Fritz-Morgenthal, 2016). The limitations of risk measurement and the decentralized na-
ture of risk taking imply that setting appropriate incentives for the organizational risk takers and pro-
moting an appropriate risk culture are essential for effective risk management (cf. Stulz, 2016). 
As dedicated risk managers can support the risk awareness with a broad understanding of company 
risks, it remains challenging to boost the same level of risk awareness across all hierarchy levels in 
large multinational companies. Risk culture always varies on local level, thus, Sheedy & Griffin (2018) 
recommend to measure and manage risk culture locally. Guidelines and regular trainings help to man-
age obvious risks, but there are also risks, which cannot be covered by such instruments. The difficul-
ty is that an appropriate risk culture develops over a longer time, largely depends on the performed 
leadership and cannot be solely implemented by external regulations or written policies. In addition, 
Liu et al. (2015) remember that different national cultures deal with risks in different ways, and there-
fore subsidiaries require a local adjusted risk sensibility approach. Thus, the study of Ashraf (2015) 
found out that the national culture of the parent bank’s home country is more important for the risk-
taking behavior of a foreign subsidiary than the national culture of its host country. Accordingly, parent 
companies should define global risk culture statements to provide guidance for subsidiary staff. 
 
Strategic risk management: The strategic risk management has to secure that there is always a risk 
coverage for the strategy and that the calculated risks are acceptable and controllable within the cor-
porate group (cf. Hopkin, 2014, p. 79).254 Many corporate groups include strategic risk assessments as 
fixed element within their strategy processes. On the one hand, a top-down approach enables the 
group to consolidate and coordinate general and regional risks for the entire group to secure risk over-
sight, the consideration of the corporate parent’s preferences and the timely definition of appropriate 
risk prevention measures.255 On the other hand, a dynamic bottom up process is also essential, which 
helps to identify host country and subsidiary specific problems and helps to evaluate those risks in a 
fast and efficient way (cf. Samuels, 2014, p. 34). The parent’s risk management function has to con-
solidate the top-down and bottom up reporting and has to inform the parent’s management body on a 
regular basis. Yet, to secure a holistic view, subsidiaries have to be involved in the process, as under-
estimated subsidiary specific risks may bear incalculable risk potential for the group as a whole.  
I argue that only if the risk management process assimilates risk tolerance, risk propensity and risk 
practices into the managerial mindset of the senior managers of both, the group and subsidiaries, it 
helps to secure a consistent risk mitigation approach. Managerial guidance on risk oversight improves 
the financial performance and a group-wide active coordination of risk tolerance orientation, risk pro-
pensity and risk practices (cf. Eastburn & Sharland, 2017). Samuels (2014, p. 34 ff.) states that risk 
evaluation involves the probability of occurrence and its potential consequences, which implies, that 
the parent has to set the macro framework conditions including a company’s risk appetite and other 
risk limits. However, this is solely useful if there is regular risk evaluation that compares the risk appe-
 
254 Strategic risk management has become a subject of increasing interest to practitioners and academics within 
the last years. Even with this longevity, the meaning of the term remains unclear, with confusion increasing with 
the advent of enterprise risk management. Bromiley et al. (2014) provide a comprehensive overview about the 
strategic management perspective on risk.  
255 Therivel & Paridario (2013) introduces a practical orientated framework for a strategic environmental assess-
ment for companies.  
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tite to the actual risk evaluation and defines countermeasures to close gaps regarding e.g. subsidiary 
or host country specific risks. Macey & O'Hara (2016) point out that all those strategically important 
risk prevention measures are obsolete if the involved senior staff of both, the subsidiary and the parent 
are not ‘banking literate,’ and do not possess the specialized knowledge needed to monitor and con-
trol risk taking in complex banking institutions. 
 
Operational risk management: Even if the overall risk responsibility cannot be delegated from the 
management body towards lower hierarchies, the operative risk management tasks have to be per-
formed by delegated risk management functions within the subsidiaries (cf. Kajüter, 2014). Altogether, 
the operational risk does not have lesser impacts like strategic risks. The operational risk management 
has to take into account the risk management environment, internal control and the organizational risk 
culture (cf. Hana, 2016). At the same time, it has to be taken into account that there are many different 
categorizations for operational risks available, which make a clear guidance of the parent inevitable 
(cf. Sadgrove, 2016, p. 8 ff.).256 Another advantage of the locally performed operative risk manage-
ment is that it strengthens the risk awareness and ensures, that they are prepared to deal with obvious 
risks. Further, it ensures that the defined risk limits and risk appetite frameworks are met and avoids a 
bloated and expensive administration in the consolidating parent. 
A regular analysis of the operational risks builds the foundation for the further development of risk 
prevention measures. The definition and implementation of such measures should be delegated to the 
subsidiaries. Even so, it remains challenging to deal with the multiple local risk regulations and mental-
ities to manage risks in the daily business (cf. Liu et al., 2015). This implies even more, that there ex-
ists a necessity for aligned intragroup procedures, based on supportive group-wide IT systems and 
standardized core processes. 
 
The parent management body is responsible for developing an intragroup future oriented risk man-
agement framework that considers existing planning and management processes, but also the realiza-
tion of business opportunities (cf. Hopkin, 2014, p. 99). Risk management is an entire part of the gen-
eral management and it has to be on the executive agenda regularly (cf. Falkner & Hiebl, 2015; Hilb, 
2012, p. 158). While this enhances the management attention, it also has to be ensured, that the en-
tire risk management approach and its related risk processes are regularly reviewed critically and ad-
justed if necessary. The management bodies have to promote an open, constructive and trustful risk 
culture. The parent’s board is responsible to set the right ‘tone at the top’ and needs to be recognized 
as role model (cf. Hopkin, 2014, p. 109 f.). 
In sum, senior staff has to understand that risk awareness, tone of the top, training, the independency 
of risk department and audit responsibilities are major indicators of good risk management (cf. Mtaki & 
Ganesh, 2016). Risk functions have to report directly to the senior management and participate regu-
larly in board meetings and other relevant sub-committees (e.g. risk committee, audit committee). The 
corporate parent should implement upstream risk committees to discuss risk related topics, that affect 
the entire group, on the one hand, but also advise the management body and steer the group-wide 
 
256 Sadgrove (2016, p. 28 ff.) provides a comprehensive overview about the multiple categorizations of operation-
al risks. Among others, especially the people risks, compliance risks, financial risks, technology risks are relevant 
within the multinational group context.  
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risk management activities, on the other hand (cf. Hines & Peters, 2015; Hilb, 2012, p. 151 f.). In addi-
tion, the management bodies have to secure that risk management and monitoring have separate 
reporting lines and predefined escalation procedures. 
Finally, as last key area for securing a professional management of corporate governance among 
financial services subsidiaries, I continue with the role of corporate audit in the last subchapter. 
 
4.2.8 Corporate audit management 
As third pillar of the Three Lines of Defense approach, a group-wide internal audit system is a crucial 
component, which has to secure that intragroup risks and problems are recognized.257 Internal audi-
tors have to act as an advocate of good corporate governance within the organization, and they are a 
relevant source to secure ethical behavior, efficiency, and effectiveness in organizations (cf. Raiborn 
et al., 2017; Ma’Ayan & Carmeli, 2016). Proper internal audit processes are a clear responsibility of 
each management body. In particular, the size, regulatory status and global structure of the corporate 
group lead to coordination and communication challenges, while language and cultural barriers play a 
less relevant role for the effectiveness of group audits (cf. Downey & Bedard, 2019). Similar towards 
the other internal control functions, Shishkina & Barac (2015) suggest that also the internal audit func-
tions should be equally structured in a geocentric approach.258 A network approach is favorable, be-
cause the local auditors should also have standardized reporting lines to the consolidating corporate 
audit function on parent level to prevent conflicts of interests on subsidiary level (cf. Yasui, 2016, p. 
19). Yasui (2016, p. 19) explains that an integrated audit function at parent level should monitor and 
consolidate the audit activities of the subsidiaries, as the internal audit effectiveness largely depends 
on a holistic and consistent intragroup approach (cf. Renz & Böhrer, 2012, p. 63). Moreover, the par-
ents corporate audit function should also support the subsidiaries in case of any difficulties, raise 
transparency and share best practices. I outline the necessity to secure a clear allocation of the roles 
and responsibilities and aligned audit plans to avoid work redundancies or even audit gaps. Despite its 
control function, internal audit should rather be recognized as a supporting instrument for intragroup 
value creation and not solely as a fulfillment of statutory provision. 
I argue that, if a professional intragroup corporate audit organization is implemented, it will support the 
corporate parent to identify risks and potential misconduct within the group at an early stage, which is 
essential to intervene before they become serious for the whole group. At the same time, evidence 
exists that a comprehensive ERM implementation significantly increases the effectiveness and per-
formance of the internal audit (cf. Tsai Chen et al., 2017). 
Accordingly, I follow the argumentation of Renz & Böhrer (2012, p. 64) who argue that for ensuring 
subsidiary governance it is fundamental to ensure a common audit understanding as well as clarity 
about the audit scope among the subsidiary network, to reduce risks and minimize the governance 
gaps. 
 
257 I do not explicit concentrate on the external audit. As this dissertation concentrates on the intragroup govern-
ance management, the primary focus matter of this debate focuses on the intragroup corporate audit. 
258 The combination of local and central audit structures is a common approach in multinational groups with finan-
cial services subsidiaries For example, the HSBC Holdings, UBS Group and the three biggest Japanese Banks 
have independent, centralized global internal audit functions to perform internal audit activities for the entire multi-
national groups and have additional local audit functions in their major subsidiaries (cf. Yasui, 2016, p. 20).  
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Audit understanding: As a prerequisite to assure compliant actions, it is important to have an equal 
understanding of audit and its implications for the organization (cf. Puhani, 2015). According to the 
Three Lines of Defense Model, the internal audit function is responsible for performing independent 
audit and advisory services. Independency of the audit function is a prerequisite to secure its effec-
tiveness, and no conflicts of interests should hinder the objectivity of the internal auditors. For that 
reason, different organizational measures have to be implemented (e.g. regular auditor rotation, or-
ganizational indecency and direct reporting lines towards the board) to strengthen the independency 
and avoidance of influence and among the audit planning, its execution and evaluation (cf. Schmidt, 
2016, p. 2). Even so, another prerequisite for audit compliant behavior is that managers and employ-
ees know and understand the purpose of internal audits (Renz & Böhrer, 2012, p. 64). It is of great 
importance that all managers in the corporate parent and the subsidiaries have transparency and a 
common understanding about the purpose of the audit programs, the design of the audit function and 
their embeddedness within the organizational structures. Moreover, the additionally performed audits 
of the parent’s corporate audit department has to be based on a partnership of equal terms, trust and 
fairness. 
 
Audit scope: The management bodies have to secure the supervision of internal control instruments 
as well as the professionalization, integrity and independency of the audit activity (cf. Schmidt, 2016, 
p. 2). The internal audit scope should vary and should slightly set different priorities every year, but 
also to take into account identified weak points from the past. As the parent’s management body 
should be included in the yearly definition of the annual audit focus and audit planning across the sub-
sidiaries, there should also be an obligatory management reporting on a regular basis.259 The auditors 
should focus on multiple financial and non-financial KPIs, but also on existing systems and processes 
and group-internal collaboration between the different interface functions.260 Further, it is also required 
to implement processes which define the mode of intragroup collaboration of the internal and external 
audit and, if implemented, respective audit committees.261 
 
After a detailed discussion of the key drivers and associated complexities of the intragroup manage-
ment of corporate governance, the following chapter discusses the implications, which arise out of the 
professional management of the earlier described eight subsidiary governance focus topics. 
 
 
259 For further information, cf. chapter 4.1.2. (Issue management). 
260 Particular the effectiveness of control mechanisms (e.g. front versus back office, four eye principles, checks 
and balances), business continuity procedures and process security should play a key role (cf. Günther & 
Gonschorek, 2008, p. 136 f.). 
261 Since many years there is large debate about its beneficial or not, but many national the regulators defined 
that external auditor should be changed on a five years’ basis to ensure their independency. The empirical proof 
of mandatory audit firm rotation on audit quality and auditor independence is inconclusive. Whilst there is evi-
dence that rotation may have a positive impact on ‘independence in appearance’, most research fails to general-
ize these findings. There is even evidence of potentially adverse effects of rotation. Representing others, cf. 
Häfele (2015, p. 157); Cameran et al. (2013); Ewelt-Knauer et al. (2013); Daniels & Booker (2011). 
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4.3 Merits of subsidiary governance management 
As debated in chapter 3.1, long-term corporate success can be operationalized via operational effi-
ciency and effectiveness. Taking into account the previously developed integrated definition of corpo-
rate governance within this dissertation and the argumentation of Malmi & Brown (2008), who outline 
the relevance to consider management control rather as a package and to embed it in a much broad-
er, holistic company context than as a loose accumulation of isolated single elements, I debate in this 
chapter the implications of a professional intragroup governance management.262 
Even if it is challenging to measure without any weak points, I discussed multiple studies, provide em-
pirical evidence that a professional intragroup corporate governance practice forms the basis for a 
better overall performance. A professional subsidiary governance management of the earlier defined 
focus areas contributes to the long-term value creation, as it positively influences the capacity for in-
novation, supports the competitiveness, sustainability, leadership and organizational performance of 
the entire group. 
Proper subsidiary governance encourages clarifying intragroup expectations and defines the roles and 
responsibilities within the multinational group. It is also a prerequisite for the parent’s ability to fulfill its 
duty of care obligations. A subsidiary governance concept defines clear financial and operational del-
egations of authority, intragroup reporting duties and also monitoring mechanisms. Even if subsidiary 
governance affects many diverse, cross-functional intragroup topics and relationships, it will also help 
to sharpen a common understanding regarding corporate governance. Subsidiary governance facili-
tates the minimization of organizational failure, aims to reduce misconduct behaviors and secures 
compliance. In the following, I will discuss how the identified subsidiary governance dimensions help 
to improve the earlier identified key determinates, contributing to the overall long-term success of 
firms: capacity for innovation, competitiveness, sustainability, leadership and organizational 
performance as illustrated in the Figure 17 on the next page.263 
 
 
262 For further information, cf. chapter 2.4 and 2.3.2. 
263 I have identified those key drivers within his earlier research in chapter 3.1.4. 
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Figure 17:  Corporate benefits of a professional subsidiary governance management. 
Source:  Own illustration. 
 
Improved competitiveness 
It is a common responsibility of the parent’s management body to secure the competitive positioning in 
each market, in which the group performs their business activities. In this context, competitiveness can 
be defined by market share, (product) innovation potential, employee quality, the effectiveness of the 
general system, structures and processes or earned profits.264 In essence, all those multiple layers 
influence the multinational group in different ways on different levels. 
To gain a significant market share, it is a basic prerequisite to have an in-depth market understanding 
of the host country and a close collaboration between the subsidiaries and the corporate parent to 
secure global integration. Therefore, different elements of the priorly identified subsidiary governance 
dimensions form the foundation to achieve a sustainable competitive advantage. In the case of subsid-
iary governance, I argue that competitiveness primarily consists of the identification of competitive 
drivers, customer orientation and sustainable competitive behavior, combined with a proactive in-
volvement culture as described in the next paragraphs. 
Identification of competitive drivers: Local subsidiary managers have to identify and understand the 
local market specifics and their local competitors to evaluate their market position to be successful in 
the long-term. Hereby, the systemic understanding (cf. framework management) in combination with 
the defined characteristics of the stakeholder management plays a major role.265 Comprehensive 
 
264 The following authors use the market share as an indicator for competitiveness: Crescimanno & Galati (2014); 
Tiffin (2014); Deshmukh (2016). Others indicate that innovation capacity is a driver for competitiveness: Supriono 
& Topowijono (2016); Hernandez & Vargas-Gonzalez (2015); Zeschky et al. (2014). In addition, several authors 
found that the employee quality plays a central role: Rao (2016); Cheruiyot & Tarus (2015); Sandhya & Kumar 
(2014); Šikýř (2013). Again, others argue that the competitiveness depends largely of appropriate corporate sys-
tems, structures and processes: Goetsch & Davis (2014); Segatto et al. (2013); Zairi (1997); Knorr (1991). Finally, 
a group of authors use the earned profits as indicator for the competitiveness: Zulfakarova et al. (2016); Liu & 
Jiang (2016); Buche (2016). 
265 For further information, cf. chapter 3.2.1 and 4.2.4. 
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local market knowledge forms the prerequisite to develop a local adjusted subsidiary specific strategy 
and local implementation approach (cf. mission management).266 
Customer orientation: Solely those organizations, that focus on a customer centric approach to gain 
competitive advantages, can improve evaluations of where to expand their efforts and resources to 
outmaneuver their competitors, improve their organizational performance, profitability and create addi-
tional benefits for their customer base (cf. Kurt-Christensen, 2010; Zand et al., 2018). Market orienta-
tion forms the foundation to define strategies that improve customer satisfaction, their loyalty and in 
sum leads tow a higher financial performance (cf. González‐Benito et al., 2014). A clear commitment 
towards market-oriented culture means striving for excellence that, in turn, emphasizes competitive-
ness and market superiority (cf. Mahmoud et al., 2016). A consequent customer centricity approach 
during the whole value chain is a central element of competitiveness and depends largely on the in-
tragroup collaboration. In particular the elements of the stakeholder relationship management (cus-
tomer satisfaction, customer centricity processes) are essential, and the regular evaluation of custom-
er satisfaction is a prerequisite to ensure the customer centric perspective.267 
Sustainable competitive behavior and proactive involvement culture: A sustainable competitive 
behavior depends on the organizational culture, legal regulations and the coherence between the 
strategy and the business model on a local and global level (cf. Rauter et al., 2017). Competitiveness 
arises from the proactive and long-term oriented market orientation. Even if this is influenced by many 
direct and indirect determinates, it has to be regularly demanded and fostered by the management 
bodies. Particularly the elements of the framework management (systematic thinking and process-
es), integrity management (problem-solving culture) and the risk management (continuous strategic 
risk evaluation of market and customer related risks) play a decisive role.268 Additionally, subtopics of 
the compliance and governance management are further prerequisites to foster a sustainable com-
petitive behavior.269 
The above-described implications insinuate that there is at least an argumentative correlation between 
properly aligned subsidiary governance and the overall competitiveness, which goes far beyond the 
obvious assumption, that the competitive advantages largely arise solely out of the prevention of com-
pliance breaches and their cost savings by avoidance of high penalty payments. Subsidiary govern-
ance has to be recognized as an intrinsic value of each corporate group and should be recognized as 
a main source for the group-wide competitiveness. 
 
Higher level of innovation 
Innovation is a key driver for nearly all types of companies to ensure their survival and long-term suc-
cess (cf. Möller et al., 2011, p. 174; Möller et al., 2016). Lundvall (2016) defines innovation simply as 
an outcome of a collision between technological opportunities and user needs. For companies, inno-
vation entails doing something they have never done before and includes e.g. new products or ser-
vices, new processes, the entry in new markets or the development of a new business idea.270  
 
266 For further information, cf. chapter 4.2.2. 
267 For further information, cf. chapter 4.2.4. 
268 For further information, cf. chapter 4.3.1, 4.3.3 and 4.3.7. 
269 For further information, cf. chapter 4.3.5 and 4.3.6. 
270 Boston-Fleischhauer (2016) explains that there are different types of innovation, which result in different out-
puts. He differentiates between incremental change and disruptive innovation. 
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In short, innovations have a positive effect on the long-term company performance and contribute 
towards a long-term profitable growth (cf. e.g., the studies of Rajapathirana & Hui, 2018; Camisón & 
Villar-Lópezb, 2014; Huang et al., 2013; Jiménez-Jiménez & Sanz-Valle, 2011; Jansen et al., 2006). 
Ciabuschi et al. (2014) found evidence that, if subsidiaries are embedded within the multinational 
group, they will directly affect the innovation related business performance of the group as a whole. 
Jiménez-Jiménez et al. (2014) add, that especially the defined processes to transfer knowledge from 
subsidiaries to the headquarters are a central enabler for enhancing the innovation capacity. Even so, 
Elia et al. (2019) analyzed that subsidiaries are less innovative in networks with partners from other 
cultures. Altogether, innovation performance in multinational groups is partly a function of the values 
that is created through intra- and inter-organizational flows of knowledge within and across the host 
countries (cf. Delgado-Márquez et al., 2017).271 According to Renz & Böhrer (2012, p. 71 ff.) profes-
sionally managed subsidiary governance contributes to a better innovation performance, largely driven 
as an outcome of the following three debated determinates: 
Comprehensive framework understanding: Organizations with transparent structures and clearly 
defined roles and responsibilities (cf. mission management) and a comprehensive system under-
standing, support the innovation readiness of an organization and its members (cf. Body & Ceri, 
2016).272 System understanding means structural thinking in dependencies and relationships (cf. 
framework management) across all hierarchy levels.273 In multinational groups, innovation arises in 
the close collaboration with internal and external actors and is influenced by different cultures (cf. Del-
gado-Márquez et al., 2017). In other words, I argue that this cultural diversity of the employees and 
geographical distances are not a barrier, but rather an innovation network in which information is 
shared to increase innovation potential. Thus, particularly selected elements of the framework man-
agement (systemic thinking and systemic processes) and the mission management (e.g. the clarity 
about the core competencies and the strategy) are essential to support innovation and provide a 
framework to enable staff to recognize which innovation is most beneficial.274 
Comprehensive customer understanding: Innovative companies aim on customer centricity and 
have the capability to identify and integrate customer trends in early stages of development (cf. Sal-
danha et al., 2017). Customers usually provide important insights or impulses for innovation during the 
purchase process, trainings or service appointments (cf. Cui & Wu, 2017). In multinational groups, it is 
crucial to define processes to transfer those generated customer ideas and insights towards the rele-
vant intragroup functions. Accordingly, in particular the sub-elements of the stakeholder relationship 
management (customer centricity processes, customer satisfaction) and aligned operational and or-
ganizational structures (cf. mission management) between the subsidiaries and the corporate parent 
are of great importance.275 
 
271 Even so, Ciabuschi et al. (2017) outline to balance carefully the parents headquarter involvement, as there 
may be also harmful effects of too much headquarters' involvement in subsidiary innovation-related activities. 
272 For further information, cf. chapter 4.2.2. For a sake of completeness, I supplement that there are also authors 
who argue that the innovation performance not solely depends on the existence of e.g. clear innovation process-
es. For example, the study results of Fontana & Musa (2017) indicate that predefined innovation processes may 
not necessarily have a positive relationship with innovation performance. 
273 For further information, cf. chapter 4.2.1. 
274 For further information, cf. chapter 4.2.1 and 4.2.2. 
275 For further information, cf. chapter 4.2.2 and 4.2.4 
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Sharpen innovation culture: The relationship of organizational culture and innovation has been 
subject to extensive research over the last decades, and it seems obvious that a corporate culture can 
either strengthen or limit the innovation capacity. Kesting et al. (2016) explain that different innovation 
stages and types raise different demands on leadership. Different leadership styles vary in their fit with 
different innovation types, stages and national cultures. Therefore, managers have to be aware of their 
role of sharpening an appropriate working environment, which supports innovation within their particu-
lar area of responsibility. To support innovative thinking, companies should reward the willingness to 
try out new ideas, even if this is also associated with higher risk potential and may be limited by the 
boundaries of existing structures and processes.276 Multinational groups, which foster knowledge 
management practices that generate new knowledge out of their subsidiaries, internal or external so-
cial relationships, will encourage an innovation culture (cf. Jiménez-Jiménez et al., 2014). 
A good subsidiary governance supports a group-wide innovation culture with multiple elements of e.g. 
the mission management and framework management, but also gets encouraged itself by an exist-
ing problem solving culture (cf. integrity management) and a clearly defined risk culture framework 
(cf. risk management).277 In sum, multiple elements of subsidiary governance framework help to im-
plement group-wide innovation networks, idea management systems and processes, and enable the 
groups to set the right framework conditions to sharpen their innovation culture. Even if this is chal-
lenging and needs time to develop, it is a major management task to foster connected working condi-
tions that support innovative thinking and cross-border collaboration. 
 
Sustainability 
Global financial institutes and large multinational groups are under close scrutiny and profound pres-
sure to focus on sustainability and accept accountability and responsibility for their various bottom 
lines of economic, governance, social, ethical and environmental performance (cf. Rezaee, 2017a; 
Dorobantu et al. 2018). Groups that introduce sustainability programs, constantly increase their in-
vestments and deliver annual reports about their initiatives to improve their sustainability efforts, giving 
the environment and human rights the same priority as profits (cf. Black, 2017; Asmussen & Fosfuri, 
2019). Harjoto & Laksmana (2018) analyzed that a better CSR performance leads to a higher firm 
value because CSR reduces excessive risk taking as well as risk avoidance. However, the challenges 
of environmental sustainability are not only crucial as a moral imperative, but also as a managerial 
responsibility to operate profitably (cf. Olson & Wu, 2017). As outlined above, sustainability covers 
both, an external an internal perspective.278 In brief, the external perspective comprises environmental 
and social living conditions and the internal perspective focuses on a long-term survival of the organi-
zation. To achieve both objectives, it is obvious that there is an appropriate governance framework 
and a clear management commitment required. Renz & Böhrer (2012, p. 75 ff.) explain that the finan-
cial impact on the group financials is often neglected. The tension and possible link between long-term 
economic performance and nonfinancial environmental, social, and governance sustainability perfor-
mance have been extensively and inconclusively debated in recent business research (cf. Rezaee, 
 
276 This is also a relevant element of the strategic governance responsibility, as described in chapter 4.1.1. 
277 For further information, cf. chapter 4.2.1, 4.2.2, 4.2.3 and 4.2.7. 
278 Several other authors also differentiate between internal and external sustainability components, cf. e.g. Wadin 
et al. (2017); Kiron et al. (2012); Kolk (2010). 
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2017b). Even so, Eccles et al. (2014) outline that sustainability companies are more likely to have 
established processes for stakeholder engagement, are increasingly long-term oriented, and exhibit 
higher measurement and disclosure of nonfinancial information. Sustainable group companies signifi-
cantly outperform their competitors, both in terms of stock market and accounting performance and 
benefit from a better public perception and reputation (cf. Camilleri, 2017; Conrad & Thompson, 2016). 
A collaborative governance approach provides the greatest impact on the sustainability performance 
(cf. Galbreath, 2017). Thus, as the following paragraph illustrates, subsidiary governance encourages 
the sustainability efforts of the multinational group in different ways: 
Identification of sustainability drivers: A prerequisite to identify relevant sources for sustainability is 
a comprehensive context and system understanding of the entire multinational group (cf. Rana et al., 
2017). In this context, particularly the framework and mission management play a crucial role, as 
they are important enablers. Subsidiary specific business models based on systematic structure and, 
processes across the entire group or lucency about dependencies and relationships are components 
of a sustainable management approach.279 Further, the clear management commitment towards the 
elements of the compliance, governance, risk and stakeholder relationship management dimen-
sions are crucial key drivers.280 In financial services subsidiary networks further targets e.g. a profes-
sional regulatory management or appropriate remuneration and incentive schemes on safeguarding 
sustainable value creation, appropriate behaviors and a balanced risk taking.281 Despite the skepticism 
whether sustainability targets can be appropriately controlled, most corporate parents define in-
tragroup sustainability objectives, develop adequate key performance indicators and define measures 
and requirements for their subsidiaries and global value chains (cf. Pillai et al., 2017; Crutzen et al., 
2017). 
Stakeholder support: Companies that improve their sustainability performance and simultaneously 
perform stakeholder dialogues are most likely to experience a decrease in sustainability-related stake-
holder criticism and increase the probability for stakeholder support (cf. Hörisch et al., 2015). The level 
of support of the different stakeholder groups is an indicator for the sustainability efforts of an organi-
zation. Consequently, a proper intragroup and external stakeholder relationship management is of 
great importance. For example, this includes appropriate code of conducts for the dealing with im-
portant stakeholder groups as well as regular stakeholder interest analysis.282 
Internal organizational sustainability: In brief, I argue that group-internal organizational sustainabil-
ity, largely achieved by good subsidiary governance, is a key prerequisite to reach external sustaina-
bility.283 It means that there are properly designed and intragroup aligned organizational structures and 
processes in place, which ensure business continuity by proper organizational alignment and decision-
 
279 According to the study of Park & Choi (2015) are the parent company, government, and NGOs the major fac-
tors that influence the local sustainability and CSR behavior of subsidiaries. In a contrary, the roles of internal 
managers, customers, local community, and media are not considered as significant factors for the sustainability 
behavior of subsidiaries. For further information, cf. chapter 4.2.1 and 4.2.2. 
280 For further information, cf. chapter 4.2.4-4.2.7. For example, a comprehensive risk management approach also 
has to take into account environmental related risk factors and appropriate mitigation measures as an integral 
element of a sustainable management approach (cf. Poddar et al., 2016; Price, 2016; Aziz et al., 2016). 
281 For further information, cf. chapter 4.2.5 and 4.2.7. 
282 For further information, cf. chapter 4.2.4. 
283 This view is supported from the study results of Eccles et al. (2014) who investigated the impact of corporate 
sustainability on organizational processes and performance. Their results indicate that high sustainability compa-
nies significantly outperform their counterparts over the long term, both in terms of stock market and accounting 
performance. 
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making frameworks. It also includes timely succession planning procedures for key functions and key 
persons. Internal organizational sustainability can also be strengthened by low fluctuation rates of 
employees, which can be mitigated by e.g. respective personal development programs or respective 
HR recruiting procedures.284 At the same time, a professional governance management on subsidi-
ary level contributes to organizational sustainability. Besides, I found that sustainable organizations, 
due to their promoted problem-solving culture, clear accountability frameworks and their comprehen-
sive framework and mission understanding can identify problems and chances in earlier stages. In 
long-term, a consistent and comprehensive audit management also provides a significant contribu-
tion on aiming at overall organizational sustainability throughout the entire corporate group. 
 
Organizational performance: A high performance organization leads to increased efficiency and 
therefore to lower costs and better implementation processes.285 As high-quality products improve 
customer relationships and customer satisfaction, the respective customer and enabling processes 
have to ensure an effective implementation. Providing the products according to the demands and 
expectations of the customers helps to increase the profitability and its market share. Whether subsid-
iary governance measures are effective and endorse a better organizational performance, largely de-
pends on the implementation willingness and transformation competencies towards the local subsidi-
ary structures, systems and processes (cf. e.g., Steijn & Tijdens, 2005; Fui-Hoon et al., 2001). 
Implementation willingness: A clear prerequisite to reach operational excellence is the overall will-
ingness and clear commitment of the different management levels to implement strategies, realize 
plans and set high but reachable targets. High performance organizations realizing the beneficial ef-
fects of a proper subsidiary governance, aim on a continuous improvement. Organizing costs in multi-
national groups are largely driven by distance to headquarters as well as the integration mechanisms, 
management willingness and the atmosphere that exists in subsidiary–headquarter relationships (cf. 
Lunnan et al., 2016b). Modern agile organizations do not implement once standardized governance 
processes and fixed structures without ongoing monitoring, self-reflection and reorganization (cf. Cer-
vone, 2014). The implementation willingness is supported by different sub-elements of the frame-
work, mission and stakeholder management.286 For example, if the personal development, the 
subsidiary strategy and operative planning is integrated in one comprehensive process, it will support 
the general implementation willingness of the involved stakeholders. Moreover, it is essential that 
there is a performance orientated, self-reflecting and consensus oriented corporate culture available 
within the entire group. 
Implementation competence: Local implementation competencies within the subsidiaries secure the 
transfer of objectives or tasks into concrete business results. The rising trend of decentralization and 
more local independence of subsidiaries underpin the importance of local implementation competenc-
es (cf. e.g., Narula 2017; Young & Tavares, 2004; Roth & Morrison, 1992; Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1986).  
 
284 For further information, cf. chapter 4.3.4. 
285 The term ‘high performance organization’ is used from scholars since many years: cf. De Waal (2007); Hol-
beche (2005); Owen et al. (2001); Wood (1999); Katzenbach & Smith (2015). Other authors apply the term ‘high 
performance work systems’: Buchanan & McCalman (2018); Lv & Xu (2018); Karadas & Karatepe (2019); Evans 
& Davis (2005); Becker et al. (1998). 
286 For further information, cf. chapter 4.2.1, 4.2.2 and 4.2.4. 
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Despite the fact that information technology is a crucial enabler to create organizational value, multina-
tionals still struggle to ensure in their subsidiaries the needed implementation competence within the 
continuous field of tension between global integration and local responsiveness. As this favors opacity, 
it is also a prerequisite to be successful, respond adequately to the local specifics and gain local 
knowledge and competencies for the group as a whole (cf. Rabbiosi, 2011). 
In implementation-oriented organizations, proper IT governance frameworks are defined, and employ-
ees take on accountability and unexpected events can be openly discussed (cf. problem-solving cul-
ture).287 Those organizations have a respective risk culture and perform a proactive operative risk 
management on subsidiary level, focus on an appropriate compliance management and proper gov-
ernance management with integrated ‘checks and balances’ mechanisms in the subsidiary process-
es.288 It also includes a positive attitude towards the audit management and it is accepted as a man-
agement instrument to identify weaknesses and governance gaps to achieve better results.289 
Adopted implementation processes: Subsidiaries can solely operate successfully in foreign loca-
tions by adjusting the parent’s policies and processes towards the multiple local contexts (cf. Ah-
woregba, 2017).290 Successful multinational groups manage the host country specifics by aligning their 
home country behavior, structures and processes and that of the subsidiaries’ host country environ-
ments. Many strategic initiatives in multinational groups struggle with the implementation because of 
their organizational complexities, including multiple IT landscapes, large geographical distances and 
cultural differences between the different business units (cf. Brinkschröder, 2014). A successful strat-
egy implementation requires a consistent planning, monitoring and control processes among the entire 
group (cf. Cândido & Santos, 2015). However, the implementation of balance scorecards with subsidi-
ary specific KPIs or other management control systems also help to increase the organizational per-
formance of the subsidiary network.291 Other enablers are the elements of the governance manage-
ment, a group-wide consistent group-wide compliance management system or aligned operational 
and organizational structures and processes, e.g. for the measurement of employee or customer satis-
faction.292  
 
Leadership  
The way subsidiaries and strategic business partners are directed and controlled by the corporate 
parent provides information about the intragroup leadership culture. The overall strategic management 
process starts with leadership self-perception of both, the management bodies of the parent and sub-
sidiaries, as the global, regional and local competitiveness largely depends on it (cf. Godiwalla, 2015; 
2016). In particular the interaction of leadership, business culture and the organizational design are of 
great importance (cf. e.g., Argyris, 2010; House et al., 2004; Smith & Peterson, 1988). Godiwalla 
(2015) explains that strategic global leadership, vision, and culture among the senior managers are 
critical for enabling the subsidiaries to pursue their vision of improved competitiveness.  
 
287 For further information, cf. chapter 4.2.6. 
288 For further information, cf. chapter 4.2.5, 4.2.6 and 4.2.7. 
289 For further information, cf. chapter 4.3.8. 
290 For further information, cf. chapter 4.1.2. 
291 This view is supported from the study of Micheli & Mura (2017), which argues that there should be given 
greater consideration to the utilization of different types of performance indicators when implementing and re-
formulating corporate strategy. 
292 For further information, cf. chapter 4.3.4, 4.3.5 and 4.3.6.  
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In that case, sustained growth and improved competitiveness in the global organizations´ multiple 
country environments become the means for the multinational group’s overall strategic enhancement. 
Subsidiaries have to coordinate the different cultures of the corporate parent, the multinational group 
as a whole, and the national culture of the host country (cf. Godiwalla, 2015; Arredondo, 1996; Harvey 
et al., 2010; Shin, et al., 2007). Despite globally aligned leadership programs, the leadership culture is 
always influenced by host country characteristics, such as culture, economy and industry specifics.293 
There is a need for organizational interventions that aiming for coordinated leadership and organiza-
tional development strategies to facilitate effective corporate governance (cf. Aarons et al., 2015). 
Local subsidiary CEOs are responsible for mobilizing the intragroup entrepreneurship of subsidiary 
staff to develop relationships to access new knowledge, create ideas, and business opportunities (cf. 
O'Brien et al., 2019a). Especially in financial services, subsidiaries’ leadership plays a dominant role 
for influencing the corporate culture and risk-taking behavior (cf. Bushman et al., 2016). 
The earlier identified dimensions provide the basis for the corporate parent to better assess and im-
prove the leadership of their managers in the subsidiaries. On the one hand, it fosters a comprehen-
sive understanding of the general framework conditions and enables to further develop leadership 
strengths. On the other hand, it helps to clarify the parent´s expectations, sharpens a common under-
standing about their governance duties and requires organizational, structural and control measures to 
support the desired leadership culture.  
Comprehensive understanding: A comprehensive understanding of group internal and external 
determinates is a clear management responsibility and a prerequisite for the subsidiary management 
bodies to fulfill their governance duties (cf. Molloy & Delany, 1998; Balaji, 2011; Pasaribu et al., 2013; 
Sandén & Mattsson, 2016). It forms the basis of the division of decision-making autonomy within the 
headquarters–subsidiary relationships (cf. De Jong et al. 2015). In brief, comprehensive leadership 
means that the subsidiaries mangers have transparency about their limited internal and external action 
scope and the predefined intragroup decision-making structures (cf. Kostova et al., 2016). It means to 
further foster the own corporate culture and promote the systemic thinking among the local managers 
and to secure a regular review of the stakeholder interests analysis.294 From a management liability 
perspective in particular the risk, governance, compliance and regulatory as well as audit man-
agement admittedly stays in the foreground, but also having transparency about the business limita-
tions regarding the hold business license or the locally legal and regulatory required board struc-
tures.295 This enables the senior managers to be aware about their duties group-internally but also 
externally. 
Leadership strengths: Another benefit of the earlier introduced governance dimensions is that it pro-
vides indicators about leadership strengths and its implementation in lower hierarchies. Leadership 
strengths have a close relationship with the already mentioned implementation willingness (cf. para-
graph operational performance). It is a major obstacle for the corporate parent to evaluate the local 
performed leadership in the subsidiaries from a distance. For that reason, processes are required to 
 
293 Godiwalla (2015) outlines that the foreign subsidiary leadership culture further depends on the decision-
making styles and approaches, the rationale for strategic and operating decision-making and the approaches to 
develop organizational structure, culture, technologies, information and control systems, policies, norms and prac-
tices in the workplace. 
294 For further information, cf. chapter 4.3.1 and 4.3.4. 
295 For further information, cf. chapter 4.2. 
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ensure that potential leadership weaknesses in subsidiaries become transparent in a systematic man-
ner. Appropriate indicators are e.g. if the elements of the framework and mission management are 
regularly reviewed and discussed, or if the elements of the integrity and compliance dimension are 
involved in the personal evaluation of the employees.296 Another indicator provides the results of regu-
larly performed employee satisfaction surveys.297 Leadership strength also means that all relevant 
internal control topics of the governance, risk and compliance management are ensured and that 
the audit-related topics are regularly on the subsidiary management agenda.298 
Organization, structure and control: Leadership can only be successful if it is supported by the or-
ganizational setup (cf. Mihalache et al., 2014). The manner in which companies are organized pro-
vides insights into their management and leadership understanding (cf. Xinsheng, 2004; Ouchi, 1977). 
Hereby one has to distinguish between processes and structures that are implemented to comply with 
the parent’s governance standards, and those that are implemented by the subsidiary management 
bodies themselves. In both cases, it has to be ensured that the entire subsidiaries’ governance 
framework gets reviewed and updated regularly to avoid governance disparities. Nevertheless, to re-
duce complexity and improve intragroup oversight, group-wide standardized core processes and or-
ganizational structures for the subsidiaries are inevitable. Earlier described governance processes, 
such as the succession planning, qualification of key persons, customer centric sales and purchase 
processes, compliance, risk evaluation procedures or predefined organizational structures lead to a 
better intragroup collaboration and greater efficiency and effectiveness, transparency and consistency 
and provide suitable drawbacks for the local self-perception of leadership. 
 
Altogether, this chapter has debated the multiple beneficial effects of a professional management of 
corporate governance among subsidiaries. As it defines a clear action framework for the local man-
agement bodies and clarifies the expectations of the corporate parent, it also helps to mitigate in-
tragroup risks, secure compliance with laws and regulations, and avoid organizational failure. Beyond 
this, it enables the parent’s management bodies to fulfill their due diligence obligations and it is a pre-
requisite to coordinate and manage their subsidiary networks with multiple natures of subsidiary char-
acteristics, aiming towards a combined value creation to achieve the overarching group targets. 
 
4.4 Interim conclusions for the intragroup corporate governance management 
The previous subchapters illustrated three different dimensions (strategic governance, operational and 
subsidiary governance) that are necessary to manage intragroup corporate governance. In terms of 
corporate groups with strong regulated subsidiaries, I identified eight governance key topics in particu-
lar (cf. chapter 4.2), that play a decisive role for improving subsidiary governance. Taking their subor-
dinated subtopics into account, the management bodies are enabled to alleviate the principle-agent 
problem between the corporate parent and their subsidiaries, secure global alignment, and simultane-
ously also ensure enough flexibility for subsidiary-specific adjustments. 
 
 
296 For further information, cf. chapter 4.2.1 - 4.2.5. 
297 For further information, cf. chapter 4.2.4. 
298 For further information, cf. chapter 4.2.5 - 4.3.8. 
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I state that a group governance framework comprising out of a strong interaction of strategic, opera-
tional and cultural governance elements in and between both, the parent’s headquarters and the 
subsidiaries has to be implemented, and they have to be managed by different intragroup governance 
instruments. The roles and responsibilities, the granularity of the operational structures and also pro-
cesses differentiate between the corporate parent (strategic and operative governance) and the sub-
sidiaries, where the transformation and local adjustment of the group-wide governance standards 
takes place. However, one of the main obstacles in multinational organizations is the open definition 
and diverse interpretations of corporate governance in the different legal systems and jurisdictions. 
Nevertheless, a common interpretation of corporate governance forms the basis for a coordinated 
intragroup corporate governance management.  
While the corporate governance of the entire group is a shared responsibility of the parent’s manage-
ment body, on a local level it is delegated to the management bodies of the subsidiaries. The parent’s 
management body is in charge of monitoring and balancing conformity and performance across the 
group and has to ensure that there is a continuous further improvement of the initial business model, 
the core competences of the group and the overall strategic positioning. To respond to the constantly 
increasing legal and regulatory obligations of both, the parents and local management bodies, I argue 
that the earlier debated key areas of subsidiary governance in subchapter 4.2 help to facilitate risk 
management, ensure compliance with applicable legal obligations and mitigate organizational failure.  
 
Altogether, the parent’s supervisory body secures control and accountability of the parent’s manage-
ment body, but also provides it with expert advice for the management of the entire group.299 The par-
ent management body is responsible for setting the strategic direction of the group, has to set the right 
tone at the top and must define the overall framework conditions for the intragroup corporate govern-
ance framework. The management body primarily steers via signs and dashboards and receives regu-
lar reports of the subordinated management levels, to have a solid information basis for taking well-
informed decisions. 
The second management level (divisional head) is responsible for the governance operationalization 
and adjustment towards the division-specific business model and has to secure the implementation of 
centrally defined group standards. Hereby, the operational governance dimension has to define and 
implement respective instruments to manage the intragroup governance among the different subsidi-
aries and has to enable them to perform their own corporate governance proactively on a local level. 
The operational governance can be managed among performance metrics, regular reporting of rele-
vant KPIs, governance instruments, such as predefined decision-making structures and processes, 
definition of local focus topics and their management, reference models for the organizational and 
operational setup to improve transparency, intragroup alignment and consistency.  
 
 
 
 
299 The parent’s supervisory body is not in the focus of this dissertation. Even so, for securing comprehensibility, I 
mention it in this context. 
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However, there has to be a constant alignment between the parent’s management body, the divisional 
heads and the subsidiary boards in terms of the strategy definition, performance and risk-related is-
sues, rewards and resource allocations throughout the corporate group as summarized in the follow-
ing Graph 18: 
 
 
Figure 18:  Tripartite structure of the intragroup corporate governance management. 
      Source:         Own illustration. 
 
A steering via professional management of corporate governance among the subsidiaries helps to 
secure congruence on certain governance related key topics, aiming at the implementation of a certain 
level of subsidiary governance standards within the entire group and is the prerequisite to define 
appropriate intragroup governance management instruments in the corporate parent for its subsidiar-
ies. The overall objective is to mitigate business model specific risks, organizational failure and to 
guarantee a common group-wide compliance and governance management philosophy. Proper sub-
sidiary governance has to safeguard the local implementing and embedding of centrally defined 
measures and strategies of the corporate parent into the host country environment. The exact local 
implementation always depends on the local market specifics, the culture, laws and regulations in the 
respective host country.  
Even so, the corporate parent has to set the boundaries and define the group-wide focus topics to 
comply in an international perspective with the general acknowledged corporate governance stand-
ards and regulations (i.e. BCBS, 2015). An integrated subsidiary governance framework has to pro-
vide guidance for the subsidiaries and their management bodies about their expected responsibilities 
and accountabilities and forms the foundation for a proactive management and steering within the 
consolidating parent entity. Concerning the research question of this dissertation, I outline that the 
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already debated subsidiary governance key topics in the subchapter 4.2 include all necessary ele-
ments that have to be evaluated and monitored by the parent among its subsidiaries. Moreover, as the 
two subchapters 4.1 and 4.2 have illustrated, there are various governance focus areas and multiple 
instruments which enable the corporate parent to influence the local governance mechanisms, struc-
tures and processes within the subsidiaries to secure oversight and consistency among the subsidiary 
networks.  
In essence, the parent manages the intragroup governance via clear and standardized framework 
contracts, including standardized terms and conditions that are applicable for all subsidiaries or 
standard contracts with the members of the local management body. Furthermore, performance re-
lated compensation schemes are an often-used instrument, even if it can also favor undesirable 
developments and increase risk taking if they are not designed carefully. Moreover, clear predefined 
subsidiary targets and their steering are crucial instruments to mitigate governance deviations. 
Standardized reporting and alignment procedures help to secure information exchange and mini-
mize risks and intragroup opacity, despite the fact that this often leads to additional bureaucratically 
burdens, that make benefits questionable if they are not further processed for e.g. top management 
reporting.  
Parent entities use guidelines to detail their expectation on how certain key topics have to be man-
aged and controlled within the subsidiaries to secure their due diligence obligations. They are also the 
starting point for the corporate audit activities on local level.  
Another typical governance instrument is the definition of intragroup minimum standards for certain 
topics or governance mechanisms, which have to be adapted to local specifics in the host country and 
nature of the subsidiary. As this secures a certain level of common understanding, their benefit can be 
limited if those minimum standards are too generic and provide room for individual interpretation. Fur-
ther, parents develop reference models e.g. for the organizational operational structures among their 
subsidiaries to secure standardization to a maximum extent and focus on decision-making systemiza-
tion (e.g. predefined committee landscapes, bylaws, predefined committee topics, alignment matrixes 
etc.). While group-wide decision-making processes are unavoidable in cross-border, hierarchical 
organizational structures, they also lead to longer decision-making procedures, may encourage diluted 
accountabilities for already taken decisions and limit the often promoted agility, flexibility and empow-
erment approaches of many top managers. In addition, group-wide leadership and HR develop-
ment programs that foster the intragroup framework understanding, exchange and knowledge trans-
fer, create a global community and share a common corporate culture are also crucial. Furthermore, it 
becomes clear that regular training and communication activities are also essential key elements to 
strengthen the governance awareness, but also to increase the understanding and the effectiveness 
of the implemented governance instruments. Thus, it seems appropriate on parent level to implement 
a ‘Center of Competence of Corporate Governance’, which is responsible for the coordination of the 
multiple governance management instruments. 
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The following Figure 19 provides a simplified overview of the so far identified, most relevant intragroup 
governance management instruments and governance focus topics that have to be addressed to miti-
gate intragroup governance gaps and deviations, and which in term secure the effectiveness of the 
group-wide governance framework: 
 
 
Figure 19:  Intragroup corporate governance management construct. 
Source:  Own illustration. 
 
The first four dimensions (framework management, mission management, integrity management, 
stakeholder management) primarily focus on typical general management competencies and are pre-
requisites for a proactive general management of a subsidiary in the context of the groups’ prefer-
ences. The other four dimensions, namely the compliance, governance, risk and audit management 
can be recognized as management supportive internal control functions, which enable the manage-
ment bodies of the subsidiaries to secure subsidiary governance and fulfill their due diligence obliga-
tions. Those functions are a crucial information source for the local decision-making and they are con-
currently a steering and monitoring instrument for the consolidating parent. Those governance func-
tions usually have a dual reporting responsibility – for the subsidiary’s management body as well as a 
consolidating function within the parent and/or a respective center of competence for corporate gov-
ernance as suggested from Mills & Haines (2015). Thus, a close collaboration and high level of lucen-
cy between the parent and the local subsidiaries can be secured.  
The application of those governance management instruments enables the parent to predefine and 
manage the relevant intragroup governance focus topics among its subsidiaries.  
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If the parent companies aim to proactively manage their subsidiaries with the already mentioned in-
struments within those governance focus topics, it contributes in some cases either directly or indirect-
ly to the overall innovation capability, competitiveness, sustainability and performed leadership. More-
over, it facilitates a better organizational performance and compliance with the applicable laws and 
regulations (cf. subchapter 4.3). 
 
To get an overview on the governance maturity level of the different subsidiaries, a regularly executed 
governance self-assessment with a standardized questionnaire provides an appropriate instru-
ment to ensure comparability.300 This questionnaire should involve questions for each of the eight de-
fined governance clusters and can be executed on a regular basis to assess on the one hand the ef-
fectiveness of the centrally defined governance instruments, but also to get feedback on how the vari-
ous governance focus topics are being locally addressed. While such a governance self-assessment 
supports management bodies to identify strengths and weaknesses of their organizations, it also edu-
cates the senior staff and the other involved functions about the essentials of good governance. It 
further clarifies the expectations of the parent and helps to mitigate intragroup governance deficits (cf. 
Gill et al., 2005). 
The standardized governance self-assessment forms the foundation to develop suitable recommenda-
tions for management actions with individual measures and solutions for each subsidiary. Neverthe-
less, as illustrated in the following example (Figure 20, next page), the evaluation scheme should have 
different scales. I suggest applying the underlying principles of the generally accepted ISO standard or 
the Capability Maturity Model Integration (CMMI, 2010) for the evaluation, which I adjusted regarding 
the subsidiary governance context.301 
 
 
300 The effectiveness of governance self-assessments or self-evaluation approaches is highlighted from Renz & 
Böhrer (2012) and Gill et al. (2005). Other authors suggest to apply self-assessments / efficiency audits for the 
evaluation of boards: Frederick (2014); Hölscher (2013); Fischhuber & Preen (2012); Schmidt & Brauer (2006); 
Audit Commission (2009); Strieder (2007); Sick (2003). 
301 The ISO 9001 builds the foundation for the process orientated quality management system and is one of the 
key drivers of modern integrated management control systems (cf. Wagner & Käfer, 2017). This is further sup-
ported with the publication of the new ISO 9001 (in the year 2015), which lays the foundation for management 
control systems. The new ISO 9001 is created as high-level management system and typical focus topics are e.g. 
strategy integration, leadership, risk-based management approaches, process orientation (cf. Wagner & Käfer, 
2017; Gietl & Lobinger, 2016). 
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Figure 20:  Measurement of the corporate governance maturity in subsidiaries. 
Source:  Own illustration. 
 
Governance organization: As suggested from Frederick (2014) and Mills & Haines (2015, p. 22), 
mixed multinationals with financial services subsidiaries should implement a ‘Center of Competence 
for Corporate Governance’ (CoC CG) on headquarters level. Such a CoC GC has to support the divi-
sional head to execute his governance function and secures the appropriate consideration of financial 
services specifics. It should also assist within the definition of intragroup governance standards and 
respective management instruments.302 The CoC should also be able to perform a regular governance 
tracking and management reporting to the top management (cf. Frederick, 2014). Likewise, ‘govern-
ance officers’ in the subsidiaries should be tasked to overtake the local coordination of governance 
topics, act as counterpart of the local governance and internal control functions (risk, compliance, in-
ternal audit) to support the local management body.303 
 
The identified tripartite approach for managing corporate governance in a multinational corporate 
group and the identified dimensions for improving subsidiary governance in chapter 4 provide a solid 
foundation for the execution of expert interviews.  
  
 
302 A CoC has to ensure the coordination and professionalization of the intragroup corporate governance man-
agement. It is supposed to facilitate best practice sharing among subsidiaries to increase group-wide efficiency, 
effectiveness, lucency and alignment. The CoC ought to be organized in a modular organizational structure to 
ensure an effective steering, coordination and interaction between the corporate parent and the local financial 
services subsidiaries (cf. Wecker & Galla, 2013, p. 36). 
303 The approach with governance officers on subsidiary level follows the steering logic of the introduced ‘Three 
Lines of Defense Model’ (cf. subchapter 3.3.2). As earlier described are compliance officers a legal requirement in 
many jurisdictions for regulated bank entities. For that reason and the overlap between many compliance and 
governance topics, most multinational groups nominate the compliance function in the subsidiaries equally to-
wards the corporate governance delegates. 
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5. Research methodology 
For the purpose of this dissertation I follow a qualitative research proceeding. On the one hand, a 
qualitative research method fits best for the initial purpose of this dissertation, and on the other hand, 
there is much need for more qualitative research in the research area of corporate governance man-
agement. I argue that this facilitates a better understanding of corporate governance mechanisms and 
enables to overcome existing shortcomings in practice and science, which may arise out of the unilat-
eral application of quantitative approaches in the past. 
 
In particular, the study results of McNulty et al. (2013), Zattoni et al. (2013) and Mat Yasin, et al. 
(2014) illustrate that there is a great need for qualitative research to improve the understanding of 
corporate governance topics, processes and mechanisms. McNulty et al. (2013) explain “…that there 
is much scope and need for more qualitative studies of significant rigor and relevance which explore 
the array of interactions and processes involved in corporate governance, across different levels of 
analysis and contexts.” Furthermore, they argue that there have been many initiatives within the last 
decades that aimed to improve corporate governance and that “… qualitative research can assist poli-
cy-makers and practitioners to develop more efficient governance mechanisms, by shedding light on 
the efficacy of policy prescription. Qualitative research provides a basis for rethinking and challenging 
some of the dominant assumptions and meanings about how governance actors and organizations 
actually function.” Zattoni et al. (2013) also highlight the necessity to use more qualitative methods to 
generate new theoretical insights about corporate governance practices and mechanisms that are 
both rigorous and relevant to address current shortcomings in this complex inter-disciplinary field of 
research. The corporate governance literature review of Mat Yasin et al. (2014) also comes to the 
same result and supports this view. As the quantitative literature on corporate governance is diverse 
and extensive, the qualitative research in this area is rather limited and partly even nonexistent (Mat 
Yasin et al., 2014). For the purpose of this dissertation, it seems the best choice to get access to the 
needed information to develop a corporate governance model for financial services subsidiaries, is a 
naturalistic approach with open orientated methods and a more holistic, inductive way of proceed-
ing.304 To gain a better understanding of the intragroup governance mechanisms, taking into account 
the social dimension of corporate governance and the identification of appropriate governance man-
agement instruments, I argue that a qualitative way of proceeding fits best to overcome the recent 
shortcomings within the current corporate governance debate. 
 
In a first step, I validate the identified focus topics for corporate governance management of multina-
tional corporate groups with open guided expert interviews among subject matter experts in chapter 
6.1, including the debated tripartite corporate governance management approach in chapter 4 and 
also taking into account the defined key topics for improving subsidiary governance. After this, I devel-
op a first draft of a holistic intragroup corporate governance management model in subchapter 6.1.3, 
which in the next step will be verified by additional expert interviews in chapter 6.2. I predefined that if 
 
304 In the inductive research approach concludes from the specific (e.g. single expert interviews) to the general 
(theory). Contrary deductive approach concludes from a general theory towards the specific case (cf. Mayer, 
2013, p. 19). 
 166 
 
there is a high degree of consensuses by the interviewed experts for the defined topics of the man-
agement model, the overall model design as well as the suggested measurement and evaluation 
method, there will be no need for additional feedback loops. As the results of the second interview 
round will illustrate, there was a broad consensus reached among the interviewed experts that implies 
a substantial likelihood that the gathering of new additional information with further expert interviews is 
questionable.305 Consequently in subchapter 6.3, I devise an ultimate model that combines both, the 
theoretical findings and practical perspective within one comprehensive model. However, to ensure 
the quality and appropriateness of the entire management model, I complete my empirical research 
proceeding in subchapter 6.3.5 with a group of discussants consisting of several of the interviewed 
experts, to discuss the outcome together and reach consensus about the model. 
 
Apart from that, this research process forms the foundation to summarize success factors and chal-
lenges that arise from the complexities of managing corporate governance of diverse subsidiary land-
scapes in subchapter 6.4. This research approach encourages me to gather a comprehensive view, 
which is based on both, the theoretical and practical perspective of corporate governance manage-
ment, to address the above discussed deficits in the recent corporate governance research. In line 
with my short explanation in subchapter 1.2, the Figure 21 on the next page provides a detailed over-
view of the applied research concept of the dissertation. 
 
 
305 Niederberger & Renn (2018, p. 13) outline that additional feedback loops are solely needed if there is a sub-
stantial likelihood to get additional information or that the interviewed experts will change their opinions. Häder & 
Häder (2013, p. 16) also outline that there is no standard for the number of feedback loops.  
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Figure 21:  Research concept of the dissertation. 
Source:  Own illustration. 
 
My overall research approach is inspired by the Delphi proceeding, which is a systematic structured, 
qualitative multi-stage survey process, originally developed as interactive forecasting method that 
relies on the opinions of selected experts, answering questions in two or more rounds, in which the 
results are systematically and continuously channeled back to increase the quality of the output. 
Moreover, I found that there is only a small number of scholars in the broad field of corporate govern-
ance research that currently applies a modified Delphi approach (cf. e.g., Elson et al. 2017; Greene et 
al., 2017; Çipi et al., 2014; Crittenden & Crittenden, 2012; Al Omari et al., 2012; Serretta et al., 2009; 
De Haes & Van Grembergen, 2008; Bekker & Steyn, 2007; Aabo et al., 2005). 
 
Delphi Methodology: This proceeding is widely used in qualitative empirical social research, particu-
larly in the field of organizational and management research. Even if I do not apply exact the same 
proceeding, my applied research procedure with several rounds of expert interviews follows the same 
idea like the generally accepted Delphi method.306 The Delphi method was introduced in the 1950s 
and 1960s as a dialog orientated method and was originally used for military purposes, but is today a 
popular technique within the business administration context and the field of social sciences to support 
 
306 For further information regarding the Delphi method, cf. Niederberger & Renn (2018); Dalkey (2017); Linstone 
& Turoff (2015); Dalkey & Helmer (1963). 
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decision-making based on subject matter expert opinions (cf. e.g., Niederberger & Renn, 2018; Mullan 
et al. 2017; Robertson et al., 2017; Latif et al., 2016; Häder, 2014; Kauko & Palmroos, 2014; Cuhls, 
2012; Ammon, 2009; Landeta, 2006; Benarie, 1988). 
However, until now there is not a uniform definition available for the Delphi approach. While Dalkey & 
Helmer (1963, p. 458) found the Delphi method assists “…to obtain the most reliable consensus of 
opinion of a group of experts … by a series of intensive questionnaires interspersed with controlled 
feedback“, Linestone & Turoff (1975, p. 3) describe Delphi as “…a method for structuring a group 
communication process so that the process is effective in allowing a group of individuals, as a whole, 
to deal with a complex problem.” Others, such as Häder & Händer (1995, p. 12), define it as strong 
structured group communication process, in which subject matter experts evaluate different complex 
situations in which either no or solely partly or unsecure knowledge exists. Niederberger & Renn 
(2018) describes the Delphi method rather as an iterative process in which expert opinions regarding a 
specific problem are consolidated, aiming on consensus and dissent opinions to consider them within 
the problem solving approach and its justification. Altogether, this approach helps to calibrate plural 
opinions of different experts and it is currently the most popular concept to reach consensuses among 
experts (cf. Latif et al., 2016). The validity of the Delphi method is generally given via the ‘Theory of 
mistakes’, which means that the aggregated answers of the interviewed sample size represent an 
answer which outclass the majority of the individual experts.  
Even if Häder (2014) illustrates that there are different variations available of the Delphi method, it is 
also possible to postulate a general processing (cf. Ammon, 2009; Cuhls & Blind, 1999; Renn & Web-
ler, 1998).307 Niederberger & Renn (2018, p. 8 ff.) describes the general proceeding based on five 
steps. At the beginning there has to be developed a standardized questionnaire, which forms the 
foundation for the first survey or interviews among subject matter experts. In a next step, the evalua-
tion of the interviews takes place as a basis for the second round of the survey or expert interviews. 
As a preparation for the second feedback loop, it is necessary that the involved experts get access to 
the results of first round before the second feedback loop gets conducted. Then, depending on those 
results, there can be multiple repeat loops with further interview rounds, conducted or not conducted. 
However, as several experiments illustrated, most changes of personal judgement take place between 
the first and the second feedback loop, and additional feedback rounds provide no or solely a few 
modifications in the most cases (cf. Cf. Kaynak et al., 1994; Murry & Hammons, 1995, p. 429, Lanford, 
1972, Häder et al., 1995). 
As the anonymity of the subject matter experts is a main characteristic of this methodic design and a 
major driver for its legitimacy, there are also critics that recognize this as a detriment of the approach. 
For example, Goodman (1987, p. 730) argues that, if there are anonymous situations, the experts 
cannot be made responsible for their opinions that perhaps are not properly reconsidered and un-
thought-through. However, I hold against and outline that anonymity leads to avoidance of opinion 
leadership and protects the experts with extraordinary opinions against a loss of prestige. In addition, 
if experts are asked to give reasons for their opinions, it is an appropriate quality assurance measure 
to avoid any superficial estimations (cf. Häder & Häder, 2013, p. 17). 
 
307 Existing variations are e.g. the Decision Delphi, Policy Delphi, Broadband Delphi, Real time Delhi, Combinated 
social media big data analysis and Delphi method or the Hybrid Delphi approach. For further information, cf. Nie-
derberger & Renn (2018, p. 18 ff.). 
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Even so, a typical weak point of the Delphi method is that the interviewed experts usually do not 
change their opinions within the different feedback loops, regardless of their anonymity, which often 
limits the benefit of additional feedback loops. Besides, it is to criticize that this way of proceeding is 
time consuming and resource intensive. Informative Delphi studies are often solely possible if they are 
conducted over several years, which also was the initial starting point to develop the group Delphi 
approaches (cf. Niederberger & Renn, 2018, p. 25). At the same time, I argue that it is still an un-
solved problem that the certain blurriness of the target setting within the Delphi method is sometimes 
criticized rather as an emergency instrument that results in undifferentiated outcomes. Further, the 
implied simplicity of the methodical approach often leads to unprofessional allocation. In spite of this, I 
feel confident that the underlying assumption of the Delphi method is beneficial for the completion of 
this research project.  
 
The following subchapter 5.1 describes in detail the conducted way of proceeding with the expert in-
terviews, before the next step subchapter 5.2 explains the used evaluation method for the executed 
expert interviews in detail. 
 
5.1 Expert interview as qualitative research method 
The expert interview is one of the most frequent used research methods in the empirical social re-
search (cf. Meuser & Nagel, 2010, p. 465; Liebold & Trinczek, 2009, p. 1). Particularly in the industry-
related social research, educational, politic and the organizational fields of research, it is a commonly 
used research method. Despite this, in most of the empirical research textbooks the expert interview is 
not at all or only shortly mentioned as independent research method (cf. e.g. Diekmann, 2008).308 At 
its core, the expert interview is a less structured research method, which is predominately applied for 
explorative research. Hence, there still exist contrary opinions that argue for a genuine in the qualita-
tive paradigm form of the expert interview (cf. Meuser & Nagel, 1991; 1994; 1997; 2010). The un-
derrepresented methodical reflection can be explained by the lower acceptance of the advantages of 
this specific interview type and the traditional thinking that expert interviews have only an explorative 
character. In a contrary, Decke (1995) argues that codified principles of the expert interview are not 
possible, and therefore no methodical generalization is possible either. He also criticizes that the ex-
pert definition varies and always depends on the particular research context (cf. Decke 1995, p. 7). 
The expert interview is a social susceptible research method, which depends a lot on the interview 
provision and which is characterized by a low level of standardization and high execution flexibility. 
Consequently Trinczek (1995, p. 59) concludes that the gained results are incomparable and implies 
the necessity to focus on a high level of transparency and a clear, predefined and traceable evaluation 
method.309 
 
 
308 An exception is Mayer (2013); von Aleman (2013); Meuser & Nagel (2010). Apart from that is the expert inter-
view in most survey textbooks not explicit mentioned (cf. e.g. Erbslöh, 1972; Froschauer & Lueger, 2003; Holm, 
1975; Möhring & Schlütz 2013; Kromrey 2013). 
309 For that reason, I provide in the next chapter 5.2 a detailed description of the used evaluation method of the 
interviews. 
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Meuser & Nagel (2010) distinguish between two different types of knowledge, which can be asked in 
expert interviews. While the organizational knowledge concerns information expressed by the subject 
matter expert about his or her own actions and corresponding rules and dictum, the context 
knowledge encompasses information about conditions, which appear in the context of other actions. 
For this dissertation, it is crucial to consider both types of knowledge to identify additional elements, 
instruments, key drivers and challenges influencing the corporate governance management of finan-
cial services subsidiaries. According to Meuser & Nagel (2010), the open guided interview is an ap-
propriate tool to reconstruct general patterns or conclusions based on expert knowledge. As open 
interviews give the chance to subject matter experts to extent answers through explanation and ex-
emplification in narrative passages, whereby additional information can be gathered. 
Nevertheless, it is necessary to keep guidance through the interview in order to clarify and distinguish 
from narrative interviews. Simultaneously, I argue that if a predefined interview guideline is not used, 
the participants may tend to recognize the interviewer as incompetent and unprepared, and it would 
make a later evaluation and comparison of the results much more difficult. That is why a guideline for 
the interview was developed with topic orientated guiding questions instead of a standardized scheme 
in order to ensure comparability.310 
The interview guideline helps to focus on specific topics without losing flexibility and gaining addi-
tional information through narrative passages (cf. Meuser & Nagel, 2010, p. 472 ff.). The interview 
guideline is structured in three parts (cf. appendix 1).311 Part A contains questions about general in-
formation and professional background of the interviewee, to secure that the interview partner can be 
classified as ‘subject matter expert’ for corporate governance in a multinational intragroup context. 
Part B encompasses the essential questions linked to the corporate governance management of fi-
nancial services subsidiaries and the identified subsidiary governance key areas in chapter 4. In part 
C, closing questions are formulated in order to gain additional information that goes beyond the exan-
imated criteria. In sum, the complete interview guideline is based on the already discussed topics and 
knowledge that was gained within the literature review among the prior topics of this dissertation. For 
the creditability of the entire research project and a successful execution of the interviews, it is of great 
importance that the interviewer also is recognized as a supposed ‘quasi expert’ by the interviewed 
subject matter experts to whom it is possible to speak at eye level (cf. Niederberger & Renn, 2018, p. 
9; Pfadenhauer, 2005). The willingness of mangers to share their knowledge is much higher if they 
recognize their counterpart as competent discussion partner (cf. Trinczek, 1995, p. 65). 
According to Hitzler et al. (1994) an expert is a person who has an ‘institutional competence for the 
construction of realities’, while expert knowledge is defined as the chance to manage within a specific 
organizational context the action conditions of others in a relevant way (cf. Meuser & Nagel, 2010, p. 
466 f.; Liebold & Trinczek, 2009, p. 3; Bogner & Menz, 2002, p. 46; Liebold & Trinczek, 2002, p. 36). 
 
310 In this context, I deviate from the classical proceeding of the Delphi method, which usually applies a standard-
ized questionnaire to make statistical evaluations (cf. Niederberger & Renn, 2018; Häder & Häder, 2013). Even 
so, Niederberger & Renn (2018, p. 9) outline that there are also topics where open guided questions are more 
beneficial and possible to apply. 
311 Mayer (2013, p. 43 ff.) recommends to structure the interview guideline into different topic areas. 
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Based on the formulated expert characteristics of Meuser & Nagel (2010), I define a subject matter 
expert as a person, who assures that she or he can provide advanced corporate governance 
knowledge for the corporate governance management of financial services companies in multinational 
automotive groups. For that, I outline that there are cases in which it is difficult to assess if a person is 
an expert or rather not, and it is still a matter of debate among scholars. That is why I tried to over-
come this challenge by focusing within the selection process of appropriate interview candidates, par-
ticularly on their profession, current job position or professional working experience as a relevant indi-
cator for their expert knowledge (cf. Niederberger & Renn, 2018, p. 8 f.). Further, as illustrated in the 
interview guideline (cf. appendix 1; part A), I started each interview with questions to clarify the per-
sonal suitability of the interviewee.  
Thus, at first, the developed interview guideline was presented to two corporate governance managers 
within a the financial services organization of an car manufacturer and the mentoring professor at the 
University of Augsburg who is specialized in the development of management models in order to se-
cure the comprehensibility and the practicability of the questions. Based on this pre-check, I adjusted 
some questions of the interview guideline. The final interview guideline of the first interview round is 
attached in appendix 1. 
Hereafter, I started to identify suitable subject matter experts for the interviews. In sum, 113 subject 
matter experts from OEMs, automotive financial services, finance captives, automotive leasing provid-
ers, consultancies, audit firms and independent research institutes as a suitable sample size could be 
identified for the interviews. 
Taking into account the recommendations of Filatotchev & Wright (2017) to respond the intra-
disciplinary character of corporate governance in this dissertation and to consider the multiple per-
spectives on intragroup corporate governance management, I focused on a broad sample. All inter-
viewed subject matter experts have an outstanding management and partly board experience among 
different cultures, countries and legal systems and own different professional backgrounds.312 As the 
sample size consists out of experts from different hierarchy levels within multinational groups, I also 
included other subject matter experts with relevant experiences in the automotive financial services 
business.313 Moreover, I interviewed one additional subject matter expert, who was recommended by 
another interview partner. 
Most of the experts were identified online within two professional business networks, online presences 
of automotive multinational companies, consultancies, audit firms and selected industry specific mag-
azines and conferences. To increase the return rate of the interview inquiries, I contacted each expert 
 
312 The interviewed experts gained professional experiences in Germany, France, United Kingdom, USA, China, 
Brazil, Russia, Canada and Australia. The interview partners are subject matter experts in multiple areas: Auto-
motive and bank experts, consultants, auditors, layers, organizational experts, HR / leadership experts, profes-
sors. 
313 The sample size consists out of e.g. a Group CEO of a car manufacturer, CEO of Financial Services of an 
automotive multinational group, managing directors / finance directors of financial services subsidiaries, managing 
partners, senior consultants, head of compliance, head of risk management, supervisory board members, head of 
organizational development, external auditors, project managers of governance projects in financial services 
organizations of multinational automotive groups.  
 172 
 
with a personal e-mail and a personalized cover letter, including information about the research project 
and the earlier debated governance dimensions, as well as a short profile of my personal background 
(cf. appendix 2). Another beneficial effect of handing over some relevant information in advance, was 
that the interview partners were enabled to get themselves better prepared for the interviews and in-
creased the likelihood to receive a higher quality of the provided statements. All interviews were exe-
cuted only in German or English language. 
 
Validation phase 
For the validation of the identified focus topics for a proper intragroup management of corporate gov-
ernance among financial services subsidiaries, I conducted the first interview round either via phone or 
personal on-site visits. Ten interviews were executed via telephone conferences and fourteen expert 
interviews took place in personal meetings in Munich, Stuttgart and Frankfurt. All interviews occurred 
between 5th of July and 20th of December 2016 and each interview lasted between 1 and 2.25 hours. 
At this point, I outline that there are different recommendations regarding a representative size of the 
sampling. Whereas Woudenberg (1991) states that a sample size of three experts is too less, Parenté 
& Anderson-Parenté (1987) argue that there have to be at least ten experts in the panel. Equally, 
Cochran (1983) found that larger panels reduce the mistakes within a Delphi study. In a contrary, 
Delbecq et al. (1975) outline 30 participants as the maximum, while Brooks (1979) makes clear that 25 
experts are more than enough. Embedded in this context, Duffield (1993, p. 236) made experiments to 
identify the perfect sample size and found out that usually 16 experts are enough as larger panels do 
not lead to different outcomes. I allocated a total sample size of 24 carefully selected experts within 
the first round of the interviews as appropriate. The background of the interviewed experts is provided 
in appendix 3. The following Table 4 provides an overview of the composition of the sample size: 
 
Sample size information Number 
Contacted experts 113 
Received responds  38 
Interviews with experts of automotive financial services organizations on parent level 19 
Interviews with experts of automotive financial services organizations on subsidiary level 5 
Interviews with experts of audit firms and corporate governance consultancies 5 
Interviews with other corporate governance experts (professors, scholars etc.) 4 
Sample size (total number of executed interviews) 24 
Table 4:  Validation: Sample size of the executed expert interviews. 
Source:  Own Illustration. 
 
For the preparation of each interview, I conducted an internet research about the profile of the subject 
matter expert in business networks and then analyzed the internet presentations of the institution they 
are working for. As twenty-two interview partners agreed to record the interviews to ensure a detailed 
paraphrasing afterwards, two interview partners did not allow recording their statements. In those par-
ticular cases, I produced handwritten notes. As already mentioned, all interviews were executed on an 
anonymous basis to secure that all interview partners were able to share freely their personal 
thoughts, expressions and experiences without any fears. 
 
 173 
 
Verification phase 
The purpose of this second interview session is to reduce the variance of the possible responses and 
the collective certainty of judgement. Thus, for the verification of the developed management model, 
as an outcome of the first interview round, I came back to the participants and contacted those again, 
who provided the most valuable input within the first interview session. In sum, I contacted fifteen of 
the twenty-four interviewed experts again with a new personalized email containing the draft of the 
respective management model (appendix 4). Although I contacted fifteen selected experts, only ten of 
them agreed to verify the model and its different subsidiary clusters in a second feedback loop (ap-
pendix 5).314 I outlined to the participants that they should use the consolidated results of the first in-
terviews, namely the model draft, as a corrective for their judgement formation (cf. Niederberger & 
Renn, 2018, p. 11 f.). 
I applied again an open interview guideline for the general structuring of the interviews, which can be 
found in appendix 6. The interviews took place in German and English language and were executed 
either via skype or in a personal meeting on site in Munich. Each of the interviews lasted between 20 
and 50 minutes and were recorded for later use within the evaluation. The following Table 5 summa-
rizes the composition of the second sample size: 
 
Sample size information Number 
Contacted experts 15 
Received responds  10 
Interviews with experts of automotive financial services organizations on parent level 6 
Interviews with experts of automotive financial services organizations on subsidiary level 4 
Interviews with experts of audit firms and corporate governance consultancies 0 
Interviews with other corporate governance experts (professors, scholars etc.) 0 
Sample size (total number of executed interviews) 10 
Table 5:  Verification: Sample size of the executed expert interviews. 
Source:  Own illustration. 
 
Group discussion 
Taking into account the initial idea of the Delphi method and suggested procedure by Niederberger & 
Renn (2018) and Häder & Häder (2013), I organized a group discussion among several the interview 
partners to discuss the overall result in an open round to increase again the level of contentious and 
the level of quality assurance. In sum, I was able to perform a group discussion among five of the ex-
perts that participated in the second feedback loop to discuss the final developed management model 
and to increase again the overall outcome. I organized this meeting in Munich, it lasted in total about 
one hour and I was allowed to record the conversation for a later transcription and evaluation of the 
results. 
 
After a detailed debate about the way of proceeding with the open guided expert interviews among the 
subject matter experts, I will in the following complete chapter 5 with a detailed description of the used 
evaluation method as an important quality measure within the qualitative research. 
 
314 This smaller sample size goes in line with the raised concerns of Häder & Häder (2013, p. 19) who outline that 
it is often a problem to motive the participants over a long period of time and to participate in several interview 
loops. 
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5.2 Evaluation method 
Until today none of the popular evaluation approaches of the qualitative research has developed to-
wards an expert interview specific method nor exists an independent evaluation method specifically for 
expert interviews (cf. Bogner et al., 2014, p. 71). Principally, it is possible to use every evaluation 
methodology (e.g. more code driven approaches or sequence analytical approaches or even a combi-
nation of both).315 Thus, to ensure that the later discussed quality criteria - objectivity, validity and reli-
ability - will be fulfilled in the best possible way, I applied the generally accepted structured research 
approach of Meuser & Nagel (2010, p. 476).316 
In comparison to other evaluation methods, such as Mühlfeld et al. (1981), the recommended meth-
odology by Meuser & Nagel (2010) is a more elaborate procedure. At first, they paraphrase the inter-
views and then make a single thematic mapping, which means that the comparison of the different 
statements and the theoretical interlinks take place at a later point of time (cf. Meyer, 2013, p. 51). 
This procedure acts as quality assurance and reflects the general demands towards qualitative evalu-
ation methods (cf. Meuser & Nagel, 1991, p. 453). At its core, this evaluation methodology focuses on 
thematic units of the interviews rather than on sequential statements of the interviewee, which means 
that the statements given throughout the interviews were allocated based on their specific thematic 
fitting and in this case based on the examined focus areas by the evaluators. Except for two inter-
views, all of the interviews were recorded in order to make a proper analysis and evaluation of the 
statements.  
 
There was no specialized software used for the evaluation of the interviews. I raise the concern, that if 
the evaluation takes place with the help of a special software, the underlying methodical assumptions 
could be unreflecting and could ignore the overall context of the made statement (cf. Kelle, 2000; 
Kopp & Menez, 2005). I found that there is the risk, that it is impossible to secure that the intention of 
the software won’t become more enforced than my own intention within the evaluation of the inter-
views. Thus, I made the complete evaluation stand-alone, as shown in the attached documentation. 
 
The evaluation of the expert interview encompassed the following systematic approach, which had to 
be applied step-by-step in order to get proper findings. Firstly, all interviews and their relevant contents 
have been transcribed, even if Meuser & Nagel (2010, p. 476) outline that this is not necessary for 
expert interviews to transcribe the audio recording completely as it is usual in biographical interviews. 
Hereby, all statements have been exactly reproduced word by word. In the next step, all statements of 
the interviewees were paraphrased sequentially and fitted to their appearance in the time flow of the 
interview. Then, the paraphrased and sequentially allocated passages were coded and reflected in a 
thematic allocation (topic clusters) of the statements to the examined criteria from the prior analysis of 
this dissertation. Hereby, the dissolution of the sequential paraphrases and single statements were 
necessary, because it not the interviewee should stand in the focus but the thematic content of the 
analysis. Thus, the thematic comparison was executed and the statements of the different interview 
 
315 Typical examples for code driven approaches are e.g. the Grounded Theory (cf. Strauss & Corbin 1994; 1998) 
or the qualitative content analysis (cf. Mayring, 2010).  
316 Validity and reliability are the general accepted quality criteria for the evaluation of research methods, cf. May-
er (2013, p. 55); Himme (2007); Brühl & Buch (2006).  
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partners were merged. At this point the evaluation beyond the single text units started. Thus, the per-
spective of the single interview was released and similar thematic passages of different interviews 
were bundled.  
The outcome of the first interview round is depicted in the subchapter 6.1.1, and those of the second 
interview loop in subchapter 6.2.1. However, the systematic approach of the interviews’ analysis goes 
further in order to develop a comprehensive intragroup management model with suitable instruments 
and recommendations for actions out of the experiences of the interviewees and the findings of the 
theoretical literature review in the prior chapters. 
Hence, in subchapter 6.1.2 (first interview round) and later on in the subchapter 6.2.2 (second inter-
view round) the analysis approach is continued with the fourth step. This encompasses the sociologi-
cal conceptualization in which similarities and differences of the expert’s statements in regard to 
theoretical findings of the earlier chapters, mainly chapter 3 and 4, are conceptualized. For all focus 
areas, the specialty will be condensed, made explicit and compared to the theoretical background. 
This abstraction level is the empirical generalization, in which general statements can be concluded 
among the gathered knowledge, and it describes the interlink towards the theoretical discussion. I 
highlight that the generalization of the results is always limited by the empirical data of the used sam-
ple size (cf. Meuser & Nagel, 2010, p. 476).  
The fifth step describes the theoretic generalization, in which the different categories are ordered 
among their theoretical internal connection. The conclusions drawn out of a theoretical informed per-
spective are based on the empirical generalized knowledge of the expert interviews. The core results 
of this final step are bundled within the model draft in subchapter 6.1.3 and the final model in the sub-
chapters 6.3.1 to 6.3.3. Beyond that, I outline that with this approach it is also possible to identify re-
spective success factors and challenges and for the effective management of subsidiary governance, 
which are summarized in subchapter 6.4. Hereafter, subchapter 6.5 provides a short tabular overview 
with the gained key findings.. 
 
Quality criteria for the qualitative research 
The identification of effective quality assurance measures is a major topic of the methodical discussion 
among scholars (cf. e.g., Roller & Lavrakas, 2015; Reynolds et al., 2011; Morrow, 2005; Golafshani, 
2003; Barbour, 1998). Altogether, quality measures define objectives, but they are also applied to 
assess research methods. The initial idea is based in the classical test theory of the psychology and 
represents the quantitative research (cf. Lamnek, 1995, p. 152). Hereby, in particular the generally 
accepted quality measures of objectivity, validity and reliability of the scientific research production 
stay in the foreground (cf. Friedrichs, 1985, p. 100 ff.). While validity aims on the question whether the 
object that had to be measured is also measured in reality, the reliability aims on the stability and ac-
curacy of the results if they will be repeated under the same circumstances (cf. Mayer, 2013, p. 56). 
In contrast to the quantitative research, general accepted quality assurance measures in the qualita-
tive research are not defined yet. The simple adoption of the traditional quality measures, which is 
applied for the quantitative research, does not fit to the qualitative research, because of its specific 
characteristics with their epistemological foundations, ethical and research related aspects (cf. 
Przyborski & Wohlrab-Sahr, 2014, p. 21; Mayring, 1999, p. 113). Despite this, there is an adoption of 
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those proven quality criteria like e.g. reliability checks of the qualitative content analysis in case of the 
inter-coder reliability testing (cf. Mayring, 1993; 2005; Mayer, 2013, p. 56). Regardless, there are still 
researchers who principally reject the definition of quality criteria for qualitative research. I summarize 
that the recent discussion about the multiple approaches to secure quality assurance represents the 
challenges of such research studies to become accepted within the research community. Some re-
searchers outline the necessity to define ‘appropriate methodical quality criteria’ (cf. Flick, 1987, p. 247 
ff.). In the context of the numerous existing qualitative research methods and the often intra-
disciplinary research topics, several topic specific criteria catalogues have been introduced, with nu-
merous weighed criteria depending on their application (e.g. basic research, applied research, evalua-
tion research etc.). Keeping this in mind, I apply the following three quality measures suggested by 
Scheiber (2016):  
Transparency: To respond to the fact that the qualitative research involves many different research 
decisions and applications of methods, it is crucial to document and explain the whole research pro-
cess in a transparent manner (cf. chapter 5). This includes the research question, the justification for 
the selected research method and their adoption towards the concrete implementation with its sample 
size and the sampling strategy. In addition, this comprises a comprehensible approach for the data 
evaluation and their conclusions (cf. Mayer, 2013, p. 56; Flick, 1999, p. 243). I argue that a high level 
of transparency contributes to assure the above debated quality targets of validity and reliability.  
Inter-subjectivity: The research evaluation and its drawn conclusions have to be plausible illustrated 
and alternative conclusions, opinions and perspectives have to be highlighted (cf. subchapter 6.1.1 
and 6.2.1). Hereby, it is important to reflect the different relationships between the groups and individ-
ual perspectives of the researcher. Legewie (1987) defines this as ‘reflective subjectivity’. Flick (1999, 
p. 239) recommends as another quality measure to include selective quotations of suitable interview 
passages (cf. chapter 6.1 and 6.2) 
Research scope: It is important to highlight to what extent a generalization is possible, due to the low 
degree of standardization and comparatively low sample sizes. Instead of representative criteria, it is 
essential to pronounce the ‘theoretical relevance and claims’ and the scope of application (cf. chapter 
7). The validity of the qualitative research relies in its reformulation with an interpretative-
communicative character (cf. Lamnek, 1995, p. 171).  
 
Filatotchev & Wright (2017) make clear that “good qualitative corporate governance studies convey a 
richness and depth of data from different sources.” Qualitative researchers have to secure that they 
engage with the various relevant stakeholders and not just presenting one perspective. Filatotchev & 
Wright (2017) further outline that qualitative research needs to provide access to documentary evi-
dence (such as e.g. a broad paper and media coverage) to complement the interview data as it is also 
found in this dissertation. 
 
I outline that all the debated quality measures of this paragraph form the foundation to assure that the 
qualitative research made within this research project and the drawn conclusions are as objective as 
possible (cf. Silverman, 2013, p. 65). Nevertheless, I highlight that it is impossible to guarantee a clear 
interpretation, because every statement can be interpreted differently (cf. Spöhring, 1995, p. 159).  
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I recorded every interview (excluding two) for the purpose of objectivity, because this should ensure 
afterwards a detailed transcription and analysis to identify similarities and differences (cf. Meuser & 
Nagel, 1991, p. 452). I underline that e.g. breaks, variety of voices or other para-linguistic elements 
have not been considered within the interpretation nor the analysis, because for this research project 
primary the content of the conversation is of great importance.  
I executed the comparatively extensive evaluation method from Meuser & Nagel (1991, p. 465), be-
cause it forces me to continuously reflect and control the meaning of the statements via the different 
categorization steps which can be characterized with recursiveness (cf. Meuser & Nagel, 1997, p. 
489).  
I feel confident that this supports the criteria of objectivity, validity and reliability in the best possible 
way and objects the earlier debated critics that the execution of expert interviews does not comply with 
the general quality standards for empirical social research (cf. Mummendey & Grau, 2008).  
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6. Results  
In this chapter 6, I start with presenting results of the validation phase, including the feedback of the 
first interview round and thereupon developed first model draft (subchapter 6.1.3). I hereafter provide 
the outcomes of the second interview round in subchapter 6.2, where the priorly introduced model 
draft gets verified and further improved to a final management model in subchapter 6.3. Then again, a 
group examination is presented, before intragroup success factors and challenges are discussed in 
subchapter 6.4 and the general key findings get mapped in a tabular summary in subchapter 6.5. 
 
6.1 Validation of the subsidiary governance dimensions 
This subchapter covers the main findings of the executed expert interviews and compares them with 
the results of the prior literature analysis in a second step (subchapter 6.1.2). On that basis, I design a 
draft for a corporate governance management model of financial services subsidiaries in a corporate 
group context in subchapter 6.1.3. 
 
6.1.1 Results of the expert interviews 
In a first step, I will summarize the answers of the subject matter experts within 17 thematic clusters 
including in sum 144 sub-clusters. While 15 of the thematic clusters can be assigned directly to the 
asked questions, two thematic clusters (cluster 1 and 4) are added based on the provided information 
by the experts. This follows the general recommendation of Meuser & Nagel (1991; 2010) who outline 
that the thematic mapping should be executed uncoupled from the specifically asked questions and 
solely based on the provided information of the interview partners, to ensure an unprejudiced view and 
to avoid any premature conclusions within the complexity reduction procedure in the interview evalua-
tion (cf. Mayer, 2013, p. 56). In contrast to other methods (e.g. Mühlfeld et al., 1981) the linkage be-
tween the theoretical and practical perspectives will be executed in a later stage (cf. subchapter 6.1.2). 
For the purpose of transparency, the following paragraphs provide a consolidated view on the provid-
ed answers of the different experts. The protocols of each expert interview and the documentation of 
the evaluation proceeding are found on the separate CD ROM that has been presented together with 
the dissertation. 
 
Thematic cluster 1: Reasons for the increased public awareness of corporate governance (new 
cluster, derived from answers of questions in part A and question 7.3) 
All interview partners confirmed that subsidiary governance is becoming increasingly important. The 
experts felt confident that it is primarily a consequence of the last financial crisis and several fraud 
scandals. Simultaneously, this is promoted by increased media awareness and, consequently, todays 
national authorities and regulators raise more attention on those issues compared to the past. Other 
national authorities also started to adopt this expanded state supervision approach because of the 
relevance for the macroeconomic environment. 
Another often mentioned key driver are high fines for governance and compliance breaches. Ex-
pert 6 explained that “…especially the USA provide with their system of class actions an effective tool 
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to complain against multinationals.” Some national courts even decided to impose high fines against 
multinationals for compliance breaches in other countries. 
The experts (e.g. expert 5, 7, 19 and 20) stated that the management liability discussion is another 
driver for increased attention for governance topics. Expert 19 clarified that today, local incidents 
cause a worldwide impact very fast, which is a serious issue for global companies. The liability issues 
for managers and members of the supervisory bodies are becoming increasingly strict. The inter-
viewed lawyers and external auditors (e.g. expert 10 and 11) pointed out that there were court deci-
sions, which illustrated that appropriate and professional governance management concepts reduced 
the management liability.  
Another key driver is that the trend to greater corporate social responsibility make ethical behavior 
of companies more critical. Few of the experts (e.g. expert 8, 9, 17 and 18) agreed that the public 
pressure for a better corporate governance behavior of managers continuously increases. For exam-
ple, expert 8 stated “…the public pressure to better corporate governance behavior of managers is the 
key driver.” 
Expert 7 explained that this is a consequence of the globalization. The globalization effect is a clear 
driver of corporate governance. Today everything is transparent and in case of compliance breaches, 
there is a massive reputational damage potential due to a fast and global presence in the media. Addi-
tionally, expert 14 stated that the global competition is intensifying and as a result, the awareness for 
the advantages of proper governance structures is rising, too. Expert 23 made clear that documenta-
tion and its professional management increases the competitiveness, organizational efficiency and 
speeds up decision-making processes.  
The experts 6, 7 and 23 identified whistleblowing as another key driver. Whistleblowing provides an 
easy opportunity to make questionable corporate behavior topics public. Thirty years ago, it was not 
possible to publish online e.g. written documents, which are now accessible from all over the world. 
Expert 6 analyzed “…nowadays it is less controllable and companies increase their awareness for 
such topics.” Expert 20 summarized that the consequence of whistleblowing in turn is increased politi-
cal pressure, combined with greater public and media awareness. 
 
Thematic cluster 2: Reasons for the increasing relevance of intragroup subsidiary governance 
(cf. part A / question 2.1) 
Several experts discussed the increasing relevance of subsidiary governance and listed numerous 
reasons why multinational companies are increasingly concentrating on this comparatively new topic. 
One major reason for the increasing relevance are the global value chains, which made it essential 
to setup foreign subsidiaries to reach their increasing global customer base. Some experts explained 
that the relevance of subsidiary governance in the automotive industry is the logical consequence of 
the organizational maturity level of the business models. In the last years, many financial services 
divisions had a significant market growth with customers, business volumes and new setups of finan-
cial services subsidiaries. Expert 7 explained that “at first many automotive financial services subsidi-
aries focused on gaining new business and the support of vehicle sales via financing and leasing 
products. In a second step, the financial services organizations started to develop and professionalize 
their governance structures as a consequence of their large business volumes to safeguard appropri-
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ate structures to secure compliance, strong governance, profit margins, sustainability and risk reduc-
tion.” 
Furthermore, legal and regulatory requirements increased at the same point in time. Expert 15 
mentioned that the level of tolerance from regulators for corporate governance failures reduced dra-
matically and subsidiary governance has become increasingly relevant for bank entities to mitigate 
e.g. outstanding fines of authorities. Expert 21 stated that “…supervisory authorities look in detail at 
the legal entity structures of the subsidiaries within the multinational context and the various external 
regulations in the different host countries.” Expert 21 highlighted that “…there is a clear statement of 
the EBA (European Banking Authority) that multinationals require an enforcement liability from the 
corporate parent towards the subsidiary structures” and expert 18 confirmed that “…in the case of 
OEMs and financial services subsidiaries there can be a situation that the subsidiary is stronger regu-
lated than its corporate parent due to the legal and regulatory requirements for financial services com-
panies.” 
In addition, some experts mentioned that subsidiary governance is a prerequisite for a consistent 
group-wide corporate governance framework. Expert 1 clarified that this “…defines the crash barri-
ers from the headquarters for the decentralized subsidiaries.” Expert 10 and 16 made clear that 
“…subsidiary governance builds the foundation for corporate governance of the parent company and 
the corporate group as a whole.” Expert 19 and 21 supplemented that subsidiary governance is the 
prerequisite to ensure standardization and transparency among structures, processes, roles, respon-
sibilities and therefore accountabilities. Expert 19 defined this as the basis for the successful man-
agement of complex decentralized organizational structures. Among others, expert 21 outlined that 
“…it is often very challenging to combine the group internal and locally external requirements.” 
Furthermore, some of the subject matter experts debated again the management liability and repu-
tational issues as a key driver. They also outlined that this is obligatory for the fulfillment of the legal 
requested duty of care. Expert 13 declared, “…the headquarters and their managers cannot exculpate 
their self via ignorance of governance or compliance gaps…” in their subsidiaries.  
 
Thematic cluster 3: Subsidiary governance focus topics and mechanisms in financial services 
entities (cf. part A / question 2.2) 
The majority of the experts stated that the subsidiary governance topics depend on the company’s 
individual definition of corporate governance. Expert 15 made clear that “…there is no commonly 
agreed definition available and corporate governance reaches from compliance, cultural, risk towards 
organizational related issues.” According to expert 1, 10 and 19, it is fundamental that there is a com-
mon intragroup understanding of corporate governance. Expert 12 explained in brief that “…in the 
limelight are all topics where there is a liability of the parent or in the final consequence even a per-
sonal liability of the executive board members.” In general, the experts agreed that governance de-
fines the process of how decisions are taken on the different hierarchy levels, embedded in the con-
text of the multinational structures and the legal and regulatory environments in the different jurisdic-
tions. Expert 20 felt confident that “…subsidiary governance starts with a clear target definition of the 
top management towards us local executives in the subsidiaries.” This said, there are certain key top-
ics of internal subsidiary governance which were particularly highlighted by the interview partners. 
 181 
 
Expert 1, 4 and 5 explained that operative governance management is a major element. This in-
cludes e.g. to establish company-wide governance minimum standards via the definition of decision-
making structures and company internal committees, competence schemes, alignment procedures, 
corporate rules, manuals, guidelines or other instructions as suitable instruments to manage govern-
ance. 
In sum, governance was primarily recognized as a legally driven issue. The large majority of the sub-
ject matter experts confirmed a rising awareness and a trend towards an integrated governance and 
compliance approach to increase their effectiveness. 
The interview partners outlined risk management as one of the main elements (e.g. expert 4, 6, 7, 9, 
12 and 14). In comparison to the other business units of a car manufacturer, the financial services 
business has a higher risk potential for the whole company and requires greater emphasis on risk 
management. A group risk management system defines appropriate processes to ensure compli-
ance and is controlled by an appropriate internal control system (ICS).  
It was also apparent that several of the experts (e.g. expert 4, 5 and 13) described the relevance of a 
proper corporate culture and common values as a fundament for a comprehensive governance ap-
proach. Expert 21 highlighted that the corporate culture forms the foundation. Others argued that this 
is also reflected in the COSO framework and is an essential part of each compliance management 
system, especially in multinational organizations, which have to deal with multiple sub-cultures. 
The experts mentioned corporate culture in combination with leadership. A strong leadership was 
recognized as a major element of corporate governance (cf. e.g. expert 1, 3, 4, 9, 21, 22). The experts 
explained the necessity of a value-oriented leadership concept, because it incorporates issues like 
openness, integrity, transparency or trust. Expert 14 outlined that “… for me the most important focus 
topic of corporate governance is integrity, because this is the basis for everything.” Expert 10 pointed 
out that corporate culture and leadership are also elements of the COSO framework.  
Internal audit was also a key topic for subsidiary governance for many of the interviewed experts 
(e.g. expert 9, 12, 14 and 19) and was often linked to the Three Lines of Defense Model. There was 
a broad consensus that internal audits have an important and independent governance control func-
tion as they evaluate the structures and processes from a comprehensive framework perspective. 
Expert 13 also highlighted intragroup consensuses among accounting topics as prerequisite to se-
cure intragroup transparency. Furthermore, few experts (e.g. expert 4, 6 and 13) particularly recog-
nized the remuneration and compensation schemes as further relevant key topics. 
From an external governance perspective, the experts (e.g. expert 6, 9, 12, 14 and 19) outlined the 
external audit function. External auditors are defined as an independent external control function and 
have to secure public faith into the published information. In line with some other experts, especially 
expert 6, outlined that the external auditor activity increased due to stricter legal and regulatory re-
quirements and greater control activities of the national authorities. 
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Thematic cluster 4: Institutional company supervision (new cluster, derived from answers of 
questions in part B / question 3.1; 3.2 and 3.3) 
The role of supervisory and institutional control organs like the supervisory board or board of di-
rectors was also a matter of debate. Hereby, particularly the scope, its collection and relevance within 
a multinational group context have been discussed. Expert 6 realized that “… in the last years the due 
diligence obligations for the management members have been always defined in more detail.” Expert 
13 made clear that “the focus topics of the supervision for banks are in Germany clearly defined by the 
BaFin,” independent of whether those entities are part of a multinational group or not. 
Three of the experts pointed out the differences between the one tier and two tier systems and 
outlined the challenges to manage different board systems within a multinational group context. Expert 
16 and 23 explained that the German supervisory board concept completely differs from the Anglo-
Saxon markets (like in US, UK, Canada, India or South Africa) with its board of directors. While the 
directors in the board of directors´ concept are personally liable for the operational business, in Ger-
many there exists a clear separation of duties for “supervision and control” (supervisory board) and the 
“management of the operative business” (executive board). Two lawyers (expert 12 and 13) described 
the role from a German legal perspective, where the ‘Vorstand’ has a clear duty of care for the entire 
company. Paragraph § 130 AktG defines that the ‘Vorstand’ is responsible for adequate structures and 
processes to ensure supervision among the entire organization, including the subsidiaries.  
Some other experts (e.g. expert 6 and 8) stated that particularly the collaboration between the ex-
ecutive board and the supervisory board is of great importance. Expert 8 analyzed that in the su-
pervisory board concept there is a shift away from the pure control function towards an advisory func-
tion for the management board. He also explained that the member selection, individual fit and per-
sonnel composition of the supervisory board as well as the enforcement rights of the different supervi-
sory organs need to be clearly defined in group structures. Expert 13 cited that the interaction between 
the different institutional (subsidiary) supervisory bodies within the hierarchical intragroup context, the 
responsibilities for the agenda setting as well as the involvement of external independent directors 
have to be clarified. 
 
Thematic cluster 5: Strategic governance dimension: The role of the parent’s management 
body and its governance tasks and responsibilities (cf. part B / question 3.1; 3.2 and 3.3) 
All interview partners highlighted the special role of the parent’s management body (e.g. Board of 
Management) for the intragroup governance. Nearly all experts agreed that they are also responsible 
for the subsidiaries in their role as the legal representatives of the corporate group. For example, 
expert 19 analyzed that “…in a final consequence the parent’s executive board is also liable for com-
pliance or governance breaches.” The parent’s management body has a general guideline setting 
competence for the entire corporate group. He sets the general group-wide framework conditions and 
determines how the company should act in the respective markets and towards its internal and exter-
nal stakeholders. The experts outlined that the parent´s management body has to ensure organiza-
tional frameworks compliance and corporate governance practice. Expert 7 and 11 made clear that 
the parent’s executive board has a joint responsibility for corporate governance, which cannot be del-
egated like individual tasks. 
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There was a broad consensus among the interviewed experts that the executive is responsible to de-
fine and provide a governance framework for the group as major element of their strategic guide-
line competence. Expert 4 specified that “… the parent’s executive board sets the crash barriers via 
the group strategy formulation and the complex issues of corporate and leadership culture.” The par-
ent’s management body has to ensure appropriate governance structures and processes to secure 
accountabilities and transparent decision-making. Moreover, e.g. subject matter expert 10 supple-
mented that “… the parent’s executive board is also responsible for the implementation, continuous 
further development and monitoring of the whole governance system.” This also includes appropriate 
organizational governance structures and the consequent implementation of the Three Lines of 
Defense approach (cf. e.g. expert 7 and 14). 
The definition of the overall strategic direction is further recognized as another important task. To 
set the company-wide vision, strategy and interlinks to define clear targets for the business units and 
its subsidiaries, its monitoring and target achievement are typical responsibilities of the parent’s man-
agement body. It was noticeable that some of the experts (e.g. expert 2, 3, 13, 17 and 20) explicitly 
mentioned a consistent target management process across all hierarchy levels as a major govern-
ance instrument of the parent’s executive management body. They explain that the balance scorecard 
(BSC) is an often-applied intragroup instrument to manage and steer the strategy implementation. 
Expert 3 and 4 agreed that the BSC helps to break down the strategic targets in respect of the differ-
ent hierarchy levels and to operationalize the high-level group objectives into hard fact based and 
measurable targets for each business segment, subsidiary, department and finally for each employee, 
too. 
All interviewed experts mentioned the power of leadership as another powerful governance instru-
ment of the parent’s management body. The top management is responsible for the guidance as ex-
haustive part of their leadership role. They have to define understandable business strategies, which 
provide direction, accountability, and avoid any uncertainty for the employees. Expert 10 further out-
lined that they have to implement a code of conduct or code of ethics to support the integrity. This 
increases the identification with the company as well as the corporate values and provides behavioral 
and ethical guidance about what is expected. Those issues are a fundamental part of good leadership. 
Expert 15 completed that the executive board has to act reliably and accountably. The management 
body has to reflect and communicate this towards the employees, suppliers, the customers and the 
public in their daily business. Hereby, the experts also talked about integrity as key driver for leading 
people of different cultures and in different locations (e.g. expert 2, 14 and 22).  
Some experts (e.g. expert 7 and 22) outlined the importance and the effectiveness of the board 
communication, which is strongly linked to their role model function. Some experts even outlined that 
the manner of communication is the most important governance instrument of the parent’s manage-
ment board (e.g. expert 22). Expert 4 confirmed that “… the “tone at the top” is the most important 
instrument of the parent’s executive board and it has to be clear, trustworthy and credible.” Few ex-
perts debated the earlier mentioned code of conduct and company internal regulations as typical 
communication instruments. Expert 6 highlighted the relevance of regular intragroup management 
conferences as appropriate communication and discussion platform. 
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Their role for the corporate culture is closely linked to the leadership role and board communication. 
Twenty-one of the interviewed experts underlined that the parent’s management body is responsible 
for defining the pillars for the group-wide corporate culture. Expert 17 analyzed that “… the corporate 
culture minimizes potential governance gaps via integrity and their behavior in terms of missing guide-
lines and instructions which cannot be defined for each case.“ According to expert 19 it is crucial that 
the executive management board creates the target picture and develops a cultural self-conception for 
the group in collaboration with the employees. They are responsible for aligning the corporate culture 
and organizational structures, so that it is possible to perform business in a compliant way. 
Some experts (e.g. expert 6 and 7) pointed out that the parent’s management body has to develop 
and define the appropriate internal control and oversight instruments for the entire group. Hereby, 
expert 2 and 4 mentioned in particular the implementation of clear reporting lines and regular man-
agement reporting. Expert 4 explained, that the parent’s management body mostly relies on (external) 
reporting lines which provide proactive information as a foundation of their decisions. Expert 12 and 20 
analyzed that a close collaboration with the internal control functions is needed. Moreover, the internal 
control system plays a crucial role to execute their governance role. Those elements particularly play a 
decisive role in the context of complex organizational structures, to ensure oversight, a certain level of 
alignment, and control. Expert 4 elucidated that “… the typical governance instruments for the execu-
tive management board are internal and external audits.” 
Among others, expert 12 and 14 stated that they are responsible for a comprehensive group-wide 
risk management framework in all its complexities and interrelations. It has to respond to the identi-
fied risks in an adequate manner, under the consideration of the applicable legislation and appropriate 
governance structures. Expert 10 supplemented, that it is also important for the parent’s executive 
management board to have transparency of potential risks in the different subsidiaries. Further, there 
are different regulatory requirements for the risk management in financial services companies, which 
need to be considered. The experts mentioned that the executive management body is responsible for 
defining the balance between risk appetite and risk minimization to clarify their expectations for the 
group. 
Expert 19 remarked that the definition of the compensation framework is also a typical responsibility 
of the parent’s management body. Expert 5 agreed that “… the remuneration and compensation sys-
tem of a company is another relevant governance instrument.” The individual compensation should 
consist of a fixed and variable component that reflects the level of achievement of the set targets and 
performed training activities (cf. expert 5). From a parent perspective, particularly the remuneration of 
the management bodies on subsidiary level (usually the MDs and FDs), of risk takers and other gov-
ernance related key functions, have to remain in the foreground. 
Some experts (e.g. expert 2 and 5) indicated that the parent’s management body has to define pro-
cedures for governance or compliance breaches. They have to define, communicate and enforce 
sanctions in case of misconduct.  
“The HR recruitment and development are also crucial governance instruments,” agreed both, expert 
6 and 24. Thus, the parent’s management body has to develop principles for the staffing of key 
management positions. The HR recruitment and their adequate deployment in accordance with their 
qualifications, personal skills and their supervision are essential. 
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Among others, especially expert 1, 2, 14 and 19 mentioned that the parent’s management body has 
an obligation to represent the corporate group and its interests in the public as well as towards 
externals. Expert 10 remembered that they are also held responsible for the corporate social respon-
sibility and corporate sustainability activities within the group. 
Some experts (e.g. expert 5, 7, 8 and 9) in this context differentiated between internal and external 
governance responsibilities of the parent’s management body. According to expert 5 “…the external 
governance [e.g. annual financial reporting, published corporate governance reports, remuneration 
reports or the supervisory boards etc.] is not that effective as a strong internal governance.” The 
statement of expert 8 generally confirmed this. 
 
Thematic cluster 6: Operative governance dimension: The role of the divisional head and its 
tasks and responsibilities (cf. part B / question 4.1 and 4.2) 
Seventeen of the interviewed subject matter experts agreed, that the divisional head plays a key role 
for the intragroup corporate governance management of financial services subsidiaries. He is in 
charge of defining the governance scope and the intragroup corporate governance approach in close 
collaboration with the parent’s management body. Expert 1 stated that the divisional head acts as 
transformer or multiplier of governance topics from the parent’s management body that are introduced 
into the financial services organization. Expert 3 explained that those top managers advise the par-
ent’s management body and play a decisive, supportive role for the effectiveness of the intragroup 
corporate governance. According to eight experts (e.g. expert 2 and 20) the major role of the divisional 
head is to coordinate and interact between the overarching group strategy, the parent’s headquarters 
functions and the foreign subsidiaries. Fourteen experts explained that his role is to act as the linking 
function, which has to operationalize the governance framework regarding the specific business model 
of the division to minimize the governance deviation between the central and decentral organizational 
units. According to four experts, the operational responsibility lies with him. He has to transform the 
group targets into the business model and define, prioritize and monitor measures for the division, to 
make sure that they are achieved in the desired way. Among others, expert 19 described that the divi-
sional head typically defines the governance standards which require a worldwide coordination and 
common understanding to assure a certain level of standardization, alignment and efficiency, but also 
enough freedom and flexibility for the subsidiaries to adjust them to their needs. While expert 9 sum-
marized that it is essential to have the “…most professional, best qualified and motivated mangers in 
those key positions,” subject matter expert 5 underlined, that “… the divisional head is in a corporate 
governance context also responsible to request the mandate, relevant resources and adequate in-
struments from the parent’s management body to ensure intragroup governance in his division.” He 
has to design and adjust governance structures, processes, framework, control mechanisms and in-
strumentals internal audit (in a positive manner) to secure clear roles, responsibility and accountability 
among the subsidiary network. Expert 3 compared the role of the divisional head with a membrane. 
He stated that “…he [divisional head] needs to be permeable for information top down and bottom up, 
provides information and transparency about relevant issues within the organization, where topics 
come up, where management and steering is required, simply where more governance is needed to 
reach the agreed targets and avoid organizational failure.” Expert 7 explained that “in the context of 
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our multinational organization there is a central overall responsibility of the parent’s management body 
which cannot get delegated by law. But we have the organizational responsibility delegated towards 
the head of financial services who has an organizational responsibility for all decentralized financial 
services subsidiaries.” 
Expert 10 and 11 made clear, that the divisional head has to secure that the nominated candidates for 
management bodies on subsidiary level and key governance functions have the required skillset, pro-
fessional qualifications and personal fit for the desired position. Five of the interviewed experts (e.g. 
expert 10 and 11) explained that comprehensive monitoring and reporting are also a governance 
task of the divisional head (e.g. to the parent’s management body, the supervisory board, board of 
directors, national regulators or supervisory authorities). Expert 6 made clear that he also has en-
forcement rights towards the subsidiaries with e.g. approval competencies for certain business deci-
sions that go far beyond the daily business (e.g. investment decisions, liquidation of a branch or other 
legal entity etc.). Four experts confirmed that it is common practice in intragroup constructs that the 
divisional head is a member of supervisory boards or the board of directors in the subsidiaries. Expert 
6 declared that “he can execute the required control and monitoring in a corporate governance context 
in this role as a representative of the company owner.” 
It was obvious that the experts outlined, that the divisional head plays, especially in the financial ser-
vices division, a key role for the governance management. Expert 6 explained that the divisional head 
of an automotive financial services division has to manage and steer a network of subsidiaries around 
the world and the employees are not based in one location. Expert 17 and 19 supplemented that the 
financial services business is strongly influenced and regulated by national regulators and bank-
ing supervisory authorities. Consequently, there is a much higher necessity for regular reviews 
about the appropriateness of the governance structures. Expert 12 noticed, that the divisional head 
has the same personal liability as the parent’s management body and is accountable the business 
activities in his area of responsibility, which he got formally ascribed from the parent’s management 
body. Expert 24 agreed that “…he [divisional head] is responsible for the corporate governance organ-
ization in his division!” 
Numerous experts (e.g. expert 3, 6, 8 and 12) outlined that the divisional head plays another compul-
sory role within the decision-making procedures on a group-wide and subsidiary level. Intragroup 
expert committees have an important advisory function for the divisional head and are a central gov-
ernance instrument. Expert 8 pointed out that “…such committees help to bundle competencies and 
increase transparency and foster decision-making.” 
 
Thematic cluster 7: Subsidiary governance dimension: The role of the management body on 
subsidiary level (usually MDs and FDs) (cf. part B / question 5.1) 
The management bodies of the subsidiaries have an interlinkage and coordination function be-
tween the parent’s headquarters and the subsidiaries. All experts agreed that they play a key govern-
ance role. Expert 14 made clear that “…whether a company has a good corporate governance is de-
cided in the subsidiaries.” Expert 1 supplemented that “…it depends much on the individual manager 
how governance is executed within a subsidiary” and expert 4 clarified that “…governance without the 
local management commitment will never work.” Four experts (expert 12, 14, 19 and 20) remarked 
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that the members of the subsidiaries’ management body are the local representative of the parent’s 
management body. Expert 13 analyzed that “…the local management has the same tasks and re-
sponsibilities in terms of governance than the executive board on a global level.” They are “…the bind-
ing element to close the cultural, geographical, legal and regulatory gap between the headquarters 
and local subsidiary” (cf. expert 17). They have to deal with different national cultures and leadership 
styles, which are essential to be locally successful. Expert 8, 20 and 21 added that the they have a 
supervision and steering function for the subsidiary and get supported by different headquarters func-
tions. 
All the interviewed experts outlined that they are the legal representatives of the subsidiary and re-
quire a certain level of independency, which means that the parent cannot predefine all issues. This is 
a major obstacle and has a huge impact towards the group-wide corporate governance management. 
Expert 9 and 23 highlighted, that in some countries (e.g. USA the MDs and FDs are) they are person-
ally liable for the fulfillment of regulatory requirements, but if they can prove that they could not fulfill 
certain legal or regulatory obligations because of missing resources from its parent, they can excul-
pate their selves to a certain degree.  
Expert 7 felt confident that “the local MD is the key person for the relationship between the overseas 
headquarters and local subsidiary. He needs outstanding knowledge of how the multinational struc-
tures and governance mechanisms work and requires a good realistic evaluation where his scope of 
action has its limits.” 
Nearly all interviewed subject matter experts summarized that the local leadership teams are held 
responsible for the implementation of legal and regulatory requirements and their consideration in 
the host country. Expert 18 outlined the necessity for local management teams to not implement a 
culture of ignorance for governance and compliance breaches. There is an increased awareness of 
the supervisory authorities in financial services entities for their governance structures. According to 
the executive board experiences of expert 18, it is important that they get the impression that they 
have the general framework understanding during their audits or evaluation meetings with the local 
managements of the subsidiaries. He pointed out that “they focus on an adequate, good, comprehen-
sive, satisfactory level of control, systems and measures to secure compliance and governance of the 
company.” He explained that “…the MD and FD of the subsidiaries have to ensure the compliance in a 
broadness and solely in a certain level of deepness.” Three experts mentioned that many countries 
introduced “fit and proper” tests for senior staff, which are executed from the national banking authori-
ties. Those developments become increasingly important and have to be considered in the succession 
planning and nomination of board members in subsidiaries. 
Seventeen of the experts mentioned that the local management teams are held responsible for the 
implementation of intragroup standards, which are predefined from their parent to ensure a certain 
level of lucency and alignment among all subsidiaries. Expert 5 and 24 stated “… that they are re-
sponsible for critically evaluating which topics or centrally defined requirements from the parent’s 
headquarters are possible to implement and which regulations require a further local detailing or ad-
justment.” 
Additionally, they are in charge of the strategy implementation in a local context. According to expert 
12 and several other interviewed experts, the local leadership teams are responsible for transferring 
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the overarching group strategy into concrete business actions on subsidiary level. Expert 12 noticed 
that “…the local management has to interpret and transform the generic, high level strategic direction 
into the context of the local legal and regulatory and business context.” 
It was conspicuous, that some of the subject matter experts depicted the relevance of a proper 
stakeholder management in the host country as another crucial management task. Expert 20 ex-
plained the importance that the local boards understand the local market conditions and different inter-
relationships between the subsidiaries in the market (e.g. automotive sales company versus car deal-
ers and financial services company) and the subsidiary role within the OEM network. Expert 20 goes 
beyond that and highlighted the relevance (particularly as a foreign company) to have transparency 
and a good relationship to the external stakeholders e.g. to the local regulators and supervisory au-
thorities in the host country, auditors, other banks and competitors. He argues that it is “…a kind of an 
early protection system, because as local MD or FD it is very important to get access to relevant mar-
ket insights to evaluate the local market and notice potential issues, which may become critical in near 
future as early as possible.” 
The subsidiary’s management body plays a central role for the local leadership understanding and 
corporate culture. They have to interpret the role model function on a local level. Many experts (e.g. 
expert 13 and 17) circumstantiated in this context again the importance of integrity. Expert 12 charac-
terized that “those local MDs and FDs have to act proactively as independent entrepreneurs and have 
to search for new business opportunities, but on the other side they must also follow respective gov-
ernance standards […] and take over their responsibility.” Expert 18 clarified concerning his CEO ex-
perience that “for me this the whole topic of leadership and corporate culture a very important key 
drivers to manage corporate governance.” 
Quite a few experts (e.g. expert 4, 14 and 19) outlined that divergent intercultural differences need 
to be aligned and to be managed on a professional level from the local management body. Intercultur-
al differences between national cultures must be transparent, because they largely influence the man-
agement of corporate governance topics and the collaboration in the day-to-day business. There is a 
different understanding and awareness for governance among jurisdictions and different legal sys-
tems. According to the experiences of expert 4 “…there is often a completely different sensibility, un-
derstanding and awareness for governance and compliance in e.g. Germany, China or Brazil and this 
needs to be considered.” Different existing governance standards also lead to different levels of atten-
tion among local managers and supervisory authorities. In sum, nine experts agreed that the local 
management has to transform the topics from the parent’s headquarters into the local intercultural 
context towards their employees. 
 
Thematic cluster 8: Intragroup management approaches for subsidiary governance (cf. part B / 
question 5.2) 
All experts agreed that the development of a group-wide target picture is an essential precondition 
for corporate governance. The intention is to reach a group-wide consensus about definition, pur-
pose and objective of intragroup corporate governance standards and focus topics. Afterwards it 
should be analyzed which level of detail is appropriate to ensure both a group-wide standard and 
enough flexibility to address local specifics. Expert 2 and 3 explained that it is obligatory to have an 
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entirely standardized governance framework with respective decision-making mechanisms for the 
subsidiaries. Expert 24 declared that the corporate parent usually sets up framework provisions, which 
describe in detail the responsibilities of the corporate parent and its daughter companies. In case of 
financial services subsidiaries there are certain variations due to the importance of particular topics. 
Such agreements clearly define which topics are either in a central versus decentral responsibility. 
It is a noticeable finding that the experts agreed that corporate governance on a subsidiary level is 
also always a clear joint responsibility of the parent’s board. The group CEO and its other board 
members have to cascade it down towards the divisional head of financial services and from there 
towards the members of the management bodies on subsidiary level. Few subject matter experts (e.g. 
expert 3, 9, 17 and 18) stated that the subsidiaries’ management body is held responsible for the gov-
ernance implementation in a local context. 
Yet, the experts also agreed that there are many multiple influencing factors which have to be con-
sidered within the definition of the right corporate governance management approach. Expert 10 indi-
cated that there is no ‘one size fits all’ approach. The level of steering and its need for management 
coming from the parent’s headquarters varies among industries, companies and the individual busi-
ness model. Apart from that, it always depends on the organizational and legal construct of the multi-
national group and the current stage of the corporate life cycle. Expert 21 explained that “…most mul-
tinationals follow a decentralized approach to secure local flexibility in order to react faster and better 
towards local regulatory requirements. Moreover, further relevant influencing factors are e.g. the busi-
ness model, complexity of the products, regulation, the business license, general company setup and 
the reporting requirements.” Similarly, expert 22 confirmed that the vast majority of the multinational 
groups in the automotive industry are decentrally organized. Expert 12 summarized that a 
“…centralized approach leads to greater inflexibility, but therefore to a common implementation. Fol-
lowing a central approach in a decentral organization can lead to challenges regarding the level of 
standardization and the implementation of governance.” In essence, it will be challenging or even im-
possible to define general accepted standards, which fit to the heterogeneous market environments. 
According to expert 4 “…there is a permanent stress ratio between centralization and decentraliza-
tion.” Expert 13 and 22 argued that it further depends on the corporate culture, because there are 
firms that are successful with both approaches.  
Several subject matter experts also outlined the necessity to clarify the parent’s governance role for 
the subsidiary network. All experts agreed that the headquarters usually establish a generic group-
wide standard to set the general intragroup framework conditions. The parent’s headquarters has to 
secure that subsidiaries all follow the same structural and procedural approach. Aligned governance 
structures increase transparency, an effective subsidiary management and provide crucial guidance 
for the staff. A number of experts pointed out that the subsidiaries on the one hand are legal inde-
pendent entities, but out of a home country perspective, the parent also has a clear duty of care obli-
gation. Even so, expert 7 remarked that “…from a legal point of view the parent’s headquarters has 
only a limited enforcement option towards the subsidiaries via terms and conditions, corporate rules or 
guidelines.” Expert 4 recommended that the parent’s headquarters is responsible for legal and regula-
tory issues with a group-wide applicability, strategic relevance or a high reputational relevance for the 
entire multinational group. 
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Some experts also advised to follow a rather central governance management approach for all 
relevant topics from a parent perspective (e.g. like grading, risk management, CEO responsibilities). 
Those topics should be identified and managed centrally and group-wide standards should be defined. 
They also agreed that exceptions have to be possible if there are local legal restrictions. Few experts 
(e.g. expert 9, 18 and 23) raised concerns about a complete centralization, because local subsidiaries 
would not feel responsible for such topics. The experts clarified that it would not be possible to handle 
all local market specifics of each host country by one central parent unit, and they suggested to take a 
more decentralized approach. For that reason, a slight majority of the experts (e.g. expert 1, 2, 12, 
13,14, 18, 20 and 23) preferred a decentralized approach and recommended to implement a principle 
based approach with pre-defined minimum requirements from the parent’s headquarters to secure a 
certain level of comparability, also in a decentral approach. According to the long executive experi-
ence of expert 22, he underlined that particularly „… in decentral structures it is crucial that the man-
agers know that they are held responsible for the local business, but also under the consideration of 
the defined boundaries of corporate governance.” 
A vast majority (e.g. expert 2, 3, 18, 19, 20 and 21) recommended a subsidiarity principle based 
governance management approach, in which the parent solely sets the general framework condi-
tions with minimum standards for relevant governance topics. Comprehensive framework provisions 
describe in detail the responsibilities and action scope of the subsidiaries. Expert 2, 3 and 18 ex-
plained that a multinational group has to follow a balanced approach according to the subsidiarity prin-
ciple. In certain topics, more guidance of the parent may be required, while concerning other topics 
less is needed. Expert 7 and 9 experienced that most multinational groups define the governance 
question for each topic individually. Expert 3 outlined that “…the parent’s headquarters can only in-
struct the subsidiaries to regulate certain topics which are core topics out of the parent’s perspective, 
but the implementation has to be executed from the local subsidiary in accordance with the local busi-
ness environment, local law and regulations.” In sum, particularly experts 5, 6, 7 and 9 postulated that 
it is not possible to state which approach is more effective and recommend to answer this for each 
governance topic separately.  
Furthermore, six of the interviewed experts (e.g. expert 9) agreed that the Three Lines of Defense 
Model is an often-applied approach for the management and steering of multinational organizations. 
Four experts (e.g. 6 and 14) outlined that this model is commonly implemented in subsidiary struc-
tures, as it defines the various independent supervisory and control tasks, combines them with the 
subsidiarity principles and ensures the individual responsibility. The experts (e.g. expert 7, 13, 16) also 
mentioned the necessity to consider the specifics of the financial services business in the multina-
tional context. Expert 21 analyzed that “there is a kind of dualism.” For regulatory topics, it makes 
sense to follow a mixed approach, which means that the local specifics get coordinated by the subsid-
iary, but is supported from a parent’s governance function. In this context some experts (e.g. expert 7, 
18 and 24) supplemented to also take into account the strong role of the national regulators. 
Few experts (e.g. expert 6, 9, 16 and 22) described the necessity to define consistent intragroup gov-
ernance reporting and control mechanisms. Governance targets should be defined and monitored 
by a consolidating, but also independent control function (e.g. internal audit), which is in a dual report-
ing line to the parent’s management body, but also towards the management body on local level. 
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Again, at least five experts (e.g. expert 10) declared the obligation to consider intercultural differ-
ences, language barriers and possible different corporate governance systems within the decision of a 
rather central or decentral management approach. 
 
Thematic cluster 9: Key drivers (success factors) for professional intragroup subsidiary gov-
ernance (cf. part B / question 5.3) 
Eight subject matter experts (e.g. expert 2, 3, 8, 15 and 19) agreed that intragroup transparency 
and communication are the two key elements for effective intragroup corporate governance man-
agement. Expert 1 explained that “it is most important to share the company specific definition of cor-
porate governance, because this defines the expectations of the overseas headquarters to their sub-
sidiaries.” Expert 8 supplemented that this ensures that “roles and responsibilities are clearly defined 
and accountability is internally but also externally transparent.” 
Almost all interviewed subject matter experts (e.g. expert 4, 7 and 21) agreed that a common under-
standing of the group-wide corporate governance framework is another crucial success factor. 
Expert 7 stated that consistency is fundamental for governance mechanisms to be effective, because 
“…if only one element is missing, the whole governance framework will not be effective.” Expert 4 
highlighted the importance to “…ensure a regular exchange of managers within the entire corporate 
group to foster and support the network thinking and framework understanding.” 
This corresponds to the clear recommendation of nine subject matter experts (e.g. expert 7, 14 and 
17) to agree on holistic group-wide standards for key areas. Expert 14 and 19 said that the definition 
and implementation of pre-defined intragroup minimum standards have to be principle based and 
should follow the subsidiarity principle. The experts outlined the necessity for flexibility to incorpo-
rate local specifics. Expert 6 emphasized to favor a balanced approach with a glocal approach. The 
foreign subsidiaries have to identify and implement the local requirements. Particularly subject matter 
expert 11 outlined the necessity of a sufficient intragroup resource allocation. Compliance and 
governance are mandatory for all companies, but there are required time and financial resources to 
ensure its professional management. According to expert 5 it is of course a prominent concern that 
“…the local MDs and FDs have enough resources available to fulfill their duties, legal and regulatory 
requirements.” In turn, to fulfill their legal duty of care, the local management also has the obligation to 
request enough resources to ensure compliance. 
Especially the interviewed top managers found that documentation and archiving become increas-
ingly important regarding management liability. A vast majority (e.g. expert 3; 21) also described the 
key role of a clear process orientation of intragroup core processes. Expert 2 outlined that “…well 
defined and lived processes are a key in organizations with decentralized structures, because it de-
fines who communicates what with whom and in which way.”  
Additionally, the experts (e.g. expert 1, 2, 3, 5 and 7) recommended to allocate approaches on how to 
deal with the complexity of internal governance targets and it’s monitoring. All governance com-
ponents have to be connected and they need to supplement each other. Corporate governance is no 
standalone KPI. Some experts even stated that it is impossible to quantify the benefits in meaningful 
key performance indicators, because it relies more on the mindset and the willingness of the people. 
Eight of the interviewed top managers explained, that the fulfillment of corporate governance require-
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ments has to be clearly delegated from the parent in appropriate terms and conditions contracts. It has 
to be documented that every MD and FD has a legal obligation for corporate governance in his or her 
organization. Moreover, the experts stated that there should also be governance, culture and compli-
ance targets included in the balance scorecard to counterbalance profitability targets - and highlight 
the relevance of such topics – also towards external authorities. Four top managers recommended 
that every manager should have integrity topics as part of his personal targets.  
The subject matter experts (e.g. expert 4, 10, 12, 14 and 18) agreed to the key role of corporate 
culture to bridge governance gaps. There is a high correspondence that the business culture is an 
important factor for corporate governance. The experts explain that culture is heterogeneous, complex 
and flexible. It is essential that there is a clear communication by the top management about the de-
sired core values and elements of company culture. Expert 4 made a clear statement that 
“…corporate culture has to act as a net for governance gaps and must be based on trust. Finally gov-
ernance depends on inter-human relationship […] the most important factor is the willingness of the 
local management.” While few experts (e.g. expert 19) agreed with this statement, three subject mat-
ter experts (expert 10, 17 and 18) outlined the necessity to supplement it with the right leadership 
style. 
Subject matter expert 13 cited that governance begins with the staffing of key (management) func-
tions and expert 9 felt confident that “HR topics are a key driver for governance”. Expert 13 outlined 
the great importance of the recruitment, nomination and succession planning of management posi-
tions. Particularly expert 13 said that, “integrity is a key requirement within the management selection 
for governance related key functions in our company.” Further, continuous training and education 
played an important role for the interviewed experts. One expert stated that “competence is the key for 
everything!”, and several other experts also confirmed this. 
The interviewed managers recognized the opportunity of whistleblowing as a crucial success fac-
tor. One of the top managers (expert 23) of an OEM added that “this is a very important instrument for 
the self-evaluation and self-regulation of each organization in terms of governance and compliance. 
There are mechanisms needed for people to raise their concerns when they see that something is not 
working right, particularly in very hierarchical structures like in many OEMs.” 
The experts explained that there are consistent predefined actions needed for governance or 
compliance breaches. Several top managers (e.g. expert 18) outlined the importance to communi-
cate that there is no tolerance accepted for any compliance breaches. 
Further, some experts described the necessity for a professional management of the subsidiary 
control organs (e.g. supervisory board/ board of directors) and the benefits of integrating new tech-
nologies, such as big data. Subject matter expert 9 explained that many companies search for ways 
of using new technologies to strengthen their internal governance management. 
 
Thematic cluster 10: Benefits of subsidiary governance (cf. part B / question 5.4) 
Expert 6, 7, 12 and 13 outlined that increased transparency is the most important superordinate ben-
efit. Expert 12 clarified that this is the overachieving goal of all measures, because it forms the founda-
tion for all decisions, which have to be taken in the organization. Expert 6 differentiated between 
shareholders and stakeholders and pointed out “…that governance helps to implement structures 
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which ensure that company internal processes become more transparent and traceable for externals.” 
Additionally, he said that “…without internal transparency it is impossible to ensure sustainable busi-
ness success.”  Besides, expert 12 stated that this is the foundation for all decisions to be taken, im-
proves the risk management and is directly linked to a firms’ competitiveness. 
All interviewed experts approved that the obligatory fulfillment of legal and regulatory require-
ments can also be seen as benefit. A few experts (e.g. expert 9, 13, 14, 15, 17, 20, 21 and 23) ex-
plained that this, particularly in the financial services industry, plays an important role. Expert 9 recog-
nized that “…it can be seen as part of the risk management, and the benefits are avoided legal pro-
ceedings, penalties or fines, reputational damages or the retention of the banking license.” Expert 19 
supplemented that “corporate governance and compliance topics are not negotiable for the subsidiar-
ies.” 
A number of interviewed experts (e.g. expert 6, 11, 24) remembered that it is a legal obligation for 
listed entities to declare e.g. in Germany their conformity with the corporate governance principles with 
a ‘comply or explain’ approach. Expert 11 felt confident that “…listed companies with a high public 
awareness have a great self-interest to communicate that they fulfill all the external requirements and 
that they have to implement functions, processes, standards and structures.”  
Several experts (e.g. expert 5, 13, 16 21 and 23) underlined that it further helps to mitigate manage-
ment liability. Expert 13 made clear that “… an investment in governance structures is the fulfillment 
of the personal duty of care…” of each executive. The implementation of a preventive compliance 
management system can reduce its personal liability. Subject matter expert 5 said that they perform 
regular governance risk assessments, in which they primarily focus on legal and regulatory topics with 
a high financial or reputational damage probability. Expert 23 even defined corporate governance as 
the “personal life insurance of each top manager”, and that he therefore has a great self-interest to 
have effective governance structures in place. 
There was a broad approval among the interviewed experts (e.g. expert 5, 14, 16 and 23) that proper 
governance standards minimize (reputational) risks. Expert 14 clarified that “…the reputational 
risk is getting more and more important for companies.” Expert 23 summarized that “corporate gov-
ernance practice is the cost for good reputation.” The reputational consequences of governance 
breaches are incalculable risks. Besides, the interviewed top managers (e.g. expert 17, 18 and 23) 
agreed that the public awareness and public pressure on politicians to impose legal infringements for 
breaches in firms is currently on a high level. Expert 17 confirmed that “…there is no doubt that some 
countries use it as an enforcement instrument to support their economy politics” and foreign compa-
nies have to be aware about this (e.g. in China). Expert 17 pronounced that “…in many countries there 
is a higher awareness of local banking supervisory authorities on the foreign companies and a much 
stricter zero tolerance approach compared to their local companies.” 
A few experts (e.g. expert 1, 4, 7, 8, 12 and 13) further agreed that proper governance structures re-
sult in a better organizational performance. Some of the experts analyzed that a higher level of 
standardization increases the companywide organizational performance with clearly defined process-
es, roles, responsibilities and decision-making procedures. According to expert 2 “…a high degree of 
standardization (processes) forms the foundation for regular improvement loops.” However, expert 1 
criticized that “…organizations become more bureaucratic and slower with governance”, even if he 
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feels convinced that the positive effects weight much stronger. Expert 7 made clear that “…clear struc-
tures and processes are the key for every organization… this helps to speed up processes and align-
ment and increases therefore efficiency.”  
Altogether, all those statements were closely linked to the general perception of the interviewed sub-
ject matter experts that carefully designed governance supports the competitiveness of a firm (e.g. 
expert 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 12 and 13). Corporate governance ensures a higher productivity and effectiveness 
if it is stringently executed with clear and rigorous practices (cf. e.g. expert 8 and 9). Expert 23 cited 
that “…corporate governance reduces fraud, corruption, errors, liability to the individuals of the com-
pany, compliance cases, and avoids costs.” Particularly expert 9 summarized, that corporate govern-
ance is an important enabler for gaining competitive advantages, because of “…transparent process-
es, clear reporting lines and efficient decision-making… good governance mechanisms act in this con-
text as an early warning indicator....” Expert 10 analyzed that “…a proper governance structure ena-
bles an organization to publish faster e.g. financial figures which leads towards a faster reaction time 
in case of any misdirection.” However, expert 4 raised concerns and explained that corporate govern-
ance is also a limiting factor, because the flexibility and agility within a market would be stronger if 
there would were only few centrally defined corporate standards and regulations. 
Furthermore, most of the experts (e.g. expert 3, 5, 8, 9, 12 and 13) feel confident that there are posi-
tive effects on a firm’s innovation capacity, even if they also accept that it is difficult to prove based 
on facts, that the reason for the innovation capabilities or competitiveness of a firm largely depends on 
their governance structures. Despite this, subject matter expert 9 explained that, “if governance gets 
connected with the organizational structures – there is a significant impact on innovation.” 
Additionally, the experts’ confirmed positive effects on the sustainability (e.g. expert 4, 6, 7, 8, 12 and 
13). Expert 6 outlined that effective governance and compliance structures are the fundament of a 
sustainable business development. Expert 7 supplemented that governance structures are fundamen-
tal to avoid compliance and governance breaches or scandals. Subject matter expert 4 linked sustain-
ability with organizational performance. 
The vast majority of the interviewed experts confirmed that corporate governance has positive effects 
on leadership and corporate culture (e.g. expert 4, 8, 12, 13, 15, 19, 22 and 24). Subject matter 
expert 22 underlined the necessity for a value driven leadership approach. Three experts (expert 19, 
22 and 24) clarified that governance and compliance topics have to be non-negotiable core values of 
every corporate culture. Following the corporate governance principles has to be a fundamental part of 
the intragroup business culture. 
Experts, such as expert 6 or expert 10, draw further conclusions and found that corporate governance 
leads to more confidence of the investors and other stakeholders. Expert 10 analyzed that 
“…governance indicates security and continuity, which is also important for e.g. customers or suppli-
ers. It indicates that they follow and fulfill certain business standards which they expect from their 
business partners.” 
Expert 20 outlined that governance reduces audit findings of all, the internal audit, external audit but 
also of the supervisory authorities, and he concluded that it could otherwise result in high fines or, in a 
worst-case scenario, in the withdrawal of the business or banking license. Expert 23 also remembered 
 195 
 
that “…without proper governance you do not even get a business license if you cannot demonstrate 
the respective management capabilities.” 
In sum, six of the interviewed experts confirmed that it is difficult to quantify the benefits of corporate 
governance. No one of the interviewed experts rejected that there are positive effects on the company, 
but accepted that they are difficult to quantify. 
 
Thematic cluster 11: Limitations for a centralized management approach for intragroup gov-
ernance (cf. part B / question 5.5) 
It was noticeable that there is a certain uncertainty about the parent’s enforcement rights towards 
the subsidiaries. Expert 12 said “this is very difficult and a much discussed issue. This has to answer 
every organization for their selves.” Several subject matter experts (e.g. expert 3, 5 and 10) defined 
that the limitations for centralization are given by the topics. Expert 7 confessed that there is no gen-
eral statement possible. According to the opinion of experts 17, 19 and 23 it is a grey area for many 
organizations. Subsidiaries have a clear dependency on the corporate parent and have to follow its 
requirements. Expert 2 said that “in Germany the corporate parent always has a certain residual risk 
for their subsidiaries, if the profits and loses get transferred towards the corporate parents balance 
sheets. In this case the parent is always responsible for taking over some monitoring and steering 
activities…”  
In contrast to this expert 17 remembered that there is de facto no legal enforcement option for the 
corporate parent. At first, subsidiaries are locally registered independent companies in the respective 
host country. The local members of the management body (e.g. MD and FD) are the legal representa-
tives and local national authorities will make them liable for breaches. Expert 11 and 19 suggested to 
solve this challenge via the deepness of the predefined intragroup requirements. The parent should 
predefine comparable high-level standards and everything, which is going beyond this refers to the 
local responsibility. He explained that many parent entities formally formulate only “strong recommen-
dations” to the local management bodies of the subsidiaries, who have to take the formal decision on 
an apparent independent basis. Expert 24 declared that “if we talk about the banking business, it is 
clearly defined that there is no opportunity to intervene [from the headquarters] into the core compe-
tences of the business [e.g. operative business] of the subsidiary…” 
A large majority of the interviewed subject matter experts (e.g. expert 1, 2, 5, 6, 9, 11, 15, 20, 21 and 
22) explained that the limitations are given by the specific legal and regulatory requirements in each 
country. Representing others, expert 1 clarified that “…local market specifics of each country and each 
legal entity structure in the host countries cannot be managed out of an overseas headquarters.” Sub-
ject matter expert 5 stated that “…the local MDs and FDs are responsible for ensuring the overall legal 
and financial compliance, but the parent’s headquarters obligation is to free up the required re-
sources.” Expert 4 outlined that there has to be a clear statement from the parent that the fulfillment of 
local legislation is the highest priority. Expert 6 stated that any group-internal regulations, that restrict 
the action scope of the subsidiary boards are invalid. It is not allowed to limit the local management 
sovereignty via intragroup instructions.  
Expert 8 responded that this depends on whether the group is organized either as finance or as man-
agement holding construct. In contrast, subject matter expert 6 felt confident that “…the limits are pre-
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defined. They are there where the parent’s headquarters tries to establish internal rules which do not 
comply with local regulations.” 
Some experts (e.g. expert 10, 14 and 23) further listed organizational limitations. For example, sub-
ject matter expert 10 outlined “…there is a great need that there are predefined organizational struc-
tures and key processes from the overseas headquarters.” A single organizational blueprint for all the 
subsidiaries ensures that all subsidiaries act in the same way with the same systematic organizational 
processual thinking. Expert 10 further suggested to implement a ‘comply or explain’ approach. Expert 
14 also underlined that “the overseas headquarters have a guideline setting competence for methods, 
processes and structures. In the end “short and sweet” is important. It is the typical target picture of 
think global but act local.” 
Few experts (e.g. expert 16 and 18) recommended not to underestimate the impact of informal limi-
tation mechanisms, such as the corporate culture. Expert 16 made clear that “…every local MD 
and FD knows that the parent’s executive management board and the divisional head in the parent’s 
headquarters are responsible for their next career steps.” This stand-alone fact already ensures that 
the local senior staff usually follows the instructions of their corporate parent. Reflecting his CEO histo-
ry in various countries, expert 13 explained that “…if the local negotiation techniques, national cultures 
etc. are completely different than in the country of the overseas headquarters, usually also the values 
vary and can lead to major challenges. For example, while corruption is part of the daily business in 
some countries, in others cultures there is a zero tolerance for such behavior.” 
 
Thematic cluster 12: Intragroup sanction mechanisms (cf. part B / question 5.6) 
Expert 3 made clear that the overachieving objective has to be to avoid escalations where it is possi-
ble. It is better to define concrete measures for governance standards in advance than to sanction 
them afterwards. 
According to expert 12 it is a prerequisite for the enforcement rights (of the parent’s headquarters 
towards the subsidiaries) to have respective group-internal regulations that are also transferred to 
framework contracts. He outlined that it is necessary to define which failures have to be sanctioned in 
which way. Expert 19 emphasized that, if the local MD does not implement the parent’s standards, he 
can be immediately replaced from the parent as the official company owner. 
Besides, three of the interviewed experts (expert 12, 14 and 15) mentioned that it is crucial to discuss 
and communicate the sanctions and possible consequences for governance breaches in an open 
and transparent way (e.g. via a rule book). Expert 12 explained, “…the general prerequisite for sanc-
tions is the existence of respective company rules which need to be transferred into personal con-
tracts.” Additionally, eight of the subject matter experts (e.g. expert 2 and 12) highlighted that it has to 
be obligatory to enforce communicated sanction mechanisms if people will not follow the rules.  
Nevertheless, the interviewed managers (e.g. expert 2 and 6) ranked independent investigations of 
governance and compliance breaches as equally important. Herby, the experts (e.g. expert 3, 4 and 
22) outlined the role of internal audit within the (governance / fraud) investigations. Expert 22 recom-
mended promoting internal audit not solely as control function, but rather as internal consultants. Six 
subject matter experts confirmed good experiences with task force approaches to independently sup-
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port local fraud investigations. Again, some experts (e.g. 22 and 23) mentioned the relevance of inter-
nal whistleblowing hotlines for employees to report proactively (anonymous) infringements.  
Others (e.g. expert 4) took into consideration that the handling of governance breaches also de-
pends on the existing corporate culture. Seven experts (e.g. expert 9, 13 and 22) underlined the 
importance of defining individual consequences. If there are no consequences for breaches of cor-
porate rules, they are superfluous. Thus, the experts (e.g. expert 1, 4, 6, 7, 9, 13 and 22) listed various 
operational sanction mechanisms like a strong say, official warnings, job rotations, recall of managers, 
fewer investment budgets, stricter reporting lines, compulsory retirement or even firing as possible 
options. 
Moreover, there was a consensus among seven of the interview partners (e.g. expert 4, 5, 8, 9, 11 
and 19) that the linkage to the individual remuneration is an often-used sanction mechanism. Six of 
the experts (e.g. expert 5, 8, 11 and 19) even felt confident that connecting it to the individual pay of 
the subsidiary board members, is the most effective instrument. 
 
Thematic cluster 13: Feedback & recommendations regarding the identified key areas of corpo-
rate governance management (cf. part B / question 5.7) 
The vast majority of the experts (e.g. expert 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 10, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 23 and 24) felt 
confident that the eight identified focus areas and the suggested evaluation approach consider all 
relevant intragroup governance management related topics from a parent´s perspective. Expert 1 ana-
lyzed that “…those dimensions support the governance structures and the awareness for relevant 
focus topics in the financial services subsidiaries.” One of the interviewed top managers (expert 18) 
even stated that “…this would be a supportive instrument for me as CEO to execute my governance 
function. The dimensions reflect my daily tasks and responsibilities.” Expert 6 was convinced that 
“…the concept including the eight clusters helps to operationalize the abstract term corporate govern-
ance […] and further highlights the benefits of corporate governance in an appropriate way, which is 
extremely important for the communication.” Expert 23 summed up that the defined focus topics can 
be applied as “management cockpit, which is very beneficial […] it is a very practical tool which really 
provides value for top managers as it highlights the focus topics.” 
Expert 14 explained that the underlying approach follows the logic of the second line of defense and 
the consolidating function (e.g. a CoC) ensures an integrated corporate governance approach on par-
ent level. While the subsidiaries are held responsible for the governance implementation, the consoli-
dating parent CoC is in charge to enable, support and steer the different topic areas within the subsid-
iaries, and the internal audit has to act as independent control function if the governance standards 
are properly implemented on subsidiary level. 
Expert 16 raised the general concern, if there is such a great intragroup governance divergence as I 
have indicated. He raised the question whether the eight dimensions are not too complex to manage 
for the target group ‘executive management board’. He recommends consolidating the subtopics on a 
higher level. Four others, particularly expert 23, contradicted and confirmed the existence of the identi-
fied intragroup governance differences between the parent and foreign subsidiaries. 
Most of the experts analyzed the eight governance key areas in detail and provided additional topic 
specific feedback. For example, expert 6 outlined that the compliance and regulatory management 
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dimension should also include the communication with supervisory authorities. Apart from expert 4, 
especially expert 20, who referred to his own CFO experience, answered that “…the mission man-
agement and framework management are very central topics.” Expert 21 outlined “…for me many 
topics in the clusters are typical CEO topics which we often discuss within our executive board meet-
ings.” Expert 23 explained that there are only “core competencies” mentioned, but in essence it is 
required to have both, “core competences and capabilities”. One of the top managers (expert 20) high-
lighted that stakeholder management is a key element for strong regulated subsidiaries. Expert 6 ex-
plained in respect to his management experience that it is very important that the local MD and FD 
pursue a good relationship to the local authorities and should be included in this key topic. Expert 20 
emphasized that the local succession planning has to take place in the context of the organizational 
maturity level of the subsidiary. He explained that in regulated companies the local regulator also 
plays a key role for the nomination of executives, because they have to check and approve the qualifi-
cation of the candidates via “fit and proper tests”. 
Some experts (e.g. expert 6) identified supplementary topics that were not adequately considered at 
this point in time. Expert 6 outlined that the external auditor could be additionally included in the di-
mensions, as some experts (e.g. expert 12) define the external auditors as the “fourth line of defense”. 
Interview partner 13 stated that the reputational management and the consequences of governance 
failures are not included yet. Expert 11 declared that the term “internal control system” is not explicitly 
mentioned in the dimensions. Expert 23 recommended to include robust documentation as a further 
very important cross-functional aspect. Expert 3 suggested to involve “…the measurement of business 
success.” Furthermore, expert 11 missed the topics of joint methodologies for e.g. calculating risks, 
while expert 19 criticized the missing target management system. Apart from that, expert 21 suggest-
ed considering the reporting towards the national supervisory bodies, while expert 23 also strongly 
supported implementing the earlier mentioned whistleblowing system. 
Few experts made comments regarding the methodology and illustration of the different clusters. 
For instance, expert 3 stated that the different clusters are high level and require concrete questions 
for the superior topics. Expert 11 and 12 recommended to implement a hierarchical logic to operation-
alize it easier. Also, expert 11 suggested to integrate a clear reporting line from the subsidiary to the 
division head in a loop structure. In addition, expert 10 recommended to make clear that the audit 
management affects all other identified dimensions. Expert 22 analyzed that “…corporate culture 
forms the foundation or has to be ranked above or, as foundation, below of all eight dimensions.” 
Apart from that, some experts made suggestions for the further proceeding. Expert 7 highlighted 
the complexity of corporate governance and pronounced that it “…is a very cross functional topic and 
involves many different issues. In regard to this context it will be important - if possible – to make a 
clear demarcation line…” towards other topics to create a common understanding. Expert 10 said that 
at first every organization has to clarify the relevant company-individual focus topics, as a basic fun-
dament. Expert 9 added that the eight dimensions are not free of overlaps. Expert 9 pointed out that 
the dimension of “integrity management” for many companies is equal to compliance. Expert 22 out-
lined that his company “…changed corporate governance to the name integrity management.” Fur-
thermore, the interviewed top managers (e.g. expert 23) outlined the importance of the softer topics 
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(e.g. leadership, culture etc.) and recommended to highlight them more. Another expert outlined that 
the intragroup relationships always have to be clear in the management model. 
Others also made statements regarding the implementation. Expert 6 outlined that it is always diffi-
cult to link a theoretic concept with the practice. Despite this, he found that it is helpful to highlight the 
different focus topics and will support a holistic fact driven evaluation of subsidiaries. Expert 3 and 8 
recommended to prioritize the topics via a step-by-step implementation. Moreover, both experts 5 and 
9 outlined the necessity of regular spot checks (on-site subsidiary visits), which follow a risk-based 
approach to ensure the effectiveness of the defined dimensions. Expert 4 highlighted the importance 
of regular meetings and close intragroup collaboration. 
The interview partners also made other useful remarks. Expert 22 stated that it is crucial to find the 
right transformer to minimize the intragroup governance discrepancies. He argued that it is important 
to weight the different dimensions in each subsidiary differently according to the maturity level and 
local market conditions. 
 
Thematic cluster 14: Evaluation approaches for subsidiary governance (cf. part B / question 
5.8) 
There was a broad consensus among the experts (e.g. expert 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 16, 17, 18, 20, 
21, 23 and 23) that a self-assessment approach is the right way to identify governance gaps and im-
provement areas. Expert 5 outlined that “…if the management has to evaluate their organization, this 
increases their awareness for governance topics and also secures an appropriate documentation for 
the supervisory authorities or external auditors.” Expert 13 found that an integrated approach of the 
defined focus areas and the assessment will “…provide a valuable and sustainable contribution to 
minimize the governance gap and to enable the subsidiaries to fulfill their governance duties.” Expert 
10 added that it is “…a perfect starting point for the dialogue with the subsidiaries.” Despite this, expert 
14 referred to the earlier debate and clarified that the evaluation of corporate governance practices is 
a major challenge, especially if it comes to leadership or cultural aspects. Thus, he suggested to de-
fine only few governance focus areas. Expert 23 recommended not to define abstract KPIs and said 
“…I recommend to focus more on how those topics are managed than on the objective itself.” 
Yet, according to the experts, there are various determinates that influence the assessment quali-
ty. Expert 6 stated that a self-assessment approach already presupposes “…a certain degree of pro-
fessionalization of the subsidiary management boards.” Expert 8 found that a self-assessment ap-
proach is suitable for mature markets, but for immature markets it could be challenging, also due to 
intercultural differences in multinational organizations. He outlined that such a management tool 
should be used as an intragroup exchange platform. Expert 13 suggested defining “…the interdiscipli-
nary topics in close collaboration with the respective group functions and internal and external special-
ists to make sure that all the defined topics are interpreted in the right direction.” 
The experts with a consulting or audit background (e.g. expert 4, 5, 8, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17 and 18) con-
firmed that a self-assessment or maturity level approach is a commonly used procedure. Expert 8 
mentioned that there are good experiences with self-assessment approaches e.g. within the imple-
mentation of compliance management systems. While expert 5 explained that a maturity model ap-
proach reflects that corporate governance management is a never-ending topic, expert 7 outlined the 
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necessity that the management model has to be agile. To be effective, expert 14 outlined that the 
evaluation approach has to avoid any kind of finger pointing or blaming of the subsidiaries. 
Based on the experiences of expert 2 and 24, the subsidiaries MDs and FDs should be the addres-
sors of the questionnaire and not the respective topic owner, to avoid conflicts of interests. Expert 17 
explained that it makes sense that the local MD and FD perform such an organizational self-
assessment as a starting point for the regular management review. 
Nevertheless, few experts (e.g. expert 1 and 21) raised concerns that a maturity model with a prede-
fined scaling system could be too difficult and end up in discussions between the subsidiaries and 
the corporate parent. Others argued that discussions are unavoidable and support to identify potential 
governance divergences and improvement areas. In accordance with expert 12, expert 9 outlined that 
it is necessary to define the parents’ expectations and which level should be reached in which of the 
defined dimensions in advance, “…because every improvement will cost money.” As it is necessary to 
secure a high level of compliance in some focus topics, there are others that allow to accept a lower 
degree of fulfillment. Expert 21 highlighted the fact, that it will be not possible to define a hard KPI for 
each (soft) topic. Yet, some experts (e.g. expert 3 and 4) pointed out the necessity of an independ-
ent control function, which acts as a corrective for the reported measures of the subsidies. Expert 4 
suggested the internal audit function as corrector. Expert 8 analyzed that “…a division-specific man-
agement committee could act as a control organ to control the predefined rules for the self-evaluation. 
Furthermore, it gets an official and binding character for the participants.” Simultaneously he ex-
plained, together with expert 22 and 23, that this depends on the intragroup leadership and corporate 
culture. They outlined the necessity for consensus orientation and an open, discussion driven commit-
tee culture, which also allows to communicate identified governance deficits without any doubt. 
In particular, expert 9 regarded the different possibilities to illustrate the results (e.g. with spider 
graphs) of a maturity level approach as an additional advantage of this methodology. 
 
Thematic cluster 15: Corporate governance organization (cf. part B / question 6.1) 
Most of the experts (e.g. expert 3, 6, 7 and 8) outlined that a general statement for the organizational 
setup of the intragroup corporate governance management is not possible. They highlighted that there 
are numerous influencing factors that have to be taken into account. All interviewed experts 
agreed that strong governance structures and processes are an essential prerequisite (e.g. due to the 
comprehensive customer data), because “…otherwise it will end up in massive compliance breaches 
with much impact towards the automotive brand and image” (cf. e.g. expert 3). Expert 3 summarized 
that one option to reflect the financial services specifics is to install a separate member in the parent’s 
management body for the financial services business only or to integrate a separate financial services 
holding into the multinational group, which can act as liability buffer for the corporate parent. Moreo-
ver, expert 3 cited that some supervisory body members should have a finance and banking back-
ground to act as a supervision mechanism and executive advisors on parent level. Expert 2 and 7 
underlined, that “…the organizational structure has to be aligned with the multinational organization”, 
but there should be a consolidating corporate governance function in the parent and in each subsidi-
ary. Expert 7 emphasized that “…the organizational structure has to clarify which roles and responsi-
bilities the parent has, and which ones the local decision makers have.” Expert 8 agreed, but declared 
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that the prerequisite for such functions (e.g. chief governance officer, CoC, local governance manag-
ers) is always the acceptance within the company. Altogether, expert 3, 4 and 23 emphasized the 
importance of organizational lucency, including clear roles and responsibilities and a close alignment 
between the consolidating governance functions on parent level and local subsidiaries.  
One expert outlined the necessity of a chief governance officer in the management body of the 
corporate parent. Expert 9 explained that there are multinational companies (e.g. Volkswagen, 
Lufthansa) which have implemented a chief governance officer on executive management board level. 
He described that usually they are responsible for coordinating the ICS, compliance and risk man-
agement system, and are in charge of developing a group-wide governance concept and monitoring 
its intragroup implementation. The majority of the interviewed experts (e.g. expert 6, 8, 12, 16 and 18) 
raised concerns and argued, that the disadvantage of such a setup is e.g. that it implies a strong con-
trol focused top management. One of the interviewed lawyers (expert 16) pointed out that the German 
AktG (stock corporation law) defines a clear collective responsibility of the executive board for corpo-
rate governance. In sum, most of the experts (e.g. expert 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 9, 10, 14, 16, 19, 20, 21 and 24) 
preferred a central coordination function, which works on governance topics and raises its awareness. 
Expert 16 explained that it is preferable to have an independent staff function that reports directly to 
the parent management body. One of the interviewed CEOs (expert 22) stated that they installed a 
corporate integrity officer who reports directly to him as group CEO, but without any own board mem-
bership, because “he is responsible to raise the awareness for corporate governance and acts as 
clearing function.” 
Yet, fifteen of the experts (e.g. 1, 2, 3, 6, 9, 14, 16, 19, 20, 22, 23 and 24) explicitly supported the im-
plementation of a CoC for Corporate Governance within the financial services division. According 
to expert 14, companies try to bundle and coordinate the various governance topics in a separate staff 
function from a single source. Expert 1, 2 and 23 recommend an own CoC for the automotive financial 
business division to better coordinate and handle the external governance regulations for banks in 
many jurisdictions. Expert 3 clarified that “the division head and his staff function (e.g. CoC) have a 
very important function and have to steer and to coordinate the governance management with the 
different headquarters functions and subsidiaries.” Three interviewed external auditors explained that 
the parent´s management body is accountable but should formally delegate the management of se-
lected governance topics to the governance functions, which develop intragroup standards. They sup-
ported the implementation of a staff function to support the parent´s management body or the division 
head to perform their governance role. Expert 23 stated that “…this helps to make sure that the direc-
tors know for what they are responsible for!” This staff function should be in the direct reporting line of 
one member of the parent´s management body. Expert 9 analyzed that a CoC should “…perform 
regular spot checks and execute the operative governance management in a group-wide context.” 
Expert 1 also agreed and added, that “a CoC has to define standards and suitable methods for how a 
corporate governance framework needs to be defined, so the subsidiaries get enabled to design their 
individual governance framework.” Expert 7 found that, to be seriously recognized, such a function 
must be “…located high in the organizational chart to reflect the importance.” Equally, he recommend-
ed designing a CoC regarding the different business models of the financial services subsidiaries (e.g. 
banks, leasing companies, insurance broker etc.) and not regarding business regions. 
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It was also noticeable that fourteen of the experts (e.g. expert: 1, 2, 5, 10, 12, 18, 19, 20, 21 and 24) 
outlined the necessity of a local corporate governance officer in each legal entity. Expert 1 under-
lined that it must be clearly defined by whom they are directed and controlled, either by the local man-
agement, by a CoC of the headquarters or by the division head of financial services. Further, it has to 
be clarified who is the disciplinary superior for the local governance officers (e.g. expert 5 clearly rec-
ommended the CoC on parent level). According to expert 5, there “can be conflicts of interests if it is 
the local management.” Seven experts (expert 1, 2, 5, 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22) added that regulated 
entities need a compliance officer (legal requirement) in each subsidiary and concluded, that they 
could take over the position of a local corporate governance delegate. 
Apart from this, a few interviewed managers (e.g. expert 9) pointed out that their multinationals have 
implemented corporate governance committees. Expert 9 explained that the committee members 
are representatives of the parent’s management board, compliance, ICS, controlling, operations, risk, 
governance, IT and HR departments to guarantee a regular cross functional alignment and to secure a 
comprehensive and group-wide governance approach. 
Even so, several experts (e.g. expert 9, 12, 14 and 18) raised concerns regarding a separate cor-
porate governance function. In line with e.g. expert 20 and 21, expert 18 stated clearly “…a chief 
compliance or governance officer on board level is in my perspective overrated.” Expert 14 argued 
that the problem of an officially named corporate governance function would be that no one else would 
feel responsible for it. Expert 16 and 20 supported this argumentation and explained, that this is a 
clear joint responsibility of each intragroup management body. Expert 14 explained that the mandatory 
compliance functions in each financial services entity usually also consider governance, legal and risk 
components. Expert 12 felt confident that it is better to focus on clear accountabilities than to imple-
ment new structures. 
In the end, the interview partners (e.g. expert 4, 8, 14, 18, 22 and 23) agreed that especially the cor-
porate culture is a key component for the decision of the right organizational setup. Expert 22 
judged that“…the governance and compliance organization also reflect the existing corporate culture” 
and expert 8 analyzed that “a governance organization relies much on their people […] and those 
structures are living from their acceptance and trust is the basic foundation.” 
 
Thematic cluster 16: Governance communication (cf. part B / question 6.2) 
Expert 13 made clear to distinguish between the internal and external corporate governance commu-
nication. Few experts (e.g. expert 13, 14 and 19) focused on the importance of tone from the top 
communication. Expert 22 summed up that “…the right tone at the right time is important”. Expert 21 
highlighted that “…governance communication as a clear board task and is possible to delegate only 
to a certain extent.” The executive board is responsible to transfer team spirit into the multinational 
group and to create a common understanding. The right tone from the top provides orientation, and 
the regular commitment reflects its importance. Expert 12 pointed out that governance communication 
is directly linked to liability topics and management / control issues.  
Others (e.g. expert 7, 9, 10, 15 and 17) highlighted the meaningfulness of target group specific 
governance communication. Expert 24 explained that the local MDs and FDs require a comprehen-
sive onboarding, which has to cover all relevant governance topics. 
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According to the experiences of expert 10, “…good communication means complete, regular target 
orientated communication.” Expert 7 and 9 felt confident that it should follow a clear top-down cas-
cade. Expert 24 supports the view that the local management bodies should be the parent´s first ad-
dressors for governance communication. Expert 7 further highlighted divisional-specific governance 
communication to be effective. 
A few experts (e.g. expert 1 and 2) also identified success factors for the corporate governance 
communication in multinational structures. Expert 10 explained that specific governance communica-
tion has to secure a minimum extent of lucency about the reasons why a company and its manage-
ment body acts in a certain way. Governance communication has to sharpen its awareness and expert 
9 analyzed that governance communication has to be “…consistent and should secure that it does not 
contradict each other within the different hierarchy levels, subsidiaries and different host countries.” 
Among others, expert 22 felt confident that “…it is required to use many different channels for an ef-
fective communication.” Expert 2 advised “…to pay attention to the wording, because several terms in 
large organizations are already pre-allocated or already used in another local context in the subsidi-
ary.” Expert 6 outlined that “…governance communication should be serious and on an equal footing 
between the headquarters and foreign subsidiaries.” In addition, expert 3 outlined that the collabora-
tion with each other in a team ensures commitment, engagement and raises the acceptance. He sug-
gested involving “…local market experts…” within the definition of new governance instruments or 
standards to consider the subsidiary perspective and to increase the quality and acceptance of gov-
ernance management in that way. Expert 4 and 5 clarified that a group-wide communication approach 
for certain topics is obligatory via e.g. binding corporate rules or principles and a group-wide validity. 
Further, expert 16 said that “…continuous exchange between the headquarters and the subsidiaries is 
the prerequisite to realize as early as possible when there are certain negative developments and 
weak points…” and expert 3 even concluded that “…good governance communication must be bi-
directional.”  
Seven experts (expert 1, 3, 4, 8, 13, 18 and 22) provided information about appropriate instruments 
and infrastructure for the governance communication. The experts (expert 5, 10, 14 and 17) 
agreed that e.g. the code of conduct and a mission statement are crucial communication instruments. 
Expert 1 recommended to “…provide information via different channels: Electronically, personal, push 
and pull information.” Expert 3 added the direct as well as indirect communication like e.g. strategy 
related information, target achievement, hard and soft communication and regular newsletters as other 
communication instruments. Expert 1 ranked guidelines, instructions, corporate rules or process de-
scriptions as essential intragroup communication instruments. He explained that internal regulation 
landscapes are a legal and regulatory requirement for each regulated entity (e.g. MaRisk regulations). 
Some experts (e.g. expert 1, 3 and 4) pointed out, that regular intragroup conferences also help to 
share experiences and to create an intragroup governance network. Expert 8 summarized that it is 
crucial to have formal and informal formats, such as regular committee meetings, but also more infor-
mal private sessions between the CEO and e.g. the chairman of the supervisory body, local MDs and 
FDs “…to inform each other and to build a personal relationship of trust and respect.” 
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Thematic cluster 17: Success factors and challenges for the intragroup implementation of cor-
porate governance (cf. part B / question 6.3) 
The experts outlined different success factors and challenges particularly related to the implementa-
tion of corporate governance. Most of the experts (e.g. expert 1, 2, 4) first highlighted the willingness 
and commitment of the management as critical success factor. Expert 2 summarized that it is es-
sential to communicate the commitment from the parent’s management body. Expert 5 and 17 under-
lined the relevance that the corporate core values and the strategy from the parent’s headquarters are 
transparent, comprehensible and understandable for each employee. Different elements of the core 
beliefs, group vision and strategy have to ensure that the employees feel proud to be part of the or-
ganization. Expert 4 cited that an “…appropriate business culture can bridge potential governance 
gaps...” Expert 22 underlined that “…employee satisfaction a key topic as this builds the foundation for 
all and is closely linked to leadership.” Expert 20 mentioned in particular the “…key role of qualification 
of the respective FD who is usually in charge to implement the operative corporate governance in the 
subsidiaries.” 
Concerning the expert experiences (e.g. expert 5, 9, 10 and 12) the broader implementation context 
is another success factor. Expert 9 and 10 made clear that the reason why governance structures get 
implemented makes a great difference for its acceptance (for example either as consequence of a 
compliance breach or to increase efficiency and the speed up alignment processes). Expert 5 ex-
plained that “…there are usually at least three different governance systems in a company: risk man-
agement system, internal control system and compliance management system. All those pillars to-
gether hopefully ensure good governance practices” and he outlined the importance to secure an inte-
grated implementation approach. 
Further, the experts emphasized not to underestimate the impact of external regulation and busi-
ness model specifics within the implementation. The regulators play an important non-negligible role 
that has to be taken into account. It is crucial to realize that governance is a system, which has to be 
regularly adjusted and monitored, and which is always under development. Today, governance is 
much more pro-actively driven than in the past, and the identification of early warning indicators are 
essential. That is why national regulators also changed their supervisory approaches from primarily 
past oriented towards a more forward-looking approach (cf. UK, Netherlands). In particular, the auto-
motive mangers (e.g. expert 4, 13 and 23) explained that the automotive financial services business is 
more extensively regulated than the rest of the company, because they have to deal and protect vari-
ous personal customer data. 
Among others, expert 8 summarized the importance of a carefully balanced and mixed implemen-
tation approach. Expert 9 outlined to focus on dual approach, because “…the connectivity of the 
central and local governance setup is a fundamental success factor.” Expert 2 also strongly recom-
mended “…to define standards solely in close collaboration with “local market experts.” 
Others outlined to ensure clarity about the framework conditions. Nearly all experts agreed that the 
intragroup crash barriers need to be balanced and carefully defined. Expert 1 made clear that “…the 
parent company should only define group-wide standards and intervene where it is needed, but not 
beyond. They must be compliant with the local legal and regulatory requirements in the host country.” 
 205 
 
In line with many others, expert 8 underlined “…the need to define clear local decision-making re-
sponsibilities between the subsidiaries and the headquarters.” 
Particularly the managers (e.g. expert 4 and 5) recommended to also concentrating on a proper 
stakeholder management. A governance consultant (expert 4) explained that it is a critical factor to 
safeguard the strategically involvement of all relevant key stakeholders as early as possible. This is 
required from a legal and commercial law perspective, but also in regard to the intragroup rules. Ex-
pert 4 added that “…personal interrelations and sensibilities can be a major barrier for the implementa-
tion.” Hereby, expert 14 explicitly mentioned the middle management as critical factor. 
Additionally, a few experts (e.g. expert 12, 14, 15) shared their experiences from governance imple-
mentation projects. According to expert 14, a proper pre-analysis is essential to cover the various 
subsidiary specific requirements and to decide in which way to implement governance management. 
Expert 12 said that it is essential to prioritize and to follow a systematic, group-wide approach. He 
recommended to start with pilot projects and to define a general high-level approach, which gives the 
possibility to adjust it towards the particular subsidiary context. According to expert 15, the biggest 
challenge is the requirement definition due to its multidimensional character and different interpreta-
tions among the various jurisdictions. This heterogeneity of different topics with different inter-relations 
makes a content-based discussion very time consuming and complex. 
Expert 18 mentioned the management of shared service centers as another critical success factor. 
According to his executive experience, the operational business is often outsourced to shared service 
centers. He described that in that case the locally regulated (bank) subsidiaries always have the chal-
lenge to demonstrate to local supervisory authorities, that those shared service centers fulfill their legal 
and regulatory requirements, even if they are located in another country.  
As another critical factor, expert 8 highlighted that “…it is important to clarify the relationship between 
the groups’ supervisory body and local supervisory body of the subsidiaries.” 
 
All provided answers referring to the closing questions in part C of the questionnaire guideline (ques-
tion 7.1-7.4) could be integrated in the above mentioned 17 thematic clusters. 
 
This chapter provided an overview of the provided statements of the first interview session, with in 
total 24 corporate governance experts. This forms the foundation for the sociological conceptualization 
as the next step of the applied research approach, in the following subchapter 6.1.2.317 
  
 
317 This refers to the applied interview evaluation method of Meuser & Nagel (2010). For further information, cf. 
chapter 5.2. 
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6.1.2 Discussion of the results  
The previous chapter 6.1.1 provided a consolidated view on the results of the executed twenty-four 
expert interviews. In the following chapter 6.1.2, I will discuss the outcome of the empirical research 
and the prior theoretical results of my literature analysis. This substantive content-related discussion 
provides a solid foundation to develop a first draft of the intragroup corporate governance manage-
ment model in a next step.  
 
There was a broad willingness of the experts to participate on the expert interviews and to share their 
personal views and market insights. The chosen open guided interview approach ensured much flexi-
bility for the interview partners to explain their individual thoughts and share their experiences. In es-
sence, this procedure was a perfect foundation to validate the prior results, while also gaining valuable 
additional feedback regarding the interaction of intragroup corporate governance mechanisms. I at-
tribute the broad heterogeneity of the provided answers to the diverse backgrounds of the experts and 
to the open asked questions with the possibility for individual interpretation. Furthermore, this reflects 
the cross-functional character of corporate governance. 
 
Thematic cluster 1: When taking into account the mentioned reasons for the increasing relevance 
of corporate governance, the experts mostly confirmed the already debated phenomena. Despite 
this, it is noticeable that most of the mentioned reasons are predominately driven by external market 
pressure (e.g. stronger regulation, high penalties in case of compliance breaches, increased man-
agement liability, reputational risks) and not by company internal drivers (e.g. higher profits, improved 
efficiency or positive effects on the capacity for innovation). Most companies recognize corporate gov-
ernance at first rather as a kind of risk insurance than an enabler to e.g. increase their organizational 
efficiency. It is conspicuous that corporate governance still is primarily recognized as a legal obligation 
instead of a crucial driver to support the long-term corporate success. 
 
Thematic cluster 2: The experts highlighted the special role of the financial services business within 
the structures of a typical car manufacturer. Many experts confirmed that, compared to other divisions 
of an OEM, particularly the external bank regulation strongly affects the automotive financial services 
organizations. Some experts outlined that the financial services subsidiaries have to fulfil even stricter 
legal and regulatory requirements for certain topics than their corporate parents, which can lead to 
additional challenges for a group-wide corporate governance management approach. This also rein-
forces my prior analysis, particularly in chapter 2.2, 3.2 and 3.4. The experts confirmed that the im-
portance of intragroup corporate governance management among financial services subsidiaries is 
constantly increasing. It became clear that research about the intragroup management of (bank) sub-
sidiary is much needed, but currently only limited available. 
In sum, there was a broad consensus on the increasing relevance of subsidiary governance as a 
prerequisite for the fulfillment of the legal and regulatory corporate governance obligations on parent 
level. As major drivers, I have identified the internationalization and global value chains, stricter legal 
and regulatory requirements and the direct interlink towards the increased management liability and 
associated reputational risks, if companies do not comply with legal and regulatory requirements. At 
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the same time, it is seen as the prerequisite for an intragroup corporate governance framework. The 
results of the empirical research support the prior debate about the literature research, although I was 
surprised, that not one expert mentioned e.g. sustainability reasons, increasing profits in the context of 
subsidiary governance and its implied effects towards a better share price development. Even if or-
ganizational efficiency is an often-discussed topic among scholars, it was not a large issue of debate 
in the expert interviews (cf. chapter 3.1 and 4.4). 
 
Thematic cluster 3: It was obvious that the experts mentioned as typical subsidiary governance 
focus topics those, which are usually included in the existing national corporate governance codes 
and regulations. In an intragroup perspective, the experts highlighted the internal control functions. 
Apart from that, accounting topics and the remuneration were also mentioned as focus topics in finan-
cial services subsidiaries. Moreover, they underlined the important role of the corporate culture and 
leadership as the underlying foundation. Some experts further talked about appropriate intragroup 
governance processes (e.g. organizational alignment, committee management, management of cor-
porate rules and internal regulations etc.) as a crucial element to define the relationship between the 
corporate parent and the subsidiaries. Especially the internal audit function was again highlighted as 
crucial instrument to evaluate the intragroup structures and processes in an independent way.318 
From an external perspective, the experts basically debated the external audit and e.g. the regular 
external reporting. The activities of the external auditor were described as an important control in-
stance for the corporate parent within their subsidiary monitoring. Even if the prior debate also briefly 
debated the relevance of external audit activity, I did not include it explicitly in the identified key gov-
ernance areas, as they are already described in chapter 4.2. Despite this, I recognized consensus 
between the prior literature research and the mentioned focus topics of the experts, even if I did not 
focus in detail on the financial reporting and accounting issues as it was stated by particularly one 
expert. 
 
Thematic cluster 4: At the same time, only selected experts mentioned the institutional superviso-
ry organs as additional focus topic. Compared to the scientific corporate governance discussions, in 
which numerous studies investigate the various roles of the management and their control organs, this 
topic was of comparatively little importance for the interviewed experts. Only a small group (mainly the 
interviewed top managers and external auditors) outlined the necessity to clarify the role and compe-
tencies of the respective institutional organs (e.g. board of directors). They highlighted, on subsidiary 
level especially, the need to clarify the parent’s expectations regarding the overall management su-
pervision and control and within the intragroup strategy process. Further, the role of independent di-
rectors and the nomination procedures of new members for the local management bodies was a mat-
ter of debate. In sum, the provided answers of the experts reflect to a large extent the prior debate of 
chapter 3.4. 
Nevertheless, primarily the interviewed top manager outlined the importance to distinguish between 
the tier systems. While the experts avoided to make clear statements whether the one- or two-tier 
system is more preferable and effective, they outlined that both systems have different consequences 
 
318 For further information, cf. chapter 4.2.8. 
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regarding the e.g. the operational business of a company or the management liability of the manage-
ment body. The key role of the management body on parent level, the divisional head and the local 
management bodies on subsidiary level of ensuring subsidiary governance, was undisputed. Alto-
gether, the expert interviews confirmed the recognized tendency of the prior analysis that the institu-
tional control organs on subsidiary level today are more and more formalized and require a more pro-
active and independent role for the subsidiary supervision than in the past. In many countries financial 
institutes are required to demonstrate to the local authorities how the supervisory organs execute their 
oversight role. 
In comparison to other business models, the experts highlighted the great importance of the institu-
tional control organs (board of directors and supervisory board) within the financial services subsidi-
aries, because such committee structures are a prerequisite for a banking license. The experts also 
confirmed the prior investigations that the general awareness of the national regulators constantly 
increases and there are continuously tighter requirements for the supervisory organs and its commit-
tee members. Thus, the experts have acknowledged my prior research, as there are already countless 
studies available, which analyze the various board structures and their consequences in different con-
texts. Both, the experts and literature review results confirm a shift away from pure control boards and 
rather towards an additional advisory organ for the management bodies. 
 
Thematic cluster 5: According to the experts, the management body of the parent has the guide-
line setting competence for the entire group. There was strong support that the parent’s executive 
board is responsible to define a group-wide corporate governance framework, including organizational 
and processual governance structures, appropriate internal control and oversight mechanisms, the 
overall strategic direction and target management processes. Moreover, it is responsible for a group-
wide aligned risk management model, a group-wide compensation framework and appropriate HR 
principles for the staffing of key governance functions among the entire group, which confirms the 
earlier outcomes of my prior literature review. Beyond that, all experts agreed that the parent’s man-
agement body has a special responsibility to raise the governance awareness as a fixed element of its 
leadership role and has to define the framework for the corporate core values and linked corporate 
culture, which is congruent with my prior analyses.  
Further, from an external point of view, the experts confirmed that they are responsible for the public 
representation of the group interests and the collaboration with the group’s institutional supervisory 
body. This also confirms the results of my prior research (cf. chapter 4.1). It was interesting to see that 
many experts highlighted in particular its leadership role and relevance for defining the pillars of a 
group-wide corporate culture and thus the necessity of a proper board communication. In sum, there 
was consensus that the parent’s management body has the overall accountability for corporate gov-
ernance within the entire group.  
Even so, none of the experts explained in detail which leadership characteristics are particularly im-
portant in the context of corporate governance. This seems to be a contradiction to the scientific litera-
ture, in which it is a much-investigated topic among scholars, as the previous analysis in chapter 3.1.3 
and 4.1 and 4.2 has illustrated. Apart from that, none of the interviewed experts explicitly mentioned 
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the responsibility of the group executive board to constantly challenge, redefine and further develop 
the core competences of the multinational group as a whole, as I have analyzed earlier in chapter 4.1. 
 
Thematic cluster 6: The role of the divisional head was recognized as an important key function by 
the vast majority of the experts. Some experts explained that, embedded in the context of the strong 
regulated financial services business, they have to act as transformer and multiplier for governance 
issues to and for the parent’s management body. Depending on the organizational setup, from a legal 
and regulatory perspective, they have similar responsibilities to the parent’s management body or at 
least a very strong organizational responsibility for their division. The experts brought to mind that the 
role of the divisional head varies in each corporate group. Some multinational automotive groups also 
outsourced their financial services business towards a separate holding as risk buffer for the parent. 
Despite this, the interview partners agreed that they are responsible for adjusting the intragroup 
standards and governance instruments towards the business model specifics and that they act as 
linking element between the parent’s headquarters and the foreign subsidiaries. It was noticeable that 
there is no doubt among the experts regarding the importance of the divisional head. Yet, this contra-
dicts the results of the reviewed literature, in which the role of a divisional head is largely ignored. It is 
noticeable that, despite the organizational importance of this governance function, it seems that the 
role of the divisional head is not clearly defined as e.g. in the case of the typical management or su-
pervisory bodies where clear legal and regulatory requirements do exist. I conclude that this depends 
on the numerous possibilities to interpret the role of a divisional head in multiple contexts. Some ex-
perts also confirmed the necessity of a CoC for corporate governance issues (cf. chapter 3.4.1) in the 
corporate parent to support the divisional head. Then, again, other experts emphasized regular report-
ing obligations of the divisional head towards e.g. the parent management body and his strong say 
within the nomination of new governance key function holders on the subsidiary level. At its core, there 
was a broad approval of the experts to divide corporate governance management into a strategic and 
operational governance dimension, as suggested in chapter 4.1. 
 
Thematic cluster 7: On a subsidiary level, the interview partners confirmed that especially the sub-
sidiary’s management bodies play a key role. The experts outlined the similarities between the roles 
of the parent´s management bodies in a group context and the local management bodies in a local 
host country context. The experts endorsed my prior analysis in chapter 3.4 and chapter 4, that the 
local boards are the legal representatives of the parent’s executive board on a local level. There was 
consensus that they are held responsible for the corporate governance management in the subsidiary 
and have to adjust the predefined group standards regarding the local specifics. Selected interview 
partners even outlined that they are the most important key functions for ensuring corporate govern-
ance. Several managers proved that, as a foreign company, the intercultural management and a 
proper stakeholder management on local market level towards e.g. the national authorities are also 
critical and add additional complexity towards the role of local MD or FD. However, I investigated in 
chapter 3.4.2 that it is important to clarify the local management responsibilities to the parent, the di-
rectors´ obligations towards stakeholders, their role in the strategy setting process or their responsibili-
ties for the internal control and risk management. I identified the composition of the subsidiary man-
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agement body and the directors’ profiles as relevant topics, but all those issues have been largely 
ignored or only briefly mentioned by the majority of the experts. Even so, I found that most experts 
highlighted the role of the subsidiary management bodies much more than it currently gets paid atten-
tion to by the scientific community. This may indicate one reason for the shortcomings of the current 
subsidiary governance debate among scholars. 
 
Thematic cluster 8: While discussing the question about the right intragroup management ap-
proach for corporate governance, it was obvious that most of the experts recommended following 
the subsidiarity principle. At the same time some experts outlined that there are business models 
which are very successful with both, either a centralized or a decentralized approach. Even so, there 
was broad consensus to centralize topics in the parent’s headquarters, which have a group-wide rele-
vance, and to decentralize topics where close market proximity is required. In the automotive financial 
services business, the experts confirmed a rather decentral approach and clear local governance re-
sponsibilities, but with strong support of the parent’s headquarters. These expert assertions all go in 
the same direction as already promoted by the prior analysis in the chapters 2.4, 3.4 and also in chap-
ter 4.2. 
The experts explained that multinational companies define a high-level intragroup governance target 
picture. On the one hand, this defines certain minimum standards, which the subsidiaries have to im-
plement to safeguard a certain level of lucency, standardization and comparability. On the other hand, 
this approach ensures enough flexibility for the foreign subsidiaries to adjust it to their specific situa-
tion. The experts made clear that market proximity for topics is a fundamental requirement and cannot 
be managed out of an overseas headquarters. The experts stated that most multinational groups fol-
low a ‘comply or explain’ approach. Finally, the experts confirmed the results of the prior analysis. 
However, some experts remembered that particularly in bank subsidiaries several internal control 
functions, such as risk management, compliance or internal audit, are not allowed to be outsourced to 
a third party, which also clearly confirmed my prior analysis (cf. chapter 3.4 and 4.2). Furthermore, 
selected experts explained that framework agreements between the corporate parent and the subsidi-
aries clarify that the fulfillment of local legal and regulatory requirements has to always be prioritized. 
While the relevance of such framework contracts has been largely highlighted by the interviewed law-
yers, it seems to only play a tangential role within my reviewed corporate governance literature. 
In addition, the experts agreed that the management approach for intragroup corporate governance 
topics depends on the corporate culture and the legal and organizational construct of the multinational 
group. Various experts confirmed the prior research that most corporate groups implement the Three 
Lines of Defense Model (cf. chapter 3.3.2).  
To sum up, the experts agreed that a mixed corporate governance management approach fits best 
due to its pure complexity, high dynamics and strong external influence towards the financial services 
business. It became clear that parents apply different instruments to manage their subsidiaries. On the 
one hand, parents predefine a certain set of administrative frameworks for their subsidiaries, which 
includes clear accountabilities and requirements for certain focus topics. On the other hand, the inter-
views and the previous analysis have shown that the parents make usage of cultural management 
instruments to bridge governance deficits. Instruments, such as e.g. group-wide corporate core val-
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ues, the tone of the top communication, a corporate vision or mission statement for the entire corpo-
rate group play a crucial role – even if their effectiveness is difficult to steer from the distance. The 
result was that parents use multiple instruments that aim at clear intragroup planning and alignment 
procedures to define clear targets and secure the right resource allocation and prioritization. Neverthe-
less, it also became clear that rewards and remuneration schemes are commonly used as manage-
ment instrument. Both, the previous analysis and the interviews have demonstrated that there are 
further used cybernetic management instruments, which focus more on either quantitative or qualita-
tive KPIs, or even on mixed approaches like the balance scorecard. 
I recognized that comparatively many experts outlined the need for governance reporting and control 
mechanisms, which was also previously discussed in chapter 3.4. However, the same experts simul-
taneously outlined later that the measurement of the corporate governance management within sub-
sidiaries is challenging from distance. 
 
Thematic cluster 9: In terms of major key drivers for an effective intragroup corporate governance 
management, most experts outlined the triangle of internal transparency, documentation and proper 
communication. Especially the interviewed top managers underlined the necessity of proper documen-
tation and archiving to mitigate management liability risks. It was noticeable that many experts under-
lined the paramount importance to aim at a common governance understanding among all hierarchy 
levels. As also earlier analyzed in chapter 3.4 and 4.2, there was a broad endorsement to predefine 
governance requirements on the parent level. At the same time, several experts also outlined the im-
portance to provide the subsidiaries sufficient resources and budget to fulfill their governance duties 
and strengthen their efforts for the integration of new technologies. Those are critical aspects, but 
seem to be very underrepresented or even ignored by the recent research community. According to 
the experts, new technologies and big data analytics provide numerous new opportunities to strength-
en the intragroup corporate governance management. 
It was surprising that several experts explicitly highlighted the relevance of internal alert procedures. In 
particular, adequate whistleblowing procedures were often mentioned to foster a proactive and bottom 
up approach to identify defective developments in the subsidiaries in early stages. Compared to oth-
ers, this governance mechanism is discussed in the scientific literature as an effective internal early 
alert system, and in most countries legally required for banks (cf. chapter 3.2.2 and 4.2.5). 
 
Thematic cluster 10: Analyzing the experts’ statements about the benefits of intragroup subsidiary 
governance, it was obvious that the large majority of them stated increased lucency, the fulfillment of 
legal and regulatory requirements and mitigation of potential reputational risks as overarching objec-
tives for a professional intragroup corporate governance management. Those benefits are equal to my 
prior analysis in chapter 3.1 and 3.2.1. Further, I also found in my literature research positive effects 
on important performance indicators like competitiveness, sustainability, innovation readiness, leader-
ship and the organizational performance (cf. chapter 3.1.1 and 4.3). While a large majority of the ex-
perts confirmed that subsidiary governance clearly contributes to a better operational performance and 
strengthens the competitiveness of the group, only half of the interviewed experts felt confident that 
there are also positive effects on the innovation capacity and the sustainability activities. At the same 
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time, the majority confirmed that professional subsidiary governance has positive effects on the corpo-
rate culture and the leadership behavior. In contrast to the earlier argumentation in chapter 3.1.2, 4.3 
and 4.4, the majority of the experts found that leadership and corporate culture rather forms the basis 
for an effective corporate governance management, than being a beneficial output of it. 
Quite a few experts explained that, in a group external perspective, a professional intragroup corpo-
rate governance management creates trust among external investors. This side effect was so far rare-
ly considered as stand-alone effect within the prior benefit analysis. 
However, many experts also outlined the challenge to directly measure the benefits of corporate gov-
ernance and confirmed the perception of the prior investigations in chapter 3.1.2. In sum, all experts 
agreed that even if the direct benefits are difficult or even impossible to measure, there could be a 
consensus reached that there are many, either direct or indirect, positive effects of aligned intragroup 
corporate governance standards. 
 
Thematic cluster 11: Concerning the limitations of centralized intragroup management ap-
proach, there has been some uncertainty among the experts about clear enforcement rights. Some 
experts stated that this is still a grey area in many corporate groups, particularly in terms of decision-
making processes. Having said that, the experts explained that the limitations are given by the topic, 
because local specific laws and regulations as well as organizational issues cannot be management 
from an overseas headquarters and require a local implementation. Additionally, subsidiaries are legal 
independent entities and the local management body is not allowed to delegate certain decisions to 
another party (e.g. corporate parent) in another country. Equally it also became clear that the parent is 
to a certain extent legally liable for the subsidiaries, especially in their role as official company owner 
or its board members e.g. as part of a local supervisory bodies. A few experts stated again that it also 
depends on whether the corporate group is organized as a management or a finance holding. In sum, 
those statements reflect the results of the prior literature review.  
Nevertheless, beyond that, some experts also provided additional views which have not been covered 
from the reviewed literature. For example, the experts explained that the parent’s headquarters man-
ages address such challenges via the definition of ‘strong recommendations’ for their subsidiaries to 
overcome the legal and regulatory burden. Further, the experts outlined that informal dependencies of 
the involved managers (often sent expatriates of the parent) within the clear hierarchical relationships 
are a vital intragroup governance and control mechanism, which should not be underestimated. Alt-
hough such informal inter-human relationships are often not visible, they are very effective and at the 
moment only rarely analyzed by scholars in the context intragroup corporate governance. Regarding 
this, the experts provided their own important additional views, which go far beyond the prior made 
investigations. 
 
Thematic cluster 12: Predefined sanction mechanisms for different levels of serious misconducts 
have also been highlighted. The experts agreed that it is a basic prerequisite that those sanctions are 
transparently communicated to the employees. Yet, it became also clear that claims are possible 
against persons, but not against the subsidiary itself. A few experts recommended to always start with 
a comprehensive and independent fraud investigation and to enforce the sanctions, if it is necessary. 
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While the experts provided valuable insights about sanction mechanisms, the prior literature review 
found no research on how to manage internal sanction mechanisms in corporate groups. 
It was obvious that the experts directly linked the sanctions towards the corporate culture, which 
seems to have a major impact on how companies define and enforce sanctions. The large majority of 
the experts highlighted the linkage towards the individual compensation as most effective sanction 
mechanism for governance failures. Especially when taking into account the countless scientific stud-
ies about the effectiveness of intrinsic and extrinsic motivational factors, it was surprising that there 
was such a clear commitment towards this single mechanism. 
 
Thematic cluster 13: The broad majority of the experts confirmed the earlier identified eight in-
tragroup corporate governance management key areas. The experts agreed that all the relevant 
focus topics are included in the governance dimensions (cf. chapter 4.2) even if they are sometimes 
named differently among companies.  
Specifically, the interviewed top managers outlined the benefit of such a topic overview as a compre-
hensive management supporting tool to get a consolidated overview about the key topics. They em-
phasized that such a comprehensive overview is often missing, but much needed – specifically in 
complex group structures and the steadily increasing regulatory pressure. Yet, few experts suggested 
to put a greater emphasis on financial management related topics, rank the different dimensions ac-
cording to their relevance or risk potential or to include the external auditor as external stakeholder 
outside the group to ensure a comprehensive view. In general, most of the experts provided detailed 
feedback to the different dimensions and contributed valuable ideas on how a management model for 
financial services subsidiaries could look like. 
It became clear that some experts suggested considering the corporate culture, corporate core values 
and leadership as underlying basis amongst all other dimensions, because together they all influence 
the management of each of the eight key areas and subordinated sub-topics. This is an interesting 
fact, as some others of the interviewed experts argued in the same direction when they talked about 
the benefits of a professional intragroup management of corporate governance. 
 
Thematic cluster 14: There was a strong support of the experts to apply a self-evaluation approach 
for the governance assessment as defined in chapter 4.3 and based on this, to develop a govern-
ance maturity index. Despite this, selected experts mentioned that the requirements to reach the dif-
ferent maturity levels need to be predefined. It was remarkable, that the experts broadly confirmed the 
necessity to follow a broader corporate governance management understanding that better connects 
the different corporate governance topics to each other, than it was the case in the past. 
 
Thematic cluster 15: The question about the right organizational design of the governance organi-
zations were answered by the experts from different perspectives and highlighted, that there are nu-
merous influencing factors that need to be taken into account. The experts outlined that, especially in 
the financial services business, strong governance structures and processes are a prerequisite and 
that they are largely predefined by the external legal and regulatory framework. To counteract the 
increasing regulatory pressure, isolated experts explained that some corporate groups decided to 
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implement chief governance officers in the management body of the parent. Nevertheless, the vast 
majority of the experts advised against such positions and argued that corporate governance should 
be defined as joint responsibility. In contrast, there was a broad approval of a CoC for corporate gov-
ernance to support the divisional head to fulfill his governance obligations. Several experts supported 
the intention to install local corporate governance delegates in the subsidiaries. Most experts agreed 
that this could be executed by the local compliance officer. The experts confirmed the prior analysis, 
particularly regarding a separate CoC and local corporate governance delegates (cf. chapter 2.4; 
4.2.6; 4.4). At the same time, I was surprised that there was such a decisive refusal of a chief corpo-
rate governance officer. It was noticeable that comparatively less experts suggested the implementa-
tion of a group-wide corporate governance committee. Then again, it was interesting that certain ex-
perts outlined that the design of the right corporate governance organization always strongly depends 
on the corporate culture, which was not prioritized in my prior analysis about the organizational setup 
of corporate groups (cf. chapter 2.2 and 3.4). 
 
Thematic cluster 16: Most of the experts linked corporate governance communication directly with 
the ‘tone from the top.’ While the experts underlined the necessity of a target group specific communi-
cation, others explained that a close collaboration with the subsidiaries and a continuous, consistent 
and timely communication across all hierarchy levels is indispensable. It was interesting that the ex-
perts provided numerous examples for governance communication instruments, but pronounced in-
tragroup conference formats in particular, as a central intragroup networking and information ex-
change platform. The experts confirmed the prior analysis (cf. chapter 4.1.1 and 4.2) and highlighted 
codes of conducts and mission statements as central instruments to provide staff guidance. Likewise, 
the experts supported the investigations in chapter 3.2, 4.1 and 4.2 that the governance communica-
tion via intragroup corporate rules and other internal regulation landscapes is becoming increasingly 
relevant. While this is the starting point for internal audit activities, it is also required to meet the exter-
nal regulatory requirements for banks. Even if there is solely limited scientific literature available, sev-
eral experts underlined the key role of intragroup corporate governance communication. Several ex-
perts explained that the informal communication is equally important to formal communication formats. 
The personal relationship between the different MDs / FDs on subsidiary level and e.g. the parent 
CEO is a crucial aspect for the intragroup governance communication and collaboration. Besides, it 
was prominent that the experts primarily focused on intragroup communication, but not on the com-
munication towards externals such as investors, the public or authorities, which I ranked as relevant 
addressors. 
 
Thematic cluster 17: As the most crucial success factors for the intragroup corporate govern-
ance implementation, the experts outlined again the willingness and commitment of the manage-
ment. The experts underlined not to underestimate the reason why e.g. stricter corporate governance 
gets implemented. The individual perception and the desired corporate governance framework differ 
completely, if stricter corporate governance is implemented due to e.g. a compliance breach or contra-
rily, to further enhance the organizational alignment. 
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The experts confirmed that dealing with various local legal and regulatory requirements is one of the 
major obstacles and make a standardized implementation approach difficult. The majority of the ex-
perts repeatedly highlighted the relevance of a common companywide definition and clarity about the 
internal and external framework conditions. According to the experts, a professional stakeholder man-
agement is essential within the implementation to ensure the acceptance and desired outcomes. An-
other mentioned obstacle is the trend towards outsourcing relevant key functions to shared service 
centers, because it must be ensured that those third party providers comply with the various legal and 
regulatory standards. As the earlier literature review illustrated, there is currently no information found 
which focuses on the corporate governance implementation in corporate group structures. The experts 
provided important insights to enhance the further understanding of corporate governance and its 
associated processes and mechanisms. I outline that only if corporate governance is carefully embed-
ded into the intragroup structures and processes it will be accepted and considered, and thus will be 
able to be effective and beneficial for the entire corporate group and its stakeholders. 
 
The results of the expert interviews, in particular in terms of the identified subsidiary governance di-
mensions and the debates about suitable management approaches, provided a solid foundation to 
develop a first draft of a management model in the next subchapter 6.1.3. The interviewed experts 
validated the different dimensions that are important for the subsidiary governance and supplemented 
additional crucial insights that were not previously considered. Both, the theoretical foundations and 
the practical experiences of the interviewed experts form the basis for the developed model draft in the 
next subchapter, which will be verified once more in a second step by some of the experts of the first 
interview round (subchapter 6.2.1). 
 
6.1.3 Development of a model draft 
According to the prior analysis and the opinions of the interviewed experts’, one of the biggest prob-
lems of the research community is the isolated view of many scholars, which ignores that corporate 
governance can only be efficient and effective if it is recognized as a package. While there are many 
instruments and governance mechanisms, which may be recognized in an isolated view as govern-
ance management instrument, this dissertation argues that the effectiveness of the intragroup govern-
ance management largely depends on the combination of the different instruments.  
The developed model (draft) in this chapter follows a holistic and integrated approach, which sepa-
rates corporate governance in a general management and internal control cluster. All identified key 
topics of the two clusters have different characteristics and interdependencies in corporate groups and 
each subsidiary, as they are always influenced by the subjective, individual interpretation and imple-
mentation of various layers, such as culture and leadership, communication, training and the integra-
tion new technologies. That is why a common understanding among those enablers forms the founda-
tion and acts as binding element between the parent and its subsidiaries to secure a consistent ap-
proach. At the same time, environmental determinants, such as the society, politics or the intensity of 
the competition within an industry, also influence the multinational group construct and their applied 
intragroup governance management instruments. Moreover, legal determinates influence corporate 
 216 
 
governance on a global and local level, which provides in turn the foundation for the intragroup man-
agement, related standards, structures and processes. As the third crucial pillar, the external audit and 
different authorities also sharpen the design and management of the subsidiary’s corporate govern-
ance in each country as the following Figure 22 illustrates:  
 
 
Figure 22:  Intragroup corporate governance management model (draft 1). 
Source:  Own illustration. 
 
Embedded in this field of tension, it is essential to create a common understanding of the crucial focus 
topics and on how the general management of the subsidiary and its internal control should be exe-
cuted to secure that the subsidiaries act in the interest of their parents. It has to be clarified how the 
intragroup collaboration is organized and how the parent can proactively manage those topics with 
respective governance instruments. 
 
The corporate governance management model has to be embedded in those externalities and con-
sists of three major elements: (1) the intragroup governance instruments; (2) subsidiary focus topics 
(divided in general management and internal control system topics) that have to be addressed within 
the subsidiaries and (3) the evaluation if they have the desired outcomes. 
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In essence, corporate groups focus on administrative governance instruments by predefining clear 
accountabilities, standardized structures and core processes as well as internal guidelines and regula-
tions. In addition, there are instruments that predominantly aim to manage the corporate culture di-
mension and social norms for the employees. Parents manage their intragroup governance via stand-
ardized planning and alignment mechanisms and cybernetic instruments, with qualitative and quantita-
tive KPIs and respective compensation and reward schemes or the simple definition of focus topics 
that have to be addressed on subsidiary level. 
 
The following Figure 23 provides a comprehensive overview of the various intragroup management 
instruments for the governance focus topics of both, the general management and internal control 
system, which will further be described in the following paragraph:  
 
 
Figure 23:  Intragroup governance instruments to manage governance topics in subsidiaries. 
Source:        Own illustration. 
 
The general management cluster focuses predominately on the subsidiaries leadership team and de-
scribes the prerequisites for ensuring governance among the entire corporate group. The framework 
management focuses on the question how subsidiaries can manage their business embedded in the 
group context. From a parent´s perspective, there are different governance instruments to support 
this. On the one hand, terms and conditions contracts can be defined which clarify in detail the pur-
pose of the subsidiary. On the other hand, parent entities organize regular workshops and confer-
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ences for the local management staff of their subsidiaries to secure a platform for best practice shar-
ing, networking and intra-group knowledge transfer to support the framework understanding through-
out the entire group (cf., e.g. the study results of Tarwneh, 2019). Intragroup job rotation programs are 
another crucial instrument to support the systemic thinking and processual mindset of the employees. 
The mission management focuses on the complex interdependencies between the parent´s head-
quarters and the subsidiaries and includes the triad of strategy, culture and structure. Typical in-
tragroup governance instruments of the parent are balanced scorecards and modular strategy 
toolboxes or predefined target product portfolios. Other instruments are intragroup standards for the 
accounting and predefined accounting approaches and methodologies to ensure consistency within 
the consolidated financial statement of the parent. Moreover, parents tend to standardize to a maxi-
mum extent local decision-making, reporting formats and organizational and structural designs for the 
subsidiaries to secure overview, alignment and comprehensibility. The most difficult topic to manage 
from distance is the corporate culture. Thus, parents define group-wide corporate core values or an 
intragroup culture statement. Parents also implement standardized HR evaluation schemes within 
their subsidiaries, in which the group core values are a fixed component of the individual merit rating. 
The integrity management addresses the often ignored soft topics that are fundamental to secure 
ethical behavior, business conduct and an appropriate risk culture. Even if this is difficult to assess 
from an overseas headquarter, parent entities concentrate on encouraging integrity by considering this 
as a standard assessment criteria for senior management staff, implement 360 degree feedback ap-
praisal systems, and define group-wide code of conducts. However, despite this, it remains difficult to 
steer or actively manage the integrity behavior. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that it should be a core 
topic within the intragroup leadership development trainings. 
The stakeholder management reflects the relevance to consider the various and sometimes even 
contradictory interests of the different stakeholder groups on a local and global level as a major pillar 
of a sustainable long-term corporate success. The consideration of the stakeholder interests should 
serve as a corrective to balance profit orientation in the decision-making, aims to provide guidance for 
the accepted risk taking behavior and contributes to mitigate the likelihood of reputational damage. 
Thus, parent companies can implement standardized employee or customer surveys on local level as 
feedback instruments or define principles for the collaboration with business partners or intragroup 
premises for outsourcings and provider management. 
In sum, the general management dimension enables both, the subsidiaries and the corporate parent, 
to gain oversight and alignment. All those instruments secure a certain level of intragroup standardiza-
tion and clarify accountabilities and responsibilities within the group network. 
 
As complementary and supplementary element, an appropriate internal control system supports the 
overall general management of the subsidiary. This cluster provides important supplementing infor-
mation to secure a comprehensive decision-making basis. Corporate groups with financial services 
entities have to develop a strong and comprehensive internal control framework and a business cul-
ture that encourages a positive attitude towards oversight and control. All internal control functions 
(namely compliance, risk and internal audit) require appropriate and sufficient authority, statue and 
access towards the subsidiary’s management body to fulfill their duties. The appropriateness and ef-
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fectiveness of the compliance and risk management functions should be regularly assessed by the 
internal audit function. All local internal control functions have to be encouraged and to be guided by 
dedicated group functions to secure an aligned group-wide approach. 
The compliance and governance management focuses on compliance with applicable laws, regula-
tions, supervisory requirements and the entity’s internal governance management in terms of e.g. local 
documentation, processes and corporate rule landscapes, but also clear roles and responsibilities and 
decision-making procedures.319 For the local compliance and governance management, parents usu-
ally favor a very strong guidance with clear minimum requirements on how those topics have to get 
managed on a local level. Further, parents usually concentrate on comparatively strong monitoring 
and reporting duties about the local compliance management. For that reason, mandatory onboarding 
and training activities also play a major role. Parents predefine mandatory governance instruments 
and procedures and how they have to be managed on a local subsidiary level (e.g. local guideline 
landscape, job descriptions, standards for local documentation and archiving activities etc.). 
The risk management concentrates on an adequate identification, measurement and mitigation of all 
risks affecting the subsidiary and therefore also its parent. Typical governance instruments used by 
the parent are binding guidelines on how different risks have to be managed, the provision of central 
developed risk models and risk calculation methodologies, risk appetite frameworks and reporting 
formats or the requirement to implement local credit and risk committees. 
The internal audit management has to control the reliability of reported financial and non-financial 
information, both internally and externally of the subsidiary, and it has to secure a proper follow up 
management of local audit findings. For the parents, the local internal audit functions are a crucial 
information source to gain feedback about the local organization and the implementation of their pre-
defined governance instruments. The parent entities predefine relevant key audit topics and processes 
in a group-wide audit plan, which ensures that local audit reports get forwarded to the parent. Other 
intragroup instruments include standards on how local audits have to be executed and automated 
follow up management procedures to stay informed about local management actions to solve identi-
fied deficits. Parents usually favor, whenever local laws and regulations permit it, not to implement 
local internal audit functions and prefer to perform the internal audit activities centrally from the corpo-
rate audit function or regional audit hubs to secure greater market proximity. 
For all internal control functions the proportionality principle always has to be taken into account to 
reflect the individual risk profiles, different sizes and natures of the subsidiaries.  
Especially the internal control dimensions support the managerial decision-making of the general 
management dimension. On the one hand, those governance functions enable the management to get 
a comprehensive decision-making basis due to their continuous monitoring and reporting obligations. 
On the other hand, the group internal control framework and risk management framework also set 
clear boundaries and provide guidance. 
 
 
 
319 Due to the close interaction of compliance and governance topics, I have decided to merge the both key areas 
compliance & regulatory management (cf. subchapter 4.2.5) and governance management (cf. subchapter 4.2.6) 
towards one focus area. 
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However, to make the different dimensions proactively manageable, it is also necessary to perform a 
regular evaluation to get transparency about the governance maturity, the implementation stage and 
effectiveness of the defined intragroup governance management instruments in the subsidiaries. The 
regular evaluation has to take place via a standardized questionnaire. On the one hand, a regular 
governance tracking provides the basis for the corporate parent to have an overview of the local cor-
porate governance maturity in its subsidiaries and to get feedback about the appropriateness and 
effectiveness of the instruments. On the other hand, it is an important self-assessment tool for the 
subsidiaries to identify governance deficits and disparities towards group standards and intragroup 
governance instruments, identify improvement areas and monitor the made progress. Consequently, 
there has to be a standardized evaluation of the maturity levels of each governance sub-topic and how 
those are locally managed with the help of different intragroup instruments to get a comprehensive 
overview of the governance situation on subsidiary level. This provides the foundation to define further 
management actions that need to be taken to mitigate identified deviations. 
 
The implementation of intragroup management instruments enables the subsidiaries to act appropri-
ately in the local market and intragroup framework and secures clear roles and responsibilities, collab-
orations and interaction procedures. The implementation of the governance management instruments 
enables the parent to proactively manage the entire corporate group as a whole and helps to protect 
the corporate group with a professional and consistent intragroup control and risk management. This 
transparency supports the parent to identify, assess and monitor business opportunities and threats 
in an early stage and it provides the foundation for the group-strategy and reasonable target definition, 
monitoring and control. The combined subsidiary governance framework forms the foundation for op-
erational effectiveness and efficiency among the entire subsidiary network, provides guidance for ex-
pected business conduct, secures a correct and reliable information basis and mitigates the general 
risk potential. 
Consequently, an adequate intragroup subsidiary governance management is a prerequisite for the 
corporate success of the corporate group as a whole. The focus on the identified focus topics ena-
bles the organizations to be compliant with legal and regulatory requirements, intragroup governance 
instruments, increases the competitiveness and has beneficial effects on the operational excellence 
and corporate sustainability.  
 
Altogether, a proper intragroup governance management creates value, increases the trust and reli-
ability of the reported financial and non-financial information, both internally and externally and miti-
gates the likelihood of reputational damage of the entire group.  
 
In a second step, this developed draft of the corporate governance management model for financial 
services subsidiaries will be verified by another interview session. As outlined in chapter 5.1, the inten-
tion behind this second interview loop is to improve the overall quality of the management model as 
implied by the underlying Delphi methodology.  
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6.2 Verification of a corporate governance model for financial services subsidiaries 
Following the introduced research concept of this dissertation, I will at first illustrate the results of the 
second interview loop with 10 of the 24 interviewed subject matter experts, who were executed be-
tween September and December 2017. Every interview partner got the draft of the initially developed 
management model including the overview with the identified sub-topics in advance, to secure a prop-
er preparation and to use it as corrective within their judgment formation. After a short overview of the 
results of the interviews, I will debate the gathered information and improvement suggestions in sub-
chapter 6.2.2, before the final management model will be introduced in chapter 6.3. 
 
6.2.1 Results of expert interviews 
After the completion of a first draft of the management model (cf. Figure 22 and 23 in chapter 6.1.3), I 
executed 10 additional interviews with the same subject matter experts of the first interview session in 
a second step, to consolidate the interim results.  
All interviewed subject matter experts agreed that all relevant subsidiary governance management 
topics are included in this first draft of the management model. However, only expert 2 and 4 raised 
the question to rethink the hierarchical relationship and dependencies between the corporate parent 
and the subsidiaries as well as the respective governance management instruments in more detail. 
For example, expert 4 ascertained that “You strongly focus on the governance topics and not that 
much on how to manage financial services subsidiaries from the parent’s headquarters perspective 
than I would expect.” Expert 2 and 4 qualified their statements and outlined that this depends on the 
overall objective of the model.  
In contrast to this, expert 5 summarized that “…this is a very comprehensive model, reduces com-
plexities and provides a simple overview of the different interactions of the complex, multidimensional 
topic of subsidiary governance management in a two-dimensional model.” Further, expert 1, 3, 6 and 
7, 9 and 10 clearly stated that the model makes sense, is comprehensive and involves all important 
layers within the two charts. Subject matter expert 7 made clear that „…a model is always a simplifica-
tion of the reality and has a certain level of abstraction with many carefully defined ulterior motives 
behind the used terms and topic clusters. Especially in combination with the existing explanations, it is 
a coherent concept.” 
 
Thematic cluster 1: Subsidiary governance management topics (general management & inter-
nal control system): The large majority of the experts (e.g. expert 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7) explicitly agreed 
that the identified topics in the ‘general management’ and ‘internal control system’ boxes of the man-
agement model cover all important focus topics of subsidiary governance. Even so, several experts 
(e.g. expert 1, 3, 4 and 7) suggested describing the different subtopics in the written explanations. 
Expert 7 outlined that such a ‘checklist with focus topics makes a lot of sense to provide guidance and 
secure a standardized evaluation and measurement of those topics. Expert 6 proposed to “[…] use a 
circle arrow to indicate the rolling process between ‘general management’ and ‘internal control sys-
tem’. The ‘general management’ gets managed and below it gets continuously supported, but also 
controlled and monitored to achieve a continuous improvement.” Expert 5, 6, 7 and 8 further suggest-
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ed to separate the ‘internal audit’ within the ‘internal control system’. Expert 5 declared that internal 
audit “…is from a holistic group-wide perspective responsible for the monitoring and control of the ‘risk 
and compliance & governance management.’ That’s why a separation would better reflect its hierar-
chical relationship.” Expert 6 remembered that this would also reflect the Three Lines of Defense ap-
proach. Expert 2 and 6 raised the question of whether it makes sense to describe and bundle the con-
trolling topics to a broader financial management area within the framework management or as sepa-
rate cluster. Expert 6 outlined that in a multinational group context with subsidiaries, particularly “[…] 
financial KPI management systems are a crucial control instrument for the parents´ headquarters.” 
Expert 9 recommended also considering the selection and nomination process of new senior manag-
ers on subsidiary level. Expert 10 recognized that there are some overlaps among the clustered top-
ics, but also agreed that it would be difficult to avoid this. Among several experts, such as expert 10, 
especially the risk culture was mentioned to be allocated in the risk management dimension. Others 
recommended combining, renaming and/or reallocating some of the sub-topics (e.g. core competenc-
es and capabilities, systemic thinking and processes) to make them more self-explanatory. Among 
others, particularly experts 2 and 10 recommended to put greater emphasis on the intragroup man-
agement of the decision-making framework as well as roles and responsibilities. 
 
Thematic cluster 2: Intragroup governance instruments: In essence, the experts agreed with the 
different intragroup governance management instruments. However, there was broad consensus to 
cluster the different management instruments not only among the topics but also among other dimen-
sions to secure more transparency and clarity about their interdependencies to each other. Expert 3 
suggested to separate them along a strategic, operative and cultural dimension, others suggested to 
use a hierarchical order (expert 1) or to cluster it among the control dimension (expert 8) or based on 
their legal and regulatory relevance (expert 6). Two experts (e.g. expert 2 and 4) even stated that it 
would be interesting to define certain indications to identify which of the intragroup governance instru-
ments fits best for which reason.  
 
Thematic cluster 3: Standardized evaluation: There was a broad degree of consensus among the 
interviewed subject matter experts (e.g. expert 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10) that a standardized evaluation 
with a maturity level approach is an appropriate way for the management, steering and monitoring of 
subsidiary governance. Even so, especially expert 6 raised the question of whether it is only a “stand-
ardized evaluation or also a measurement” and explained that in his multinational group the parent’s 
consolidating governance functions perform both. For that reason expert 2 and 6 criticized that the 
arrow signs in the model draft regarding the intragroup instruments and the evaluation are currently 
misleading, as this is a clear task of the parent. Subject matter expert 7 and 8 noted again that such a 
procedure requires clearly predefined measures for the evaluation. Expert 10 recommended to clarify 
why the allocation of the topics follows a risk-based approach.  
 
Thematic cluster 4: Corporate parent: There was a dissent among the experts regarding the inter-
pretation of the ‘corporate parent’ box. Although some of them (e.g. expert 1, 3, 5, 7) agreed with the 
wording, others (e.g. expert 2, 4, 6) recommended to rename it or use a different design as this termi-
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nation is unclear and indeterminate. Expert 2 suggested to clarify this in more detail, to adjust it ac-
cording to the different subtopics and to make it more self-explanatory. Expert 4 analyzed in this con-
text that “…currently the terms ‘enabling’, ‘protection’, ‘transparency’ etc. seem to be the outcome of 
the intragroup governance management model, but those terms also describe the essentials of gov-
ernance and can be both, the input / output of them....”  
 
Thematic cluster 5: Protection and enabling: The interviewed experts agreed that the context of the 
‘enabling’ and ‘protection’ boxes fit into the argumentation and make sense. Expert 6 recommended to 
use a circle graph at this point, with arrows to indicate the continuous interaction between both, the 
‘enabling’ and ‘protection’ dimensions. Expert 5 suggested to also highlight in the protection box the 
interpretation and adjustment of the external laws and regulations towards the context of the corporate 
group. Expert 2 explained that out of his point of view the mentioned topics in the ‘protection’ box re-
flect the key elements of the operational governance. 
 
Thematic cluster 6: Transparency: The vast majority of the interviewed experts (e.g. expert 1, 3, 5, 
6, 7, 9, 10) confirmed that the defined measures in the ‘enabling’ and ‘protection’ box result in a great-
er intragroup transparency. Expert 6 criticized that ‘operational effectiveness and efficiency’ is rather 
the reverse effect of proper corporate governance or the output of a high level of transparency. Expert 
2 complemented that the conclusion arising out of a high level of transparency is currently not ade-
quately considered and argued that “…stand-alone ‘transparency’ does not automatically lead to ‘cor-
porate success…’ it is rather the basis to define appropriate management actions and monitoring of 
governance deficits. Subject matter expert 10 recognized that out of a conceptual perspective it would 
be preferable if the ‘protection’, ‘enabling’ and ‘transparency’ box would have a different design than 
the other ones, as they have a different message. One rather describes the effects and the other two 
describe more the organizational forms (e.g. ‘subsidiary’, ‘corporate parent’). 
 
Thematic cluster 7: Corporate success: In general, consensus was found about the identified cor-
porate success factors. According to the experiences of expert 3, the term ‘corporate success’ is 
commonly used to describe solely the economic success and he suggested to redefine it with the term 
‘corporate stability’ or ‘corporate benefits. He found that governance is rather the basis for corporate 
and organizational stability and is therefore more an ‘enabler’ and ‘stabilizer’. Expert 6 recommended 
to separate the ‘corporate success’ box, as this refers to the entire corporate group, including the cor-
porate parent and subsidiaries. Also, he suggested to replace the box with a circle and continuous 
process loop as it has to be understood as continuous improvement process in a fast and ever-
changing business environment. Expert 1 also remarked to include ‘customer centricity’ as another 
crucial characteristic in this context, which further directly pays in the overarching objective of ‘value 
creation’. 
 
Thematic cluster 8: Value creation, trust and reputation: At its core all interviewed experts agreed 
to the identified overarching objectives of ‘value creation’, ‘trust’ and ‘reputation’ in the context of cor-
porate governance management. Especially experts 3 and 7 outlined the benefits of a generic term 
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like ‘value creation’ as this provides the flexibility to interpret it in various ways with respect to the het-
erogeneous target groups. Contrarily, expert 10 raised the question if value creation is rather the 
heading for other terms, such ‘trust’ and ‘reputation’. Expert 6 advised to add also ‘shareholder value’ 
at this point and transferred the term ‘competitiveness’ also to the ‘value creation’ box. In his opinion, 
this was rather the external perception of group-internal operational efficiency and effectiveness. 
 
Thematic cluster 9: Underlying dimensions: All experts confirmed the identified underlying dimen-
sions and outlined that a common understanding regarding those topics is a clear prerequisite in mul-
tinational groups, to secure an adequate intragroup corporate governance management. To highlight 
its importance, expert 4 recommended to illustrate a clear interlink to the ‘value creation’. Expert 5 
suggested to also include ‘people to address both, the qualitative and quantitative staffing' in the ‘or-
ganization & technology’ box. She argued that “…this always gets more crucial to have enough people 
including the right skillset and professional experiences and reflects the increasing dependency of 
governance efficiency and effectiveness of appropriate IT infrastructure.” Furthermore, expert 6 in-
duced to place those underlying dimensions on the left/ right and not on the bottom line to make clear 
that those are the binding elements which have to be aligned among the entire corporate group. 
 
Thematic cluster 10: External environment: The experts agreed that the management model is 
embedded in different externalities and confirmed the defined key influencing determinants. Expert 1 
even recognized the elements of the St. Galler Management Model. Expert 2 and expert 3 strongly 
recommended to choose another format of presentation to make it more self-explanatory. Thus, they 
endorsed to use circles with different sizes to clarify that the environmental framework influences the 
entire corporate group. Experts 1, 4 and 10 recognized that the different external forces are currently 
illustrated as they are all on the same hierarchical level. Yet, subject matter expert 7 responded to that 
and advised to use a pie chart as presentation form to avoid any rating or hierarchical arrangement 
among the three external forces.  
 
Thematic cluster 11: External audit and authorities: Experts 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 advised to exclude 
the external audit from the box as this is a different procedure. Expert 3 made clear that “…the exter-
nal authorities provide guidance with the interpretation of legal and regulatory framework, but the ex-
ternal auditor is the independent control function and has to be separated from the role of the authori-
ties and should be stand-alone.” Moreover, expert 5 remembered that this would also better reflect the 
‘Three Lines of Defence’ approach. Finally, expert 5 and 6 outlined the need to supplement the term 
‘supervision’ and law enforcement’. 
 
Thematic cluster 12: Legal and regulatory determinants: Some of the experts critically questioned 
whether there was a clear demarcation line between ‘legal and regulatory determinants’ and the ‘ex-
ternal audit / authorities’. Expert 5 explained that from an international perspective there are different 
argumentations possible. Expert 4 raised the question if it would increase clarity if there was no differ-
entiation between the ‘legal and regulatory determinates’ and the authorities. Furthermore, expert 2, 4, 
7, 8 and 10 suggested to also reflect the influence of lobbying with an arrow from the group construct 
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towards the ‘legal and regulatory determinants’. Expert 7 explained that this is in many immature mar-
kets common practice and is an important mechanism for setting the right future oriented external 
framework conditions. Having said this, this statement is contradictory towards the opinion of expert 5 
who recommended to leave this topic out of the model as the influence of lobby associations is rather 
weak. In addition, expert 8 mentioned that he would prefer ‘requirements’ instead of the softer termi-
nology ‘standards’ to make clear that there are also legal obligations that companies have to follow. 
 
After a short overview of the statements of the interview partners in the second interview loop, I will 
discuss the conclusions for the further development of the model in the following subchapter. 
 
6.2.2 Discussion of the results 
All interviewed experts provided valuable input to further develop the earlier introduced model draft. 
While most interviewed subject matter experts agreed to the considered subject areas that were cov-
ered in the first model draft, many of the provided valuable insights to improve the illustration of the 
model. Due to the complexity of the topic, the experts outlined the benefits of a simple illustration to 
demonstrate the intragroup context in which the model is embedded.  
It also became clear that in particular the target group, scope and expectations of the management 
model have to be properly described, as the divergent statements of the interviewed experts had illus-
trated. While some argued that the concept only provides a governance management concept itself, 
others highlighted, e.g. from their senior management role of a financial services subsidiary, a clear 
benefit of the model. Two single experts argued that they would concentrate more on the different 
management instruments. I responded to that and outlined that appropriate management instruments 
will be discussed in detail within the explanation of the entire model and will be covered by a question-
naire for evaluating the local implementation and effectiveness of intragroup governance instruments. 
For limited time reasons, I decided not to include the complete questionnaires in detail for each gov-
ernance topic within the interviews. Nevertheless, the provided feedback indicates that the intragroup 
instruments and the hierarchical relationship should be better reflected and it implies the imperative 
need to refer to specific management instruments for the particular topics within the evaluation ques-
tionnaire. 
The experts confirmed that the external forces with the’ environmental’, ‘legal and regulatory de-
terminates’ as well as the ‘external audit’ and ‘supervisory authorities’ influence the corporate 
governance management of the entire group. Moreover, there was a discussion if the lobbying activi-
ties of the automotive industry should rather be considered or not. Concerning this, there was a dis-
sent among the interviewed experts and I have not concentrated on this particular mechanism so far. 
However, as the majority of the experts recommended to take into account lobbying activities, I will 
consider this mechanism in the further development of the model. Even so, it became clear that the 
‘external audit’ and the ‘supervisory authorities’ should be separated from each other as they have to 
fulfill different tasks. While the ‘supervisory authorities’ are responsible for the law enforcement and 
supervision, the ‘external audit’ has to act primarily as an independent external control function. 
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There was consensus that the identified focus topics reflect the relevant intragroup corporate gov-
ernance topics. However, within the general management dimension, especially the topics of ‘frame-
work management’, ‘mission management’ and ‘integrity management’ have been in the limelight and 
some experts suggested to rename them and reallocate some of the sub-topics to make them more 
self-explanatory. The interviewed subject matter experts recommended to place greater emphasis on 
the topic of decision-making in particular as well as the definition of clear roles and responsibilities. 
Some others experts suggested to take more account of weighting strategy, financial management 
and HR related governance mechanisms in the model. 
In sum, all experts confirmed the ‘risk management’, ‘compliance and governance management’ as an 
entire component of the ‘internal control’ dimension. Yet, few of the experts recommended to slightly 
separate the internal audit function from the others. While some argued that internal audit has to be 
considered within the model to secure a comprehensive 360-degree view, others found that it should 
be allocated outside of the model's scope. However, the consideration of the Three Lines of Defense 
approach logic within the model was positively highlighted by several experts. 
 
Regarding the ‘evaluation’ of the topics, the experts agreed that a standardized questionnaire seems 
to be appropriate to monitor and evaluate the maturity level in the subsidiaries and to get feedback 
concerning the local implementation stage. However, the experts made clear that there have to be 
clear evaluation measures to secure comparability and consistency by following a risk based ap-
proach.  
 
Two experts critically discussed the general topic of ‘enabling’, ‘protection’ and the ‘transparency’. 
One of them found that transparency itself does not lead to corporate success as, from his point of 
view, it rather describes the fundament and is a prerequisite for the parent management body to de-
fine appropriate actions. In fact, this is a perspective that is currently not adequately considered in the 
model. Moreover, the expert found that the ‘enabling’ and ‘protection’ box rather describe the opera-
tional governance that is performed by the consolidating internal control functions.  
 
Another much-discussed issue was the ‘corporate success’ dimension. In essence, the experts rec-
ommended to use a different design for this box, to reflect that this is the benefit of a consistent in-
tragroup corporate governance management. Thus, it should be separated from the corporate parent, 
as this affects the entire group from the subsidiaries towards the parent.  
 
Moreover, the experts confirmed the identified binding elements between the parent and its subsidiar-
ies (‘culture and leadership’, ‘communication and training’, ‘organization and technology’) as relevant 
key components. Especially the term ‘technology’, ‘training’ and ‘communication’ was highlighted, and 
the qualitative and quantitative staffing of the right people was emphasized as another crucial key 
enabler.  
 
In terms of the ‘value creation’, the experts generally agreed, but some advised to add ‘competitive-
ness’ as another crucial output factor within the overall external perception of the corporate group. At 
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the same time, similarly to the first round of interviews, the experts again highlighted the difficulties to 
measure the additional value of a proper management of the corporate governance.  
 
Overall, the second round of interviews provided additional ideas and relevant insights to hereafter 
develop a comprehensive management model for groups to evaluate and measure the corporate gov-
ernance maturity levels of their subsidiaries in a final step. 
 
6.3 Entire corporate governance management model for financial services subsidiaries 
Based on the feedback of the second interview loop with the selected subject matter experts, I was 
able to advance the first draft of the introduced management model. The second draft reflects even 
more the complex environment in which the management model is embedded and puts a greater em-
phasis on the intragroup governance management instruments and their evaluation. 
Different external forces, such as the society, politics industry and competition, the legal and regulato-
ry determinants and the competent supervisory authorities as well as external auditors, influence the 
entire corporate group. With their lobbying activities, the automotive multinational groups also influ-
ence, in some cases rather direct and in others rather indirect, the standard setting and general 
framework conditions for their industry. In sum, all those externalities exert influence on the corporate 
culture, the corporate core values and performed leadership within the group, the overall organi-
zational structures and processes, its people and deployed technologies as well as the prevalent 
communication approaches and training activities, which altogether form the basis for the group-wide 
corporate governance management. Furthermore, it influences the selection and the design of the 
intragroup governance management instruments and defines focus topics that have to be addressed 
by them. The Figure 24 on the next page illustrates the complete group construct in which the man-
agement model (red box) is embedded. 
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Figure 24:  Group corporate governance construct. 
       Source:  Own illustration. 
 
The intragroup governance management model consists out of three different elements:  
At first, the corporate parent has to decide about the appropriate governance management approach, 
which is essential to determine the management instruments that fit best. Those instruments formu-
late the parent´s expectations in many different ways and set the intragroup standards that have to be 
met by the subsidiaries and which will be discussed in the following subchapter 6.3.1. The implemen-
tation of those instruments forms the basis for intragroup transparency, alignment, coordination and 
control, but also leads to a continuous improvement on subsidiary and parent level. In addition, they 
are a prerequisite for the parent to manage the different intragroup governance focus topics. 
Secondly, alongside the instruments, the respective governance focus topics on subsidiary level 
also have to be defined. While such topics enable the subsidiaries to perform a holistic general man-
agement, they also secure appropriate internal control and risk mitigation measures to provide a solid 
information basis for decisions that have to be taken. Those key topics will be discussed in subchapter 
6.3.2. 
Thirdly, to get transparency of both, the effects and implementation stage of the instruments, but also 
to secure oversight and insight about the defined intragroup governance focus topics, a standardized 
measurement and evaluation is required. This enables the parent to define the governance maturity 
of the subsidiaries and will be detailed in subchapter 6.3.3. The Figure 25 on the next page provides 
the overview of the interaction of the three parts of the entire model. 
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Figure 25:  Intragroup Corporate Governance Management Model. 
      Source:  Own illustration. 
 
This tripartite approach of predefined instruments, governance focus topics and a standardized meas-
urement and evaluation, enables the parent to gain intragroup oversight and alignment and to perform 
respective planning activities. It is a prerequisite to define clear responsibilities and accountabilities 
and to implement intragroup standards. Equally, this approach contributes to risk prevention, as it 
secures a continuous monitoring and reporting of risk related topics, and it supports to avoid in-
tragroup organizational failure and defines clear boundaries for the subsidiaries.  
In sum, all this gathered information is a prerequisite to secure the effectiveness of the group-wide 
internal risk management and internal control framework. It enables the group to have transpar-
ency of all relevant information to secure a holistic overview about group-wide business threats and 
opportunities, provides indications about intragroup strengths and weaknesses and allows reliable 
conclusions on the business conduct and behavior of the organizational members.  
All in all, a proper intragroup governance management will lead to greater quality of the decisions 
which have to be taken, it will improve the operational effectiveness and efficiency and it will enable 
the parents to define appropriate management actions and will help to fulfill its due diligence obliga-
tions. 
Finally, the combination of the multiple mechanisms, instruments and their multiple direct or rather 
indirect interdependencies lead towards legal conformity, support the sustainability efforts and se-
cure operational excellence. It encourages the value creation and fosters external trust, mitigates the 
probability for reputational damage and thus, in a final consequence, the perceived competitiveness 
of the corporate group. 
After this introduction, I will take a step further and outline the respective intragroup management in-
struments as a first part of the model in the next subchapter. 
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6.3.1 Part 1: Intragroup governance management instruments 
Clarity about the individual corporate governance definition is the starting point to define intragroup 
management instruments and relevant focus topics, which are essential to make corporate govern-
ance manageable. Mutually agreed upon intragroup governance standards are required to ensure 
transparency, standardization and oversight in the multinational group. It influences the identification, 
allocation and the design of the right instruments to manage intragroup governance. As the previous 
analysis illustrated, the different intragroup governance instruments can be clustered in six different 
groups.320 Parents focus on instruments to set a clear cultural and administrative framework, apply 
reward and compensation instruments, use outsourcing agreements and different planning and cyber-
netic instruments to manage their subsidiaries. The different types of instruments encourage the par-
ent to proactively manage their subsidiaries among essential focus topics, secure intragroup coordina-
tion and alignment and reduce the overall risk potential within the group. The following Figure 26 illus-
trates the multiple clusters of instruments by which parents manage the intragroup governance:  
 
 
Figure 26:  Intragroup governance management instruments. 
       Source:  Own illustration. 
 
On the one hand, parents focus on cultural management instruments and, on the other hand, they 
define clear administrative governance frameworks for their subsidiaries, in which are embedded dif-
ferent other management instruments (e.g. outsourcings, planning or cybernetic instruments). While 
each of the mentioned instruments can be recognized in isolation as own governance management 
system, I combine them to one package.321 Only if they are properly aligned with each other, it is pos-
sible to secure the holistic and comprehensive corporate governance approach. In the following para-
graph, I debate the different instrument clusters and how parents use the different groups of instru-
ments to secure a group-wide approach. 
 
 
 
320 The classification of the management instruments is derived from the suggested dimensions of management 
control of Malmi & Brown (2008). 
321 This argumentation is adopted from Malmi & Brown (2008) who introduced this perspective for management 
control. For further information, cf. chapter 2.4. 
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Cluster 1: Culture management instruments: Parent entities use culture to bridge existing govern-
ance gaps within the group that undoubtedly exist in each organization. The corporate culture consists 
of shared values, beliefs and social norms within the entire group and influences the individual 
thoughts and behaviors.322 Especially in multinational organizations the conscious and targeted use of 
cultural management instruments are of great importance. Corporate culture is a sustainable key driv-
er, develops over time and usually stays within an organization even if local managers or other key 
persons in the subsidiary change. However, cultural instruments are often difficult to steer from dis-
tance, depend much on the individual interpretation and always have to be transferred to the local 
national culture to be effective. Nevertheless, the instruments used by the executives to communicate 
formally and reinforce values, purpose and direction towards the organization (e.g. mission state-
ments, vision statements, corporate core values etc.) are essential and aim on a group-wide feeling of 
togetherness. Other instruments are those focusing on visible signs and symbols (e.g. design of the 
buildings, clothing styles, workplace designs etc.) and provide guidance regarding the accepted social 
norms within the corporate group. Especially in mixed groups with different business models (e.g. car 
production and financial services), it is required to balance, on the one hand, one uniform group 
standard, and on the other hand, also to take into account any business model specifics to secure the 
authenticity and desired effects. Other culture-related management instruments focus on the recruiting 
to secure that the hired employees fit to the organizational values (e.g. predefined recruiting criteria or 
assessment processes, centralized recruiting for senior management positions within the parent). 
Apart from that, even if it is difficult to manage via central instruments, the parents use intragroup 
leadership development programs and job rotation programs to promote the joint core values, to foster 
a similar interpretation and to avoid too many variances within the subcultures in the subsidiaries. 
Apart from the fact that it is not possible to eliminate subcultures, particularly in large multinational 
organizations they are necessary for the local staff to identify with the organization; finally they also 
reduce employee fluctuation. While subcultures have a strong impact on the individual behavior within 
the socialization process (e.g. own ceremonies, rituals, team events etc.), parents want to avoid too 
strong subcultures. In order to cope with this challenge, parents usually install e.g. a manager out of 
the local market as subsidiary CEO and mangers out of the parent as CFO. Nevertheless, the cultural 
dimension is one of the most critical management instruments, even if it is only possible to a very lim-
ited extend to manage from abroad. Whether the desired effects of the cultural management are 
achieved or not largely depends on the local management and how they interpret their role as local 
ambassadors of the parent´s management body. 
 
Cluster 2: Administrative management instruments: Other crucial instruments are clear require-
ments for e.g. the organizational and operational design of subsidiaries, intragroup accountability 
frameworks and intertwining policies and procedures. Other instruments include the provision of tools 
and group-wide IT systems, guiding principles or the provision of central developed blueprints. Parents 
implement those instruments to secure structures and procedures for alignment between the different 
functions and organizational units both vertically and horizontally, but also locally and globally. At its 
core, those instruments aim to guide the staff and their behaviors throughout the organization and 
 
322 For further information, cf. chapter 3.1.3. 
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specify the parent´s expectations on how tasks and behaviors have to be performed or not. Additional-
ly, they secure that the subsidiaries are accountable for their behaviors.  
Even if this sounds obvious, it is often difficult to balance the right level of detail to secure on the one 
hand a clear organizational systemization among the entire group but, on the other hand, enough flex-
ibility for local adoption. There are different instruments applied with different levels of obligation, start-
ing with guiding principles, blueprints and best practices towards compulsory policies and procedures 
that have to be implemented in each subsidiary. However, especially organizational and operational 
reference models are commonly used instruments to standardize structure types, core processes, 
relations and interdependencies to a maximum extent. Standardized organizational and operational 
designs help to reduce variances, variability of behaviors and increase the intragroup transparency. In 
a perfect world, this seems to be logical, but in multinational groups with historically grown structures, 
different types of subsidiaries, merger and acquisitions, varying business models and levels of regula-
tions it is often difficult to achieve. Moreover, parents predefine clear accountability frameworks and 
decision-making structures via different instruments. As particularly in the financial services business, 
this is closely linked to the liability and duty of care obligations, parents tend to use clear requirements 
for the design and the composition of the institutional management and supervisory body, and tend to 
implement standardized job descriptions for the senior management positions in subsidiaries. In addi-
tion, there are usually formal lines of authority and accountability as well as standardized intragroup 
escalation mechanisms for the case of dissent.  
Thus, parents often introduce predefined decision-making procedures, including standardized commit-
tee designs, (pre-) alignment matrixes for the decision-making, predefined committee topics, docu-
mentation and follow up processes and regular reporting formats. While this is necessary for in-
tragroup information flow and decision-making preparation of the parent, it also leads to more bureau-
cratic burdens, longer decision-making processes and in many ways limits the often requested agility 
and flexibility of the parent´s top management. Further, it has to be kept in mind that the local man-
agement is held accountable by the local authorities for the decisions taken, which may lead to prob-
lems if crucial decisions affecting the subsidiary have to be taken from an intragroup perspective on 
higher hierarchy levels. Having said that, parents can solve this problem via mandatory intragroup pre-
alignment procedures before the final decisions are taken by the local management body.  
Tools and IT Infrastructure are another crucial, but often ignored governance management instrument. 
The group-wide application of the same tools and IT systems fosters the systemic approach, simplifies 
the management and is a prerequisite for reporting, alignment, communication and information ex-
change. There is no doubt that it is a crucial enabler to manage the growing digitalization and data 
driven business models. Even so, many multinational companies struggle to harmonize their multifac-
eted, fragmented IT landscapes and form a uniform intragroup IT architecture. 
 
Cluster 3: Intragroup management via outsourcing agreements: Another crucial intragroup gov-
ernance management instrument is outsourcing. Intragroup outsourcings are arrangements in which 
the parent or another affiliated company provides services for others within the same group, which 
could also be or usually have been typical in-house activities. Multinational groups use intragroup and 
external outsourcings to increase internal efficiency regarding e.g. services, such as administration, 
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information technology or finance, which are provided in arm's length relationships. Even if there are 
multiple transfer pricing requirements and cross boarder tax treatments that have to be taken into ac-
count, parents predefine for topics with a high strategic relevance, high-risk potential or other core 
competencies that are relevant for securing the competitive advantage which have to be outsourced 
from their subsidiaries to the parent. While this supports intragroup standardization, it also reduces 
organizational opacity, redundancies and duplication of work within the different business units, but 
likewise can favor cluster risks. On the one hand, for the parents this centralization simplifies defining 
and implementing intragroup standards, secures better oversight and alignment and may reduce ad-
ministrative costs. On the other hand, especially in strong regulated financial services entities, clear 
limitations exist for outsourcings in most countries. While in banks it is usually not allowed to out-
source certain business and core control activities (e.g. risk management function, internal audit, 
compliance functions) towards another entity, in other countries, it is prohibited to outsource activities 
cross-border or transfer customer data to any third-party providers. Nevertheless, outsourcings are an 
increasingly important governance instrument and parents implement standardized service level 
agreements with their subsidiaries, define standards for local outsourcing activities and implement 
provider management functions to secure a professional management of the outsourcing activities. 
 
Cluster 4: Intragroup management via forecasting / planning instruments: Planning and forecast-
ing instruments are another commonly used group of instruments. Such instruments have an ex ante 
focus and define targets and actions for the subsidiaries, i.e. they define standards and expectations 
of the parent that have to be achieved. While planning instruments are required to coordinate the in-
tragroup targets, it is also a prerequisite to control the subsidiaries and to secure the successful im-
plementation of the group strategy, target achievement and the desired outcomes from a group-wide 
perspective. Typical instruments are the stringent implementation of intragroup balance scorecards 
among all hierarchies, from division specific strategies derived from the overarching group strategy, 
strategy toolboxes for subsidiaries with modular strategies or target product portfolios. Such instru-
ments provide intragroup guidance for the decision-making and prioritization of future activities within 
the subsidiaries. 
The targets and actions between the middle and long-term view are usually defined in standardized 
intragroup long-range planning procedures to overcome future uncertainty and take into account future 
trends to see what the possible range of alternative futures might be. At the same time, there are also 
more operative planning instruments which formulate rather short-term targets and actions (e.g. up to 
one business year) and include much more detailed standards and concrete instructions. 
In sum, those instruments primarily aim to secure that the overarching group strategy gets implement-
ed and they formulate e.g. clear time schedules, specific tasks and behaviors to be taken or concrete 
resource allocations for the achievement of the set standards. Although intragroup planning and fore-
casting instruments are often bureaucratic, time-consuming and lead to much discussion, they are 
crucial to manage global subsidiary networks. While those instruments support managing intragroup 
complexity and interdependencies, they are also necessary to manage stakeholders and to deal with 
the increasingly volatile business environments. 
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Cluster 5: Cybernetic management instruments: As the previous discussion illustrated, there are 
tools used to manage the intragroup governance with standardized feedback loops and primarily focus 
either on information provision or decision support. While such instruments formulate the expectations 
of the parent in e.g. intragroup standards and targets that have to be achieved, they are further used 
as measuring system to check and compare the performance of the subsidiaries, and therefore the 
variance level towards the set standards. Such instruments are commonly used, as they provide tar-
gets or systems with the help of their counter flow procedure feedback (which is a prerequisite to con-
tinually modify existing intragroup standards).  
Parents primarily use such instruments for the yearly budgeting of their subsidiaries, which further 
forms the basis to perform the yearly ex post performance evaluation. Apart from that, such instru-
ments help to assign responsibilities and are a main source for decisions about resource allocations. 
There are many financial or non-financial, qualitative or rather quantitative cybernetic management 
instruments used to manage and control the subsidiaries. They are applied via financial performance 
measures, such as profit contribution towards the parent, ROI, EVA, EBIT KPIs, but are also used as 
a tool for the intragroup target setting. While financial measurement instruments seem to be the most 
obvious, there are also other quantitative governance instruments, which define standards with abso-
lute or relative KPIs for e.g. the IT performance or process quality. 
There are also non-financial measurement instruments used to bridge the limitations of pure financial 
performance measures (e.g. TQM Models, Three Lines of Defense). Such qualitative measurement 
instruments are e.g. regular employee / customer surveys or mandatory 360-degree feedback ap-
praisal systems. Instruments that incorporate elements of financial and non-financial measures also 
become increasingly important, as it typically is the case in the Balance Scorecard, COSO Frame-
works and ‘Management by Objectives’ approaches. Also due to the preferred usage of information 
technology and customer-centric approaches, such cybernetic management instruments become in-
creasingly relevant, secure a more collaborative approach and are essential to transform multinational 
groups into the earlier mentioned high-performance organizations. However, such cybernetic instru-
ments are also often associated with comparatively high implementation complexity, time and cost 
effort to steer their effectiveness. 
 
Cluster 6: Intragroup management via reward and compensation: Driven by the previous debates, 
parents also use management instruments that focus on the extrinsic and intrinsic motivation to in-
crease the performance and target congruence. In particular, parents design monetary incentive 
schemes as management instruments to support organizational and individual prioritization and clarify 
their expectations regarding the set intragroup standards. While this further helps to increase the effort 
of subsidiaries and their employees, it is also a crucial control instrument for the parent to set clear 
boundaries about the expected level of risk taking or accepted variances of the predefined intragroup 
standards. Parents apply instruments that focus on both, individual and group rewards to encourage 
cultural controls and foster intragroup alignment and collaboration. Typical intragroup management 
instruments are e.g. joint targets for subsidiaries in the same host country (local financial services 
subsidiary and local sales subsidiary) or level-target agreements among different hierarchy levels or 
business units. It is common practice that the variable component of the individual remuneration in-
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cludes a fixed element that depends on the achievement of the overarching group results to encour-
age the intragroup collaboration.323 While this supports the intragroup target congruence, it can also 
have a demotivating effect if there is an over-fulfillment of the set targets on a local level, but not on 
group-wide scale. The group-wide alignment of the reward systems is often difficult as there are multi-
ple internal and external factors that influence the individual amount of remuneration (e.g. different 
income tax systems in host countries, varying social security systems, purchasing powers and many 
others) and affect the individual compensation package. More difficulties may arise from the different 
business models within a multinational group, which usually include varying compensation schemes, 
too. Nevertheless, parents usually put a great emphasis on aligned reward systems, implement scor-
ing systems, and define standards for the local grading or job evaluation schemes within the subsidiar-
ies to secure a group-wide standard. Contrarily, as the expert interviews illustrated, the compensation 
schemes are also used as effective sanction mechanism for non-compliant behavior with intragroup 
governance and compliance standards. 
 
In essence, all those multiple intragroup governance management instruments, that are sometimes 
legally or regulatory required, enable the parent to manage a particular topic on different levels, aim at 
different target groups, have different levels of interdependencies and aim to manage either process-
es, structures or simply formulate expectations on how to behave or not. 
 
Selection criteria 
As this previous debate illustrated it is neither possible nor target-orientated to define whether one 
instrument may be more important than the other, as they all have different purposes and are used in 
multiple contexts. Even so, I argue that there are some criteria, which can assist corporate groups to 
identify the most appropriate instrument for their needs as the Figure 27 on the next page demon-
strates. 
 
 
323 The study of Krapp et al. (2010) provides evidence that optimal compensation contracts under decentralization 
includes both divisional and firm-wide metrics, but that pure divisional performance evaluation is optimal under 
centralization when abstracting from risk interdependencies. 
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Figure 27:  Selection criteria for the right intragroup governance instrument. 
Source:  Own illustration.  
 
On the one hand, parents should clarify the target group for the use of the instruments. While there 
are instruments that primarily focus on the subsidiary’s management body, there are others that pre-
dominantly aim e.g. at the management levels, focus on a particular expert function or are applicable 
for all employees. Others again focus on the subsidiary as a whole to secure internal collaboration and 
alignment (e.g. joint targets). 
On the other hand, especially in the strongly regulated financial services business, parents have to 
take into account the legal and regulatory relevance of the instrument. In classified bank entities 
there are multiple instruments and mechanisms that are predefined by the external banking regula-
tions (e.g. own internal control functions, implementation of a supervisory body), that have to be im-
plemented and that predefine which implementation standard is expected without allowing divergenc-
es. Other instruments are required to fulfill the parent’s duty of care obligations or are known as pre-
ferred audit topic, of e.g. national supervisory authorities, and imply the necessity to implement a cer-
tain standard. 
Likewise, an impact analysis for the intragroup risk prevention should be taken into account. While 
there do exist instruments and mechanisms that are required to secure the effectiveness of the group-
wide internal control or risk management framework, there are others that primarily concentrate on a 
better information basis for decision-making and have a rather indirect impact on risk mitigation. Risk 
mitigation effects for the personal management liability are another crucial decisive factor. 
Closely linked to this is the degree of obligation of the instrument. Driven by the fact, that from a local 
perspective subsidiaries are legally independent entities, it is crucial to also consider the binding char-
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acter of the applied instruments. While for some topics a strong instruction character from the parent is 
possible, others have to stay in the responsibility of the local management. Consequently, the degree 
of commitment has to be taken into account. While some instruments provide guidance and support 
intragroup knowledge and best practice sharing, there are others that define compulsory require-
ments, which have to be locally implemented. Hereby, especially legal and regulatory requirements 
are a key driver, but also the associated risk potential in case of ignorance or the level of possible 
detailing influences the instrument selection. 
Another selection criterion for the most appropriate management instrument can be its relevance to 
fulfill the strategic targets of the entire corporate group. While there are instruments that are obliga-
tory to meet the strategic targets, such as intragroup planning instruments or balance scorecard ap-
proaches for the target prioritization and resource allocation, there are others that have a rather indi-
rect impact and focus on the organizational sustainability or e.g. the cultural dimension. 
However, the compatibility with the corporate culture is important, too. Within the selection process, 
parents should be aware of the signal function towards the affected target group of the instrument. 
While there are very control-oriented corporate cultures, there are others which favor trust or principle-
based approaches. If the respective instrument does not reflect the core values of the corporate 
group, the desired effect of the intragroup governance instrument will be limited or will lead to unwant-
ed side effects. Hereby, the different national cultures have to also be taken into account.  
Furthermore, the level of interdependency between the governance management instruments them-
selves is a crucial criterion. For instance, only a standardized organizational design of the subsidiaries 
enables the parent to implement e.g. an aligned process map with predefined core processes or 
standardized job descriptions including clear roles and responsibilities of e.g. the subsidiary’s CEO 
and CFO. Others, such as intragroup long-range planning procedures, must be aligned to enable the 
consolidating group functions to have oversight and coordinate the intragroup resource prioritization 
and allocation. Besides that, subsidiaries depend e.g. within their local strategy development process 
on the input of the headquarters or the overarching group strategy. Thus, the intragroup level of up-
stream and downstream interdependencies is essential to observe, too. Functional and cross-
functional interdependencies also need to be considered. For example, the predefined subsidiary tar-
gets affect the structure of the personal compensation of the local management, which again affects 
their risk taking behavior, and that may also influence the local risk culture. 
The reactivity (implementation) time also is a relevant selection criterion. Notably in large multina-
tional organizations the development and implementation of new instruments can be time consuming 
and complex. Compared to others, some instruments only have to be developed once within the par-
ent and are then implemented for the entire group, while others’ relevance primarily rely on the addi-
tional efforts of alignment within the subsidiaries to implement them optimally. For instance, in case of 
a local governance or compliance breach within the subsidiary, a market visit of the parent´s govern-
ance function can be a short-dated measure, but the development of an intragroup guideline to ade-
quately address this deficit area can be time consuming and requires many alignment efforts. Where-
as others might require a strong tone from the top or more communication and training activities to be 
effective, others can be immediately implemented. Thus, the estimated time until the desired effects of 
the instrument will be achieved, can vary and should be observed. 
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In addition, the implementation complexity is directly related to the reactivity time. The implementa-
tion complexity largely depends on the application scope of the respective instrument. There are in-
struments that aim for a group-wide application, while there are others, which have a division-specific 
or solely a business model specific scope. The related IT complexity is another fundamental key driv-
er, because the implementation and outcome of many instruments largely relies on their implementa-
tion within the IT landscape. While in an ideal world there are solely aligned intragroup IT systems 
available, in many multinational groups multiple IT systems exist on local as well as global level, that 
are not in any case compatible with each other. 
However, not only the implementation complexity, but also the associated costs for the instrument 
have to be considered. Some instruments bear development costs only once, while others cause 
regular follow-up costs for their administration and maintenance. In many cases the effectiveness of 
the instruments depends on intragroup training and communication activities, which have to be taken 
into consideration particularly in large subsidiary networks. 
In line with the management control classification of Merchant & Van der Stede (2007), the control 
focus of the respective instrument has to be also taken into account. While there are instruments that 
focus more on the personal control of the employees, there are others, which concentrate rather on 
action control and specify how a certain activity has to be executed (e.g. intragroup guidelines). Still 
others solely focus on the outcome without predefining any requirements or standards that have to be 
met, to achieve the desired result.  
Finally, the validity of the instrument is also a relevant selection criterion. While parents can apply 
governance instruments, which have an unlimited validity, if they are approved once, there are others, 
which require new approval on a regular basis. Therefore, I argue that it must be carefully assessed 
whether an instrument requires an unlimited validity. In most cases it seems recommendable to en-
sure a regular review and adjustment of the instruments towards any changed intragroup or external 
requirements. 
The level of measurability is also of great interest. While there are clear financial KPIs available for 
e.g. the cybernetic financial measurement instruments, there are solely indirect indicators available for 
others that measure their effectiveness. Yet, it is of great importance to be aware of the interpretation 
of the measures to avoid any superficial transparency or oversight, which might reflect unreal situa-
tions within the subsidiaries. 
 
I summarize that there are multiple instruments available for parents to manage their intragroup gov-
ernance among their financial services subsidiaries. Their individual design, implementation and effec-
tiveness always depend on the individual multinational group. Nevertheless, I was able to provide 
indications on how parents can decide which instrument is more appropriate compared to the others. 
 
After the introduction of the intragroup governance management instruments, I now introduce the dif-
ferent focus topics, which have to be addressed on subsidiary level to secure intragroup governance 
and to mitigate the overall risk of reputational damage or organizational failure.  
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6.3.2 Part 2: Intragroup corporate governance focus topics 
As the second part of the management model, the governance focus topics, on which parents have to 
concentrate within their subsidiary networks, play a crucial role. While this is required to secure a 
comprehensive intragroup governance framework, a professional management of those topics also 
enables the subsidiaries to position themselves well to execute their role within the group and the local 
business environment. Without the instruments debated above, the aligned and coordinated in-
tragroup management of the relevant governance focus topics is impossible.  
Parents define a different bundle of instruments for each of those topics, that should be used to pro-
vide enough flexibility and to consider the nature of the subsidiary as well as the different local mar-
kets, legal and regulatory environments and overall maturity levels of the various host countries. This 
means that there are also subsidiaries in which the local legal and regulatory framework is stricter than 
the defined parent’s standards or may also hinder the local implementation due to contradictory re-
quirements. In general, it must be clear that the top priority above all set intragroup standards is that 
the subsidiaries comply with applicable legal and regulatory requirements. Thus, the parent indeed 
defines standards regarding the content, but, in many cases, solely how these topics have to get 
managed with particular instruments. 
Due to the cross-functional character of some focus topics, there also exist interdependencies among 
some of the identified subtopics. As previously outlined, the relevant focus topics can be divided into 
topics that rather concentrate on the general management and others, which rather concentrate on the 
adequate internal control. The focus areas illustrated in Figure 28 are defined by following a risk-
based approach. They are the outcome of the previous literature review as well as of the conducted 
expert interviews. In the following paragraphs, each of the focus areas will be explained in more detail: 
 
 
Figure 28:  Intragroup corporate governance focus topics. 
Source:  Own illustration. 
 
The framework management addresses the general business environment in which the subsidiary is 
embedded in the particular host country. This is a prerequisite for the local executives to manage the 
subsidiary. Hereby, it is essential to have transparency about the host country’s specific governance 
framework, including the legal and regulatory structures of the local entity and their implications for the 
conducted business, the provided products and their services. Further, the organizational and opera-
tional structure also has to be clearly defined as in the best case they reflect the overall structural and 
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processual approach of the group. For this, typical intragroup governance management instruments 
are e.g. organizational and operational reference models, which help to standardize the intragroup 
organizational structures and processes of the subsidiaries. 
Likewise, it is required to have an overview of the intragroup and external outsourcing framework of 
the subsidiary. Parents usually predefine intragroup quality standards for local outsourcings, provider 
management and the documentation of service level agreements. 
To foster the framework understanding, clarity about intragroup approach for the strategy setting is 
essential, too. The subsidiary strategy development has to address both, the overarching group and 
financial services strategy as well as the local specific market environment. An aligned intragroup 
strategy process with standardized pre-alignment and approval procedures assures strategy harmoni-
zation before it becomes formally approved by the local senior management. 
Moreover, it is essential to secure lucency of the intragroup financial management framework. It aims 
on a comprehensive understanding, oversight and clear procedures for the financial planning, report-
ing and tax management to fulfill the subsidiary’s obligations. To safeguard an aligned intragroup fi-
nancial management, parents implement automated reporting systems, define standardized intragroup 
processes, calculation and accounting methods for financial KPIs and predefine due dates for report-
ing to secure the disclosure of the group financials on time. Intragroup policies for the handling of re-
porting risks or guiding principles for the local tax management also exist to formulate the expectations 
of the parent. 
 
The decision-making management focuses on the decision-making procedures within the subsidi-
ary. To make intragroup decision-making manageable, it has to follow the subsidiarity principle. Most 
of the decision-making is formally operated on a local level. Thus, an aligned intragroup decision-
making framework is required to secure organizational alignment with clear roles and responsibilities 
and adequate competence schemes. Appropriate local committee frameworks and a common deci-
sion-making culture guarantee an effective and efficient way of decision-making. To secure a coordi-
nated decision-making, it is required to assure that the local decision-making structures and processes 
fit to the decision-making procedures on parent level. Typical governance management instruments 
are standardized intragroup committee landscapes. Others include binding committee by-laws, man-
datory pre-alignment approaches before local decisions are taken or standards for the decision-
making administration. Besides, clearly defined competence schemes for both, committees and indi-
vidual employees, avoid redundancies and secure clear decision-making scopes. When there is con-
sensus about essentials for decision-making, such as the four-eye principle or the separation between 
front and back office in financial services organizations, it contributes to achieve a common standard 
and decision-making systemization. 
 
Culture and business conduct management focuses on a corporate culture, which reinforces ap-
propriate norms for responsible and ethical behavior. The expectations of the parent regarding the 
group-wide core values, subsidiary’s corporate culture and business conduct of the staff, have to be 
reflected in the daily business. To provide guidance it is crucial that the group culture elements get 
supplemented by country specific cultural issues as well as other additional elements, such as appro-
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priate mechanisms in case of continuous dissent among committee members, guidance for dealing 
with conflicts of interests, adequate compensation schemes and internal alert procedures. As already 
outlined, the management of the corporate culture from an overseas headquarters is challenging, but 
there are instruments that parents use to formulate their expectations, such as e.g. a risk culture 
statement, a risk appetite framework, a group risk policy and predefined risk limits. Other instruments 
are e.g. a group-wide code of conduct, a compliance culture statement or leadership principles. Espe-
cially regular staff surveys or 360-degree employee evaluation systems are a crucial cybernetic man-
agement instrument to get an indication on the local corporate culture. An intragroup conflict of inter-
ests, policy, principles for local job evaluations and remuneration practices help to clarify the expecta-
tions of the parent on how such topics have to be managed within the subsidiaries. To report bottom 
up local misconduct, all subsidiary staff should have transparency and access towards internal alert 
procedures (e.g. anonymous whistleblowing mechanism). 
 
Clarity about the roles and responsibilities is essential to mitigate intragroup governance risks, avoid 
misalignments and ensures clear accountabilities. Thus, a common approach for the definition of 
tasks, roles and responsibilities are a basic prerequisite. The subsidiary’s senior management acts as 
local ambassador of the parent’s management body and has to fulfill a strategic governance role in the 
subsidiary. The local management is held responsible for the succession planning of certain govern-
ance key roles on subsidiary level. For example, in most markets, it is a legal or regulatory require-
ment to have internal control functions (compliance, risk, internal audit) and it has to be secured that 
those functions are always adequately staffed. If this should not be the case, it could result in a with-
drawal of the held business license. 
Also, it is of great importance that there is transparency of mandatory local legal and regulatory expert 
functions (e.g. remuneration officer, compliance officer, health and safety officers etc.) and any man-
datory expert functions (e.g. IT Security Officer, Governance Officer, Information Protection Officer). 
Every single employee has to understand that he is held responsible for following the governance 
standards within his action scope. 
It has to be assured that there is lucency of the relevant intragroup and external stakeholder groups 
and that their interests are adequately taken into account. This enables subsidiaries to define clear 
responsibilities for each local key stakeholder group (e.g. media, politics, governmental agencies, 
external auditor). Commonly agreed intragroup standards for the communication and collaboration 
with external stakeholder groups further professionalizes the stakeholder management and externally 
secures a uniform appearance of the group as a whole. 
Moreover, it is crucial that there are also appropriate escalation mechanisms in place for the case of 
dissent within the subsidiaries, e.g. between the local management members. 
 
A professional compliance and governance management are basic elements for corporate govern-
ance in the subsidiaries. As second line of defense function, it has to support the local management 
body to fulfill their duties and mitigate the risks of non-compliance with intragroup requirements and 
external laws and regulations. A competent compliance function on subsidiary level has to mitigate the 
risk of management liability, reputational damage and financial penalties or even the loss of the busi-
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ness license due to any misconduct or illegal actions of local staff. Hereby, especially the strengthen-
ing of the business frontline compliance and governance, IT security and governance and any finan-
cial services business model specific compliance topics (e.g. anti-money laundering or consumer 
credit protection topics) plays a dominant role as they differ in many cases largely from the compliance 
topics that have to be addressed by the rest of the multinational group. 
A professional regulatory management helps to mitigate on the one hand the management liability, but 
on the other hand, also strengthens the public faith in the organization, secures transparency and 
accountability and forms the foundation to fulfill the different disclosure obligations. This also includes 
a regular forecasting of any upcoming legal and regulatory trends, which may affect the subsidiary in 
future. While this is only possible to perform with a close market proximity, it is also essential to secure 
adequate intragroup (long-range) planning. 
In each subsidiary there has to be an operative governance management performed which is e.g. 
responsible for the coordination of local governance instruments (e.g. local policies) and their align-
ment with the overarching intragroup standards. Moreover, it is required to have local delegates, which 
are responsible for the local information protection management. 
 
Risk management is an important internal control function in financial subsidiaries. It has to secure 
that risks get identified, analyzed and evaluated, and that respective mitigation measures get defined 
and implemented. In each legal entity, there is the necessity to implement a professional risk man-
agement to ensure consistency and risk transparency on local level but also on group-wide level within 
the parent. An aligned risk understanding with clear roles and responsibilities regarding strategic and 
operative risk management are essential. In automotive financial services subsidiaries, in particular 
the residual value risk, credit risk and interest rate risk management require a clear separation of du-
ties between the involved functions to execute a group-wide strategic risk management. Consequent-
ly, governance management instruments from the parent are a predefined group-wide risk strategy, an 
intragroup risk management framework, VaR models, equity planning or stress testing procedures for 
the subsidiaries. Also intragroup risk guidelines and policies enable the subsidiaries to locally perform 
a professional risk management. Respective credit approval matrixes and standardized risk processes 
support to mitigate risks and secure a consistent risk management approach within the group. In addi-
tion, aligned risk calculation methods, risk parameters and intragroup reporting tools enable the parent 
to get a realistic picture of the group-wide risk situation in the different markets and subsidiaries. 
 
As another crucial element of a 360-degree view on corporate governance on subsidiary level, there 
also has to be a professional internal audit management. The internal audit function has to be im-
plemented as independent third line of defense and has to identify and assess potential risks for the 
business operations. Internal audit has to deliver transparency for corporate management and support 
the subsidiary’s management body to ensure a holistic view on the entire organization and associated 
risks. As independent business unit, it has to verify the effectiveness of the implemented control pro-
cedures, which are required to secure the effectiveness of the group-wide internal control system. 
While it has to evaluate, if the desired effects of the intragroup governance instruments are locally 
achieved, it further provides an additional independent view to better classify the reported information 
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of the subsidiaries. Internal audit performs important advisory services to constantly further develop 
the governance framework, helps to minimize local governance variances and secures an organiza-
tion-wide perspective on the interdependencies of the applied instruments. The gathered information 
of the different intragroup internal audit instruments is a crucial information source for the manage-
ment bodies and their supervisory bodies to fulfill their duty of care obligations. Without the implemen-
tation of group-wide aligned and specialized internal audit instruments (e.g. standardized documenta-
tion and reporting duties, follow up systems, aligned audit methodologies) it is nearly impossible to 
adequately manage this among the global subsidiary network. 
However, a challenge arises out of the fact that there are some countries where it is mandatory to 
have an own internal audit function within the subsidiary, while in others it is no problem to outsource it 
towards the parent. Another difficulty is that the internal audit requires in-depth local market expertise, 
which makes it challenging to follow a centralized corporate audit approach.  
It must be assured that the design of the internal audit functions in the subsidiaries avoid any conflicts 
of interests e.g. within the reporting of audit findings towards the consolidating parent function. Thus, 
parents define e.g. clear premises for the organizational design of the local internal audit functions. In 
addition, there should be predefined standards for the internal audit activity and e.g. for the alignment 
of the local internal audit planning with the corporate audit department of the parent. Aligned audit 
reporting formats and procedures for audit findings as well as follow-up management encourages the 
consolidating parent to secure intragroup lucency and oversight of identified weaknesses and the 
monitoring of the implementation efforts of defined countermeasures within the subsidiaries. 
However, due to its ordinary independent control function, internal audit can also be recognized as 
independent function outside of the management model. But I argue that a holistic overview of the 
maturity level of the corporate governance management on subsidiary level can only be achieved if 
the subsidiary’s internal audit management is integrated in the regular corporate governance maturity 
assessment. 
 
All above outlined governance related focus topics within the subsidiaries are essential and must be 
taken into consideration to secure a holistic corporate governance approach. As the previous debate 
showed, some of the topics are easier and others are more challenging to manage from distance and 
lead towards different intragroup management approaches for each topic. While in certain cases a 
central management is comparatively easy, e.g. via a central reporting tool, there are other govern-
ance topics that are solely insufficient or even not possible to manage from the parent´s oversea 
headquarters. In such cases, parents concentrate to rather formulate management standards than the 
concrete topic to secure a common intragroup management approach. 
 
The instruments for each of the seven focus topics have to be regularly reviewed and be adjusted to 
group-internal and external changes. The responsibility for the topicality, correctness, completeness 
and quality of the intragroup governance instrument stays with the consolidating risk owner function in 
the parent. This approach secures a close alignment between the consolidating group functions and 
the local counterparts, and it is the starting point to achieve a group-wide consolidated view on all 
corporate governance related risks and weaknesses.  
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It provides the opportunity to derive recommendations for actions individually for each subsidiary and it 
improves the acceptance for the management model if the different local functions are closely in-
volved. 
 
As from now, the first two parts of the management model have been introduced, I will complete the 
model in the next subchapter with the standardized measurement and evaluation methodology. 
 
6.3.3 Part 3: Standardized measurement and evaluation methodology 
A regular governance maturity assessment enables the parent to gain a better understanding of how 
the subsidiaries manage their local corporate governance within the intragroup context. While the re-
sults of the assessment itself can already be used as a crucial intragroup governance management 
instrument, a regular self-assessment further demonstrates to external stakeholders (e.g., supervisory 
authorities) the management awareness for a consistent further advancement of the intragroup corpo-
rate governance. 
Therefore, intragroup (minimum) standards on how the different governance focus topics have to be 
managed on a local level and with the help of which instruments are a basic prerequisite.324 All consol-
idating group functions have to define, within their ordinary governance role for their area of responsi-
bility, the intragroup governance standards that have to be met by the subsidiaries and monitor their 
local implementation (e.g., the parent’s consolidating risk management function is responsible for 
monitoring the subsidiary’s risk management functions). A CoC should be mandated to consolidate 
the multiple results of the monitoring activities to secure a comprehensive overview of the subsidiaries, 
to assure a regular management reporting and to guarantee a continuous further development of the 
model. 
Intragroup minimum standards for the instruments and governance focus topics form the foundation to 
secure a common understanding and clarify the expectations of the parent’s management body to-
wards its subsidiaries. Only if standards and instruments are defined, transparent and implemented, 
they can be regularly measured and evaluated.  
 
Practical implementation in an intragroup context 
The implementation stage of the standards and instruments can be regularly measured and evaluated 
by a self-assessment with a standardized questionnaire. Such a self-assessment approach enables 
the parent to get a comprehensive 360-degree view on the corporate governance maturity of each 
financial services subsidiary. It has to be ensured that all minimum standards are covered within the 
questionnaire to assess the degree of compliance with the intragroup minimum standards. Depending 
on the coded average values of the provided answers (either yes / no / not applicable) it is possible to 
get an aggregated indication of the maturity level of each subtopic, which in sum provide a compre-
hensive overview about the subsidiary’s corporate governance maturity.  
 
324 The management of subsidiaries via minimum standards is often applied approach within multinational com-
panies. The foundation for the definition of the minimum standards are usually the home country requirements of 
the multinational group (cf. Clark & Brown, 2015). 
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The self-assessment of the subsidiaries has to reflect the current as-is situation. The risk has to be 
avoided that the reported self-assessments rather reflect a desired future oriented target state than the 
current situation, which would lead to an inaccurate overview within the parent entity. 
 
As the overview in Figure 29 on the next page illustrates, it is possible to draw different conclusions 
from the reported results of the subsidiaries self-assessments. Depending on the calculated degree of 
compliance (average sum of the provided answers), it is possible to classify the maturity levels and 
severity of the identified deficits to draw appropriate consequences for required management actions. I 
point out that it is also possible to include an additional weighting of the different sub measures e.g. in 
accordance to their risk potential or their importance for the entire group.325 However, for simplification 
reasons, I recommend to aggregate the results in a first step via the calculation of the average sums 
and to ignore an additional weighting of the relevance according to a risk-based approach. I apply the 
well-known and internationally accepted maturity classifications (level 1-5) of the Capability Maturity 
Model Integration (CMMI), which is a group of reference models for different areas, but especially 
used for the identification of organizational strengths and weaknesses and the identification of respec-
tive improvement measures (CMMI 2010, Proença et al., 2016). 
 
 
Figure 29:  Practical self-assessment approach for intragroup corporate governance management. 
Source: Own illustration. 
 
In cases where subsidiaries fulfill the aggregated minimum standards (e.g. >90%), it is expected that 
there is no maturity gap to internal and external requirements and that there is no need for manage-
ment action. A fulfillment of e.g. 75-90% of the defined minimum standards indicates that governance 
is quantitatively managed and that the subsidiary monitors and proactively manages its governance 
practices, which lead to small governance variances of the centrally defined standards and can be 
 
325 Possible indications about relevant issues that should be taken into account to evaluate the criticality of the 
instruments are debated in subchapter 6.3.1. 
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adequately solved by the locally responsible subsidiary function. A degree of conformity between e.g. 
50-75% indicates that the basic standards are defined and the required documentation, policies and 
procedures are implemented, but not continuously enforced. This bears a moderate risk potential and 
may have negative effects on the management of the affected focus topic and requires the attention of 
the local management body to define appropriate countermeasures. The maturity level 2 (fulfillment of 
e.g. 30-50% of the minimum standards) implies that the awareness for the topics is available, but the 
intragroup instruments and defined standards are to a large extent inappropriately implemented. Con-
sequently, there is the likelihood that the respective governance focus topic cannot be adequately 
managed and needs the attention of both, the local management and the consolidating group function. 
Governance areas with the maturity level 1 (e.g. 0-30% compliance with the governance standards) 
bear a high risk potential and imply critical governance maturity gaps. Those identified deficits require 
immediate attention of the parent´s senior staff (e.g. divisional head) and imply the necessity to send 
e.g. governance specialists from the parent to secure prompt implementation of the defined intragroup 
standards and perform adequate local training activities. In such cases the governance focus topic is 
unpredictably managed, only weakly controlled and reactive, and it indicates basic deficits and bears a 
high-risk potential. Taking into account the various natures of the subsidiaries, diverse business mod-
els and different levels of national laws and regulations, there also has to be the opportunity for the 
subsidiaries to signal that the requested minimum requirement is not applicable for them. 
 
This assessment methodology enables the parent to create a holistic group-wide overview of the cor-
porate governance maturity of their subsidiaries. Furthermore, this approach ensures that the parent’s 
management body receives a consolidated and fact based overview of the overall corporate govern-
ance maturity situation of its wholly owned financial services subsidiaries. At the same time, it provides 
the management body with the needed transparency of the situation in their particular area of respon-
sibility on subsidiary level. It also enables the risk owners to gain a holistic oversight of key topics in 
their action scope and respective need for action. 
 
After the introduction of the last element of the corporate governance management model and its 
practical measurement and evaluation, I will discuss the introduced corporate governance model in its 
entirety in the following subchapter. 
 
6.3.4 Evaluation of the corporate governance management model  
The introduced management model illustrates an adequate approach how parents can evaluate, man-
age and steer their subsidiaries and simultaneously get a holistic overview of the intragroup corpo-
rate governance maturity of the group. Furthermore it also helps parents to derive conclusions about 
the effectiveness of the intragroup governance instruments, their effects on local level and whether 
and how they are applied within the subsidiaries.  
The transparency about all the defined focus areas itself can already function as early warning indi-
cator of where efforts need to be intensified. The model is also crucial to derive and prioritize the rele-
vant imminent management measures on group level, with a risk-based approach. The gathered in-
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formation from this model also provides a relevant information source for the annual corporate audit 
planning among the subsidiary network. 
 
The management model can be further applied for the intragroup target setting and is an appropri-
ate instrument to demonstrate the areas of improvement over time via the regular reporting of the 
made self-assessments. This approach enables the organization to identify and prioritize needs for 
action, depending on the severity of the identified governance deficits or local variances. This model 
can be used as a fixed component in the yearly evaluation process and target setting of the subsidi-
ary’s management bodies to balance e.g. a too strong focus on sales or financial KPIs which could 
favor misguiding behaviors. 
 
While the applied self-assessment approach of the subsidiaries increases the acceptance of the 
overall results and fosters the comprehensive understanding, it also bears some risks. There is no 
doubt, that if the same functions that are responsible for the respective focus topic or the implementa-
tion of the particular instrument on a local level, are also responsible to report results, this practice 
increases the likelihood to get reported results, which may tend to not reflect the current situation. 
Thus, it is required that there is a clear communication about what is expected from the subsidiaries 
within the particular assessment topic. Regular on-site visits to make plausibility checks can mitigate 
this risk, but also a high likelihood that the corporate audit department checks the reported results. 
Intra-organizational trust is of great importance and should be regularly promoted by the top manage-
ment and fostered by adequate training activities. However, there is no doubt that, if the subsidiary is 
willing to ignore the intragroup standards there will be enough possibilities to do so in future. 
 
Another benefit of this model is the availability of a proper documentation. This model can be applied 
as documentation proof to verify that the members of the parent´s management body fulfill their duty 
of care obligations for their subsidiaries against external supervisory authorities, the investor base and 
other external stakeholder groups. 
 
The introduced management model is agile and carefully balances the field of tension between 
centralization and decentralization. This approach provides enough flexibility to consider group-
internal and external interests and integrates local specifics regarding culture, regulation, the subsidi-
ary specific business model, the local business environment and other relevant externalities. The 
model follows a geocentric approach, which involves a careful customization to address local context, 
while operating within established uniform standards in a group framework to realize synergy effects 
where necessary and needed. Uniform minimum standards enable the subsidiaries to execute good 
corporate governance practices and avoid organizational failure in a proactive way while fostering the 
intragroup knowledge transfer. However, it has to be taken into account that minimum standards sole-
ly define the basic requirements that have to be met, but that, especially for subsidiaries in major mar-
kets, the fulfillment of minimum standards is simply insufficient. In rather immature markets, merely the 
fulfillment of the set minimum standards can be challenging and should be kept in mind.  
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Moreover, I outline that this management model helps to enable, support and strengthen the first 
line and second line of defense and helps to better understand the intragroup governance mecha-
nisms and appropriate governance management instruments. 
Another advantage of this management model is that it incorporates crucial, but even today, often 
ignored elements related to IT security and governance, information protection or business 
model specific compliance and governance issues (e.g. consumer protection), which are becom-
ing increasingly critical in many countries. Any non-compliance within those areas could lead to high 
financial penalties and reputational damage on local level as well as for the entire group. 
 
Due to the earlier outlined situational dimension of the corporate governance, it is crucial that every 
organization does not just blindly implement this management model without a critical pre-
assessment of their organization about other additional topics that bear high risk potential. Such iden-
tified topics should additionally be taken into account and any non-relevant topics should be removed 
to avoid a perfunctory picture, which does not reflect the realistic situation of the subsidiary network. 
 
In this context, I highlight the formerly debated premises to consider the principle of proportionality. 
This secures that the intragroup governance arrangements are consistent with the individual business 
model, risk profile and reflect the global presence to make sure that the objectives of this governance 
management model are effectively achieved and sufficient. Appropriate indicators that provide guid-
ance are e.g. the size of the consolidated balance sheets and of the individual subsidiary, the legal 
construct of the corporate group and its consolidating parent entity, the geographical presence and the 
size of the local subsidiaries or the fact whether the parent or the subsidiaries are listed at the stock 
exchange or not. Moreover, the type of business license and authorized business activities and ser-
vices, the underlying business model and thereof derived strategy, the nature and complexity of the 
performed business activities, the customer base (e.g. retail, corporate, public), product complexity 
and organizational structure have to be taken into account. Moreover, the risk strategy, the defined 
risk appetite and the risk profiles or the outsourced activities and existing IT systems can provide indi-
cations for the appropriateness of the model design and its implementation (cf. EBA, 2017d; 2017e). 
For instance, if an automotive financial services organization is ranked by the European Central Bank 
as a ‘Group of Institutions’ or is classified as a ‘significant institution’ (due to its balance sheet sum), 
this may imply that the parent has to put much greater emphasis on their risk management and other 
internal control functions.326 Organizations that only act as financial intermediaries may have to con-
centrate more on the business frontline compliance (first line of defense activities). 
I point out that this model so far aims at wholly owned financial services subsidiaries. Neverthe-
less, it can be also adjusted to e.g. joint ventures or listed subsidiaries, but, taking into account the 
corporate governance definition of this dissertation, it should not be blindly applied to other organiza-
tional forms. 
 
326 The European Central Bank lists five ‘groups of institutions’: Monetary financial institutions, investment funds, 
financial vehicle corporations, payment static relevant institutions, insurance corporations (cf. ECB, 2018). ‘Signif-
icant institutions’ are defined in Article 131 of the Directive 2013/36/EU: Globally systematically important institu-
tions and other systematically important institutions and, other institutions determined by the national authority or 
national law, based on assessment of the organizations size and internal organization, their nature and scope and 
complexity of their business activities (cf. European Parliament, 2013). 
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The different instrument clusters illustrate the broad instrument heterogeneity. While there is no doubt 
that each of them is important to secure the intragroup governance, I also define relevant selection 
criteria on how corporate groups can identify suitable instruments to achieve the desired effects.  
This management model should not be recognized as opponent to existing approaches, but rather as 
supplementing element to bridge existing intragroup governance management variances and to con-
nect the dots to get a holistic overview of the governance maturity. Even today, most of the corporate 
parents solely manage their subsidiaries via centrally defined targets, yearly budgeting, quarterly fi-
nancial reporting or the balance scorecards. The herein introduced management model provides an 
additional management and steering instrument. The model focuses not solely on one isolated topic, 
but rather takes into account the complete intragroup complexity and draws a comprehensive picture 
to assure a 360-degree view. While this reduces the overall risk potential and management liability, it 
contributes to the intragroup value creation in terms of a greater innovation capacity, sustainability, 
organizational performance and finally an increased competitiveness, in a long-term perspective. 
 
6.3.5 Results of the group examination 
In the course of the applied Delphi methodology and on the basis of the gained results of the second 
interview round, I decided to perform another group discussion among the experts to discuss the final 
management model. I was able to coordinate a workshop with five of the experts of the first two inter-
view rounds that lasted in total around one hour. 
The group discussion confirmed the introduced management model and suggested evaluation ap-
proach. One expert addressed some concerns about the size of the questionnaire; while the others 
found that this is actually rather beneficial to understand in detail the underlying governance mecha-
nisms and possible management instruments. 
The expert group made clear that it is important to take into account the principles for corporate gov-
ernance of the Basel Committee for Bank Supervision and the latest EBA Guideline for internal gov-
ernance. The experts outlined the necessity to make sure that whistleblowing and project governance 
topics are addressed. Particularly one expert mentioned that it is beneficial that the risk management 
topics specifically reflect the risk types which are important within the automotive financial services 
business, even if they are not congruent with the suggested risk allocation promoted by the scholars. 
In line with prior interviews, the expert group highlighted again that the achievement of the desired 
effects largely depends on the social dimension, such as the corporate culture, business conduct and 
risk culture, integrity topics and leadership issues. For example expert 5 summarized “...I think another 
increasingly important topic is the management of the soft topics – the corporate culture, business 
conduct and risk culture, integrity topics and leadership. Those are for me the main reasons of many 
corporate failures in the past and require much more emphasis to secure the effectiveness of the gov-
ernance mechanisms than in the past.” 
Particularly one expert recommended to define some indications for multinational groups on how to 
use this model and outlined that it would be beneficial to give some statements about the overall effec-
tiveness in practice. I confirmed this and outlined that there is a detailed explanation on how to apply 
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this model. I accepted that it would be beneficial to test the model among subsidiary networks, but 
emphasized that this would go far beyond the current scope of this research project and would require 
a long-term study among multiple subsidiaries that is not yet possible. 
 
By now, the overarching goal of this dissertation, the development of an appropriate corporate gov-
ernance model for financial services subsidiaries has been achieved. In the next chapter, I will go one-
step further and I will debate in sum my drawn conclusions for major success factors and challenges 
for the intragroup corporate governance management of subsidiaries. 
 
6.4 Success factors and challenges for the corporate governance management  
Based on the gained knowledge within the literature review and the qualitative research made for this 
dissertation, I summarize and conclude in this section the lessons learned regarding the identified 
success factors and challenges of the intragroup corporate governance management in multinational 
automotive groups. 
 
In complex multinational corporate groups, it is of great importance to have a tripartite organizational 
structure to secure lucency, a clear separation of duties from the parent´s management body, a divi-
sional manger (e.g. Head of Financial Services) and the local subsidiaries. In group structures with 
different business models it is a major challenge that the financial services business in particular is 
strongly regulated and supervised by external bank authorities. In certain areas it even has to fulfill in 
stronger requirements than their corporate parents themselves. This underlines the necessity for tai-
lored management approaches. Despite this, until today there are only fragmented principles defined 
which provide guidance for how the intragroup corporate governance should be adequately man-
aged.327 
 
In multinational groups there are multiple management systems in use that altogether aim at secur-
ing intragroup governance. While some instruments are comparatively easy to implement and enforce, 
there are others, such as the cultural control management instruments, which require time to develop. 
Even if all those instruments are in place, there is no guarantee that they will have the wanted effects. 
The effectiveness of the instruments largely depends on their implementation, the management of 
their interdependencies and the awareness of the local senior management. 
The previous examinations demonstrated that for some topics a more central and for other topics a 
more decentral management approach fits best. Multinational groups respond to this and use a mix of 
different methodologies, tools and instruments. Although this favors opacity, it is the only approach for 
parents to secure a holistic management of their subsidiary networks. 
Especially for topics with a high-risk potential for the entire group, management liability, or topics with 
a high criticality for the automotive brand and its reputation, it is considered as appropriate to provide 
strong guidance, monitoring and control of the subsidiaries out of the parent’s headquarters. 
 
327 Some general guidance for intragroup governance management provides e.g. the BCBS (2015) and the EBA 
(2017a). 
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The diverse nature of financial services subsidiaries is a key challenge and makes a single ap-
proach for governance management impossible. One of the major strains are the diverse subsidiary 
structures that may lead to problems if the governance practices of the corporate parent and the sub-
sidiary to not fit together. The blinkered implementation of different governance structures may prevent 
both, the subsidiary and the group as a whole of achieving their objectives. This could create consid-
erable risks and a superficial compliance culture.  
Another major driver of complexity is the heterogeneity among subsidiaries. The complexities arise out 
of different owner structures (e.g. wholly owned, mixed-ownerships/joint ventures, listed subsidiaries), 
which largely depend on the individual growth and expansion strategy of the corporate group (e.g. 
M&A, Greenfield, joint ventures), the market environment, economic and political risks, taxation as 
well as regulation issues in the respective target countries. In some jurisdictions only foreign bank 
subsidiaries are allowed, in other jurisdictions branches are also allowed and in others again, banks 
have to be listed and have to follow the stock market regulations with clear rules for corporate govern-
ance. As opposed to branches, many host countries prefer subsidiaries, as they are locally registered 
legal entities and are supervised by their local authorities and ultimately under the applicable host 
country regulations. Branches are usually regulated and supervised by the authorities in their home 
country, although some regulators already started to introduce different concepts. Embedded in such 
different market forces, it is difficult for multinational groups to secure lucency and to allocate suitable 
management approaches to take into account all the various externalities affecting their subsidiary 
networks. 
Closely related to this are challenges, which arise from the different sizes and levels of complexity 
of the subsidiary networks. Most multinational groups have hundreds of heterogeneous subsidiaries 
in numerous countries and the sheer number is simply too complex for them to oversee. Many of them 
struggle to secure up-to-dateness and compliance with both, locally binding governance requirements 
and group-internal governance requirements. Such complexities and inter-relations significantly con-
tribute to risk, as governance and its monitoring gets more difficult. 
 
The different stages of development of legal and regulatory frameworks for corporate govern-
ance around the world also hinder implementing one single management approach for all subsidiaries 
to secure oversight. The deviating provisions can be only met if they are largely managed by the sub-
sidiary itself in the respective host country. Nevertheless, in order to secure a certain level of align-
ment and transparency the parent company should carefully define, implement and monitor de-
signed uniform standards that have to be met, as long as they do not contravene local laws and 
regulations. Even if this means that there will be subsidiaries which have to meet even stricter re-
quirements than their local supervisory authorities expect of them, it helps to mitigate the overall risk 
potential for the group, increases its organizational alignment and efficiency and leads to greater lu-
cency. 
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The different levels of board autonomy and independence between the different countries are also 
a challenge for a group-wide internal governance management. In many countries, there are clear 
tendencies of the regulators to prefer greater board autonomy and independence.  
Many supervisors favor autonomous and independent boards, which is a field of tension and dilemma. 
The parent´s management boards have a clear obligation to define, control and manage the group-
wide risk and business strategy. At the same time, those are clear tasks and duties of the subsidiaries, 
and it is often critically questioned by local authorities how subsidiary boards can influence this inter-
vention in favor of the local organization and their independency. What kind of level of centralization is 
too much and how is it balanced with the local responsibilities? The achievement of the right balance 
between central control and local autonomy is challenging and has to be carefully designed, which in 
turn makes one single approach for the management of corporate governance among the entire sub-
sidiary network critical.  
 
Different business models also lead to much greater complexity within the intragroup corporate gov-
ernance management. Multinational groups have different business divisions with different business 
models and require an either more centralized or decentral approaches, which make a single 
group-wide governance management very complex. Different business models culminate in different 
governance structures and practices. Decentralization often means more independent governance 
structures, with e.g. autonomous boards, independent directors, own strategies and risk management 
approaches. Centralization is usually associated with close alignment of the subsidiary and the par-
ent´s headquarters as well as predefined governance measures. Even if this concept is in many cases 
preferred by the parent, it is often criticized because the subsidiary’s management bodies only exe-
cute the instructions from their parents and focus solely on implementing their decisions. The execu-
tives of the parent companies are usually nominated as chairs, which makes an independent judge-
ment questionable. They have in most cases only limited local market expertise and no understanding 
of the local culture, language, or business environment. Consequently, it is a challenge within a group 
wide corporate governance approach to observe the differ expectations of the supervisors and those 
of the parent´s management body and the local subsidiaries. For the most multinational groups the 
local management bodies are recognized as instrument to secure that their centrally defined 
measures are implemented and considered. In contrast to this, the national regulators expect from the 
subsidiaries that their governance practices follow the same standards as autonomous companies. 
Even if subsidiaries never act completely independently, it is a challenge to define individually which 
measures improve the subsidiary governance and risk management in a group context, while also 
meeting the regulator´s expectations of home and host country. Parents will never support a complete 
standalone governance in its subsidiaries, as each member of the parent´s management body has 
also to fulfill legal duty of care obligations regarding the subsidiaries. 
 
Even if it is outdated, it is simply true that a ‘one size fits all’ approach is not possible. Due to this 
reason many corporate groups follow the subsidiarity principle. This means that the corporate par-
ents define central governance standards for certain governance key topics, while for other topics a 
clear local responsibility is defined. The prior debate made clear that it is a crucial success factor to 
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follow the principle of proportionality and a general risk-based approach to identify the most criti-
cal focus topics out of the parent´s perspective. 
 
Another crucial success factor is the stringent implementation of the Three Lines of Defense as a 
comprehensive and flexible management instrument to clarify the different roles and responsibilities of 
the different functions and its intragroup segregation. Even if this concept also has some weaknesses, 
it is still beneficial, highlights the independent control and supervisory function and combines it with 
the subsidiarity principle. 
 
A problem of the intragroup governance is that situations may arise, in which the local management 
bodies are challenged in regard to their loyalty towards the corporate parent. In practice, there can be 
conflicts of interest between the parent company and the subsidiary. In some countries, the 
company law clearly defines that the members of the management body have to make their decisions 
in the best interest of the subsidiary or even of its shareholders. Consequently, there can be situations 
where the subsidiary management bodies have to act against the interest of their parent company if it 
would affect the subsidiary in a negative manner.  
Such conflicts can arise within the human resources management, when e.g. the corporate parent is 
responsible for the hiring process in the subsidiaries and decides centrally about the nomination of 
local executives or key function holders, which might be more loyal to the parent than to the needs of 
the subsidiary. It is challenging to define the boundaries for loyalty and to balance between the subsid-
iary as part of the multinational group and as an independent entity with obligations, which can also 
follow contradictory interests. To create this awareness, there should be regular trainings for the exec-
utives on how to handle situations with such conflicts of interests. 
 
Another critical issue is that in particular bank subsidiaries have numerous stakeholders, which have 
key roles for the economy. It is necessary to question, within the design of subsidiary governance 
management, to whom such bank subsidiary boards have to own their loyalty. Banks in general are 
highly regulated due to their economic and social role and also have to consider various other stake-
holder interests (e.g. government, debt holders and depositors): The management bodies of bank 
subsidiaries have a legal obligation to consider their stakeholders interests equally to the interest of 
their corporate parent. There are limitations regarding the level of protection, and the subsidiary’s 
management bodies carefully have to balance between the various interests and require guidance for 
their decision-making procedures. 
Equally, the consideration of other social movements (e.g. trend to whistleblowing) and stakeholder 
groups which are not an ordinary part of a corporate governance system (e.g. media) becomes in-
creasingly critical within the intragroup decision-making and requires clear alignment procedures to 
mitigate the increased risk of reputational damage. 
 
Another critical aspect is the subsidiaries boards’ role within the strategy definition, as this is 
generally seen as one of the most important functions of the highest ranked management organ. In 
corporate group structures, it is defined by the management body of the parent company and has to 
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be implemented by the lower hierarchy levels. Strategy implementation has far-reaching implications 
for many management tasks, such as e.g. risk planning, staffing or investment decisions.  
Even if from a legal perspective the subsidiary management body is the highest ranked management 
organ, its action scope within the group structures is comparatively low. The parent´s management 
body usually requests the subsidiary management bodies to implement their defined strategic policies 
but not to create their own strategic initiatives, which is often contrary to the regulator´s views who 
prefers a local strategy setting within the subsidiaries. Another critical issue is that members of the 
subsidiary management bodies often lack experiences in strategy formulation, because they are usu-
ally rather operationally orientated within their daily business. Despite this, there is no doubt about the 
necessity that the parent maintains control of the group strategy to avoid misalignment and misinter-
pretation within lower hierarchies. This implies the challenge for subsidiary management bodies con-
cerning their expected role within the strategy formulation. I argue that the subsidiary’s management 
bodies can overcome this challenge if they are proactively engaged within the strategy development 
on group level (e.g. via feedback loops), to secure that it is sound and practical in a local context and 
that they are not only recognized as pure execution functions. 
 
The target setting process and its target evaluation of subsidiaries is closely linked to the above-
mentioned strategy topic. In many multinational groups the increased global competition resulted in a 
prioritization of profitability and financial performance targets. Even though this was a major reason for 
the latest financial crisis, companies have still defined merely insufficient and partly high-level com-
pliance and governance targets as adequate corrective measure. Even if this is getting ever more 
important for supervisory authorities, organizations are still struggling to implement appropriate target 
schemes and transfer them to the individual compensation packages of their senior staff that incentiv-
izes such behaviors. There are obvious concerns that too much emphasis on compliance and govern-
ance topics could also result in losing business. However, it should be of great interest of all execu-
tives to reduce their management liability and minimize reputational risks of the entire corporate group. 
For this purpose, the developed management model provides great value to demonstrate how parents 
can incentivize good corporate governance practice. 
 
The expectations towards independent directors to put greater emphasis on integrity, objectivity 
and independency within the corporate control, are another challenge within subsidiary governance 
management. Many new or revised hard and soft law initiatives are putting a greater emphasis on 
those topics. Independent directors have to steer potential conflicts of interest, identify potential ex-
cesses of the management, safeguard interests of minority shareholders, and require in-depth local 
market knowledge and specialized skills towards the subsidiary while also having diplomatic skills to 
manage conflicting issues between the corporate parent and the subsidiary. In some national regula-
tions, it even seems that they should take over a certain pseudo-regulatory responsibility and steer the 
bank according to a regulator´s perspective. The fulfilling of all such requirements is difficult and in fact 
unrealistic – especially regarding the ordinary case of one or at the most two independent directors in 
the subsidiary boards. However, as the independency and objectivity of such directors in subsidiaries 
is a much-discussed issue, I argue that in a subsidiary context, the focus lies not on the formal inde-
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pendence but rather on the capacity of the directors to challenge decisions in an objective manner. 
Corporate groups can solve this challenge by defining clear selection and nomination procedures for 
such independent directors. 
Another challenge in this context is that subsidiary boards have to meet the national legal and 
regulatory requirements for the design and composition of boards (e.g. regarding board size, 
nationality, fit and proper test, independency, directors’ profiles) that are initially defined for standalone 
companies in the host countries. The subsidiary boards have to fulfill such requirements even if they 
seek a different director’s profile from those of independent entities. Subsidiary management bodies 
have to primarily focus on compliance with the group strategy and intragroup policies, ensure effective 
controls and risk management on a local level and also require implementation competencies. The 
corporate parent would never nominate directors, which challenge their centrally developed arrange-
ments or favor the interests of the subsidiary over those of the parent when conflicts arise. On the 
contrary, some countries require local representatives in the boards to secure market proximity. This 
makes it difficult for parents to send expatriates to the subsidiaries, which are a crucial intragroup gov-
ernance management mechanism and essential for the intragroup knowledge transfer or which are in 
some cases simply required to overcome the lack of experienced managers in the host country loca-
tion. 
 
An often-underestimated factor is the collaboration between the different boards within the hierar-
chical group structures. It is crucial that there is a clear segregation of duties, regular formal and in-
formal alignment between the chairs of the boards and a balanced, collaborative partnership on eye 
level based on trust. It is essential to consider that intragroup reporting relationships also influence 
the behaviors of the board members. In many cases, the subsidiary management board members 
have reporting relationships to other managers within the group network, which may have to decide, 
e.g. as member of the supervisory body, about their personal performance evaluation or variable re-
muneration. This could result in biased positions in discussions or inhibit communication of concerns 
in an open and trustful manner. It seems appropriate to make regular evaluations of the environments 
of both, the boards on subsidiary and parent level, and to implement an intragroup nomination policy 
and interests of conflicts policy to avoid such constellations. All appointed boards within the group 
have to regularly analyze if their board composition is best suited to address their needs. Regular 
training activities for the board members and new candidates regarding subsidiary governance chal-
lenges help to ensure that they have a clear understanding of their roles. 
 
Particularly the intragroup decision-making systemization with aligned committee landscapes is a 
crucial governance instrument. While there are often predefined expert committee landscapes to 
increase alignment and prepare the intragroup decision-making, this is also associated with a lot of 
administrative efforts. However, it can be critically questioned how beneficial such expert committees 
are, if they usually have neither official decision-making competencies nor much leeway regarding the 
design within the group framework. Despite this, they are a crucial governance instrument to improve 
the decision-making quality, even if their composition and the competencies have to be clearly de-
fined. 
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Sub committees of the subsidiary’s supervisory body (e.g. audit, remuneration, and risk or nomi-
nation committees) are also critical bodies that have to be taken into account. Like the expert commit-
tees, such committees should increase the quality and transparency within the decision-making. How-
ever, it is still a matter of debate if such sub committees generate additional value. Even though many 
of the topics – like the remuneration or nomination of local board members - are decided within the 
parent and imply that such committees are obsolete, a local audit and risk committee with certain in-
dependency could add value. They can support the consideration of the corporate parent´s interests, 
even if they often feel confident that they can fully execute their obligations via the existing reporting 
and control mechanisms. 
 
Another critical issue is the selection and nomination procedure of the external auditor. The parent 
usually prefers the same external auditor within their subsidiary network to secure a better alignment 
and consistency. Contrarily however, the selection and nomination of the external auditor is a clear 
responsibility of the supervisory body or, if implemented, the audit committee, and has to be decided 
independently from the parent. Due to the different meeting schedules and the fact that in many coun-
tries, such as India, official representatives of the supervisory authorities participate in meetings of the 
supervisory body, it can be challenging to manage an aligned nomination procedure of the subsidiar-
ies and the parent. Parents prefer global presence of the audit firms among their subsidiaries, com-
bined with diverging national regulations for the rotation of the external audit firms; it requires great 
alignment efforts and indicates only a very small pool of recurring applicants for the external audit 
activities. This can also be critically questioned from an external point of view. 
 
Also, regular evaluations of subsidiary boards can play a crucial role to create awareness and 
contribute to greater group-wide subsidiary governance. Although subsidiary board evaluations are 
only legally required in some countries, it is an effective tool to assess the board´s governance prac-
tices. Subsidiary board evaluations should target the internal functioning, but also the group internal 
and external framework conditions, as well as the communication towards the parent or authorities. 
Yet, the results should not be shared with e.g. the public or the supervisory authorities, to avoid too 
optimistic evaluations that may not reflect the real situation.  
Parents should promote such evaluation approaches predominantly as internal tools within their sub-
sidiaries. If subsidiaries are required to execute internal evaluations and if they only have to disclose 
that they have executed them, it will support them to better identify governance weaknesses. A right 
“tone of the top” communication of the parent´s management body can support the subsidiaries and 
their boards to take the evaluations seriously. 
 
Another key driver is the implementation of a group-wide internal control and risk management 
framework that secures clear responsibilities, appropriate and independent risk management, com-
pliance and internal audit functions with the required authority and resources. It has to be carefully 
balanced between the central oversight and local accountability. Consolidating control functions on 
parent level have to secure a group-wide transparency and understanding of risks, which has to be 
complemented by adequate control measures and local control functions within the subsidiaries.  
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The effectiveness of risk analysis and control relies largely on local knowledge and involvement. The 
subsidiary management bodies should contribute to internal control and risk management by securing 
that the central risk policies are modified and group requirements are contextualized. In addition, they 
have to ensure that the ultimate responsibility and accountability for risk management and control 
stays on subsidiary level. The local management bodies have to announce dedicated compliance and 
risk officers and should develop their own (compliance) risk assessment that relies on both, local and 
group-wide information, and that shares the results with their consolidating counterpart function within 
the parent. 
 
To additionally foster a bottom-up approach within corporate governance management, there should 
also be appropriate internal alert procedures in place. Employees should have the opportunity to 
report governance and compliance breaches e.g. via an anonymous whistle-blowing hotline. To be 
effective, it has to be ensured that the persons who report breaches are appropriately protected from 
any negative consequences (e.g. discrimination, unfair treatment). The multinational group has to 
make sure that no person engages in victimization of those employees. Equally, I argue that there 
should also be intragroup measures, which protect reported employees from any negative effects, 
even if the investigations can prove that there was fraudulent behavior. 
 
Another crucial key element is a group-wide governance network between the governance func-
tions of the subsidiaries, to encourage best practice sharing and information exchange. A regular tar-
get-oriented communication and training of governance topics is of great importance. While this 
helps to mitigate the intragroup opacity within the subsidiary network, it improves alignment and con-
sistency and thus reduces the agency costs for the parent. Even if this seems to be obvious, it re-
quires continuous efforts from the parent to implement platforms to foster the intragroup collaboration 
and to avoid silo thinking. 
 
Moreover, the integration of the appropriate (IT) infrastructure is another, so far ignored, or at least 
undervalued enabling element to secure an efficient and effective intragroup management. All in all, 
this key driver serves as both, the basis as well as crucially binding element for a professional man-
agement and monitoring of corporate governance among decentral organizational units. 
 
Joint corporate core values and a mutual understanding of leadership are also critical, but often 
underestimated aspects of a successful corporate governance management. Multinational companies 
have to balance a common group-wide corporate culture and supplement it with specific elements of 
the subsidiaries and the national cultures of the host countries. However, the sharpening of a common 
corporate culture cannot be delegated top down and requires supportive leadership styles among all 
hierarchy levels. On the one hand, a common corporate culture provides guidance and can close ex-
isting governance gaps. On the other hand, a value orientated leadership concept with the right “tone 
at the top” is a prerequisite for promoting values like integrity, trust or transparency as a fundament of 
an integrated and pro-active, bottom-up driven corporate governance approach and indispensable for 
the effectiveness of the introduced management model in the previous chapter 6.3. 
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An intragroup system for the governance tracking of the subsidiaries helps to monitor local gov-
ernance practices and secures a group-wide standard. This supports assuring that subsidiaries con-
sider group internal governance policies as well as local host country governance requirements. Web 
based solutions can provide real time information, reduce complexity and help to meet the expecta-
tions of the supervisors. That is why a Center of Competence on parent level can help to profession-
alize the internal corporate governance coordination. 
A Chief Corporate Governance Officer as permanent member of the parent’s management body is not 
recommended to secure its collective responsibility. Despite this, the implementation of a mandatory 
corporate governance officer within subsidiaries seems to be an appropriate support for their local 
management bodies to fulfill their governance duties and responsibilities. 
 
Furthermore, another critical aspect is that it is difficult to quantify the corporate benefits of subsid-
iary governance. To increase the acceptance of subsidiary governance, it is crucial for managers to at 
least understand that governance practices are the prerequisite for the fulfillment of their compliance 
duties. From a group-wide perspective, it is a major enabler for organizational excellence, creates 
values and fosters trust, which in sum underpin the group´s overall competitiveness. 
 
Corporate governance management challenges for the supervisory authorities 
For the sake of completeness, I outline that my prior work also provides some implications on how the 
supervisory authorities can contribute to improve the intragroup governance management.  
Many of the applicable legal and regulatory requirements for subsidiaries are initially designed for their 
parent organizations and standalone institutes, which are not very effective without adopting them in 
regard to the individual subsidiary’s context. Regulators should follow either the principle of propor-
tionality or a risk-based approach to define requirements, that take into account the subsidiaries na-
ture, size, business model complexity, risk and the parent’s context and additionally, which are already 
promoted by e.g. the latest EBA guideline for internal governance (2017a). 
Moreover, as my analysis showed, it seems beneficial to follow a mixed approach of mandatory regu-
lations and voluntary principles to governance, based on the local context and legal culture. I found 
that there are tendencies of over-regulation, thus regulators should avoid bureaucratic burdens and 
rather focus on a selective, but therefore effective and efficient governance regulation. I argue that it 
would be more beneficial to have less, but therefore better-designed regulation initiatives that are en-
forced by an efficient and comprehensive supervision.  
There should be a close dialogue between the supervised entities and the supervisory authorities to 
help clarify their expectations and support the formulation of more effective governance regulations to 
avoid poorly designed ineffective regulations. Moreover, this has to be supplemented with a better 
exchange between the authorities of the home and host countries, to ensure a better view on the indi-
vidual subsidiary, and the economic ties within the corporate group as a whole. However, a better 
communication, information exchange and dialogue between the authorities within the host country 
should also be strengthened to further enhance the quality of the supervision. 
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As another major purpose of this research project I have identified multiple challenges and success 
factors in subchapter 6.4, which have to be taken into account within the intragroup corporate govern-
ance management. For reasons of clarity, the following subchapter 6.5 illustrates a brief overview of 
the main results.  
 
6.5 Overview of the main results  
After the research questions are adequately answered yet, I illustrate in this subchapter 6.5 a short 
tabular overview with the key findings of this dissertation. The following Table 6 provides for the focus 
topics a systematic comparison between the recent view of the scholars on the left, and the results of 
the expert interviews in the right column: 
 
Corporate governance understanding 
- Most scholars either follow a shareholder or stakeholder 
perspective, only few researchers follow a broad com-
prehensive view 
- CG is often recognized from the perspective of one 
single research discipline (e.g. law, management etc.) 
- Clear commitment to a comprehensive perspective 
- Different topics, mechanisms, processes and social 
dimensions of corporate governance (CG) are recognized 
as package 
- Consideration of stakeholder and shareholder elements 
- Industry specific and company-individual definition is 
crucial to ensure its effectiveness 
- Leadership, integrity and  corporate culture play a key 
role for the acceptance in the daily business 
Corporate governance phenomena 
- Most scholars base their research on existing theories, 
which have shortcomings to explain the complexities of 
the real world 
- Existing theories explain the CG phenomena solely 
from one single perspective 
- Most research applies to a large extent quantitative 
research methods to explain the CG phenomena  
- Perception that scholars have limitations to explain the 
multi-dimensional CG phenomena 
- Inter-human relationships (and e.g. integrity topics) are 
crucial key drivers, difficult to regulate from outside of the 
organization  HR development and recruiting of the 
right people is of great importance 
- Intercultural differences are often not considered 
Relevance of subsidiary governance 
- General assumption that CG generates additional value 
for the firm and the society 
- Indications that intragroup corporate governance im-
proves competitiveness, innovation, sustainability, lead-
ership and organizational performance 
- Only fragmented  research about corporate governance 
of subsidiaries available   intragroup corporate gov-
ernance research is still underrepresented  
- Intragroup CG is mainly driven from external pressure 
- CG primary perceived as legal obligation 
- CG is recognized as risk insurance, not only as crucial 
enabler for relevant key drivers (i.e., more profit, competi-
tiveness, innovation readiness etc.) 
- There is a high management attention, because this topic 
is directly linked to their management liability  govern-
ance tracking and documentation plays a crucial role 
- Professional CG of subsidiaries gets increasingly im-
portant  Prerequisite for the corporate parent to comply 
with CG standards and to fulfill its legal obligations 
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Corporate governance regulation 
- Different national and international legal and regulatory 
initiatives to improve CG of stand-alone entities   
- Comparative research on the one and two tier board 
systems in multiple contexts 
- Since the financial crisis, there are numerous initiatives 
aiming to improve CG in stand-alone banks 
- Intragroup subsidiary governance is still ignored to a 
large extent (except e.g. in the revised Basel guidelines 
for CG in banks) 
 
- Existing standards are often theoretical and address 
technical issues (e.g. number of board members), but ig-
nore practical questions related to the daily business 
- Problem that national and international standards are 
often vague and in some cases even contradictory in 
terms of group governance  (e.g. tax regulations, reten-
tion periods) 
- Corporate governance of subsidiaries is a focus topic of 
regulators and supervisory authorities although clear 
guidance is often missing (e.g. in the case of risk culture) 
Intragroup corporate governance management topics 
- Extended research of single, often isolated CG topics 
(e.g. remuneration, board composition, risk manage-
ment, external audit etc.) 
- Dependencies and interrelations between CG topics 
and mechanisms are often ignored or inadequately 
considered   
- CG scholars currently ignore important CG topics (e.g. 
data governance, IT governance etc.) with high risk po-
tential for the entire corporate group 
- No information about the nomination procedure of 
external auditors in subsidiaries 
- Corporate culture, corporate core values and leadership 
are the underlying key fundaments for CG 
- Large consensus about the consideration of new topics 
related to intragroup CG, such as IT security, data gov-
ernance, information protection, consumer protection, 
etc. 
- Particularly the elements of the framework management, 
roles and responsibilities and the stakeholder manage-
ment in the host country are crucial  also the adequate 
documentation and publication are crucial focus topics 
- Inter-human and social dimensions in the intra-group 
context play a key role on how effectively the different CG 
topics are managed 
Intragroup management bodies (parent management board, divisional head, subsidiary boards) 
- Concentration on management bodies of stand-alone 
entities, only fragmented research on the interaction of  
management bodies in a group context  
- Research on the intragroup governance roles and 
responsibilities of the middle management (e.g. divi-
sional head)  and subsidiary boards is partly non-
existent or solely rare available 
- In many cases is uncertainty on how to interpret the role 
of the different organs (e.g. management and/or super-
visory organ) in hierarchical intragroup constructs (e.g. 
in the strategy development, nomination of directors/ 
external auditors etc.) 
- In-deep information about the different intragroup gov-
ernance roles, responsibilities and interaction of the par-
ent management board, divisional head and the subsidi-
ary management body 
- The divisional head plays an important key function  
although without legal mandate, but a strong organiza-
tional responsibility 
- Subsidiary boards have to be more formalized, proactive 
and independent than in the past (e.g. within the strategy 
development) 
- Strong influence of (bank) authorities within the nomina-
tion of intragroup governance key function holders  Un-
certainty about how to interpret “independent” directors in 
a group context 
- Particularly in financial services subsidiaries play institu-
tional control organs a crucial role 
Intragroup corporate governance management approaches 
- No recommendations whether a central or rather decen-
tralized management approach fits best for intragroup 
corporate governance management  
- Most scholars refer towards the Three Lines of Defense 
Model, despite the fact that scientific investigations are 
rare  
- A common group-wide definition of CG builds the basis 
- Difficulty to adequately address the specifics of the differ-
ent tier systems within one management approach and  
to consider the different levels of regulation in the home 
and host countries 
- Three-fold management approach in multinational groups 
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- Consensus that intragroup governance tracking is 
needed, but without further recommendation for the im-
plementation 
- No research about how to integrate new technologies 
(strategic, operative and subsidiary governance dimen-
sion) is usual practice in multinational groups 
- CG management follows the subsidiarity principle with a 
risk-based approach and group-wide (minimum) stand-
ards 
- Parents adopt the Three Lines of Defense Model for the 
management of their subsidiaries 
- Multinationals tent to centralize topics in the parent’s 
headquarters, which have a group-wide relevance, and 
decentralize topics where close market proximity is (le-
gally) required 
- Parents manage certain key topics rather content wise, in 
other areas with a high variance between the markets, 
they focus rather on the management itself (e.g. via pre-
defined core processes)  
- Communication and training activities are intragroup key 
drivers for the effectiveness of CG management 
measures intercultural issues are often neglected 
- A intragroup governance network for best practice shar-
ing and knowledge exchange between the different gov-
ernance functions is beneficial  
- Intragroup decision-making procedures and its admin-
istration are from utmost importance 
- Governance tracking and control mechanisms are crucial, 
but it is difficult to set appropriate targets to avoid mis-
guiding incentives 
 
Intragroup corporate governance management instruments 
- Only limited and in some case even no research regard-
ing intragroup management instruments available  
- No research regarding selection criteria of appropriate 
management instruments available 
- Research from related disciplines (e.g. Malmi & Brown, 
2008,  management control systems) serves as general 
foundation 
- No research about intragroup sanction mechanisms 
- Identification of various management instruments which 
play a crucial role (e.g.  intragroup management via out-
sourcings, blue prints, standards, tools and IT infrastruc-
ture, decision-making committees etc.) 
- Identification of selection criteria for instruments 
- The effectiveness of instruments depends to a large 
extent on the prevailing corporate and leadership culture 
- Consensus that sanction mechanisms that are linked 
towards the individual remuneration are most effective 
(Intragroup) organizational issues 
- Focus on the management and supervisory bodies and 
its sub-committees (audit committee, risk committee 
etc.) 
- No information on the intragroup organizational setup to 
adequately manage intragroup corporate governance. 
Solely selected information regarding e.g. the setup of 
the compliance, risk or audit function 
- In financial services organizations are strong governance 
structures and processes largely predefined by the exter-
nal legal and regulatory frameworks 
- Rejection of a chief governance officer on board level, to 
make sure that corporate governance is a common task 
- Recommendation for a CoC for CG to support the divi-
sional head to fulfill his governance obligations  
- Recommendation to install on subsidiary level govern-
ance officers and other expert functions as local man-
agement support functions 
- Isolated recommendations to implement corporate gov-
ernance committees 
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Intragroup corporate governance management model 
- A coherent management model for the intragroup cor-
porate governance of financial services subsidiaries is 
non-existent –> solely isolated models for specific  top-
ics (e.g. Three Lines of Defense Model, COSO Model 
etc.) are available 
- No overview about the relevant CG topics that have to 
be managed  on subsidiary level from a parent perspec-
tive  
- No or solely scattered research on how those CG  
topics can be adequately managed by which instru-
ments 
- Large consensus that a comprehensive overview with the 
relevant focus topics in a coherent management model is 
currently missing, but much needed  
- Request for a cross-functional and coherent management 
view of all relevant topics in one holistic model 
- Identification of CG topics which are not explicitly in-
volved in existing CG standards (e.g. business model 
specific compliance topics, IT security, expert functions, 
project governance, outsourcings, stakeholder mgmt.) 
- The intragroup tracking of corporate governance is diffi-
cult  Measurement and evaluation of intragroup corpo-
rate governance maturity via self-assessment approach  
is recommended 
Table 6:  Tabular overview of the main results. 
Source:  Compiled by the author. 
 
This tabular overview provides a shot overview about the most crucial key findings of this dissertation 
and the added value of this research project. As from now the defined research questions have been 
studied in detail and finally adequately answered, I will close my research project with a final conclu-
sion in the following chapter 7. 
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7. Conclusion 
In this last chapter 7, I start with drawing major conclusions based on the main results of this disserta-
tion in subchapter 7.1. I hereafter provide implications for practice and science in subchapter 7.2, and 
close this dissertation in subchapter 7.3, with some final forward-looking ideas for further fields of re-
search that go beyond this dissertation. 
 
7.1 Summary of the main results 
The overall objective of this dissertation was to analyze the corporate governance management in 
multinational corporate groups with wholly owned financial services subsidiaries and to provide appro-
priate action recommendations for its management. I investigated the group-internal corporate gov-
ernance mechanisms, relevant key topics and appropriate governance management instruments in 
the context of the automotive financial services industry. While financial services subsidiaries play a 
distinctive role for the business models of car manufacturers to support their vehicle sales, many of 
them struggle to appropriately integrate them in their traditionally grown group constructs and simulta-
neously meet the continuously tightened multiple requirements of the bank regulators. So far, the in-
tragroup governance management of financial services subsidiaries is insufficiently studied and only 
provides scant empirical evidence – while at the same time enjoying a burgeoning interest of multina-
tionals and financial institutes. Given the scarcity of information and lack of clear consensus, it is one 
major overarching goal of my dissertation to provide guidance at this point, enhance the corporate 
governance debate in this particular field of management research and close existing research gaps. 
 
This dissertation has developed an advanced corporate governance understanding that goes beyond 
the sole separation of management and control or the pure financial driven perspective. I expand cor-
porate governance beyond the stewardship and leadership topics and promote a more situational, 
dynamic and inclusive interpretation, which takes into account leadership systems, managerial control, 
ownership rights, decision-making structures, processes and legal and regulatory elements. I also 
consider the rising trend among mangers to put a greater emphasis on the interests of their stake-
holder groups (e.g. customers, media, regulators) that are not ordinarily considered in the execution of 
their governance duties and have no direct ownership of the organization. The prior research has 
shown that based on the higher probability of whistleblowing or rapid public reporting of corporate 
fraud on social media, governance topics have become increasingly relevant in the managerial deci-
sion-making. In sum, I demonstrated that executives have started to shift their attention from pure 
profit orientation towards a more sustainability-driven perspective, taking into account not only the 
profit, but also the people and environment. 
 
While this advanced understanding recognizes corporate governance as a package of multiple deter-
minates, whose effectiveness largely depends on different formal and informal forces, this dissertation 
has also shown the great complexities that arise to manage it. I have not focused on the traditional 
agency conflict but shifted my attention on the intra-organizational architecture as well as its alignment 
and collaboration, by also taking into account internal and external social processes within a multina-
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tional intragroup context. This issue has previously not been investigated in such a depth and breadth 
(cf. Tihanyi et al., 2014). To respond to the specifics and complexities of the financial services busi-
ness and its strong external requirements, my findings have shown that multinational groups usually 
implement a tripartite approach (i.e. strategic, operational and subsidiary governance dimension) to 
coordinate the intragroup corporate governance. 
 
At its core, this research contributes to gain a better understanding of the roles of the executives 
and the management bodies in the various organizational processes, the design of the internal gov-
ernance framework, policies and other practices as well as their role in governance and external pro-
cesses, including social and regulatory changes and stakeholder engagement. This research also 
provides substantial insights regarding the role of the middle management (divisional head), the sub-
sidiaries senior staff, and the boards on subsidiary level for the intragroup governance legitimacy 
judgements and their role as ambassadors of the parent’s management board to secure the imple-
mentation of a functioning intragroup internal governance framework. At the same time, this research 
project provides crucial indications on how the middle management and subsidiary boards manage to 
transfer the set objectives and ideas of their top managers to their local organizational contexts and 
external environments around the globe. 
 
Likewise, this dissertation also provides a crucial contribution to better understand how corporate gov-
ernance can be adequately managed in relation to external environmental processes, such as the 
continuous changing regulatory environment and stronger stakeholder pressures within global value 
chains and decentral organizational units. 
 
The global dimension of corporate governance has also been a matter of debate and provides benefi-
cial ideas to also enhance this field of research. While the previous research focused to a large extent 
on the agency relationship between the parent’s management body and its owners, I went beyond 
existing literature insights and focused on the related challenges for their organization and administra-
tion activities, arising out of e.g. the autonomous subsidiaries and its autonomous management bodies 
in different locations. Such constellations without any doubt leverage the organizational complexity 
and their managerial monitoring and had to be adequately addressed by this dissertation. Equally, this 
dissertation demonstrated that another challenge for multinational groups arises from their heteroge-
neous stakeholder groups, including an increasingly global shareholder base and their interactions 
with local customers, national regulators and authorities or other stakeholder groups. The pressure of 
such diverse stakeholders leads to different effects and levels of effectiveness of intragroup govern-
ance mechanisms, which were also a matter of debate within this dissertation.  
In sum, this dissertation illustrates that the pure adoption of corporate governance guidelines - without 
following the principle of proportionality and the fact that there is no ’one size fits all’ approach 
available – not automatically results in an improved corporate governance. A ‘situational dimension’ 
that focuses on the interaction of the multinational groups in internal and external contexts has to al-
ways be taken into account. However, the diverse nature of subsidiaries and varying local market ex-
ternalities are too complex to manage them with a centralized approach from the parent’s headquar-
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ters. A successful intragroup corporate governance management balances group-wide standards, 
while ensuring enough flexibility for the local subsidiary boards to adjust them with a so-called ‘glocal’ 
approach and with a strong emphasis on the subsidiarity principle within the decision-making. 
Moreover, this dissertation has also demonstrated that multinational groups adopt the Three Lines of 
Defense Model for their financial services organizations to manage the organizational complexity, 
ensure clear roles and responsibilities and reduce opacity. The often ignored social and cultural de-
terminates, such as an appropriate corporate culture, integrity of the mangers and a supportive ‘tone 
at the top’ in combination with ‘walking the talk’ of the top management, are the fundaments for the 
effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms. Even if those issues are difficult to assess from 
outside in the respective overseas headquarters, parents should put great emphasis on those topics, 
as they can help to bridge existing governance gaps. 
 
To better understand and professionalize the intragroup corporate governance management in the 
field of tension of global alignment and local responsiveness, I developed an appropriate manage-
ment model. It assists parent companies to reduce governance deviations and intra-organizational 
complexity, increases lucency, alignment and standardization across the entire corporate group and 
helps to gain a common understanding of corporate governance topics. It additionally provides valua-
ble indications for the selection of the appropriate instruments to secure the desired corporate out-
comes.  
The model integrates the multiple intragroup governance management instruments that all have 
different purposes and aim for different things and target groups. Even so, as the analysis has shown, 
there are in particular six different groups of management instruments, by which intragroup govern-
ance gets managed: cultural and administrative governance instruments, outsourcing, planning and 
cybernetic management instruments as well as reward and compensation schemes. Whereas many of 
those instruments in themselves already act as independent corporate governance management sys-
tem, they are most effective if they are not implemented in a stand-alone manner, but rather jointly as 
part of a comprehensive intragroup corporate governance framework. 
In addition, the introduced management model with its general management and internal control 
dimension enables the subsidiary’s management bodies to improve their own governance practices 
and helps them to identify governance deficits within their local organization. The introduced model is 
a comprehensive management control tool and encourages both, parent and subsidiary companies to 
better understand intragroup governance mechanisms. Moreover, it also provides guidance for parent 
companies to coordinate and manage their heterogeneous subsidiary landscapes. Hereby, this disser-
tation also considers comparatively new governance topics, such as information protection, IT security 
or the handling of customer data across borders, which received none or solely limited attention 
among corporate governance scholars so far. 
The introduced management model enables parents to gain transparency of the governance maturity 
of their subsidiaries, draw conclusions of the effectiveness of the used intragroup governance instru-
ments, define relevant focus topics and derive appropriate management actions to mitigate the overall 
risk potential for the group as a whole. In sum, with its holistic approach the introduced management 
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model overcomes the shortcomings of the recent corporate governance research as outlined at the 
beginning of this dissertation. 
 
In contrast to past research, that has concentrated on investigating the isolated effects of multiple 
governance mechanisms on company performance, the results of this dissertation go beyond and 
analyze the combinations of the different mechanisms. Despite the fact, that direct attributional effects 
of corporate governance mechanisms are difficult to make visible and transferable in practice, the 
empirical research clearly showed positive implications. I was able to demonstrate that better in-
tragroup governance has beneficial effects on the organizational performance, the innovation capacity 
and sustainability efforts and leads to a better competitiveness. 
 
Simultaneously, the results of this dissertation highlight that there is still much effort needed to further 
enhance the subsidiary governance from also a regulators point of view. So far, in many countries 
the supervisory authorities do not differentiate whether the local entities are stand-alone companies or 
part of a corporate group with a powerful parent in the background. This leads to certain challenges for 
the affected companies, their senior managers and management boards, as there is still uncertainty 
concerning how to interpret external regulations in the intragroup context. 
 
The outcome of this dissertation provides a fundamental contribution to enhance the intragroup gov-
ernance management and deepens the understanding of its related mechanisms. By applying the 
Delphi methodology and numerous open guided interviews with subject matter experts, this research 
project was able to answer the related research questions in the necessary breadth and depth to se-
cure a comprehensive management model. I feel confident, that the gained results are beneficial for 
the entire corporate governance community as the following subchapter 7.2 will illustrate. 
 
7.2 Contribution for practice and science 
This thesis provides valuable information for practice and science. From a research point of view, this 
dissertation, with an in-depth investigation of the group-internal corporate governance management, 
contributes to a better understanding of dedicated mechanisms and practices as a proper foundation 
for further studies in this comparatively new field of interdisciplinary research.  
 
The past showed that the isolated view on selected governance topics of many scholars and national 
regulators to improve corporate governance have been insufficient and have so far had only little suc-
cess, as prominent company scandals and recent management failures still illustrate. In this context 
the dissertation provides a crucial contribution to overcome this shortcoming of the current corporate 
governance discussion and introduces an urgently needed management approach which is ‘connect-
ing the dots’ to secure a comprehensive view on corporate governance as an inherent part of 
general management. I address the critique of academics (cf. e.g., Tihanyi et al., 2014) that many 
scholars extensively study one particular topic (e.g. remuneration, board structures, risk management) 
of corporate governance in isolation and ignore examining it in a broader context to consider recipro-
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cal effects, underlying dimensions and other relevant direct or rather indirect mechanisms that lead to 
different effects. 
 
In contrast to others, who form their argumentations on abstract theories with obvious problems to 
reflect the reality and have only limited value to enhance the corporate governance management in 
the real world, I went beyond prior research and demonstrated, on the basis of expert interviews, that 
the reality is often more complex than the underlying assumptions of those scholars often indicate. 
 
This research project also illustrated that the term corporate governance is still in development. I pro-
vide an important state of the art contribution for an advanced understanding of intragroup corpo-
rate governance mechanisms, relevant focus topics and suitable management instruments. 
This dissertation provides valuable insights about the role of the top management, middle manage-
ment and local senior staff for the effective implementation of corporate governance in multinational 
groups. While this broader view contributes to the scholars’ ability to gain a better understanding of 
intragroup governance mechanisms, it also stimulates the research discussion concerning this focus 
topic that has so far received too little attention. Until today, those existing gaps in comprehension 
avoided an efficient and effective intragroup management approach for many governance mecha-
nisms. 
 
In addition, this dissertation addresses the recent limitations of many corporate governance related 
research publications, because it bridges the gap between the theoretical perspective and the 
practical experiences by following a qualitative research approach with open guided expert inter-
views. In this dissertation I comply the request of several scholars (cf. e.g., McNulty et al., 2013; Zat-
toni et al., 2013; Mat Yasin et al., 2014) to provide more qualitative research to overcome the current 
shortcomings that cannot be sufficiently investigated with quantitative methods. The applied Delphi 
methodology provided valuable outcomes to gain a better understanding of the relevant focus topics 
and respective governance mechanisms that had priorly never been investigated before with the help 
of this methodology and its related breadth and depth. The unique combination of a theoretic perspec-
tive of the latest scientific research results and a supplementing dimension, that makes the implicit 
knowledge of the numerous corporate governance experts explicit within one management model, 
creates much value for affected stakeholders. 
The promoted situational and holistic interpretation of corporate governance in combination with the 
chosen qualitative research approach forms a solid foundation for the identification of future research 
projects and creates new ideas for corporate governance academics, to critically reflect their currently 
applied approaches with the use of this new perception of corporate governance.  
 
Concurrently this dissertation also provides important insights for board members on parent and 
subsidiary level, senior managers, directors, consultants, lawyers, internal and external audi-
tors within financial institutes and multinational groups about their governance duties, responsibilities 
and dilemmas in a group context. Even if many managers in of multinational groups tend to centralize 
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many corporate governance topics, I demonstrated that this is not always preferable and effective; 
thus, I provide guidance on how to address this field of tension. 
 
In addition, this dissertation involves crucial information for standard setters and domestic regula-
tors. My research identifies and debates certain deficits within the legal and regulatory frameworks 
and provides indications for its further improvement to address the specifics of multinational compa-
nies with foreign financial services subsidiary networks. 
 
To sum up, I feel confident that this dissertation provides valuable insights for both, the academics and 
practitioners from economic, legal and social fields. This thesis draws a comprehensive picture of the 
complexities and interaction forces of corporate governance management, which is supplemented with 
a comprehensive overview of relevant success factors and challenges. With this dissertation, I provide 
a solid foundation for the further enhancement of the intragroup management of subsidiaries. This 
dissertation is a scientifically sound contribution that can help to overcome the recent corporate gov-
ernance crisis of public trust against companies in general and its top managers in particular. 
 
7.3 Further fields of research 
Even if the issue of how corporate governance affects the corporate success of large listed firms has 
already been investigated many times, there is still little research available that analyzes the group 
internal effects on the value creation of the corporate group as a whole. The focus of this dissertation 
were foreign financial services subsidiaries. However, multinational groups usually also own other 
types of subsidiary – e.g. sales subsidiaries. It would be from great interest to further study the inter-
relations of such a triangular relationship between the corporate parent, local sales and the finan-
cial services subsidiaries within one domestic market e.g. regarding the effects of the intragroup gov-
ernance mechanisms or from the competition law perspective.  
 
Moreover, there is the need for further research that empirically investigates the introduced corpo-
rate governance management model of this dissertation to analyze the long-term effects, which was 
not possible within the duration of this project. 
Beyond that, it would be from great interest to study the different effects on the subsidiary governance 
among multinationals in different industries, with different subsidiary sizes or its implications towards 
different national cultural backgrounds and host country environments or other social movements. 
 
Additionally, this dissertation showed an increasing relevance of new technologies to manage in-
tragroup corporate governance. It would be of great value for the research community to investigate 
these phenomena and how new technologies can contribute to further enhance corporate gov-
ernance management. I feel confident that in particular big data analytics, artificial intelligence and a 
better integration of IT solutions can provide significant contributions for a more effective and efficient 
corporate governance management and risk mitigation – especially in complex multinational struc-
tures. Even so, it would be of great necessity to investigate how they affect governance mechanisms. 
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Furthermore, it would be interesting to conduct empirical research concerning the primary motiva-
tions for multinational companies to concentrate on subsidiary governance. It would be exciting 
to study, if the main drivers are rather the increasing legal and regulatory requirements or more inter-
nally driven by the conviction that it has positive effects on their long-term corporate success and 
higher profits. 
 
To address the increasing relevance of financial services subsidiaries, there will be also a great ne-
cessity in future to analyze framework conditions or certain thresholds (e.g. equity ratios, risk ap-
petite, business volumes) of whether it is more favorable for multinationals to outsource their financial 
services business. I feel confident that in near future there will be a discussion, if it is preferable to 
separate the financial services business from the rest of the multinational groups e.g. towards a sepa-
rate financial holding as intermediary risk buffer to address the increased regulatory burden. This re-
search area could be of great interest for academics in the field of the corporate governance, legal and 
organizational development.  
 
There is a clear tendency that ever more proposals of regulators are making subsidiary boards look 
more like the boards of stand-alone banks, ensuring greater localization and sovereignty within the 
strategy setting and control in the subsidiary itself. Because of this, there is a need for greater in-depth 
research regarding the independency of subsidiary boards in hierarchical relationships with their 
parent companies, and potential escalation procedures in case of dissent between the local boards 
and their parents. 
 
This dissertation has found that, especially within the last years, compliance has become more and 
more popular. Yet, there is no clear picture that clarifies the interdependency between compliance 
and corporate governance. It seems to be an interesting question to study, whether compliance is a 
prerequisite for securing corporate governance or whether corporate governance secures compliance. 
Apart from that, it would also be of great interest to measure the consequences of a firms’ damaged 
reputation on the intragroup governance mechanisms. 
 
I feel confident that there have to also be more studies that encourage the national regulators to im-
prove their legal and regulatory frameworks for cross-border companies with complex organiza-
tional structures and different subsidiary characteristics. How can they better collaborate and align 
their domestic initiatives to enhance a globally efficient and effective supervision of globally acting 
financial services organizations?  
Having said that, it would of be further interest to analyze the power of multinationals and their execu-
tives in some countries to change local institutions or even legal and regulatory environments, which 
are more preferable for them (e.g. by modifying the corporate governance systems towards their for-
eign home countries). Consequently, I derive that in future it will be interesting to examine studies that 
explore whether the different corporate governance systems rather converge or diverge in a global 
context. 
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Simultaneously, I found that there is more research needed to better understand the social dimen-
sion and their effects on corporate governance mechanisms. For example, as already outlined, 
multinationals and consequently their executives have to deal with multiple stakeholder groups. There-
fore, it would be interesting to investigate how the different levels of reputation (e.g. among employ-
ees, suppliers, regulators, investors etc.) influence their strategic decision-making behaviors.  
When taking into account the greater emphasis of many regulators to steer the cultural dimensions in 
organizations, it would also be of great interest to explore the role of external regulation and authori-
ties on the effectiveness on those governance mechanisms. 
 
Overall, I also encourage scholars to apply more qualitative research studies, as I feel confident that 
this will provide another much-needed contribution to a better understanding of the multiple corporate 
governance phenomena and will help to explore the still unsolved issues mentioned above, or even go 
beyond them.  
 
7.4 Outlook  
In recent years, domestic and international regulators and their stringent enforcement approaches 
have forced multinational groups to enhance their intragroup governance. Over the last years, it 
seems that both, multinational companies and regulators have started to understand the pivotal role of 
subsidiaries regarding their corporate governance practices, reporting and their efforts to manage their 
risks. Another small notice that indicates that this trend will continue is that several countries started 
initiatives to oblige listed companies to disclose how they manage risks that are associated with their 
subsidiaries. Such regulatory requirements already changed the perception of corporate governance, 
leading it away from a pure business unit centric view towards a rather holistic view, with a stronger 
emphasis on the legal entity perspective. 
In many multinational groups, there has historically been no real awareness about the risk potential of 
their subsidiaries and the associated costs and efforts of managing and overseeing them until some-
thing went wrong. Nowadays, this has changed, as there is an increased legal risk for the board mem-
bers, senior staff and other directors, which include personal exposure to legal and regulatory breach-
es or unauthorized approvals within subsidiaries. Based on this knowledge, it must be stated that 
there will be even higher awareness for intragroup governance mechanisms in near future. 
One can say that there is a general shift among regulators, authorities and the public, which expect 
more than just sound corporate governance practices on top of the listed parent to be sufficient. Today 
there is no doubt that subsidiary governance forms the foundation to fulfill respective corporate gov-
ernance standards as entire corporate group. Regulators, investment analysts, investors and even 
employees want to know more about how the parent companies monitor and entrench sound in-
tragroup corporate governance concepts. In future corporate parents will have to increasingly justify 
how they manage and control intragroup governance mechanisms.  
 271 
 
However, only the future will show whether the increased attention for intragroup corporate govern-
ance will also result in more sustainable corporate governance practices and fewer corporate scan-
dals. 
Yet, as this thesis illustrated, the corporate governance research in general and the subsidiary gov-
ernance research in particular is under a continuous development. Even if there has been a lot of pro-
gress within the last years, there will also be enough room for improvement in future. In a retro per-
spective, the corporate governance discussion in the past was largely influenced by the financial crisis 
and was rather reactive than proactive. Driven by the developments mentioned above, I feel confident 
that subsidiary governance will raise even more attention among the academic community in future. 
Thus, this dissertation provides a valuable scientific contribution for the improvement of corporate 
governance among subsidiaries. 
In sum, all the debated interrelated trends within this dissertation have shown a number of areas of 
new inquiries, and I am convinced that these research studies will broaden the scope of further re-
search on governance topics. The matter of financial services subsidiary governance is a global topic 
with profound implications in many directions. In future, there will surely be more to tell about this cru-
cial subfield of corporate governance and there will also be an ongoing debate about the concept of 
what governance and what exactly it should be. The different parties involved in the organizational 
management and oversight will provide many opportunities for scholars of different disciplines to 
shape the dialogue and to provide new ideas on how firms can better serve the needs of their socie-
ties. 
My expectation is that this dissertation will contribute its part to the discussion of what constitutes good 
subsidiary governance and will likewise advance the foundation for upcoming discussions among ac-
ademics, practitioners, regulators and supervisors. 
 

 
 
 
8. Appendix 
 
Appendix 1: Validation phase: Interview guideline  
 
Expert name: __________________   Place and Date: _______________________ 
 
Introductory words of the interviewer 
 Short Introduction of the dissertation project  
 Clarification, if audio-recording is ok 
 Pointing out that all pieces of information are handled anonymously without any personal or 
company details 
 Timeframe: 25 questions / around 60-minute interviews 
 
 
Part A: Introduction 
 
1. General information and personal background 
1.1.  What is your professional background? 
1.2. What is your current position in the company? 
1.3. What experiences do you have regarding corporate governance and financial services sub-
sidiaries (particularly in automotive group corporations)? 
 
2. Corporate Governance in multinational automotive companies with financial services sub-
sidiaries  
2.1. Could you please highlight in a few words the importance of subsidiary governance?  
2.2. From your point of view, what are the focus areas that are addressed within corporate gov-
ernance in financial services subsidiaries?  
(e.g. risk management, internal audit, remuneration, leadership, strategy, organizational 
alignment and decision making, company culture etc.) 
 
Part B: Intragroup corporate governance management of financial services subsidiaries 
 
3. Strategic governance dimension  
3.1. In your opinion, which role does the Executive Management Board (e.g. “Vorstand”) play for 
corporate / subsidiary governance in multinational companies? 
3.2. What do you think are the key governance tasks/ responsibilities of the Executive Man-
agement Board? 
3.3. What do you think are appropriate oversight and steering instruments for the Executive 
Management Board to manage (internal/ external) corporate governance in the multinational 
organization? 
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4. Operative governance dimension 
4.1. According to your experience, which role does the Senior Management / Divisional Head 
(e.g. “Bereichsleiter”) of the financial services division play for corporate / subsidiary govern-
ance? 
4.2. What do you think are the key governance tasks / responsibilities of the Senior Manage-
ment (and their Center of Competence CG)? 
(e.g. development of governance instruments, implementation of company-wide CG stand-
ards, consulting for subsidiaries, governance steering)?  
 
5. Subsidiary governance dimension  
5.1. In your perspective, which role does the local Management Team play for subsidiary gov-
ernance in the host country? 
5.2. According to your experience, could you please describe a suitable approach for the gov-
ernance management of decentralized subsidiaries?  
(e.g. management from distance, subsidiarity principle) 
5.3. What do you think are the key elements (success factors) to ensure effective subsidiary 
governance? 
(e.g. system management, mission management, integrity management, stakeholder rela-
tionship management, risk management, audit management) 
5.4. What do you think are the benefits of subsidiary governance?  
(e.g. innovation, competitiveness, organizational performance, leadership) 
5.5. Based on your experience, where are the limits for a centralized management of the de-
centralized (legal independent) subsidiaries?  
5.6. Could you give me some examples of effective sanction mechanisms (from headquarters) 
in case of governance breaches in the subsidiaries? 
5.7. What do you think of the identified management dimensions? 
(Are there any topics which should be supplemented / excluded? Any improvement sugges-
tions?) 
5.8.  What do you think of the suggested evaluation approach?  
 
6. Corporate governance organization, communication and implementation 
6.1. From your point of view, how should corporate governance in the financial services divisions 
be organized? 
(e.g. special HQ department for FS business, CoC, local governance mangers, separation 
between HQ and subsidiaries) 
6.2. Based on your experience, what is important to consider for an effective governance com-
munication? 
6.3. What are the most important success factors and challenges for the implementation of 
subsidiary governance? 
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Part C: Closing 
 
7. Closing questions 
7.1. What do you think are further important aspects for corporate governance management of 
decentralized finance subsidiaries? (e.g. pre-definition of company-wide minimum standards 
necessary?) 
7.2. What further advice would you give automotive financial services divisions who would like to 
professionalize their corporate governance management? 
7.3. In your opinion, why has corporate governance become more important within the last 
years? 
7.4. Based on your practical experience, what are other typical practical challenges for corpo-
rate governance? 
 
On behalf of Prof. Dr. Kunz and me, thank you very much for participation! 
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Appendix 2: Validation phase: Cover letter and introduction of the research project 
 
Dear Prof. Dr. xxx, 
as a consequence of several company scandals, increased regulation and growing manager liability – many top managers ask 
themselves how to professionalize the corporate governance management within their decentralized financial services subsidi-
aries around the world. 
Therefore, this dissertation project between the BMW Group Financial Services and the University of Augsburg: Chair for Con-
trolling investigates possible ways how to close this governance gap. The objective of the research project is to develop a corpo-
rate governance management model for financial services subsidiaries of automotive multinationals with decentralized struc-
tures.  
Therefore, in a first step the current state of research regarding corporate governance areas and its professional management 
was analyzed. As well, the author identified a suitable intragroup corporate governance management (for details please refer to 
the appendix). The intragroup corporate governance management exits out of a strategic, operative and subsidiary governance 
dimension. Those dimensions are coordinated by different instruments from the headquarters to overcome the governance gap 
between the headquarters and the local subsidiaries due to their geographical distances, cultural and legal differences in the 
host countries. In this context, also potential key drivers and challenges for the governance management were identified. By 
now, the identified results and drawn assumptions should be verified and complemented with your support and professional 
experience within this field.  
 
Therefore, the interview will cover the following corporate governance topics: Strategic governance, operative governance, 
subsidiary governance, corporate governance organization, governance communication and implementation. 
 
Based on the results of the theoretical research and the additional expert interviews it will be possible to identify supplementary 
corporate governance related key drivers and challenges to develop an intragroup corporate governance management model. 
Furthermore, it will be the basis to define recommendations for actions for governance communication and implementation in 
automotive multinationals with decentralized financial services subsidiaries. 
With the participation on the expert interviews you are making an important contribution for the further development of the cor-
porate governance management in the automotive industry and the applied science in this new field of study. Therefore, I will 
gratefully acknowledge for your willingness to participate on the interviews and to share your knowledge with me. If you are 
interested, I will send you an abstract with the results after completing the research project (expected in winter 2019).  
Obviously I can guarantee that your shared information, answers and market insights will be kept confidential and are only used 
and published within this dissertation project. It will not be possible to draw any inferences out of the research project or written 
dissertation to your person or your company, due to the fact that all provided information will be handled anonymous.  
 
For any further information feel free to contact me or the responsible mentoring professor at the University of Augsburg:  
Chair for Controlling 
Prof. Dr. Jennifer Kunz 
Universitätsstraße 16 
86159 Augsburg, Germany 
E-Mail: Jennifer.kunz@wiwi.uni-augsburg.de 
 
Best regards 
Matthias Heitz 
 
E-Mail: Matthias.heitz@bmw.de or Matthias.heitz@student.uni-augsburg.de  
Phone: +49 152 54057570 
 
Dissertation Project: Corporate Governance Management in Automotive Multinationals:  
Development of a Corporate Governance Management Model for Financial Services Subsidiaries 
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Appendix 3: Professional background information of the interviewed experts 
 Expert 1: Corporate Governance Expert, OEM, Financial Services Division, CEO Support for 
Corporate Governance & Compliance, 10.08.2016, personal meeting in Munich, 60 minutes 
 Expert 2: Senior Compliance Manger, OEM, Financial Services Division CEO Support for 
Corporate Governance & Compliance, 11.08.2016, personal meeting in Munich, 60 minutes 
 Expert 3: Project Manager International Compliance Rollout Financial Services, OEM, Finan-
cial Services Division, 11.08.2016, personal meeting in Munich, 60 minutes 
 Expert 4: Head of International Risk Management, OEM, Financial Services Division, 
17.08.2016, personal meeting in Munich, 90 minutes 
 Expert 5: Lawyer, Auditor, Tax Advisor, Director, “Big Four” Audit Firm, Governance & Assur-
ance Services, Telco, 70 minutes 
 Expert 6: Head of the Supervisory Board Office of a bank subsidiary, OEM, Financial Services 
Division, CEO Support for Corporate Governance & Compliance, 24.08.2016, 90 minutes 
 Expert 7: Head of Corporate Governance and Compliance Coordination, OEM, Financial Ser-
vices Division, CEO Support for Financial Services, 24.08.2016, personal meeting in Munich, 
80 minutes  
 Expert 8: Senior Partner, Audit Firm and Corporate Governance Consultancy, Switzerland, 
29.08.2016, Telco, 80 minutes 
 Expert 9: Senior Manager for Corporate Governance, “Big Four” Audit Firm, 30.08.2016, Tel-
co, 90 minutes 
 Expert 10: Managing Director Europe, Audit Firm and Corporate Governance Consultancy, 
06.09.2016, Telco, 60 minutes 
 Expert 11: Partner, Auditor and Tax Advisor, Audit Firm and Corporate Governance Consul-
tancy, 06.09.2016, Telco, 60 minutes 
 Expert 12: Partner for Audit, Governance & Assurance Services, “Big Four” Audit Firm, For-
mer Managing Director of the German Institute for Internal Audit, 07.09.2016, Telco, 90 
minutes 
 Expert 13: Managing Partner, Global Consultancy for Corporate Governance & Financial Ser-
vices, 12.09.2016, Telco, 70 minutes 
 Expert 14: Director, Financial Services Risk Consulting, “Big Four” Audit Firm, 17.09.2016, 
Personal meeting in Munich, 95 minutes  
 Expert 15: Senior Manager, Center of Competence Corporate Governance, Corporate Gov-
ernance Consultancy, 26.09.2016, Telco, 70 minutes 
 Expert 16: Academic Director Center of Competence for Corporate Governance of a leading 
Business School, CEO of several bank and investment companies and finance subsidiaries, 
(Former) Supervisory Board Member of several DAX companies, Co-Founder and permanent 
member of the German Corporate Governance Commission, permanent member of the Inter-
national Corporate Governance Network (ICGN), permanent member of the Global Govern-
ance Knowledge Group of the International Finance Corporation (IFC) / World Bank, 
28.09.2016, Telco, 60 minutes 
 283 
 
 Expert 17: Governance Manager, OEM, Financial Services Division, CFO Support for Finan-
cial Services China; 06.10.2016, Personal meeting in Munich, 60 minutes 
 Expert 18: CEO and CFO of a leasing subsidiary, Former CFO of Financial Services Region 
North America, Former Head of Accounting and Controlling at a bank subsidiary, OEM, Finan-
cial Services Division, 13.10.2016, Personal meeting in Munich, 145 minutes 
 Expert 19: Head of Governance Structures, OEM, Financial Services Division, 17.10.2016, 
personal Meeting in Munich, 45 minutes 
 Expert 20: CFO of a Financial Services subsidiary in Russia, OEM, Financial Services Divi-
sion, 17.10.2016, Skype Meeting, 90 minutes 
 Expert 21: Managing Partner, Audit & Governance Financial Services, “Big Four” Audit Firm, 
19.10.2016, Telco, 55 minutes 
 Expert 22: Member of the Board of Management of a OEM, Chairman of Financial Services 
Division, CEO of a Financial Services Holding, 03.11.2016, Personal Meeting in Stuttgart, 70 
minutes 
 Expert 23: President Financial Services Americas (Canada, USA, Mexico, Brazil); Former Vice 
President for Business Development, Strategy, Marketing and Compliance, Financial Ser-
vices, Former CEO / President of a Financial Services subsidiary in UK / Canada / Brazil, 
OEM, Financial Services Division, 30.11.2016, Personal Meeting in Munich, 70 Minutes. 
 Expert 24: Head of Group Supervisory Board Office, OEM, 06.12.2016, Personal Meeting in 
Munich, 60 minutes 
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Appendix 4: Verification phase: Corporate governance management model draft 
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Appendix 5: Verification phase: Professional background information of the experts 
 
 Expert 1: Corporate Governance Expert, OEM, Financial Services Division, CEO Support for 
Corporate Governance & Compliance, 10.08.2016, personal meeting in Munich, 60 minutes, 
05.10.2017, Skype Call, 25 minutes 
 Expert 2: Head of the Supervisory Board Office of a bank subsidiary, OEM, Financial Services 
Division, CEO Support for Corporate Governance & Compliance, 05.10.2017, Personal Meet-
ing, 40 minutes 
 Expert 3: Head of Corporate Governance and Compliance Coordination, OEM, Financial Ser-
vices Division, CEO Support for Financial Services, 06.10.2017, Personal Meeting, 45 minutes 
 Expert 4: Head of International Risk Management, OEM, Financial Services Division,, 
09.10.2017, Skype Call 40 minutes 
 Expert 5: Senior Compliance Manger, OEM, Financial Services Division CEO Support for 
Corporate Governance & Compliance, 10.10.2017, Skype Call, 30 minutes 
 Expert 6: Project Manager International Compliance Rollout Financial Services, OEM, Finan-
cial Services Division, 12.10.2017, Personal Meeting, 50 minutes 
 Expert 7: Governance Manager, OEM, Financial Services Division, CFO Support for Financial 
Services China; 13.10.2017, Personal Meeting, 35 minutes 
 Expert 8: Corporate Governance Expert, OEM, Financial Services Division, CEO Support for 
Corporate Governance & Compliance, 23.10.2017, Skype Call, 30 minutes 
 Expert 9: CFO of a Financial Services subsidiary in Russia, OEM, Financial Services Division, 
17.10.2016, 20.11.2017, 30 minutes 
 Expert 10: Head of Governance Structures, OEM, Financial Services Division, 17.10.2016, 
personal Meeting in Munich, 18.12.2017, skype call, 40 minutes. 
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Appendix 6: Verification phase: Interview guideline 
 
Expert name: _____________________________ Place and Date: ______________________ 
  
Part A: Introduction 
 Short Introduction of the developed corporate governance management model 
 Clarification, if audio-recording is ok 
 Pointing out that all pieces of information are handled anonymously without any personal or 
company details 
 Timeframe: 4 questions / around 30-45 minutes interview 
 
 
Part B: Corporate governance management model for financial services subsidiaries 
1. Corporate governance management model review 
1.1. What are your first thoughts about the developed corporate governance management mod-
el draft? 
1.2. According to your experience, do you think that all relevant corporate governance topics 
are included in the model draft? Are there any topics missing or should be removed? 
1.3. What is your personal impression of the overall structure / design of the model draft? (e.g. 
hierarchical structure, interlinks, dimensions, clusters, conclusions etc.). 
 
Part C: Closing 
2. Closing question 
2.1. According to your experience, are there any additional important issues regarding the 
model draft that we have not discussed yet (e.g. topics / challenges / success factors)? 
 
On behalf of Prof. Dr. Kunz and me, thank you very much for participation! 
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